Urgent: 'no eForms, no fun' -- getting serious about building a procurement data architecture in the EU

EU Member States only have about one year to make crucial decisions that will affect the procurement data architecture of the EU and the likelihood of successful adoption of digital technologies for procurement governance for years or decades to come’. Put like that, the relevance of the approaching deadline for the national implementation of new procurement eForms may grab more attention than the alternative statement that ‘in just about a year, new eForms will be mandatory for publication of procurement notices in TED’.

This latter more technical (obscure, and uninspiring?) understanding of the new eForms seems to have been dominating the approach to eForms implementation, which does not seem to have generally gained a high profile in domestic policy-making at EU Member State level despite the Publications Office’s efforts.

In this post, I reflect about the strategic importance of the eForms implementation for the digitalisation of procurement, the limited incentives for an ambitious implementation that stem from the voluntary approach of the most innovative aspects of the new eForms, and the opportunity that would be lost with a minimalistic approach to compliance with the new rules. I argue that it is urgent for EU Member States to get serious about building a procurement data architecture that facilitates the uptake of digital technologies for procurement governance across the EU, which requires an ambitious implementation of eForms beyond their minimum mandatory requirements.

eForms: some background

The EU is in the process of reforming the exchange of information about procurement procedures. This information exchange is mandated by the EU procurement rules, which regulate a variety of procurement notices with the two-fold objective of (i) fostering cross-border competition for public contracts and (ii) facilitating the oversight of procurement practices by the Member States, both in relation to the specific procedure (eg to enable access to remedies) and from a broad policy perspective (eg through the Single Market Scoreboard). In other words, this information exchange underpins the EU’s approach to procurement transparency, which mainly translates into publication of notices in the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED).

A 2019 Implementing Regulation established new standard forms for the publication of notices in the field of public procurement (eForms). The Implementing Regulation is accompanied by a detailed Implementation Handbook. The transition to eForms is about to hit a crucial milestone with the authorisation for their voluntary use from 14 November 2022, in parallel with the continued use of current forms. Following that, eForms will be mandatory and the only accepted format for publication of TED notices from 25 October 2023. There will thus have been a very long implementation period (of over four years), including an also lengthy (11-month) experimentation period about to start. This contrasts with previous revisions of the TED templates, which had given under six months’ notice (eg in 2015) or even just a 20-day implementation period (eg in 2011). This extended implementation period is reflective of the fact that the transition of eForms is not merely a matter of replacing a set of forms with another.

Indeed, eForms are not solely the new templates for the collection of information to be published in TED. eForms represent the EU’s open standard for publishing public procurement data — or, in other words, the ‘EU OCDS’ (which goes much beyond the OCDS mapping of the current TED forms). The importance of the implementation of a new data standard has been highlighted at strategic level, as this is the cornerstone of the EU’s efforts to improve the availability and quality of procurement data, which remain suboptimal (to say the least) despite continued efforts to improve the quality and (re)usability of TED data.

In that regard, the 2020 European strategy for data, emphasised that ‘Public procurement data are essential to improve transparency and accountability of public spending, fighting corruption and improving spending quality. Public procurement data is spread over several systems in the Member States, made available in different formats and is not easily possible to use for policy purposes in real-time. In many cases, the data quality needs to be improved.’ The European Commission now stresses how ‘eForms are at the core of the digital transformation of public procurement in the EU. Through the use of a common standard and terminology, they can significantly improve the quality and analysis of data’ (emphasis added).

It should thus be clear that the eForms implementation is not only about low level form-filling, but also (or primarily) about building a procurement data architecture that facilitates the uptake of digital technologies for procurement governance across the EU. Therefore, the implementation of eForms and the related data standard seeks to achieve two goals: first, to ensure the data quality (eg standardisation, machine-readability) required to facilitate its automated treatment for the purposes of publication of procurement notices mandated by EU law (ie their primary use); and, second, to build a data architecture that can facilitate the accumulation of big data so that advanced data analytics can be deployed by re-users of procurement data. This second(ary) goal is particularly relevant to our discussion. This requires some unpacking.

The importance of data for the deployment of digital technologies

It is generally accepted that quality (big) data is the primary requirement for the deployment of digital technologies to extract data-driven insights, as well as to automate menial back-office tasks. In a detailed analysis of these technologies, I stress the relevance of procurement data across technological solutions that could be deployed to improve procurement governance. In short, the outcome of robotic process automation (RPA) can only be as good as its sources of information, and adequate machine learning (ML) solutions can only be trained on high-quality big data—which thus conditions the possibility of developing recommender systems, chatbots, or algorithmic screens for procurement monitoring and oversight. Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) systems (aka blockchain) can manage data, but cannot verify its content, accuracy, or reliability. Internet of Things (IoT) applications and software oracles can automatically capture data, which can alleviate some of the difficulties in generating an adequate data infrastructure. But this is only in relation with the observation of the ‘real world’ or in relation to digitally available information, which quality raises the same issues as other sources of data. In short, all digital technologies are data-centric or, more clearly, data-dependent.

Given the crucial relevance of data across digital technologies, it is hard to emphasise how any shortcomings in the enabling data architecture curtail the likelihood of successful adoption of digital technologies for procurement governance. With inadequate data, it may simply be impossible to develop digital solutions at all. And the development and adoption of digital solutions developed on poor or inadequate data can generate further problems—eg skewing decision-making on the basis of inadequately derived ‘data insights’. Ultimately, then, ensuring that adequate data is available to develop digital governance solutions is a challenging but unavoidable requirement in the process of procurement digitalisation. Success, or lack of it, in the creation of an enabling data architecture will determine the viability of the deployment of digital technologies more generally. From this perspective, the implementation of eForms gains clear strategic importance.

eForms Implementation: a flexible model

Implementing eForms is not an easy task. The migration towards eForms requires a complete redesign of information exchange mechanisms. eForms are designed around universal business language and involve the use of a much more structured information schema, compatible with the EU’s eProcurement Ontology, than the current TED forms. eForms are also meant to collect a larger amount of information than current TED forms, especially in relation to sub-units within a tender, such as lots, or in relation to framework agreements. eForms are meant to be flexible and regularly revised, in particular to add new fields to facilitate data capture in relation to specific EU-mandated requirements in procurement, such as in relation with the clean vehicles rules (with some changes already coming up, likely in November 2022).

From an informational point of view, the main constraint that remains despite the adoption of eForms is that their mandatory content is determined by existing obligations to report and publish tender-specific information under the current EU procurement rules, as well as to meet broader reporting requirements under international and EU law (eg the WTO GPA). This mandatory content is thus rather limited. Ultimately, eForms’ main concentration is on disseminating details of contract opportunities and capturing different aspects of decision-making by the contracting authorities. Given the process-orientedness and transactional focus of the procurement rules, most of the information to be mandatorily captured by the eForms concerns the scope and design of the tender procedure, some aspects concerning the award and formal implementation of the contract, as well as some minimal data points concerning its material outcome—primarily limited to the winning tender. As the Director-General of the Publications Office put it an eForms workshop yesterday, the new eForms will provide information on ‘who buys what, from whom and for what price’. While some of that information (especially in relation to the winning tender) will be reflective of broader market conditions, and while the accumulation of information across procurement procedures can progressively generate a broader view of (some of) the relevant markets, it is worth stressing that eForms are not designed as a tool of market intelligence.

Indeed, eForms do not capture the entirety of information generated by a procurement process and, as mentioned, their mandatory content is rather limited. eForms do include several voluntary or optional fields, and they could be adapted for some voluntary uses, such as in relation to detection of collusion in procurement, or in relation to the beneficial ownership of tenderers and subcontractors. Extensive use of voluntary fields and the development of additional fields and uses could contribute to generating data that enabled the deployment of digital technologies for the purposes of eg market intelligence, integrity checks, or other sorts of (policy-related) analysis. For example, there are voluntary fields in relation to green, social or innovation procurement, which could serve as the basis for data-driven insights into how to maximise the effects of such policy interventions. There are also voluntary fields concerning procurement challenges and disputes, which could facilitate a monitoring of eg areas requiring guidance or training. However, while the eForms are flexible, include voluntary fields, and the schema facilitates the development of additional fields, is it unclear that adequate incentives exist for adoption beyond their mandatory minimum content.

Implementation in two tiers

The fact that eForms are in part mandatory and in part voluntary will most likely result in two separate tiers of eForms implementation across the EU. Tier 1 will solely concern the collection and exchange of information mandated by EU law, that is the minimum mandatory eForm content. Tier 2 will concern the optional collection and exchange of a much larger volume of information concerning eg the entirety of tenders received, as well as qualitative information on eg specific policy goals embedded in a tender process. Of course, in the absence of coordination, a (large) degree of variation within Tier 2 can be expected. Tier 2 is potentially very important for (digital) procurement governance, but there is no guarantee that Member States will decide to implement eForms covering it.

One of the major obstacles to the broad adoption of a procurement data model so far, at least in the European Union, relates to the slow uptake of e-procurement (as discussed eg here). Without an underlying highly automated e-procurement system, the generation and capture of procurement data is a main challenge, as it is a labour-intensive process prone to input error. The entry into force of the eForms rules could serve as a further push for the completion of the transition to e-procurement—at least in relation to procurement covered by EU law (as below thresholds procurement is a voluntary potential use of eForms). However, it is also possible that low e-procurement uptake and generalised unsophisticated approaches to e-procurement (eg reduced automation) will limit the future functionality of eForms, with Member States that have so far lagged behind restricting the use of eForms to tier 1. Non life-cycle (automated) e-procurement systems may require manual inputs into the new eForms (or the databases from which they can draw information) and this implies that there is a direct cost to the implementation of each additional (voluntary) data field. Contracting authorities may not perceive the (potential) advantages of incurring those costs, or may more simply be constrained by their available budget. A collective action problem arises here, as the cost of adding more data to the eForms is to be shouldered by each public buyer, while the ensuing big data would potentially benefit everyone (especially as it will be published—although there are also possibilities to capture but not publish information that should be explored, at least to prevent excessive market transparency; but let’s park that issue for now) and perhaps in particular data re-users offering for pay added-value services.

In direct relation to this, and compounding the (dis)incentives problem, the possibility (or likelihood) of minimal implementation is compounded by the fact that, in many Member States, the operational adaptation to eForms does not directly concern public sector entities, but rather their service providers. e-procurement services providers compete for the provision of large volume, entirely standardised platform services, which are markets characterised by small operational margins. This creates incentives for a minimal adaptation of current e-sending systems and disincentives for the inclusion of added-value (data) services potentially unlikely to be used by public buyers. Some (or most) optional aspects of the eForm implementation will thus remain unused due to these market structure and dynamics, which does not clearly incentivise a race to the top (unless there is clear demand pull for it).

With some more nuance, it should be stressed that it is also possible that the adoption of eForms is uneven within a given jurisdiction where the voluntary character of parts of the eForm is kept (rather than made mandatory across the board through domestic legislation), with advanced procurement entities (eg central purchasing bodies, or large buyers) adopting tier 2 eForms, and (most) other public buyers limiting themselves to tier 1.

Ensuing data fragmentation

While this variety of approaches across the EU and within a Member State would not pose legal challenges, it would have a major effect on the utility of the eForms-generated data for the purposes of eg developing ML solutions, as the data would be fragmented, hardly representative of important aspects of procurement (markets), and could hardly be generalisable. The only consistent data would be that covered by tier 1 (ie mandatory and standardised implementation) and this would limit the potential use cases for the deployment of digital technologies—with some possibly limited to the procurement remit of the specific institutions with tier 2 implementations.

Relatedly, it should be stressed that, despite the effort to harmonise the underlying data architecture and link it to the Procurement Ontology, the Implementation Handbook makes clear that ‘eForms are not an “off the shelf” product that can be implemented only by IT developers. Instead, before developers start working, procurement policy decision-makers have to make a wide range of policy decisions on how eForms should be implemented’ in the different Member States.

This poses an additional challenge from the perspective of data quality (and consistency), as there are many fields to be tailored in the eForms implementation process that can result in significant discrepancies in the underlying understanding or methodology to determine them, in addition to the risk of potential further divergence stemming from the domestic interpretation of very similar requirements. This simply extends to the digital data world the current situation, eg in relation to diverging understandings of what is ‘recyclable’ or what is ‘social value’ and how to measure them. Whenever open-ended concepts are used, the data may be a poor source for comparative and aggregate analysis. Where there are other sources of standardisation or methodology, this issue may be minimised—eg in relation to the green public procurement criteria developed in the EU, if they are properly used. However, where there are no outside or additional sources of harmonisation, it seems that there is scope for quite a few difficult issues in trying to develop digital solutions on top of eForms data, except in relation to quantitative issues or in relation to information structured in clearly defined categories—which will mainly link back to the design of the procurement.

An opportunity about to be lost?

Overall, while the implementation of eForms could in theory build a big data architecture and facilitate the development of ML solutions, there are many challenges ahead and the generalised adoption of tier 2 eForms implementations seems unlikely, unless Member States make a positive decision in the process of national adoption. The importance of an ambitious tier 2 implementation of eForms should be assessed in light of its downstream importance for the potential deployment of digital technologies to extract data-driven insights and to automate parts of the procurement process. A minimalistic implementation of eForms would significantly constrain future possibilities of procurement digitalisation. Primarily in the specific jurisdiction, but also with spillover effects across the EU.

Therefore, a minimalistic eForms implementation approach would perpetuate (most of the) data deficit that prevents effective procurement digitalisation. It would be a short-sighted saving. Moreover, the effects of a ‘middle of the road’ approach should also be considered. A minimalistic implementation with a view to a more ambitious extension down the line could have short-term gains, but would delay the possibility of deploying digital technologies because the gains resulting from the data architecture are not immediate. In most cases, it will be necessary to wait for the accumulation of sufficiently big data. In some cases of infrequent procurement, missing data points will generate further time lags in the extraction of valuable insights. It is no exaggeration that every data point not captured carries an opportunity cost.

If Member States are serious about the digitalisation of public procurement, they will make the most of the coming year to develop tier 2 eForms implementations in their jurisdiction. They should also keep an eye on cross-border coordination. And the European Commission, both DG GROW and the Publications Office, would do well to put as much pressure on Member States as possible.

10 years on, the CJEU creates more uncertainty about the (in)divisibility of public powers and economic activities in public procurement (C-687/17 P)

In its Judgment of 7 November 2019 in Aanbestedingskalender and Others v Commission, C-687/17 P, EU:C:2019:932 (the ‘TenderNed’ case), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) rejected the appeal against the earlier Judgment of the General Court (GC) of 28 September 2017 (T-138/15, EU:T:2017:675) and thus left intact the GC’s upholding of the European Commission’s finding that ‘e-procurement was a service of general interest, and not an inherent economic activity, which could be commercially exploited so long as the State did not offer that service itself’ (T-138/15, para 108, for discussion see the earlier comment in this blog).

However, in TenderNed, the CJEU did not rely on the consideration of e-procurement as a service of general interest as such (which is a less than persuasive argument), but rather on the basis of its persistently confusing case law on the separability of economic activities and those connected with the exercise of public powers [for discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells & I Herrera Anchustegui, 'Revisiting the concept of undertaking from a public procurement law perspective – A discussion on EasyPay and Finance Engineering' (2016) 37(3) European Competition Law Review 93-98; and, more in depth, A Sanchez-Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (2nd edn, Hart 2015) ch 4].

The reasoning followed by the CJEU deserves close analysis, as it once again relies on the artificial indivisibility or interconnection between the economic and non-economic activities carried out by an entity tasked with a public procurement role; as it already did, initially in 2006, in FENIN v Commission, C-205/03 P, EU:C:2006:453; and 10 years ago in Selex Sistemi Integrati v Commission, C-113/07 P, EU:C:2009:191. Remarkably, this is another CJEU Judgment without Advocate General Opinion, despite the complexity of the issue and the far-fetched potential implications of the case.

Indeed, the way the TenderNed Judgment recasts the applicable (in)divisibility test is less than clear cut and can thus create renewed difficulties for the analysis of predominantly economic activities carried out by entities with some public powers—or tasked with an SGEI involving them—which is increasingly the case of central purchasing bodies [such as eg the English NHS supply chain management entity; as briefly discussed in A Sanchez-Graells, 'State Aid and EU Public Procurement: More Interactions, Fuzzier Boundaries' in L Hancher & JJ Piernas López (eds), Research Handbook on European State Aid Law (2nd edn, Edward Elgar 2020) forthcoming, section 8].

Background to the TenderNed case

In simple terms, the case concerned the controversial decision by the Dutch government to intervene in the market for the provision of electronic procurement platform services through the creation of TenderNed—an in-house e-procurement platform run by PIANOo, the tendering expertise centre for the Dutch government.

Prior to the creation of TenderNed, private providers of e-procurement services had been offering their services to Dutch contracting authorities. The creation of TenderNed and the offering of services free of charge to contracting authorities by this in-house entity logically killed the e-procurement services industry (or a part of it), which triggered the litigation.

As explained in more detail by the CJEU,

TenderNed offers a number of functionalities, made available to contracting authorities and special sector entities … free of charge. It provides the following functionalities:

– a publication module, which can be used for the publication of tender notices as well as associated tender documents (“the publication module”);

– a tendering (submission) module, offering functionalities such as the exchange of questions and answers, and the uploading and downloading of tenders and bids. That module also includes a “virtual company” section in which economic operators can introduce and manage their data (“the submission module”);

– an e-guide, which supports interested parties in using TenderNed (“the e-guide”) (C-687/17 P, para 3).

However, in providing the relevant background, the CJEU glosses over one aspect that is particularly damaging to private providers of e-procurement services, as not only is the availability of TenderNed free of charge, but contracting authorities are also obliged to use some of TenderNed’s functionalities (what the CJEU calls the “publication module” and the GC had earlier described as the “notice board”). Indeed, as explicitly stated in the TenderNed website itself: ‘All Dutch authorities are obliged to publish their national and European tenders on Tenderned’s announcement platform’. It is also clear that contracting authorities can then decide whether ‘businesses must submit their offer digitally in TenderNed’.

This stems from the fact that, as explicitly established under Dutch law, ‘while the Netherlands legislature expressly considered the publication module to be a service of general economic interest, it did not concern itself in any way with the question of whether the submission module, as an economic activity, was of general economic interest or not. Indeed, it considered that part of TenderNed’s activities to be a “simple” economic activity’ (as argued by the appellants; see C-687/17 P, para 25).

In functional terms, the unavoidable use of TenderNed for the publication of the mandatory tender notices works as an anchor for contracting authorities, which will have a strong incentive to rely on the rest of TenderNed’s free functionalities rather than pay for separate e-procurement services (even if, at least theoretically, they were of a higher quality). This creates an important issue that would be assessed as bundling under competition law, were these rules applicable. Any such argument, however, as well as the main argument on State aid in the TenderNed case, rely on the analysis of whether the entity providing the services (TenderNed) is an undertaking or not.

Succinctly, the relevant test to determine whether an entity is or not an undertaking relies on the analysis of whether it is engaged in an economic activity or not; as competition and State aid rules apply to economic activities, but not to the exercise of public powers. And this is the crux of the TenderNed case: the CJEU’s recast and application of its case law on the (in)divisibility of public powers and economic activities carried out by the same entity.

As the CJEU summarises in relation to the appellant’s claim, the issue requires determining whether:

a simple ‘connection’, even if it is a connection by their nature, by their aim and by the rules to which the activities are subject, is not sufficient to classify those activities as activities falling within the exercise of public powers, if the criterion stemming from the judgment of 12 July 2012, Compass-Datenbank (C‑138/11, EU:C:2012:449), is not to be deprived of its full meaning. The Court of Justice held … that, when an entity exercises an activity which can be separated from the exercise of its public powers, that entity, in relation to that activity, acts as an undertaking, while, if that economic activity cannot be separated from the exercise of those public powers, the activities exercised by that entity as a whole remain activities connected with the exercise of those public powers. According to the appellants, compliance with that criterion is much more difficult than with a mere criterion of ‘connection’ (C-687/17 P, para 13).

It is thus a matter of establishing an appropriate test to assess the intensity and severability of the connection between the public powers and the economic activities carried out by the relevant entity.

The (in)divisibility test in TenderNed

The CJEU recast its earlier case law on this issue as follows:

… in so far as a public entity carries on an economic activity, since that activity is not connected to the exercise of its public powers, that entity, in relation to that activity, acts as an undertaking, while, if that same economic activity cannot, however, be separated from other activities connected with the exercise of public powers, the activities exercised by that entity as a whole remain activities connected with the exercise of those public powers.

The ‘separation’ criterion ... is in fact referred to by the Court ... only in the particular situation where certain activities of a public entity do not, as such, form part of the exercise of public powers and must be considered, in isolation, to be economic activities (C-687/17 P, paras 18-19).

This is another puzzling ‘clarification’ from the CJEU (see also the recent Irgita case, discussed by Janssen & Olsson in this blog), which raises a number of potential interpretive quagmires. The verbose test in para 18 is relatively straightforward: if the different activities carried out by a single entity cannot be separated, they are exempted from competition/State aid law as a whole (as the entity cannot be classed as an undertaking); whereas if the activities are separable (or ‘not connected’, and here lies the catch?) then only the activities that do not involve the exercise of a public power are subjected to competition/State aid law (as the entity is classed as an undertaking in relation to those activities only).

The more concise clarification in para 19 is much more confusing, though. In my opinion, the CJEU’s statement is circular. It makes no sense to state that the test of ‘separation’ is only applicable to activities that ‘do not, as such, form part of the exercise of public powers’ because the whole and only point of assessing whether two sets of activities are separate or not lies in the fact of determining whether some of them are to be considered economic activities. The CJEU seems to indicate that the ‘separation’ criterion is to be applied in a second-tier of analysis, once it is clear that some activities are, in isolation, to be considered economic activities because they ‘do not, as such, form part of the exercise of public powers’. This begs the question what is the first-tier criterion for the relevant analysis.

A very convoluted systematic interpretation of both paragraphs could indicate that the first-tier criterion is that of ‘connection’, whereas the second-tier criterion is that of ‘separation’. This could make some sense as the first-tier would seek to establish whether there is an approximation between two connected sets of activities, whereas the second-tier would assess the intensity (or severability) of such connection. However, a literal interpretation of paragraph 18 dispels the illusion of such possibility, as the CJEU contraposes economic activities ‘connected to’ the exercise of public powers to economic activities that can be ‘separated from’ such exercise of public powers; thus indicating that ‘connection’ and ‘separation’ are used interchangeably for the purposes of the main test.

Therefore, in my view, the recast or clarification of the test in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the TenderNed Judgment brings nothing new (except some scope for linguistic contortion) and the issue continues to revolve around the need to assess the intensity and severability of the connection between the public powers and the economic activities carried out by the relevant entity. Such assessment has been carried out in a notoriously vague manner by the CJEU in earlier cases, and this is no different in TenderNed.

The application of the test in TenderNed

Indeed, in TenderNed, the ‘connection’/’separation’ test is applied in a rather convoluted and three-step process, in a way that overlaps across different steps and creates confusion as to the relevant scope of the analysis. In any case, the most relevant part comes at paragraphs 43 to 45, which state that

43 As regards the submission module, in order to find that there is a connection between that functionality and the exercise of public powers, the General Court held … that … separating the submission module from the publication module and the e-guide, or even removing it entirely from the overall TenderNed framework, would interfere with TenderNed’s activities and undermine the objectives pursued by [the 2014 Public Procurement rules].

44 In that respect, it should be pointed out, on the one hand, that it is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that two activities can be considered not able to be separated when one of them would be rendered largely useless in the absence of the other (see, to that effect, … Compass-Datenbank, … paragraph 41) or where those two activities are closely linked (see, to that effect, … Selex Sistemi Integrati v Commission, … paragraphs 76 and 77). On the other hand, as noted in paragraph 18 of the present judgment, if an economic activity carried out by a public entity nevertheless cannot be separated from other activities connected with the exercise of public powers, the activities of that entity as a whole must be regarded as being connected with the exercise of public powers.

45 It follows that the General Court was fully entitled to deduce from the factual assessments set out in paragraph 43 of the present judgment,… that the submission module cannot be separated from the publication module, so that those two activities must be regarded as being connected to the exercise of public powers (C-687/17 P, paras 43-45, emphasis added).

If we synthesise the CJEU’s reasoning, the TenderNed case comes to say that “when the separation of activities would interfere with the functioning of the entity and undermine the objectives it pursues [at least, as long as they are mandated by EU law], those activities cannot be separated and those activities must be regarded as being connected to the exercise of public powers”.

This test of ‘interference’ or ‘goal undermining’ is most bizarre and difficult to understand. It also seems to introduce an even more light-touch approach than the original ‘separation’ test, which the CJEU explicitly restated in TenderNed as still representing good law (at paragraph 18)—subject to the circular ‘clarification’ (in paragraph 19).

It may be worth revisiting the original factual assessment carried out by the GC at paragraph 51 of its Judgment (to which the CJEU refers in para 43), according to which:

It must be noted that considering TenderNed’s various functionalities in isolation, or reducing TenderNed to one of those functionalities, by regarding them as independent of each other, when they are all indispensable for e-procurement and constitute different facets of one and the same activity, would interfere with that activity and disregard the objective pursued by [the 2014 Public Procurement rules] (T-138/15, paragraph 51).

But, alas, this is another of the largely unsubstantiated analyses that pepper this line of case law. The reasoning of the GC was structured as follows: (1) one of the objectives of the 2014 EU Public Procurement rules ‘is that procurement procedures should be carried out via electronic means throughout the European Union’ and, to that effect, ‘when implementing e-procurement, Member States were obliged to provide guidance and support to contracting authorities and economic operators’ (para 44). (2) ‘TenderNed was created and implemented by the Kingdom of the Netherlands precisely in order to comply with those obligations’, even if it did so ahead of the adoption of the 2014 EU Public Procurement rules and on the basis of draft texts (para 45). It follows that (3) ‘considering TenderNed’s various functionalities in isolation, or reducing TenderNed to one of those functionalities, by regarding them as independent of each other, when they are all indispensable for e-procurement and constitute different facets of one and the same activity, would interfere with that activity and disregard the objective pursued by [the 2014 Public Procurement rules]’ (para 51).

The key issue here is that the GC does not explain, in any meaningful way, why TenderNed’s functionalities ‘are all indispensable for e-procurement and constitute different facets of one and the same activity’. As a matter of fact, the different functionalities are easily separable from a technical perspective and the existence of decentralised e-procurement systems coordinated through a central database (such as in the case of Ukraine’s Prozorro) is definitive evidence of this. The separability of the activities was raised by the appellants and the CJEU summarised their arguments at paragraphs 26 and 27 of the TenderNed Judgment, as follows:

… the Netherlands legislature itself regarded the submission module as distinct from the publication module. Moreover, in the appellants’ view, the day-to-day practical operation of TenderNed confirms that the publication module, on the one hand, can be separated from the submission module, on the other.

In addition, the General Court wrongly held … that it is as a whole that TenderNed assists in achieving the objective of harmonisation and technical integration in the field of public procurement and that TenderNed’s activities as a whole constitute facets of the same activity. The mere fact that two activities contribute to the same objective is not sufficient for them to be considered to be facets of the same activity. The appellants point out, in that respect, that that same activity is carried out in a large number of Member States by private companies (C-687/17 P, paras 26 & 27).

However, confusingly, the CJEU did not take this into account when upholding the GC’s factual assessment (at paras 43-45), which was the third step of its analysis of the ‘connection’/’separation’ of the activities, but rather dismissed it earlier (paras 30-32).

Therefore, the strange salami slicing of the relevant issues by the CJEU leads it to confirm a disputed factual assessment by the GC without engaging with the arguments provided by the appellants to support their views. This could not be more puzzling.

Final thoughts

Not to mince words, I find TenderNed to be another highly-criticisable CJEU Judgment, due to its poor technical foundations and the additional uncertainty it creates for the assessment of the economic and non-economic activities carried out by entities with public procurement functions. The CJEU has further obscured the relevant tests and, in the end, continued to expand the procurement activities beyond the reach of competition and State aid law on the basis of flimsy assessments of separability of activities. To my mind, the litmus test to this approach will come with challenges against the activities of central purchasing bodies. I am not optimistic of the chances of a correction of this defective line of case even then. We will have to wait and see if the right case emerges from national practice and litigation, though.