Urgent: 'no eForms, no fun' -- getting serious about building a procurement data architecture in the EU

EU Member States only have about one year to make crucial decisions that will affect the procurement data architecture of the EU and the likelihood of successful adoption of digital technologies for procurement governance for years or decades to come’. Put like that, the relevance of the approaching deadline for the national implementation of new procurement eForms may grab more attention than the alternative statement that ‘in just about a year, new eForms will be mandatory for publication of procurement notices in TED’.

This latter more technical (obscure, and uninspiring?) understanding of the new eForms seems to have been dominating the approach to eForms implementation, which does not seem to have generally gained a high profile in domestic policy-making at EU Member State level despite the Publications Office’s efforts.

In this post, I reflect about the strategic importance of the eForms implementation for the digitalisation of procurement, the limited incentives for an ambitious implementation that stem from the voluntary approach of the most innovative aspects of the new eForms, and the opportunity that would be lost with a minimalistic approach to compliance with the new rules. I argue that it is urgent for EU Member States to get serious about building a procurement data architecture that facilitates the uptake of digital technologies for procurement governance across the EU, which requires an ambitious implementation of eForms beyond their minimum mandatory requirements.

eForms: some background

The EU is in the process of reforming the exchange of information about procurement procedures. This information exchange is mandated by the EU procurement rules, which regulate a variety of procurement notices with the two-fold objective of (i) fostering cross-border competition for public contracts and (ii) facilitating the oversight of procurement practices by the Member States, both in relation to the specific procedure (eg to enable access to remedies) and from a broad policy perspective (eg through the Single Market Scoreboard). In other words, this information exchange underpins the EU’s approach to procurement transparency, which mainly translates into publication of notices in the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED).

A 2019 Implementing Regulation established new standard forms for the publication of notices in the field of public procurement (eForms). The Implementing Regulation is accompanied by a detailed Implementation Handbook. The transition to eForms is about to hit a crucial milestone with the authorisation for their voluntary use from 14 November 2022, in parallel with the continued use of current forms. Following that, eForms will be mandatory and the only accepted format for publication of TED notices from 25 October 2023. There will thus have been a very long implementation period (of over four years), including an also lengthy (11-month) experimentation period about to start. This contrasts with previous revisions of the TED templates, which had given under six months’ notice (eg in 2015) or even just a 20-day implementation period (eg in 2011). This extended implementation period is reflective of the fact that the transition of eForms is not merely a matter of replacing a set of forms with another.

Indeed, eForms are not solely the new templates for the collection of information to be published in TED. eForms represent the EU’s open standard for publishing public procurement data — or, in other words, the ‘EU OCDS’ (which goes much beyond the OCDS mapping of the current TED forms). The importance of the implementation of a new data standard has been highlighted at strategic level, as this is the cornerstone of the EU’s efforts to improve the availability and quality of procurement data, which remain suboptimal (to say the least) despite continued efforts to improve the quality and (re)usability of TED data.

In that regard, the 2020 European strategy for data, emphasised that ‘Public procurement data are essential to improve transparency and accountability of public spending, fighting corruption and improving spending quality. Public procurement data is spread over several systems in the Member States, made available in different formats and is not easily possible to use for policy purposes in real-time. In many cases, the data quality needs to be improved.’ The European Commission now stresses how ‘eForms are at the core of the digital transformation of public procurement in the EU. Through the use of a common standard and terminology, they can significantly improve the quality and analysis of data’ (emphasis added).

It should thus be clear that the eForms implementation is not only about low level form-filling, but also (or primarily) about building a procurement data architecture that facilitates the uptake of digital technologies for procurement governance across the EU. Therefore, the implementation of eForms and the related data standard seeks to achieve two goals: first, to ensure the data quality (eg standardisation, machine-readability) required to facilitate its automated treatment for the purposes of publication of procurement notices mandated by EU law (ie their primary use); and, second, to build a data architecture that can facilitate the accumulation of big data so that advanced data analytics can be deployed by re-users of procurement data. This second(ary) goal is particularly relevant to our discussion. This requires some unpacking.

The importance of data for the deployment of digital technologies

It is generally accepted that quality (big) data is the primary requirement for the deployment of digital technologies to extract data-driven insights, as well as to automate menial back-office tasks. In a detailed analysis of these technologies, I stress the relevance of procurement data across technological solutions that could be deployed to improve procurement governance. In short, the outcome of robotic process automation (RPA) can only be as good as its sources of information, and adequate machine learning (ML) solutions can only be trained on high-quality big data—which thus conditions the possibility of developing recommender systems, chatbots, or algorithmic screens for procurement monitoring and oversight. Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) systems (aka blockchain) can manage data, but cannot verify its content, accuracy, or reliability. Internet of Things (IoT) applications and software oracles can automatically capture data, which can alleviate some of the difficulties in generating an adequate data infrastructure. But this is only in relation with the observation of the ‘real world’ or in relation to digitally available information, which quality raises the same issues as other sources of data. In short, all digital technologies are data-centric or, more clearly, data-dependent.

Given the crucial relevance of data across digital technologies, it is hard to emphasise how any shortcomings in the enabling data architecture curtail the likelihood of successful adoption of digital technologies for procurement governance. With inadequate data, it may simply be impossible to develop digital solutions at all. And the development and adoption of digital solutions developed on poor or inadequate data can generate further problems—eg skewing decision-making on the basis of inadequately derived ‘data insights’. Ultimately, then, ensuring that adequate data is available to develop digital governance solutions is a challenging but unavoidable requirement in the process of procurement digitalisation. Success, or lack of it, in the creation of an enabling data architecture will determine the viability of the deployment of digital technologies more generally. From this perspective, the implementation of eForms gains clear strategic importance.

eForms Implementation: a flexible model

Implementing eForms is not an easy task. The migration towards eForms requires a complete redesign of information exchange mechanisms. eForms are designed around universal business language and involve the use of a much more structured information schema, compatible with the EU’s eProcurement Ontology, than the current TED forms. eForms are also meant to collect a larger amount of information than current TED forms, especially in relation to sub-units within a tender, such as lots, or in relation to framework agreements. eForms are meant to be flexible and regularly revised, in particular to add new fields to facilitate data capture in relation to specific EU-mandated requirements in procurement, such as in relation with the clean vehicles rules (with some changes already coming up, likely in November 2022).

From an informational point of view, the main constraint that remains despite the adoption of eForms is that their mandatory content is determined by existing obligations to report and publish tender-specific information under the current EU procurement rules, as well as to meet broader reporting requirements under international and EU law (eg the WTO GPA). This mandatory content is thus rather limited. Ultimately, eForms’ main concentration is on disseminating details of contract opportunities and capturing different aspects of decision-making by the contracting authorities. Given the process-orientedness and transactional focus of the procurement rules, most of the information to be mandatorily captured by the eForms concerns the scope and design of the tender procedure, some aspects concerning the award and formal implementation of the contract, as well as some minimal data points concerning its material outcome—primarily limited to the winning tender. As the Director-General of the Publications Office put it an eForms workshop yesterday, the new eForms will provide information on ‘who buys what, from whom and for what price’. While some of that information (especially in relation to the winning tender) will be reflective of broader market conditions, and while the accumulation of information across procurement procedures can progressively generate a broader view of (some of) the relevant markets, it is worth stressing that eForms are not designed as a tool of market intelligence.

Indeed, eForms do not capture the entirety of information generated by a procurement process and, as mentioned, their mandatory content is rather limited. eForms do include several voluntary or optional fields, and they could be adapted for some voluntary uses, such as in relation to detection of collusion in procurement, or in relation to the beneficial ownership of tenderers and subcontractors. Extensive use of voluntary fields and the development of additional fields and uses could contribute to generating data that enabled the deployment of digital technologies for the purposes of eg market intelligence, integrity checks, or other sorts of (policy-related) analysis. For example, there are voluntary fields in relation to green, social or innovation procurement, which could serve as the basis for data-driven insights into how to maximise the effects of such policy interventions. There are also voluntary fields concerning procurement challenges and disputes, which could facilitate a monitoring of eg areas requiring guidance or training. However, while the eForms are flexible, include voluntary fields, and the schema facilitates the development of additional fields, is it unclear that adequate incentives exist for adoption beyond their mandatory minimum content.

Implementation in two tiers

The fact that eForms are in part mandatory and in part voluntary will most likely result in two separate tiers of eForms implementation across the EU. Tier 1 will solely concern the collection and exchange of information mandated by EU law, that is the minimum mandatory eForm content. Tier 2 will concern the optional collection and exchange of a much larger volume of information concerning eg the entirety of tenders received, as well as qualitative information on eg specific policy goals embedded in a tender process. Of course, in the absence of coordination, a (large) degree of variation within Tier 2 can be expected. Tier 2 is potentially very important for (digital) procurement governance, but there is no guarantee that Member States will decide to implement eForms covering it.

One of the major obstacles to the broad adoption of a procurement data model so far, at least in the European Union, relates to the slow uptake of e-procurement (as discussed eg here). Without an underlying highly automated e-procurement system, the generation and capture of procurement data is a main challenge, as it is a labour-intensive process prone to input error. The entry into force of the eForms rules could serve as a further push for the completion of the transition to e-procurement—at least in relation to procurement covered by EU law (as below thresholds procurement is a voluntary potential use of eForms). However, it is also possible that low e-procurement uptake and generalised unsophisticated approaches to e-procurement (eg reduced automation) will limit the future functionality of eForms, with Member States that have so far lagged behind restricting the use of eForms to tier 1. Non life-cycle (automated) e-procurement systems may require manual inputs into the new eForms (or the databases from which they can draw information) and this implies that there is a direct cost to the implementation of each additional (voluntary) data field. Contracting authorities may not perceive the (potential) advantages of incurring those costs, or may more simply be constrained by their available budget. A collective action problem arises here, as the cost of adding more data to the eForms is to be shouldered by each public buyer, while the ensuing big data would potentially benefit everyone (especially as it will be published—although there are also possibilities to capture but not publish information that should be explored, at least to prevent excessive market transparency; but let’s park that issue for now) and perhaps in particular data re-users offering for pay added-value services.

In direct relation to this, and compounding the (dis)incentives problem, the possibility (or likelihood) of minimal implementation is compounded by the fact that, in many Member States, the operational adaptation to eForms does not directly concern public sector entities, but rather their service providers. e-procurement services providers compete for the provision of large volume, entirely standardised platform services, which are markets characterised by small operational margins. This creates incentives for a minimal adaptation of current e-sending systems and disincentives for the inclusion of added-value (data) services potentially unlikely to be used by public buyers. Some (or most) optional aspects of the eForm implementation will thus remain unused due to these market structure and dynamics, which does not clearly incentivise a race to the top (unless there is clear demand pull for it).

With some more nuance, it should be stressed that it is also possible that the adoption of eForms is uneven within a given jurisdiction where the voluntary character of parts of the eForm is kept (rather than made mandatory across the board through domestic legislation), with advanced procurement entities (eg central purchasing bodies, or large buyers) adopting tier 2 eForms, and (most) other public buyers limiting themselves to tier 1.

Ensuing data fragmentation

While this variety of approaches across the EU and within a Member State would not pose legal challenges, it would have a major effect on the utility of the eForms-generated data for the purposes of eg developing ML solutions, as the data would be fragmented, hardly representative of important aspects of procurement (markets), and could hardly be generalisable. The only consistent data would be that covered by tier 1 (ie mandatory and standardised implementation) and this would limit the potential use cases for the deployment of digital technologies—with some possibly limited to the procurement remit of the specific institutions with tier 2 implementations.

Relatedly, it should be stressed that, despite the effort to harmonise the underlying data architecture and link it to the Procurement Ontology, the Implementation Handbook makes clear that ‘eForms are not an “off the shelf” product that can be implemented only by IT developers. Instead, before developers start working, procurement policy decision-makers have to make a wide range of policy decisions on how eForms should be implemented’ in the different Member States.

This poses an additional challenge from the perspective of data quality (and consistency), as there are many fields to be tailored in the eForms implementation process that can result in significant discrepancies in the underlying understanding or methodology to determine them, in addition to the risk of potential further divergence stemming from the domestic interpretation of very similar requirements. This simply extends to the digital data world the current situation, eg in relation to diverging understandings of what is ‘recyclable’ or what is ‘social value’ and how to measure them. Whenever open-ended concepts are used, the data may be a poor source for comparative and aggregate analysis. Where there are other sources of standardisation or methodology, this issue may be minimised—eg in relation to the green public procurement criteria developed in the EU, if they are properly used. However, where there are no outside or additional sources of harmonisation, it seems that there is scope for quite a few difficult issues in trying to develop digital solutions on top of eForms data, except in relation to quantitative issues or in relation to information structured in clearly defined categories—which will mainly link back to the design of the procurement.

An opportunity about to be lost?

Overall, while the implementation of eForms could in theory build a big data architecture and facilitate the development of ML solutions, there are many challenges ahead and the generalised adoption of tier 2 eForms implementations seems unlikely, unless Member States make a positive decision in the process of national adoption. The importance of an ambitious tier 2 implementation of eForms should be assessed in light of its downstream importance for the potential deployment of digital technologies to extract data-driven insights and to automate parts of the procurement process. A minimalistic implementation of eForms would significantly constrain future possibilities of procurement digitalisation. Primarily in the specific jurisdiction, but also with spillover effects across the EU.

Therefore, a minimalistic eForms implementation approach would perpetuate (most of the) data deficit that prevents effective procurement digitalisation. It would be a short-sighted saving. Moreover, the effects of a ‘middle of the road’ approach should also be considered. A minimalistic implementation with a view to a more ambitious extension down the line could have short-term gains, but would delay the possibility of deploying digital technologies because the gains resulting from the data architecture are not immediate. In most cases, it will be necessary to wait for the accumulation of sufficiently big data. In some cases of infrequent procurement, missing data points will generate further time lags in the extraction of valuable insights. It is no exaggeration that every data point not captured carries an opportunity cost.

If Member States are serious about the digitalisation of public procurement, they will make the most of the coming year to develop tier 2 eForms implementations in their jurisdiction. They should also keep an eye on cross-border coordination. And the European Commission, both DG GROW and the Publications Office, would do well to put as much pressure on Member States as possible.

More detail on the UK's procurement transparency ambitions -- some comments and criticisms

© GraceOda / Flickr.

On 30 June 2022, the UK Government’s Cabinet Office published the policy paper ‘Transforming Public Procurement - our transparency ambition’ (the ‘ambitions paper’, or the ‘paper’). The paper builds on the Green Paper and the Government’s response to its public consultation, and outlines ‘proposals to dramatically improve transparency of UK public contracts and spending’. The ambitions paper provides a vision well beyond the scant (almost null) detail in the Procurement Bill (clause 88), which is attracting a number of proposed amendments to try to enshrine in law the basic elements now spelled out in the paper.

In this post, I reflect on the need to amend the Procurement Bill to bind (successive) UK Governments to the current transparency aspirations. I also comment on other aspects of the paper, including persistent issues with the lack of granularity in planned access to procurement data, which I already raised in relation to the Green Paper (see here, Q27 and Q29, and here).

A necessary amendment of the Procurement Bill

The additional level of detail in the paper is welcome and helpful in understanding how the UK plans to operationalise its procurement transparency ambitions. However, a first point to make is that the publication of the ambitions paper should in no way deactivate concerns on the insufficiency of the Procurement Bill to ensure that a significant change in the way procurement information is captured and disseminated in the UK is achieved. In particular, the wording of clause 88(1) has to change.

It is nowhere close to good enough to simply have a weak enabling clause in legislation, stating that ‘An appropriate authority may by regulations make provision requiring certain information to be shared in a particular way, including through a specified online system’. The obvious first shortcoming is that the authority may do so, which also means it may not do so. The second is that the indication of a specified online system as a possible particular way of sharing information seems to take us back quite a few years. If not online (and if not as open data), how would a transparency aspiration be commensurate to the UK’s commitment to e.g. the open contracting data standard?.

Given the high level of aspiration in the paper, a more solid legal grounding is required. My proposal, which builds on discussions with the open contracting community, as well as the amendment already tabled by Baroness Hayman of Ullock, would be to amend clause 88(1) of the Procurement Bill, so it reads:

'An appropriate authority shall by regulations make provision requiring certain information to be shared through a specified online system. Such online system shall, at a minimum, establish and operate a freely accessible, machine-readable and licence-free digital register for all public procurement notices under this Act, wherein all information will be regularly updated in accordance with the time limits for the publication notices set out in the Act.'

Comments on the aspirations paper

Once the general commitment to having single digital register is strengthened, we can move on to consider the detail of what (and how) should be published in the register, what should be kept for restricted use, and what further transparency-related interventions can build upon it—e.g. the creation of a dashboard with useful data analytics, or the interconnection of the register with other sources of e.g. relevant anti-corruption information (for discussion, see here). There are some indications of what the UK aspires to do, but also some lack of clarity in the paper, and some clear risks of undesirable knock-on effects from the maximalist approach to procurement transparency it embraces.

Vision

The aspirations paper indeed starts from a maximalist position, indicating that the vision is ‘to create a fully transparent public procurement system’. However, there are two clear limitations to that approach.

First, the proposal itself includes a proportionate approach to transparency requirements: ‘we want to ensure that we are only asking for the most detailed information - contract documents, performance markings etc - from the largest contracts, in order to maintain transparency without bogging procurement teams down in unnecessary bureaucracy for low-value contracts’. This immediately means that a potentially large volume of (local) procurement will not be subjected to (some aspects) of the new transparency regime. Moreover, as the Procurement Bill stands, there would also be significant exclusions from important transparency obligations e.g. in relation to light touch contracts (see here, section 7, issues #21 on performance-related KPIS and non-performance notices, and #23 on modification notices). That already falls short of generating a ‘fully transparent’ procurement system, precisely in relation to the award of contracts where the risk of capture can be high.

Second, the publication of procurement information remains subjected to the general exclusions and carve-outs resulting from i.a. the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA). Interestingly, the ambitions paper does not refer to it at all, despite the Green Paper having made clear that, in the absence of FOIA reform (which is not sought), ‘only data which would be required to be made available under FOIA … would be publishable’ (at 167). Regardless of the paper’s silence on the issue, FOIA will continue to play a significant role in establishing which level of detail is disclosed, in particular in relation to disclosure of information not captured as a matter of mandatory disclosure in the relevant (award) notices, and perhaps even in relation to that.

The importance of preserving commercial confidentiality in the procurement setting is clear, and was also a clear focus of concern in the Green Paper consultation, leading e.g. to the Cabinet Office dropping its initial ambition of publishing tenders received in procurement procedures. As the Government’s response stressed: ‘We have considered the potential impact of public disclosure of information, such as (but not limited to) tenders. The feedback we received from stakeholders was that publishing tenders at this stage could prejudice future competitions that may run if the initial one is aborted and re-run for any reason, as bids will have been disclosed to the competition. As a result, we will not require disclosure of tenders submitted in a procurement’ (at 221).

Therefore, the system will not (and should not be) fully transparent. What is more useful is to see what the vision wants to enable in relation to procurement data and related analytics and insights. The vision indicates that the UK Government would like for everyone ‘to be able to view, search and understand what the UK public sector wants to buy, how much it is spending, and with whom’. This is a more realistic aspiration that does not necessarily entail total transparency and, given some safeguards and a more granular approach to the disclosure of differing levels of detail in the information (see here and discussion below), it should be welcome. Ultimately, the Government wants the future platform to help people understand:

  1. current and future procurement opportunities created in the UK public sector; including pipelines of future work. [This should open up opportunities within the public sector to small businesses, driving down prices, increasing innovation and improving the business landscape across the country];

  2. how much money the public sector spends on purchasing essential goods and services. [This should] allow taxpayers to see how much is being spent through procurement on and in their local area, who it is spent with and how it is delivering on local priorities. [Moreover, this should show] which routes to market are available to contracting authorities, and how much has been spent through each of those. [This should] give contracting authorities the data they need to collaborate better, drive value for money and identify cost savings in their procurements, so they can monitor for signs of waste and inefficiency;

  3. which contracts finished on time and on budget–and which did not. [This means providing more detail across] the true lifecycle of government contracts, including how much the final amount spent on a contract differs from its original intended value, or how often contracts have been extended;

  4. which companies have been excluded from winning future work due to fraud, corruption or persistent poor performance; [and]

  5. who is really benefiting from public money - not just the companies winning contracts but the ownership of those companies

This list (which regroups the longer and slightly repetitive list in the paper, as well as aggregate the purpose for the disclosure of specific information) points to three categories. First, a category where the information is purely notice-based (categories 1, 4). Second, a category where the related insights should be easily derived from the information included mandatory notices (categories 2 and 3). Third, a category (mainly 5) that concerns non-procurement information and will require either (a) embedding disclosure obligations in the procurement life-cycle (thus raising the red tape and participation costs), or (b) interconnection with non-procurement databases.

The first category is relatively unproblematic, although there is an inherent tension between the disclosure of planned procurement opportunities and the facilitation of collusive practices (more details below).

The second category probably points at the need of considering the extent to which data dashboards should differentiate between different users, including the level of detail (and timeliness) of the information published in each of them (also discussed below).

The third category points at the need to consider issues of design and interoperability of the platform, as it would be preferable for it to be susceptible of plugging into other databases. Moreover, there are other (anti-corruption) functionalities that could be enabled, such as cross-checks against databases of political donations to identify potentially problematic relationships between procurement awardees and political donors. In relation to this category, and to anti-corruption efforts more generally, the ambitions paper is not particularly ambitious. However, the creation of a solid procurement data architecture on the basis of OCDS could facilitate those extensions in the future.

The future platform

The ambitions paper indicates that the Government seeks to operationalise the new transparency regime through two main elements (as the ‘tell us once’ supplier register is a parallel and distinct intervention):

  • The introduction of a number of new procurement ‘notices’, covering the entire procurement lifecycle from planning through to contract expiry

  • A digital platform which will display all of this information publicly, with API access to data published to the Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS). Once we have completed the core notice development, over time we also plan to build a number of useful registers, and explore integrating commercial data analysis tools

What this means is that the future platform will initially simply bring into one place what is currently published across a scattered landscape of transparency tools (see section 3.1 in the paper). That is an improvement, but the more significant change will only come when register and dashboard insights get developed. Importantly, however, the design of these registers and dashboards need to be very carefully considered and linked back to the intended (and likely) use by different audiences. However, the ambitions paper does not seem to consider this need and rather seeks to establish a system accessible to any type of data user on an undifferentiated form (see section 4.4).

Research has shown that most of the gains from procurement transparency concern ex ante disclosure of information [M Bauhr et al, ‘Lights on the shadows of public procurement: Transparency as an antidote to corruption’ (2020) 33(3) Governance 495-523]. Conversely, the publication of ex post information is particularly risky in relation to e.g. anticompetitive practices, as well as corruption, and can generate limited benefits as it is unlikely that there will be a sustained level of engagement with that information by most stakeholders with a theoretical motivation to engage in procurement oversight [N Köbis, C Starke and I Rahwan, ‘The promise and perils of using artificial intelligence to fight corruption’ (2022) 4 Nature Machine Intelligence 418-424].

In that regard, it is particularly problematic that the aspirations paper seems to indicate that the UK Government would be publishing (in real time, for everyone to see) information such as: ‘Analysis of bid and win rates, analysis of supplier & bidder beneficial ownership patterns, general market trends analysis’. This should concern regulators such as the Competition and Markets Authority, as well as the Serious Fraud Office. While the latter should absolutely have access to that information and market intelligence, its public disclosure (in detail, with no time lag) could be counterproductive and help, rather than hinder, corrupt and collusive practices. In that regard, it is of paramount importance that those authorities (and others, such as the National Audit Office) are involved in the design of the system—which is not entirely clear from the ‘user-centric’ approach embraced in the aspirations paper (see section 4.1).

A multi-layered level of transparency

In relation to these risks and issues, it is necessary to reiterate a call for a more nuanced and discriminating approach than the one that transpires from the aspirations paper. As stressed in the response to the Green Paper consultation (here Q29), while it can but be endorsed that the platform needs to be created, and the data automatically fed into it in accordance with OCDS and other technical interoperability requirements, a key feature of the new system should be its multi-layered level of access/transparency.

Analysis carried elsewhere (see here) supports a nuanced approach to the level of transparency created by public contract registries similar to the envisaged central digital platform, which needs to fall short of the full transparency paradigm in which it seems to have been conceived. As a functional criterion, only the information that is necessary to ensure proper oversight and the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures should be disclosed, whereas the information that can be most damaging for competition should be withheld.

Generally, what is needed is granularity in the levels of information that are made accessible to different stakeholders. A full transparency approach whereby all information was made available to everyone would fall very short from the desired balance between the transparency and competition goals of public procurement. A system based on enabling or targeted transparency, whereby each stakeholder gets access to the information it needs for a specific purpose, is clearly preferable.

In more specific terms, it is submitted that:

  • The content of the central digital platform should not be fully available to the public. Access to the full registry should be restricted to public sector officials under a strong duty of confidentiality protected by appropriate sanctions in cases of illegitimate disclosure.

  • Even within the public sector, full access to the central digital platform should be made available on a need-to-know basis. Oversight entities, such as the National Audit Office, the Serious Fraud Office, or the Competition and Markets Authority, as well as the new public procurement review unit (PPRU) should have full access. However, other entities or specific civil servants should only access the information they require to carry out their functions.

  • Limited versions of the central digital platform that are made accessible to the public should aggregate information by contracting authority and avoid disclosing any particulars that could be traced back to specific tenders, specific contracts, or specific undertakings.

  • Representative institutions, such as third sector organisations, journalists or academics should have the opportunity of seeking full access to the central digital platform on a case-by-case basis where they can justify a legitimate or research-related interest. In case of access, ethical approval shall be obtained, anonymization of data attempted, and specific confidentiality requirements duly imposed.

  • Delayed full access to the central digital platform could also be allowed for, provided there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that historic information does not remain relevant for the purposes of protecting market competition, business secrets and commercial interests.

  • Tenderers should have access to their own records, even if they are not publicly-available, so as to enable them to check their accuracy. This is particularly relevant if public contract registries are used for the purposes of assessing past performance under the new rules.

  • Big data should be published on an anonymised basis, so that general trends can be analysed without enabling ‘reverse engineering’ of information that can be traced to specific bidders.

  • The entity in charge of the central digital platform should regularly publish aggregated statistics by type of procurement procedure, object of contract, or any other items deemed relevant for the purposes of the public accountability of public buyers (such as percentages of expenditure in green procurement, etc).

  • The entity in charge of the central digital platform should develop a system of red flag indicators and monitor them with a view to reporting instances of legal non-compliance to the relevant oversight entity, or potential collusion to the competition authority. In that regard, the earlier attempts (eg through the abandoned ‘Screening for Cartels’ tool) should be carefully analysed to avoid replicating past errors.

Interesting paper on effects of open procurement data on outcomes: Duguay, Rauter & Samuels (2019)

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A recently published working paper has assessed the impact of increased availability of procurement data on competition for public contracts and on procurement outcomes in the EU context: R Duguay, T Rauter & D Samuels, ‘The Impact of Open Data on Public Procurement’ (November 22, 2019).

Duguay, Rauter & Samuels concentrate on the increased availability of TED data in a (more) user-friendly format in July 2015 (when the data started being available for a bulk download on CSV format) to assess the effects that easier access to procurement data has on the functioning of procurement markets and on procurement outcomes. The paper is very interesting and their results are quite striking.

However, it is important to stress the important caveat that their analysis is still based on TED data and, thus, potentially affected by the quality shortcomings of that data. As mentioned in other occasions, the TED database has problems because it is constructed as a result of the self-declaration of data by the contracting authorities of the Member States, which makes its content very inhomogeneous and difficult to analyse, including significant problems of under-inclusiveness, definitional fuzziness and the lack of filtering of errors—as recognised, repeatedly, in the methodology underpinning the SMSPP itself (see here and here).

With that in mind, however, it is interesting to look closely at their findings.

A seemingly striking insight derived from the paper is that ‘the new European government contracting provisions have anti-competitive effects‘ (at 17). This is in the context of an analysis of the ‘likelihood that government agencies allocate public contracts through an open procedure‘ and should thus not be surprising, given the flexibilisation in the use of procedures involving negotiations. However, even with this regulatory effect, the authors find that more open data triggers more use of open procedures, in particular in EU countries with weaker institutional frameworks (at 18-19, and see below). This could be symptomatic of the fact that more complexity in procurement subjected to higher levels of transparency pushes for a risk-averse approach to procurement compliance. The same would be supported by their finding of higher levels of award of contracts on the basis of price-only award criteria (at 25, and see below).

This tension between procurement complexity and transparency is generally strongly evidenced in the paper.

On the one hand, and in line with claims of the pro-competitive nature of more openness in procurement data (note, not of more openness or transparency of contract opportunities), the authors find that

  • the likelihood of competitive bidding increases sharply for TED contracts around July 2015 and that this increase persists through the end of our sample period [ie to the end of 2018] (at 18);

  • open procurement data leads government officials to implement more competitive bidding processes [ie open procedures], and that this increase in competitive bidding is driven by countries that do not have the institutions to effectively monitor public officials (at 19);

  • the number of bids increases sharply for TED contracts soon after the open data initiative, and this increase persists throughout our sample period (at 20);

  • public officials are 8.7 percentage points more likely to award government contracts to new vendors after the open data initiative (at 21);

  • contract values fall by approximately 8% ... after the open data initiative (at 23).

On the other hand, and also in line with theoretical expectations of a degradation of procurement decisions subjected to higher levels of transparency (and the fact that this transparency does not concern contract opportunities, but more general open procurement data), the authors also find that

  • [the results] are inconsistent with the idea that easier access to procurement data fosters cross-border competition throughout the European Union … open procurement data fosters local competition among vendors by reducing barriers to entry but does not promote cross-border competition across the European single market (at 22);

  • after the open data initiative, the likelihood of a contract modification increases by 2.9 percentage points for contracts above TED publication thresholds (at 24);

  • after the open data initiative, public officials are 38% ... more likely to award contracts above TED publication thresholds exclusively based on price (at 25);

  • the performance ... is significantly worse if price was the only award criterion in the allocation decision (at 26);

  • the increase in modifications is driven by contracts awarded to new government suppliers, consistent with information asymmetries contributing to the observed deterioration in contract performance. Moreover, this evidence suggests that procurement relationships before the open data initiative were not necessarily corrupt or otherwise inefficient (at 26);

  • the decline in contract performance is stronger for complex procurements, consistent with project complexity exacerbating the potential allocative distortions of open procurement data (at 27).

Their overall conclusion is that

Comparing government contracts above and below EU publication thresholds, we find that increasing the public accessibility of procurement data raises the likelihood of having competitive bidding processes, increases the number of bids per contract, and facilitates market entry by new vendors. After the open data initiative, procurement prices decrease and EU government agencies are more likely to award contracts to the lowest bidder. However, the increased competition comes at the expense of lower contract performance, particularly if suppliers are new, procurement projects are complex, and contracts are awarded solely based on price.

Overall, our results suggest that open data on procurement awards facilitates competition and lowers ex-ante procurement prices, but does not necessarily increase allocative efficiency in government contracting (at 27-28, emphases added).

I find these results striking and difficult to assess from the perspective of evidence-based policy-making. There are two issues of particular concern/interest to me.

One, the finding that more availability of data does not generate more cross-border procurement, and that the push for more competitive (ie open) procedures is mostly appreciable in countries with weaker institutional frameworks. This could support the position that institutional robustness is an alternative to data transparency, which would significantly alter the prioritisation of systemic procurement reforms and take the sides of systems that favour strong institutional oversight in a context of relative opacity.

Second, that transparency exacerbates problems at execution phase, in particular in complex projects and/or projects with new suppliers. This would take the wind out of the sails of reform and policy-making approaches concentrating on perceived or apparent competition for the contract at award stage, and rather force a refocus on an analysis of procurement outcomes at the end of the relevant project. This would also side with approaches that would advocate for more robust institutional approaches to contract design and performance management, rather than relying on transparency to correct contract execution problems.

The mixed results of the paper are also interesting in the context of the long-term effect of more open procurement data on competition, as well as on cartelisation and bid rigging risks, which are not assessed in the paper.

On the round, I think that the paper offers some interesting evidence to back up that there is a need to reconsider the level of transparency given to procurement data. I do not think this should stop the development of an improved procurement data architecture in the EU. To the contrary. I think this should reignite and prioritise discussions concerning the level of disclosure or public access to that information (ie its openness), which cannot be simply assumed to be positive in what, in my view, is currently an excessively simplistic approach in leading policy-making and think tank proposals. For more (but not new) discussion, see here and here.