What's the rush -- some thoughts on the UK's Foundation Model Taskforce and regulation by Twitter

I have been closely following developments on AI regulation in the UK, as part of the background research for the joint submission to the public consultation closing on Wednesday (see here and here). Perhaps surprisingly, the biggest developments do not concern the regulation of AI under the devolved model described in the ‘pro-innovation’ white paper, but its displacement outside existing regulatory regimes—both in terms of funding, and practical power.

Most of the activity and investments are not channelled towards existing resource-strained regulators to support them in their task of issuing guidance on how to deal with AI risks and harms—which stems from the white paper—but in digital industrial policy and R&D projects, including a new major research centre on responsible and trustworthy AI and a Foundation Model Taskforce. A first observation is that this type of investments can be worthwhile, but not at the expense of adequately resourcing regulators facing the tall order of AI regulation.

The UK’s Primer Minister is clearly making a move to use ‘world-leadership in AI safety’ as a major plank of his re-election bid in the coming Fall. I am not only sceptical about this move and its international reception, but also increasingly concerned about a tendency to ‘regulate by Twitter’ and to bullish approaches to regulatory and legal compliance that could well result in squandering a good part of the £100m set aside for the Taskforce.

In this blog, I offer some preliminary thoughts. Comments welcome!

Twitter announcements vs white paper?

During the preparation of our response to the AI public consultation, we had a moment of confusion. The Government published the white paper and an impact assessment supporting it, which primarily amount to doing nothing and maintaining the status quo (aka AI regulatory gap) in the UK. However, there were increasing reports of the Prime Minister’s change of heart after the emergence of a ‘doomer’ narrative peddled by OpenAI’s CEO and others. At some point, the PM sent out a tweet that made us wonder if the Government was changing policy and the abandoning the approach of the white paper even before the end of the public consultation. This was the tweet.

We could not locate any document describing the ‘Safe strategy of AI’, so the only conclusion we could reach is that the ‘strategy’ was the short twitter threat that followed that first tweet.

It was not only surprising that there was no detail, but also that there was no reference to the white paper or to any other official policy document. We were probably not the only ones confused about it (or so we hope!) as it is in general very confusing to have social media messaging pointing out towards regulatory interventions completely outside the existing frameworks—including live public consultations by the government!

It is also confusing to see multiple different documents make reference to different things, and later documents somehow reframing what previous documents mean.

For example, the announcement of the Foundation Model Taskforce came only a few weeks after the publication of the white paper, but there was no mention of it in the white paper itself. Is it possible that the Government had put together a significant funding package and related policy in under a month? Rather than whether it is possible, the question is why do things in this way? And how mature was the thinking behind the Taskforce?

For example, the initial announcement indicated that

The investment will build the UK’s ‘sovereign’ national capabilities so our public services can benefit from the transformational impact of this type of AI. The Taskforce will focus on opportunities to establish the UK as a world leader in foundation models and their applications across the economy, and acting as a global standard bearer for AI safety.

The funding will be invested by the Foundation Model Taskforce in foundation model infrastructure and public service procurement, to create opportunities for domestic innovation. The first pilots targeting public services are expected to launch in the next six months.

Less than two months later, the announcement of the appointment of the Taskforce chair (below) indicated that

… a key focus for the Taskforce in the coming months will be taking forward cutting-edge safety research in the run up to the first global summit on AI safety to be hosted in the UK later this year.

Bringing together expertise from government, industry and academia, the Taskforce will look at the risks surrounding AI. It will carry out research on AI safety and inform broader work on the development of international guardrails, such as shared safety and security standards and infrastructure, that could be put in place to address the risks.

Is it then a Taskforce and pot of money seeking to develop sovereign capabilities and to pilot public sector AI use, or a Taskforce seeking to develop R&D in AI safety? Can it be both? Is there money for both? Also, why steer the £100m Taskforce in this direction and simultaneously spend £31m in funding an academic-led research centre on ethical and trustworthy AI? Is the latter not encompassing issues of AI safety? How will all of these investments and initiatives be coordinated to avoid duplication of effort or replication of regulatory gaps in the disparate consideration of regulatory issues?

Funding and collaboration opportunities announced via Twitter?

Things can get even more confusing or worrying (for me). Yesterday, the Government put out an official announcement and heavy Twitter-based PR to announce the appointment of the Chair of the Foundation Model Taskforce. This announcement raises a few questions. Why on Sunday? What was the rush? Also, what was the process used to select the Chair, if there was one? I have no questions on the profile and suitability of the appointed Chair (have also not looked at them in detail), but I wonder … even if legally compliant to proceed without a formal process with an open call for expressions of interest, is this appropriate? Is the Government stretching the parallelism with the Vaccines Taskforce too far?

Relatedly, there has been no (or I have been unable to locate) official call for expressions of interest from those seeking to get involved with the Taskforce. However, once more, Twitter seems to have been the (pragmatic?) medium used by the newly appointed Chair of the Taskforce. On Sunday itself, this Twitter thread went out:

I find the last bit particularly shocking. A call for expressions of interest in participating in a project capable of spending up to £100m via Google Forms! (At the time of writing), the form is here and its content is as follows:

I find this approach to AI regulation rather concerning and can also see quite a few ways in which the emerging work approach can lead to breaches of procurement law and subsidies controls, or recruitment processes (depending on whether expressions of interest are corporate or individual). I also wonder what is the rush with all of this and what sort of record-keeping will be kept of all this so that it there is adequate accountability of this expenditure. What is the rush?

Or rather, I know that the rush is simply politically-driven and that this is another way in which public funds are at risk for the wrong reasons. But for the entirely arbitrary deadline of the ‘world AI safety summit’ the PM wants to host in the UK in the Fall — preferably ahead of any general election, I would think — it is almost impossible to justify the change of gear between the ‘do nothing’ AI white paper and the ‘rush everything’ approach driving the Taskforce. I hope we will not end up in another set of enquiries and reports, such as those stemming from the PPE procurement scandal or the ventilator challenge, but it is hard to see how this can all be done in a legally compliant manner, and with the serenity. clarity of view and long-term thinking required of regulatory design. Even in the field of AI. Unavoidably, more to follow.

Short comments on the proposed regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, as it relates to procurement

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The European Commission is currently consulting on its recent Proposal for a Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (COM(2021) 223 final, 5 May 2021). The public consultation will be open until 15 July 2021. I have just submitted my views on chapter four of the proposal, which concerns the rules for the analysis of foreign subsidies distorting tenders for contracts with a value above €250 million. The feedback form only allows for 4,000-character submissions, so here are mine. As always, comments welcome: a.sanchez-graells@bristol.ac.uk.

The proposed Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (RFSDIT) is both (1) undesirable and (2) problematic, in particular as it concerns the investigation of foreign subsidies linked to public procurement procedures. The following is limited to chapter 4.

1. Primarily, ch 4 RFSDIT is undesirable because it adds a layer of scrutiny and red tape that will affect high-value tenders submitted by tenderers from jurisdictions that have either signed up to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, or that have a plurilateral or bilateral trade agreement covering procurement with the EU. Tenderers from other jurisdictions can already be excluded on the basis of the current rules (see Art 25 Dir 2014/24; Art 43 Dir 2014/25), as emphasised in the Commission's 2019 guidance on the participation of third-country bidders and goods in the EU procurement market. First, the (inadvertent) targeting of GPA- or FTA-originated tenders is in itself undesirable on trade policy terms and could erode third countries' bilateral relationships with the EU within the GPA framework, as well as under the relevant FTA (or the UK TCA) even if those already include subsidy-related provisions. Second, it is also undesirable due to the technical shortcomings of the proposal, as below, as there could be a basis for claims of unequal treatment concerning the non-scrutiny of EU-originated tenders that are tainted by illegal State aid. Finally, it is also undesirable because the ex ante nature of ch 4 screening can dissuade economic operators from participating in public tenders even if they think that subsidies they have received could overcome the tests in Arts 3-5 RFSDIT. Recipients of foreign subsidies may rather forgo their chances of being awarded a public contract than trigger an investigation they could avoid under the general motu proprio regime. Such loss of international competition is to the EU public buyers' detriment.

2. Ch 4 RFSDIT is also highly problematic because of its incompatibility with the mechanisms in the EU procurement Directives, as well as the inconsistency of approach with the rest of the chapters in the RFSDIT. First, the proposed rules are incompatible with the trigger for an investigation of the distortive effects of State aid granted to an EU-based tenderer, which derives from the prima facie abnormally low character of its tender (ALT) (see Art 69 Dir 2014/24). EU-generated non-ALT bids are not screened for receipt of (illegal) State aid, even if they can be 'winning tenders' in a given procedure. As above, this can trigger claims of discrimination against non-EU generated tenders. Second, procurement case law pre-empts tenderers from offering commitments related to the tender at hand to the Commission's satisfaction without materially altering their tenders. Such changes would be impermissible under EU procurement law. This is an inescapable limit, which is partly but insufficiently acknowledged in Art 30(1) RFSDIT. This means that any tender where the Commission found an unbalanced distortion of the internal market would lead to the inevitable exclusion of the tender. This is at odds with the appearance of 'correctability' created by Art 30 RFSDIT. This evidences the inadequacy of applying a merger or State aid control logic to the public procurement context. Third, the relative intensity of the foreign subsidy is much lower for procurement than for concentrations under the RFSDIT. Art 18(3) creates a safe harbour of up to 10% of the value of a concentration. Art 27(2) contains no parallel rule. Thus, Art 3(2) offers the only (soft) safe harbour for procurement, which means that subsidies of 2% or less of the tender value would be caught. The reason for this different treatment under RFSDIT opens it to challenge on proportionality grounds. Moreover, it is unclear how a 2% subsidy could create a situation comparable to that of an ALT, which further reinforces concerns of unequal treatment, as above.

10 years on, the CJEU creates more uncertainty about the (in)divisibility of public powers and economic activities in public procurement (C-687/17 P)

In its Judgment of 7 November 2019 in Aanbestedingskalender and Others v Commission, C-687/17 P, EU:C:2019:932 (the ‘TenderNed’ case), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) rejected the appeal against the earlier Judgment of the General Court (GC) of 28 September 2017 (T-138/15, EU:T:2017:675) and thus left intact the GC’s upholding of the European Commission’s finding that ‘e-procurement was a service of general interest, and not an inherent economic activity, which could be commercially exploited so long as the State did not offer that service itself’ (T-138/15, para 108, for discussion see the earlier comment in this blog).

However, in TenderNed, the CJEU did not rely on the consideration of e-procurement as a service of general interest as such (which is a less than persuasive argument), but rather on the basis of its persistently confusing case law on the separability of economic activities and those connected with the exercise of public powers [for discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells & I Herrera Anchustegui, 'Revisiting the concept of undertaking from a public procurement law perspective – A discussion on EasyPay and Finance Engineering' (2016) 37(3) European Competition Law Review 93-98; and, more in depth, A Sanchez-Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (2nd edn, Hart 2015) ch 4].

The reasoning followed by the CJEU deserves close analysis, as it once again relies on the artificial indivisibility or interconnection between the economic and non-economic activities carried out by an entity tasked with a public procurement role; as it already did, initially in 2006, in FENIN v Commission, C-205/03 P, EU:C:2006:453; and 10 years ago in Selex Sistemi Integrati v Commission, C-113/07 P, EU:C:2009:191. Remarkably, this is another CJEU Judgment without Advocate General Opinion, despite the complexity of the issue and the far-fetched potential implications of the case.

Indeed, the way the TenderNed Judgment recasts the applicable (in)divisibility test is less than clear cut and can thus create renewed difficulties for the analysis of predominantly economic activities carried out by entities with some public powers—or tasked with an SGEI involving them—which is increasingly the case of central purchasing bodies [such as eg the English NHS supply chain management entity; as briefly discussed in A Sanchez-Graells, 'State Aid and EU Public Procurement: More Interactions, Fuzzier Boundaries' in L Hancher & JJ Piernas López (eds), Research Handbook on European State Aid Law (2nd edn, Edward Elgar 2020) forthcoming, section 8].

Background to the TenderNed case

In simple terms, the case concerned the controversial decision by the Dutch government to intervene in the market for the provision of electronic procurement platform services through the creation of TenderNed—an in-house e-procurement platform run by PIANOo, the tendering expertise centre for the Dutch government.

Prior to the creation of TenderNed, private providers of e-procurement services had been offering their services to Dutch contracting authorities. The creation of TenderNed and the offering of services free of charge to contracting authorities by this in-house entity logically killed the e-procurement services industry (or a part of it), which triggered the litigation.

As explained in more detail by the CJEU,

TenderNed offers a number of functionalities, made available to contracting authorities and special sector entities … free of charge. It provides the following functionalities:

– a publication module, which can be used for the publication of tender notices as well as associated tender documents (“the publication module”);

– a tendering (submission) module, offering functionalities such as the exchange of questions and answers, and the uploading and downloading of tenders and bids. That module also includes a “virtual company” section in which economic operators can introduce and manage their data (“the submission module”);

– an e-guide, which supports interested parties in using TenderNed (“the e-guide”) (C-687/17 P, para 3).

However, in providing the relevant background, the CJEU glosses over one aspect that is particularly damaging to private providers of e-procurement services, as not only is the availability of TenderNed free of charge, but contracting authorities are also obliged to use some of TenderNed’s functionalities (what the CJEU calls the “publication module” and the GC had earlier described as the “notice board”). Indeed, as explicitly stated in the TenderNed website itself: ‘All Dutch authorities are obliged to publish their national and European tenders on Tenderned’s announcement platform’. It is also clear that contracting authorities can then decide whether ‘businesses must submit their offer digitally in TenderNed’.

This stems from the fact that, as explicitly established under Dutch law, ‘while the Netherlands legislature expressly considered the publication module to be a service of general economic interest, it did not concern itself in any way with the question of whether the submission module, as an economic activity, was of general economic interest or not. Indeed, it considered that part of TenderNed’s activities to be a “simple” economic activity’ (as argued by the appellants; see C-687/17 P, para 25).

In functional terms, the unavoidable use of TenderNed for the publication of the mandatory tender notices works as an anchor for contracting authorities, which will have a strong incentive to rely on the rest of TenderNed’s free functionalities rather than pay for separate e-procurement services (even if, at least theoretically, they were of a higher quality). This creates an important issue that would be assessed as bundling under competition law, were these rules applicable. Any such argument, however, as well as the main argument on State aid in the TenderNed case, rely on the analysis of whether the entity providing the services (TenderNed) is an undertaking or not.

Succinctly, the relevant test to determine whether an entity is or not an undertaking relies on the analysis of whether it is engaged in an economic activity or not; as competition and State aid rules apply to economic activities, but not to the exercise of public powers. And this is the crux of the TenderNed case: the CJEU’s recast and application of its case law on the (in)divisibility of public powers and economic activities carried out by the same entity.

As the CJEU summarises in relation to the appellant’s claim, the issue requires determining whether:

a simple ‘connection’, even if it is a connection by their nature, by their aim and by the rules to which the activities are subject, is not sufficient to classify those activities as activities falling within the exercise of public powers, if the criterion stemming from the judgment of 12 July 2012, Compass-Datenbank (C‑138/11, EU:C:2012:449), is not to be deprived of its full meaning. The Court of Justice held … that, when an entity exercises an activity which can be separated from the exercise of its public powers, that entity, in relation to that activity, acts as an undertaking, while, if that economic activity cannot be separated from the exercise of those public powers, the activities exercised by that entity as a whole remain activities connected with the exercise of those public powers. According to the appellants, compliance with that criterion is much more difficult than with a mere criterion of ‘connection’ (C-687/17 P, para 13).

It is thus a matter of establishing an appropriate test to assess the intensity and severability of the connection between the public powers and the economic activities carried out by the relevant entity.

The (in)divisibility test in TenderNed

The CJEU recast its earlier case law on this issue as follows:

… in so far as a public entity carries on an economic activity, since that activity is not connected to the exercise of its public powers, that entity, in relation to that activity, acts as an undertaking, while, if that same economic activity cannot, however, be separated from other activities connected with the exercise of public powers, the activities exercised by that entity as a whole remain activities connected with the exercise of those public powers.

The ‘separation’ criterion ... is in fact referred to by the Court ... only in the particular situation where certain activities of a public entity do not, as such, form part of the exercise of public powers and must be considered, in isolation, to be economic activities (C-687/17 P, paras 18-19).

This is another puzzling ‘clarification’ from the CJEU (see also the recent Irgita case, discussed by Janssen & Olsson in this blog), which raises a number of potential interpretive quagmires. The verbose test in para 18 is relatively straightforward: if the different activities carried out by a single entity cannot be separated, they are exempted from competition/State aid law as a whole (as the entity cannot be classed as an undertaking); whereas if the activities are separable (or ‘not connected’, and here lies the catch?) then only the activities that do not involve the exercise of a public power are subjected to competition/State aid law (as the entity is classed as an undertaking in relation to those activities only).

The more concise clarification in para 19 is much more confusing, though. In my opinion, the CJEU’s statement is circular. It makes no sense to state that the test of ‘separation’ is only applicable to activities that ‘do not, as such, form part of the exercise of public powers’ because the whole and only point of assessing whether two sets of activities are separate or not lies in the fact of determining whether some of them are to be considered economic activities. The CJEU seems to indicate that the ‘separation’ criterion is to be applied in a second-tier of analysis, once it is clear that some activities are, in isolation, to be considered economic activities because they ‘do not, as such, form part of the exercise of public powers’. This begs the question what is the first-tier criterion for the relevant analysis.

A very convoluted systematic interpretation of both paragraphs could indicate that the first-tier criterion is that of ‘connection’, whereas the second-tier criterion is that of ‘separation’. This could make some sense as the first-tier would seek to establish whether there is an approximation between two connected sets of activities, whereas the second-tier would assess the intensity (or severability) of such connection. However, a literal interpretation of paragraph 18 dispels the illusion of such possibility, as the CJEU contraposes economic activities ‘connected to’ the exercise of public powers to economic activities that can be ‘separated from’ such exercise of public powers; thus indicating that ‘connection’ and ‘separation’ are used interchangeably for the purposes of the main test.

Therefore, in my view, the recast or clarification of the test in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the TenderNed Judgment brings nothing new (except some scope for linguistic contortion) and the issue continues to revolve around the need to assess the intensity and severability of the connection between the public powers and the economic activities carried out by the relevant entity. Such assessment has been carried out in a notoriously vague manner by the CJEU in earlier cases, and this is no different in TenderNed.

The application of the test in TenderNed

Indeed, in TenderNed, the ‘connection’/’separation’ test is applied in a rather convoluted and three-step process, in a way that overlaps across different steps and creates confusion as to the relevant scope of the analysis. In any case, the most relevant part comes at paragraphs 43 to 45, which state that

43 As regards the submission module, in order to find that there is a connection between that functionality and the exercise of public powers, the General Court held … that … separating the submission module from the publication module and the e-guide, or even removing it entirely from the overall TenderNed framework, would interfere with TenderNed’s activities and undermine the objectives pursued by [the 2014 Public Procurement rules].

44 In that respect, it should be pointed out, on the one hand, that it is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that two activities can be considered not able to be separated when one of them would be rendered largely useless in the absence of the other (see, to that effect, … Compass-Datenbank, … paragraph 41) or where those two activities are closely linked (see, to that effect, … Selex Sistemi Integrati v Commission, … paragraphs 76 and 77). On the other hand, as noted in paragraph 18 of the present judgment, if an economic activity carried out by a public entity nevertheless cannot be separated from other activities connected with the exercise of public powers, the activities of that entity as a whole must be regarded as being connected with the exercise of public powers.

45 It follows that the General Court was fully entitled to deduce from the factual assessments set out in paragraph 43 of the present judgment,… that the submission module cannot be separated from the publication module, so that those two activities must be regarded as being connected to the exercise of public powers (C-687/17 P, paras 43-45, emphasis added).

If we synthesise the CJEU’s reasoning, the TenderNed case comes to say that “when the separation of activities would interfere with the functioning of the entity and undermine the objectives it pursues [at least, as long as they are mandated by EU law], those activities cannot be separated and those activities must be regarded as being connected to the exercise of public powers”.

This test of ‘interference’ or ‘goal undermining’ is most bizarre and difficult to understand. It also seems to introduce an even more light-touch approach than the original ‘separation’ test, which the CJEU explicitly restated in TenderNed as still representing good law (at paragraph 18)—subject to the circular ‘clarification’ (in paragraph 19).

It may be worth revisiting the original factual assessment carried out by the GC at paragraph 51 of its Judgment (to which the CJEU refers in para 43), according to which:

It must be noted that considering TenderNed’s various functionalities in isolation, or reducing TenderNed to one of those functionalities, by regarding them as independent of each other, when they are all indispensable for e-procurement and constitute different facets of one and the same activity, would interfere with that activity and disregard the objective pursued by [the 2014 Public Procurement rules] (T-138/15, paragraph 51).

But, alas, this is another of the largely unsubstantiated analyses that pepper this line of case law. The reasoning of the GC was structured as follows: (1) one of the objectives of the 2014 EU Public Procurement rules ‘is that procurement procedures should be carried out via electronic means throughout the European Union’ and, to that effect, ‘when implementing e-procurement, Member States were obliged to provide guidance and support to contracting authorities and economic operators’ (para 44). (2) ‘TenderNed was created and implemented by the Kingdom of the Netherlands precisely in order to comply with those obligations’, even if it did so ahead of the adoption of the 2014 EU Public Procurement rules and on the basis of draft texts (para 45). It follows that (3) ‘considering TenderNed’s various functionalities in isolation, or reducing TenderNed to one of those functionalities, by regarding them as independent of each other, when they are all indispensable for e-procurement and constitute different facets of one and the same activity, would interfere with that activity and disregard the objective pursued by [the 2014 Public Procurement rules]’ (para 51).

The key issue here is that the GC does not explain, in any meaningful way, why TenderNed’s functionalities ‘are all indispensable for e-procurement and constitute different facets of one and the same activity’. As a matter of fact, the different functionalities are easily separable from a technical perspective and the existence of decentralised e-procurement systems coordinated through a central database (such as in the case of Ukraine’s Prozorro) is definitive evidence of this. The separability of the activities was raised by the appellants and the CJEU summarised their arguments at paragraphs 26 and 27 of the TenderNed Judgment, as follows:

… the Netherlands legislature itself regarded the submission module as distinct from the publication module. Moreover, in the appellants’ view, the day-to-day practical operation of TenderNed confirms that the publication module, on the one hand, can be separated from the submission module, on the other.

In addition, the General Court wrongly held … that it is as a whole that TenderNed assists in achieving the objective of harmonisation and technical integration in the field of public procurement and that TenderNed’s activities as a whole constitute facets of the same activity. The mere fact that two activities contribute to the same objective is not sufficient for them to be considered to be facets of the same activity. The appellants point out, in that respect, that that same activity is carried out in a large number of Member States by private companies (C-687/17 P, paras 26 & 27).

However, confusingly, the CJEU did not take this into account when upholding the GC’s factual assessment (at paras 43-45), which was the third step of its analysis of the ‘connection’/’separation’ of the activities, but rather dismissed it earlier (paras 30-32).

Therefore, the strange salami slicing of the relevant issues by the CJEU leads it to confirm a disputed factual assessment by the GC without engaging with the arguments provided by the appellants to support their views. This could not be more puzzling.

Final thoughts

Not to mince words, I find TenderNed to be another highly-criticisable CJEU Judgment, due to its poor technical foundations and the additional uncertainty it creates for the assessment of the economic and non-economic activities carried out by entities with public procurement functions. The CJEU has further obscured the relevant tests and, in the end, continued to expand the procurement activities beyond the reach of competition and State aid law on the basis of flimsy assessments of separability of activities. To my mind, the litmus test to this approach will come with challenges against the activities of central purchasing bodies. I am not optimistic of the chances of a correction of this defective line of case even then. We will have to wait and see if the right case emerges from national practice and litigation, though.

Do EU procurement & State aid rules conflict on possibility for consortium members to 'go it alone'? (C-127/16 P)

In its Judgment of 7 March 2018 in SNCF Mobilités v Commission, C-127/16 P, EU:C:2018:165, in the context of the analysis of a measure of State aid for restructuring and recapitalisation involving a bidding process, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) indicated that it is not acceptable for the assets to be transferred to a bidder that had initially participated in the process as a member of a consortium but subsequently decided to 'go it alone' and submitted a solo bid for the assets. In establishing this principle, the CJEU seems to have taken a position that can potentially be functionally incompatible with its previous case law in the area of public procurement and, in particular, in its Judgment of 24 May 2016 in MT Højgaard and Züblin, C-396/14, EU:C:2016:347 (see here). This blog post discusses this potential functional contradiction in the case law of the Court.

 

SNCF Mobilités v Commission

In simple terms, this dispute concerned France's obligation to recover State aid given to SNCF (its national state-owned railway company) that was declared incompatible with EU law (Art 107 TFEU) by the European Commission. One of the possibilities that France had was to sell all assets of the relevant company within the SNCF group (Sernam) 'en bloc ... at market price through a transparent and open procedure to a company that has no legal link with SNCF' (C-127/16 P, para 7). The process for the sale of Sernam's assets en bloc was rather complicated, but the relevant part of the mechanism was as follows:

... Sernam’s economic situation failed to elicit any proposals based on a positive valuation in the call for tenders conducted on SNCF’s behalf by a bank. All the offers submitted under that procedure concluded that the value was very negative. As no firm offer had been submitted, the decision was taken to continue the discussions solely with the consortium established by candidate 5 who was associated with Sernam’s management team. On 15 June 2005, candidate 5 ultimately informed SNCF orally that it was not in a position to submit a takeover offer — not even a conditional one — before 30 June 2005. On 30 June 2005, SNCF took the decision to conclude the sale with Financière Sernam, which was wholly owned by Sernam’s management team (C-127/16 P, paras 8-9).

In the context of the dispute whether France met the requirements of the previous Commission decision requiring recovery of the State aid, one of the legal issues triggered by the French authorities' decision to enter into a sale agreement with Sernam's management team (through Financière Sernam) is whether it met the requirements for the transfer to result from 'a transparent and open procedure'. The Commission took the view that this was not the case. Before the CJEU considered this issue on appeal, the General Court (GC) had assessed the situation in its Judgment of 17 December 2015 in SNCF v Commission, T-242/12, EU:T:2015:1003.

In the relevant part of the Judgment (T-242/12, paras 162 and ff), the GC explains how, in the context of the procedure aimed at finding a buyer Sernam's assets en bloc, a final round of negotiations resulted in two offers. In simple terms, there was an offer by candidate 4 that valued the assets at - €65.2mn and an offer by a consortium composed of candidate 5 and Sernam's management team that valued the assets at -€56.4mn. In view of this, it was agreed to solely continue discussions with candidate 5 and Sernam’s management (para 164). During these discussions, as mentioned above, candidate 5 withdrew from the process and the management team submitted a solo offer that valued the assets at -€95.5mn (para 167). The acceptance of this offer by SNCF triggered two main issues.

First, given their significant divergence in the valuation of Sernam's assets, whether the solo offer submitted by Sernam's management team was comparable to the prior indicative offer of the consortium with candidate 5. The GC considered that 'the Commission was correct in not considering equivalent in terms of credibility and soundness the offer from a financial investor, candidate 5, who, moreover, was proposing to inject a significant amount of capital into Sernam, and the offer from 84 management and director employees financing a low amount, being EUR 2 million of the price, from their own resources' (T-242/12, para 168). Second, and more relevant for our discussion, there were concerns about the transparency and openness of the procedure for the sale of the assets en bloc. In that regard, the GC established that

... [SNCF] and the French Republic observe that the requirement that a procedure be transparent and open does not cease once the best bidder has been selected and the other candidates have, by definition, been rejected, and that the discussions continue with the ‘last interested party’.

The ‘last interested person’ in the transparent and open tendering procedure in this case was candidate 4 ... the management team’s firm offer, for EUR ‑95.5 million, was also less attractive for the vendor than the preliminary second-round offer from candidate 4, with its negative price of EUR ‑65.2 million ... As observed by the Commission in its written pleadings, following candidate 5’s withdrawal, recourse should have been had to candidate 4, who had been part of the process since the beginning and had also indicated its interest at the end of the second round.

The offer from the management team cannot be considered that of the ‘last interested party’, since it did not participate independently in the transparent and open procedure.

... the applicant submits that it is not relevant to compare the management team’s firm offer with the non-binding offer from the consortium of which it was a part, as only the firm offer is valid, even if it is not the best bid.

That argument must be rejected, since the question here is whether the management team’s firm offer was the result of the tendering procedure, which necessarily involves an examination of the non-binding offers submitted during the tendering procedure.

Therefore, the argument aimed at establishing that the management team participated from the beginning of the tendering procedure must be rejected because it did not participate independently and did not submit alone the offer it had initially submitted with candidate 5. Its offer cannot therefore be considered to result from a transparent and open procedure (T-242/12, paras 169-174, emphases added).

Regardless of the issue of equivalence of the offers, the argumentation constructed by the GC in these passages (implicitly) relies on the principle that members of a consortium cannot be seen as participating both within the consortium and in their own name, which establishes an insurmountable impossibility against any decision to 'go it alone' if the other member(s) of the consortium withdraw.

This principle was directly challenged in the appeal before the CJEU. In short, the challenge was that '... candidate 5 and Sernam’s management team had, within a consortium, been associated with the tendering procedure from the start of that procedure and had proposed the least negative value for the assets en bloc. It was only after candidate 5 withdrew that Sernam’s management team decided to pursue the process and submit on their own the takeover offer initially put forward by the consortium. The applicant thus takes the view that such circumstances meet the requirements of an open and transparent tendering procedure as reflected in the Commission’s decision-making practice and the Court’s case-law' (C-127/16 P, para 62).

Remarkably, SNCF argued that 'it is possible to accept that the principles of openness and transparency in public procurement may be applicable by analogy to procedures involving transfers of assets. It is apparent from Directive 2014/24/EU ... and from Directive 2014/23/EU ... that EU law allows for awarding such a contract to an economic operator without prior advertising or competition following an unsuccessful first tendering procedure, including when the operator did not participate in that first procedure, without that constituting an infringement of the principles of openness and transparency. Those principles should a fortiori be deemed to have been observed where the assets have been transferred to the last interested party, the only one to have made a firm offer, when it has participated in the process in its entirety, initially as part of a consortium from which the other party withdrew in the course of the procedure' (C-127/16 P, para 64).

On this point, the CJEU reasoned as follows:

First of all, without it being necessary to rule on a potential analogy between the tendering procedure relevant to the present case and the principles that are applicable in public procurement ... it should be noted that the applicant’s argument concerning that potential analogy is based on the fact that, at the end of the tendering procedure, no bid or no appropriate bid had been submitted. That kind of argument can be successful only if it challenges the General Court’s findings of fact in paragraph 170 of the judgment under appeal, to the effect that ‘[t]he “last interested person” in the transparent and open tendering procedure in this case was candidate 4. … As observed by the Commission in its written pleadings, following candidate 5’s withdrawal, recourse should have been had to candidate 4, who had been part of the process since the beginning and had also indicated its interest at the end of the second round’. That argument, which asks the Court of Justice to substitute its analysis for the one carried out by the General Court as part of its sovereign assessment of the facts and evidence, is therefore inadmissible and must be rejected.

Next, the practice followed by the Commission in its decisions or its guidelines, even if that practice were to support the applicant’s argument cannot, in any event, bind the Court in its interpretation of the EU rules ...

In any event ... according the Court’s case-law, the question whether a tendering procedure has been open and transparent is determined on the basis of a body of indicia specific to the circumstances of each case ...

Accordingly, in the light of the facts of the present case, and having held in paragraphs 170 and 171 of the judgment under appeal, that the successful bid did not originate from a candidate who had participated autonomously in the tendering procedure from the beginning of that procedure, the General Court was correct in holding, in paragraph 174 of that judgment, that the requirement of an open and transparent procedure had not been observed (C-127/16 P, paras 66-69, references omitted).

Accordingly, the CJEU SNCF Mobilités Judgment explicitly upholds the fact that for a tenderer to be awarded the contract for the sale of assets en bloc as a result of an 'open and transparent procedure', it is an absolute requirement that the 'successful bid ... originate[s] from a candidate who had participated autonomously in the tendering procedure from the beginning of that procedure'. This is in functional conflict with the previous Judgment in MT Højgaard and Züblin, as discussed below.

MT Højgaard and Züblin

In this public procurement case based on the 2004 EU utilities procurement rules (Dir 2004/17/EC), the CJEU ruled on whether the principle of equal treatment of economic operators must be interpreted as precluding a contracting entity from allowing an economic operator that is a member of a group of two undertakings which was pre-selected and which submitted the first tender in a negotiated procedure for the award of a public contract, to continue to take part in that procedure in its own name, after the dissolution of that group due to the bankruptcy of the other partner.

In that case, the contracting authority had indicated that it wanted to proceed to negotiations with between four and six candidates. It received expressions of interest from five candidates, which included interest by a consortium consisting of Per Aarsleff and E. Pihl og Søn A/S (‘the Aarsleff and Pihl group’). The contracting authority pre-selected all five candidates and invited them to submit tenders. One of the pre-selected candidates subsequently withdrew from the procedure. 

For the purposes of our discussion, the relevant fact is that Pihl entered into bankruptcy prior to the submission of the tender, which de facto implied the dissolution of the Aarsleff and Pihl group. Aarsleff decided to 'go it alone' and proceed as a solo tenderer. The contracting authority was thus left with two options: (a) to consider that Aarsleff was not qualified on its own merits (or, in the terms of the SNCF Mobilités Judgment (above) that it had not 'participated autonomously in the tendering procedure from the beginning') and to carry on with the negotiated procedure with 'only' three tenders; or, conversely, (b) to consider that Aarsleff could benefit from the qualification of the group to which it initially belonged and go forward with its desired minimum of four tenders. After some deliberation and information to all remaining candidates, Aarsleff was  allowed to submit a solo tender and, after a further round of best and final offers between the three better placed tenderers, it was awarded the contract.

In reviewing the compatibility of this decision with general principles of EU public procurement law, the CJEU established that, in the absence of specific rules on this subject, 'the question of whether a contracting entity may allow such an alteration must be examined with regard to the general principles of EU law, in particular the principle of equal treatment and the duty of transparency that flows from it, and the objectives of that law in relation to public procurement' (C‑396/14, para 36). In carrying out such analysis, the CJEU determined that

The principle of equal treatment of tenderers, the aim of which is to promote the development of healthy and effective competition between undertakings taking part in a public procurement procedure, requires that all tenderers must be afforded equality of opportunity when formulating their tenders, and therefore implies that the tenders of all competitors must be subject to the same conditions ...

...  [the rules on qualitative selection] may be qualified in order to ensure, in a negotiated procedure, adequate competition ...

If, however, an economic operator is to continue to participate in the negotiated procedure in its own name, following the dissolution of the group of which it formed part and which had been pre-selected by the contracting entity, that continued participation must take place in conditions which do not infringe the principle of equal treatment of the tenderers as a whole.

In that regard, a contracting entity is not in breach of that principle where it permits one of two economic operators, who formed part of a group of undertakings that had, as such, been invited to submit tenders by that contracting entity, to take the place of that group following the group’s dissolution, and to take part, in its own name, in the negotiated procedure for the award of a public contract, provided that it is established, first, that that economic operator by itself meets the requirements laid down by the contracting entity and, second, that the continuation of its participation in that procedure does not mean that the other tenderers are placed at a competitive disadvantage
(C-396/14, paras 38, 41, 43-44 & 47, references omitted and emphases added). 

As is clear from these passages, in MT Højgaard and Züblin, the CJEU rejected the principle that transparency and equal treatment required that a tenderer had 'participated autonomously in the tendering procedure from the beginning'. It rather established a more nuanced approach that required that the 'going it alone' tenderer was in a position to meet all relevant requirements of previous phases of the procedure (in that case, qualitative selection) and that it gained no competitive advantage--or, conversely, that no other tenderer was placed at a competitive disadvantage.

Overall comments

In my view, the SNCF Mobilités Judgment is problematic for the dogmatic principle that it sets out in terms of an absolute requirement of autonomous participation from the beginning. The MT Højgaard and Züblin Judgment can be criticised on other grounds (see here) but, from that perspective, its more nuanced approach towards tolerating decisions to 'go it alone' may be preferable in contexts where retention of a solo tender by the remaining member of a disbanded consortium can be determinative of the competitive tension within the tender procedure [see A Sanchez-Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 339].

More importantly, in my view, the SNCF Mobilités Judgment could have reached the same conclusions if it applied the more nuanced approach of MT Højgaard and Züblin. Indeed, it is hard to argue against the view that, by continuing conversations solely with Sernam's management team and accepting an offer that valued the assets at a very significant value below the previous consortium offer as well as the previous offer by candidate 4, SNCF put Sernam's management team at a clear advantage. In view of the withdrawal of candidate 5, SNCF would have been better advised to go back to the immediate previous step of the procedure and compare whichever solo offer Sernam's management team could submit with that of candidate 4. Doing that would also respect the basic principles of stage rounds of negotiations, whereby ceteris paribus the offers presented in each of the rounds should improve upon previous offers.

On the whole, then, I think that the SNCF Mobilités Judgment is a missed opportunity to have created more integration and compatibility between the procedural requirements applicable under EU State aid and public procurement rules. At the same time, given that the CJEU avoided engaging in the 'potential analogy between the tendering procedure [for the sale of assets en bloc] and the principles that are applicable in public procurement', it is to be hoped that the dogmatic approach of the SNCF Mobilités Judgment will not muddy the waters of the case law on modification of the composition of bidding consortia for the strict purposes of EU public procurement law.

Funding of in-house entities, CPBs and risks of state aid, some thoughts re Aanbestedingskalender (T-138/15)

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In its Judgment of 28 September 2017, Aanbestedingskalender & Others v Commission, T-138/15, EU:T:2017:675, the General Court (GC) rejected a complaint against a previous Commission decision (SA.34646) that the Netherlands had not breached EU State aid rules by funding TenderNed--an in-house e-procurement platform run by PIANOo, the tendering expertise centre for the Dutch government. The complaint derived from the fact that, prior to the creation of TenderNed, private providers of e-procurement services had been offering their services to Dutch contracting authorities. The creation of TenderNed and the offering of services free of charge to contracting authorities by this in-house entity logically killed the e-procurement services industry (or a part of it), which triggered the complaint. The circumstances of the case raise some issues that would be common to any intervention by a Member State that in-sourced (or nationalised) previously outsourced services, but the legal challenge was limited to State aid considerations.

In a nutshell, the GC decided that the Netherlands was not in breach of EU State aid law because TenderNed is not an undertaking, in the sense that it is not engaged in an economic activity because its services are closely linked to the exercise of public powers by the Dutch State and the Dutch contracting authorities that use this service. The State aid aspects of the Judgment are insightfully discussed in more detail by Prof Nicolaides.

Reading the case, one of the statements by the GC that caught my attention was that "e-procurement was a service of general interest, and not an inherent economic activity, which could be commercially exploited so long as the State did not offer that service itself" (para 108). In this post, I offer some thoughts on the potential implications of this finding for the funding of in-house entities and of central purchasing bodies (CPBs), in particular if the EU Courts were to take further steps down the road of considering the exercise of the procurement function non-economic and/or a service of general economic interest (SGEI)--and, in so doing, I pick up on some of the issues discussed in more detail in A Sanchez-Graells & I Herrera Anchustegui, 'Impact of Public Procurement Aggregation on Competition: Risks, Rationale and Justification for the Rules in Directive 2014/24', in R Fernández Acevedo y P Valcárcel Fernández (eds), Centralización de compras públicas (Madrid, Civitas, 2016) 129-163.

The consideration of e-procurement as an SGEI

In its Judgment, the GC arrived to the position that e-procurement is an SGEI on the basis of the following:

... the claim that, because commercial platforms offer services similar to those of TenderNed, the Commission should have concluded that TenderNed’s activities are economic in nature, does not take into consideration the developments that have taken place in the e-procurement market.

In that respect, it must be noted that that market had developed before Directives 2014/24 and 2014/25 were adopted and imposed an obligation on the Member States to implement e-procurement in those States. The fact that that obligation was decided upon at EU level implies that it was considered important to put in place mechanisms which would ensure greater effectiveness and transparency in public procurement. As the Slovak Republic indicated in its statement in intervention, the trend in the development of public procurement systems in Europe is towards e-procurement. The fact that Directives 2014/24 and 2014/25 were adopted is indicative of the intention to harmonise public procurement within the European Union, through actions by the Member States, so that it is carried out electronically throughout the European Union.

In addition, the Netherlands authorities stated ... that the existing commercial platforms did not offer the conditions relating to price, objective quality characteristics, continuity and access to the services provided that would be necessary to fulfil the general interest objectives established by those authorities.

Thus, in the light of those developments in public procurement rules, driven by public interest considerations, the Commission was entitled to state ... that e-procurement was a service of general interest, and not an inherent economic activity, which could be commercially exploited so long as the State did not offer that service itself (T-138/15, paras 105-108, emphases added).

In my view, this part of the Aanbestedingskalender Judgment is particularly weak because the arguments of EU harmonisation and unsatisfactory private supply can hardly be considered determinative of the nature of SGEI of a given service. The 2014 Public Procurement Package imposes an obligation to carry out e-procurement, but that does not make this an SGEI, as the competence to establish what an SGEI lies with the Member States (see Art 14 and Protocol No 26 TFEU). Moreover, if private provision is unsatisfactory, the Member State could opt to regulate minimum standards mandatory for all private (or public) providers. The Member State could also have established a framework agreement or other mechanism for the provision of the services by a non-in-house entity, or created public service obligations linked to the provision of e-procurement services. Thus, the conclusion that the evolution of the regulation of e-procurement at EU level implies its treatment as an SGEI is far from justified.

The original reasoning of the European Commission is equally unconvincing

Such services might have previously been needed because of the complexity of legislation, the lack of user-friendliness of analogue or digital tools offered by the government services, or because companies find it more convenient to outsource such activities. However, the State does not forego the right to carry out an activity that it deems necessary to ensure its public bodies comply with their statutory obligations by acting at a point in time when private operators – perhaps due to lack of prior action by the State – have already taken the initiative to offer services to the same end. Ensuring public authorities comply with their statutory obligations by channelling public procurement may be an economic activity for the complainants. It is not, however, an inherent economic activity, but rather a service of general interest, which can be commercially exploited only so long as the State fails to offer that service itself (SA.34646, para 68, reference omitted and emphasis added).

This fails to properly characterise the nature of the activities, which I think are better understood as the provision of the IT services and infrastructure necessary to carry out e-procurement, rather than as a public power of channelling procurement to an electronic platform (which is what the 2014 Public Procurement Package has done, or tried to do).

Moreover, this is functionally contrary to the position taken in the 2016 Notice on the notion of State aid, which explicitly establishes that '[t]he decision of a public authority not to allow third parties to provide a certain service (for example, because it wishes to provide the service in-house) does not rule out the existence of an economic activity. In spite of such market closure, an economic activity can exist where other operators would be willing and able to provide the service in the market concerned. More generally, the fact that a particular service is provided in-house has no relevance for the economic nature of the activity' (para 14). In this case, it seems clear that the creation and funding of TenderNed is functionally equivalent to the reservation of activity (which contracting authority would pay a private provider for the services it can get for free from TenderNed?) and it is obvious that there are third parties willing to provide those services (the complainants). Consequently, the position reached in the case at hand does not make much sense.

The functional incompatibility is even larger when contrasted with a different passage of the same Notice on notion of State aid, which foresees that

The fact that the authorities assign a public service to an in-house provider (even if they were free to entrust that service to third parties) does not as such exclude a possible distortion of competition. However, a possible distortion of competition is excluded if the following cumulative conditions are met: (a) a service is subject to a legal monopoly (established in compliance with EU law); (b) the legal monopoly not only excludes competition on the market, but also for the market, in that it excludes any possible competition to become the exclusive provider of the service in question; (c) the service is not in competition with other services; and (d) if the service provider is active in another (geographical or product) market that is open to competition, cross-subsidisation has to be excluded. This requires that separate accounts are used, costs and revenues are allocated in an appropriate way and public funding provided for the service subject to the legal monopoly cannot benefit other activities (para 188, references omitted).

In the TenderNed case, it was clear that 'while contracting authorities and special sector entities may ultimately be obliged to publish their offers via TenderNed, they are not prohibited from using other platforms like those of the complainants in parallel. Likewise, the Dutch authorities have emphasised that private e-procurement platforms can export TenderNed notifications on their own portal as well as import their notices to TenderNed. Commercial operators are, in other words, free to develop a differentiated offer of public procurement-related services in terms of quality or added value' (SA.34646, para 69, reference omitted and emphasis added). Therefore, the existence of a situation with potential anticompetitive effects derived from the public funding of TenderNed would hve required careful analysis, but for the finding that its activities are covered by the public power exemption (ie are non-economic, and thus TenderNed is not an undertaking; and not so much for their potential classification as an SGEI).

In my view, these functional inconsistencies are problematic. The simple reasoning that because EU procurement law mandates (or encourages) a specific form or modality of procurement, this means that it is an SGEI or a non-economic activity (which is also unclear in the reasoning highlighted above) is tricky and potentially problematic. In a case such as TenderNed, and even if TenderNed does not offer services to private buyers and does not receive any payments from contracting authorities and is centrally funded by the Dutch government, this is problematic because it has the impact of wiping out an entire industry (or category of services within an industry). And, in other cases where the entity considered to be carrying out an SGEI offers other types of non-SGEI services to the public or private sector, because of the potential additional distortions of competition in those neighbouring markets. The latter case would concern in-house and CPB if they were to be classed as SGEIs.

The consideration of in-house provision and/or CPB activities as SGEIs

Together with e-procurement, two other main areas of reform in the 2014 Public Procurement Package concerned the expansion of the in-house exemption (Art 12) and the more detailed and expansive regulation of the activities of central purchasing bodies (CPBs, Art 37). In both cases, the fact that contracting authorities assign contracts directly to these entities raises important risks of distortions of competition where there is private provision for the relevant works, goods or services. Thus, the award of public contracts under the exemptions foreseen in Arts 12 and 37 of Directive 2014/24/EU generates risks of State aid (see G S Ølykke, 'Commission Notice on the notion of state aid as referred to in article 107(1) TFEU - is the conduct of a public procurement procedure sufficient to eliminate the risk of granting state aid?' (2016) 25(5) Public Procurement Law Review 197-212), and the continued stream of revenue derived from reserved or directly awarded public business can put the undertaking in a favourable position when competing with other entities for private or non-in-house public business.

One potential defence against claims of violation of EU competition law and/or State aid law by in-house entities or CPBs would thus concern the possibility of classifying their activities as SGEIs (regarding CPBs, this is a claim Ignacio Herrera and I dispelled in the article referred to above, and similar arguments apply for in-house entities). And, if the thrust of the approach in the Aanbestedingskalender Judgment was to be followed, the European Commission and national competition authorities could be tempted to consider that in-house provision or CPB activities are SGEIs, solely on the basis that these are activities promoted or facilitated in the 2014 Public Procurement Package and, concerning CPBs, in subsequent Commission policy. However, in my view, this would be a wrong justification for the classification of those activities as SGEIs.

What would be the implications?

The main implication of classing an activity as an SGEI is that it both (i) allows the Member State to shield the entity providing the SGEI from compliance with competition rules "in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them" (Art 106(2) TFEU, and (ii) Member States have increased freedom for the funding of SGEIs than for the granting of other types of State aid [see generally, A Sanchez-Graells, 'The Commission’s Modernization Agenda for Procurement and SGEI', in E Szyszczak & J van de Gronden (eds) Financing Services of General Economic Interest: Reform and Modernization, Legal Issues of Services of General Interest Series (The Hague, TMC Asser Press / Springer, 2012) 161-181]. A fundamental element in this extended discretion for the funding of SGEIs is that an EU-compliant procurement exercise excludes the existence of State aid under the so-called Altmark fourt condition. This has been developed in some more detail in the 2016 Notice on the concept of State aid (paras 89 and ff), but it still assumes that an EU-compliant procurement is, for these purposes, one where there is a public tender and an element of competition--a position that the 2013 Guide to the application of the European Union rules on state aid, public procurement and the internal market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social services of general interest does not completely clarify.

Therefore, the conundrum that a broad classification of in-house or CPB activities as SGEIs would create is that, in a setting where the direct award of contracts (however lucrative or benefitial) to in-house entities or CPBs is compliant with the rules in Directive 2014/24/EU (Art 12, Art 37(1), Art 37(4)) despite not having involved any element of competition, and where the conditions of those contracts cannot be tested against EU State aid rules because a very broad understanding of the public power exclusion of the classification of an activity as economic, and therefore of the in-house entity or CPB as an undertaking for the purposes of Art 107(1) TFEU, there may be no rule capable of controlling the channelling of public funds to these entities, regardless of the distortions in the market that their activities would create--which would also be excluded from assessment under the core competition rules of Arts 101 and 102 TFEU precisely for the same reason of the entities not being classed as undertakings due to the non-economic nature of their activities.

On the whole, then, I think that the greatest threat that results from the thrust of the Aanbestedingskalender Judgment is that too broad an understanding of what procurement activities imply the exercise of public powers, and an overlapping consideration of procurement activities as SGEI would lead to a complete exclusion of the applicability of all EU competition law mechanisms in this large sector of the economy. This would be an expansion of the problems derived from the FENIN-Selex doctrine, and one which I think requires urgent reconsideration by competition enforcers and, in particular, the European Commission [for in-depth discussion of the shortcomings of the FENIN-Selex doctrine, see A Sanchez-Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn (Hart, 2015) ch 4].

Again, on the 'tricky' concept of State resources under EU State aid law: GC rules on German financial support for renewable energy (T-47/15)

In its Judgment of 10 May 2016 in Germany v Commission, T-47/15, EU:T:2016:281, the General Court (GC) has revisited once more the tricky issue whether publicly-mandated payments between private economic operators can constitute State aid. The GC has followed the functional approach of the Court of Justice (ECJ) in Vent De Colère and Others (C-262/12, EU:C:2013:851, see here), continuing a line of case law that distinguishes PreussenElektra (C-379/98, EU:C:2001:160, see here), and further minimising the 'outlier' decision in Doux Élevages and Coopérative agricole UKL-AREE (C-677/11, EU:C:2013:348, see here).

In the case at hand, the relevant German scheme of financial support for the production of renewable energy created both mandatory purchase obligations of energy from renewable sources ('EEG energy') at above-market prices (the 'support scheme'), and reductions in such surcharges for certain types of electric-intensive undertakings in the manufacturing sector (or 'EUIs') (the 'compensation scheme'). Thus, the EEG energy financial scheme included both measures in support of producers and of 'heavy-users' of electricity. Importantly, all these financial measures were managed by intermediaries in the energy markets. The Commission had found this scheme in breach of EU State aid rules, unless stringent conditions applied.

One of Germany's main submissions against the application of State aid rules by the Commission (mainly, Art 107 TFEU) to prohibit was that the EEG energy support and compensation schemes was that 'according to the case-law, payments between individuals which are ordered by the State without being imputable to the budget of the State or of another public body and in respect of which the State does not relinquish any resources, in whatever form (such as taxes, duties, charges and so on), retain their private-law nature' (para 73).

This submission triggers an analysis of whether such payments qualify as State resources, which mainly hinges on whether the State has control over those funds. Seeking to rely on PreussenElektra and Doux Élevages, the arguments submitted by Germany focused on the fact that the aid was administered 'at arms length' by the energy intermediaries. On the contrary, seeking to rely on a functional approach to the assessment of 'public control' of the private funds that derived from the EEG energy financial scheme, the Commission's arguments were closer to the position of the ECJ in Vent De Colère.

In order to assess these issues, the GC reiterated consolidated case law of the ECJ and stressed that 'Article 107(1) TFEU covers all the financial means by which the public authorities may actually support undertakings, irrespective of whether or not those means are permanent assets of the public sector. Therefore, even if the sums corresponding to the measure in question are not permanently held by the Treasury, the fact that they constantly remain under public control, and therefore available to the competent national authorities, is sufficient for them to be categorised as State resources' (para 83).

In the assessment of the EEG energy support and compensation schemes, the GC engaged in a reasoning that, fundamentally, relied on two main issues: 1) the fact that German law imposed on specific energy intermediaries (in the case, on transmission system operators, or TSOs) obligations oriented towards the administration of the EEG energy financial schemes that 'can be assimilated, from the point of view of their effects, to a State concession' (para 93); and 2) the fact that the funds raised through the EEG energy financial schemes are ring-fenced by law or, in other words, 'the funds are not paid into the TSOs’ general budget or freely available to them, but are subject to separate accounting and allocated exclusively to the financing of the support and compensation schemes, to the exclusion of any other purpose' (ibid).

As a result of these two circumstances, the GC concludes that 'the funds generated by the EEG surcharge and administered collectively by the TSOs remain under the dominant influence of the public authorities in that the legislative and regulatory provisions governing them enable the TSOs, taken together, to be assimilated to an entity executing a State concession' (para 94, emphasis added). Or, even more clearly, that 'the fact that the State does not have actual access to the resources generated by the EEG surcharge, in the sense that they indeed do not pass through the State budget, does not affect ... the State’s dominant influence over the use of those resources and its ability to decide in advance, through the adoption of the EEG 2012, which objectives are to be pursued and how those resources in their entirety are to be used' (para 118).

The second key element in the analysis, in my view, is that the GC gives significant relevance to the fact that the payments ultimately required from consumers derived necessarily from the existence of the German law enacting the . In other words, the GC relied heavily on the fact that the surcharges amounted to '20% to 25% of the total amount of an average final consumer’s bill. Having regard to the extent of that burden, its passing on to final consumers must therefore be regarded as a consequence foreseen and organised by the German legislature. It is thus indeed on account of the EEG 2012 that final electricity consumers are, de facto, required to pay that price supplement or additional charge. It is a charge that is unilaterally imposed by the State in the context of its policy to support producers of EEG electricity and can be assimilated, from the point of view of its effects, to a levy on electricity consumption in Germany. Indeed, that charge is imposed by a public authority, for purposes in the general interest, namely protection of the climate and the environment by ensuring the sustainable development of energy supply and developing technologies for producing EEG electricity, and in accordance with the objective criterion of the quantity of electricity delivered by suppliers to their final customers' (para 95, emphasis added).

In my view, the GC is right on both points, and both the functional analysis of the control the State exercises over ring-fenced mandatory charges and the stress given to the (para)fiscal nature of the charge are good justifications for the enforcement of State aid rules against this type of State intervention--thus closing the gap created by cases such as Doux Élevages

However, the case also leaves a strange aftertaste due to the references to a 'State concession'. Given the increasing body of EU economic law applicable to concessions (notably, Dir 2014/23, which does not seem to have much to do with what the GC assessed in Commission v Germany), it would probably have been preferable for the GC to keep a stricter use of language.

In that regard, if the GC actually wanted to stress that the intermediaries administering the EEG energy financial scheme were exercising (quasi) delegated public powers or (quasi) delegated State prerogatives (which was the language used in Doux Élevages, para 32), then it better ought to say so in those terms. Otherwise, there is a risk of generating additional confusion in an area of EU economic law that, honestly, is getting ever more complex.