Still on the topic of interaction between corruption and collusion, or how corrupt officials can create or consolidate collusion in procurement markets, I have come across another interesting recent paper: T Gong & N Zhou, "Corruption and marketization: Formal and informal rules in Chinese public procurement" (2014) 9(1) Regulation & Governance 63-76.
This time, the research focuses on the Chinese experience and shows shockingly (not) similar trends to the Russian case study mentioned yesterday. The paper forcefully argues that 'empirical findings from China indicate that the relationship between
market liberalization and corruption is more complex and nuanced than
conventional wisdom suggests'.
Some of the most interesting insights refer to the collusion (in broad terms) of bidders and public officials to avoid the application of formal public procurement rules (72-73) which, once again, will sound very familiar to scholars and practitioners with experience in any jurisdiction.