AG Cruz Villalon on access to leniency applications: A stringent test. Really? (C-365/12)

In his Opinion of 3 October 2013 in case C-365/12 EnBW Energie, Advocate General Cruz Villalon has proposed a holistic interpretation of the regulatory schemes relating to access to documents of the institutions and, more specifically, of access to the European Commission's files in the context of its leniency programme. In my view, the holistic approach advocated for still leaves some important issues unresolved and, consequently, the Judgment of the CJEU in this case will be highly relevant.
 
According to AG Cruz Villalon, when access to the file in cartel investigations is concerned,
63. In short, the presumption [that access should be refused] must operate in relation to documents the disclosure of which is either ruled out or – in the case of Regulation No 1/2003, as compared with Regulation No 1049/2001– possible only on certain conditions. In other words, the presumption should be fully effective vis-à-vis parties who, in accordance with Regulation No 1/2003 and Regulation No 773/2004, have no right, in principle, to access the documents in cartel proceedings, as in the case of EnBW here; and this must also be the case vis-à-vis parties who have only a limited right of access or a right which is recognised solely for the purposes of safeguarding the right of defence.
64. That conclusion must carry a qualification, however. The abovementioned presumption ‘does not exclude the possibility of demonstrating that a given document, of which disclosure is sought, is not covered by that presumption or that there is a higher public interest justifying the disclosure of that document under Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 (Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, paragraph 62)’. Consequently, the fact that Regulation No 1/2003 does not provide for access by persons who are not parties to the proceedings means only that, in the event that such persons request access, their requests must be dealt with in accordance with Regulation No 1049/2001 (as the general legislation in the area of transparency), interpreted in the light of the general presumption that disclosure of the documents may undermine the purpose of the proceedings under Regulation No 1/2003. This presumption does not in any way rule out access pursuant to Regulation No 1049/2001: it merely imposes more stringent conditions on the access granted under that regulation (emphasis added).
In his Opinion, AG Cruz Villalon takes a very different approach, but basically supports a stringent test that would lead to the same restrictive outcome supported by AG Jaaskinen some months ago in C-536/11 Donau Chemie and others, where he considered that: 
in my opinion a legislative rule would be more appropriate that provided absolute protection for the participants in a leniency programme, but which required the interests of other participants to a restrictive practice to be balanced against the interests of the alleged victims. [...] Furthermore, in my view and except for undertakings benefiting from leniency (sic!), participation in and of itself in an unlawful restriction on competition does not constitute a business secret that merits protection by EU law (para 64, emphasis added).
It is worth stressing that such a radical approach (which I criticised) was rejected by the CJEU in the final Donau Chemie Judgment:
as regards the public interest of having effective leniency programmes [...] it should be observed that, given the importance of actions for damages brought before national courts in ensuring the maintenance of effective competition in the European Union (see Courage and Crehan, paragraph 27), the argument that there is a risk that access to evidence contained in a file in competition proceedings which is necessary as a basis for those actions may undermine the effectiveness of a leniency programme in which those documents were disclosed to the competent competition authority cannot justify a refusal to grant access to that evidence (para 46, emphasis added).
AG Cruz Villalon is aware of the position of the CJEU in Donau Chemie and, consequently (but implicilty), seeks to clarify his proposal for a stringent test on access to the file (and, more specifically, to leniency applications) by stressing that:
the effectiveness of leniency programmes can be safeguarded only (sic!) if it is guaranteed that, as a general rule, the documentation provided will be used by the Commission alone. This would, of course, be the ultimate safeguard. However, other safeguards should also be considered that are less extensive but still attractive for those wanting to take advantage of those programmes. In the final analysis, the rationale underlying leniency programmes is a calculation as to the extent of the harm that might arise from an infringement of competition law. Considered in those terms, to guarantee that the information provided to the Commission can be passed on to third parties only if they can adequately prove that they need it in order to bring an action for damages could constitute a sufficient safeguard, particularly considering that the alternative might be a penalty higher than that which might ensue were the action for damages to be successful. Admittedly, it is possible that a safeguard of that kind might result in fewer parties deciding to take advantage of leniency programmes. However, the objective of maximum effectiveness for that mechanism should not be regarded as justification for a complete sacrifice of the rights of those concerned to be compensated and, more generally, for an impairment of their rights to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (para 78, emphasis added).
In my opinion, the carve out that AG Cruz Villalon creates against his own proposal for a general presumption of non-disclosure (which waiver should be subjected to a stringent test) is not terribly consistent in logical terms, but seeks to accomodate the Donau Chemie Judgment. Nonetheless, the safeguard/test is not clearly presented and the AG's Opinion in EnBW Energie does not really clarify this (increasingly?) grey area of EU competition law. In fact, in view of his concern with the protection of the commercial interests of leniency applicants, it seems that he is actually de facto advocating for the strongest (absolute) safeguard presented above (which, in those terms, would basically amount to the absolute protection advocated for by Jaaskinen and rejected by the CJEU in Donau Chemie).
 
Indeed, AG Cruz Villalon weakly criticises the finding of the GC in paras 147-148 of the appealed EnBW Energie Judgment (‘the interests of the undertakings that had participated in the cartel … in non-disclosure of the documents requested cannot be regarded as commercial interests in the true sense of those words. Indeed, [...] the interest which those companies might have in non-disclosure of the documents requested seems to reside not in a concern to maintain their competitive position on the [...] market [...] but, instead, in a desire to avoid actions for damages being brought against them before the national courts’. In any event, that would not constitute ‘an interest deserving of protection, having regard, in particular, to the fact that any individual has the right to claim damages for loss caused to him by conduct which is liable to restrict or distort competition’), by indicating that, in his opinion, 
the possibility that disclosure of the information provided by the undertakings in question might objectively undermine their commercial interests cannot be ruled out. The fact that the information was provided voluntarily and with a view to avoiding or minimising a penalty is, in my opinion, no basis for regarding the commercial interests involved as unworthy of protection. Otherwise, undertakings that have cooperated with the Commission would suffer a further penalty, in addition to whatever penalty is ultimately considered appropriate, in the form of the damage caused to their commercial interests (para 93).
Therefore, in my view, AG Cruz Villalon's EnBW Energie Opinion (because of its different technical approach) does put some pressure on the CJEU to finally and explicitly take a position on the compatibility with EU law of the protection of leniency applications that the European Commission and the National Competition Authorities within the European Competition Network are pursuing (see Resolution of 23 May 2012 on the protection of leniency material in the context of civil damages actions)--beyond the general remarks made in Donau Chemie.
 
Indeed, the CJEU failed to close that door in Donau Chemie by indicating that:
47 By contrast, the fact that such a refusal is liable to prevent those actions from being brought, by giving the undertakings concerned, who may have already benefited from immunity, at the very least partial, from pecuniary penalties, an opportunity also to circumvent their obligation to compensate for the harm resulting from the infringement of Article 101 TFEU, to the detriment of the injured parties, requires that refusal to be based on overriding reasons relating to the protection of the interest relied on and applicable to each document to which access is refused.
48 It is only if there is a risk that a given document may actually undermine the public interest relating to the effectiveness of the national leniency programme that non-disclosure of that document may be justified.
Hence, the debate is alive and kicking (on the CJEU's door) and a more definite answer is needed. Personally, I would support a very clear indication by the CJEU that leniency applications do not merit special treatment and, consequently, need to be disclosed to (credible) potential damages claimants and always under the supervision and within the context of judicial procedures. Otherwise, the leniency policy will kill damages actions and, even if it is very hard to trade-off the advantages and disadvantages of both policies, it seems clear that allowing for private redress and effective compensation is a requirement under EU law (as the CJEU has been so keen to consistently emphasise since Courage).
 
In the end, I would submit that the CJEU should bring his reasoning a step beyond and determine that "giving the undertakings concerned, who may have already benefited from immunity, at the very least partial, from pecuniary penalties, an opportunity also to circumvent their obligation to compensate for the harm resulting from the infringement of Article 101 TFEU, to the detriment of the injured parties" goes beyond the scope of the leniency programme--which advantages need to be contained within the sphere of the administrative effects (or, put otherwise, within the sphere of public enforcement).
 
Otherwise, the Commission and the NCAs will continue in their schizophrenic quest against cartels, where they try to have their cake (numerous leniency applications leading to resounding fines for the rest of the cartelists) and eat it too [by fostering a system for effective (collective) private reddress that, simply, cannot coexist peacefully with (or at least, cannot blossom under) full-blown leniency protection].