If you fine me, I have the right to appeal ~ even if someone else foots the bill (C-652/11)

In its Judgment of 11 April 2013 in case C-652/11 Mindo, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has reversed a prior Judgment of the General Court (GC) whereby it denied active standing to appeal a competition fine to an undertaking that was jointly and severally liable for its payment, on the basis that the other jointly liable party had already paid the fine in full and had not seeked recovery of any amounts for a period of 5 years.

The CJEU Judgment is interesting because it comes to set the general principle that, as long as there is a possibility of being made to pay the amount of the fine (fundamentally, because the claim is not time-barred and there are no specific indemnity agreements between the jointly liable parties), there is always a residual benefit for the undertaking to appeal the fine.

I think that the Mindo Judgment must be welcome and the CJEU has rightly quashed the prior GC ruling, which was basically relying on a set of 'factual' assumptions that were too far fetched. As the CJEU clearly emphasises, the GC erred in law in assuming that, by simply waiting to claim, Mindo's co-debtor had waived its right to seek reimbursement of the fine (particularly in a scenario where there was a pending appeal and, on top of that, Mindo had filed for bankruptcy and was under administration in accordance with Italian law--which justify the 'wait and see' strategy adopted).

However, I think that the CJEU could have even gone one step further and set the broader principle that the addressee of a fine is always entitled to appeal it if there are sufficient legal grounds, regardless of who ends up paying the fine. Otherwise, in cases where there is a dissociation between the fined undertaking and the payee of the fine (not necessarily due to their joint liability), it could be that no one has standing to appeal. 

The CJEU ducked this issue by not addressing the second ground of appeal, submitted in the alternative, where it was alleged that denial of active standing to appeal would infringement Mindo’s right to a fair trial. The fact that the CJEU did not address this issue derives probably only from the fact that it was presented in the alternative. However, given that the CJEU made no reference to the right of a fair trial, this can also be read as an exercise of certain self-restraint on the part of the Court, and as an attempt to open that Pandora's box only when necessary (since, indeed, the extension of fair trial rights to companies in the setting of EU competition law is not without problems, as I have discussed in The EU’s Accession to the ECHR and Due Process Rights in EU Competition Law Matters: Nothing New Under the Sun?). Be it as it may, in general terms, the referral of the case back to the GC should be welcome.