Digital procurement, PPDS and multi-speed datafication -- some thoughts on the March 2023 PPDS Communication

The 2020 European strategy for data ear-marked public procurement as a high priority area for the development of common European data spaces for public administrations. The 2020 data strategy stressed that

Public procurement data are essential to improve transparency and accountability of public spending, fighting corruption and improving spending quality. Public procurement data is spread over several systems in the Member States, made available in different formats and is not easily possible to use for policy purposes in real-time. In many cases, the data quality needs to be improved.

To address those issues, the European Commission was planning to ‘Elaborate a data initiative for public procurement data covering both the EU dimension (EU datasets, such as TED) and the national ones’ by the end of 2020, which would be ‘complemented by a procurement data governance framework’ by mid 2021.

With a 2+ year delay, details for the creation of the public procurement data space (PPDS) were disclosed by the European Commission on 16 March 2023 in the PPDS Communication. The procurement data governance framework is now planned to be developed in the second half of 2023.

In this blog post, I offer some thoughts on the PPDS, its functional goals, likely effects, and the quickly closing window of opportunity for Member States to support its feasibility through an ambitious implementation of the new procurement eForms at domestic level (on which see earlier thoughts here).

1. The PPDS Communication and its goals

The PPDS Communication sets some lofty ambitions aligned with those of the closely-related process of procurement digitalisation, which the European Commission in its 2017 Making Procurement Work In and For Europe Communication already saw as not only an opportunity ‘to streamline and simplify the procurement process’, but also ‘to rethink fundamentally the way public procurement, and relevant parts of public administrations, are organised … [to seize] a unique chance to reshape the relevant systems and achieve a digital transformation’ (at 11-12).

Following the same rhetoric of transformation, the PPDS Communication now stresses that ‘Integrated data combined with the use of state-of the-art and emerging analytics technologies will not only transform public procurement, but also give new and valuable insights to public buyers, policy-makers, businesses and interested citizens alike‘ (at 2). It goes further to suggest that ‘given the high number of ecosystems concerned by public procurement and the amount of data to be analysed, the impact of AI in this field has a potential that we can only see a glimpse of so far‘ (at 2).

The PPDS Communication claims that this data space ‘will revolutionise the access to and use of public procurement data:

  • It will create a platform at EU level to access for the first time public procurement data scattered so far at EU, national and regional level.

  • It will considerably improve data quality, availability and completeness, through close cooperation between the Commission and Member States and the introduction of the new eForms, which will allow public buyers to provide information in a more structured way.

  • This wealth of data will be combined with an analytics toolset including advanced technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), for example in the form of Machine Learning (ML) and Natural Language Processing (NLP).’

A first comment or observation is that this rhetoric of transformation and revolution not only tends to create excessive expectations on what can realistically be delivered by the PPDS, but can also further fuel the ‘policy irresistibility’ of procurement digitalisation and thus eg generate excessive experimentation or investment into the deployment of digital technologies on the basis of such expectations around data access through PPDS (for discussion, see here). Policy-makers would do well to hold off on any investments and pilot projects seeking to exploit the data presumptively pooled in the PPDS until after its implementation. A closer look at the PPDS and the significant roadblocks towards its full implementation will shed further light on this issue.

2. What is the PPDS?

Put simply, the PPDS is a project to create a single data platform to bring into one place ‘all procurement data’ from across the EU—ie both data on above threshold contracts subjected to mandatory EU-wide publication through TED (via eForms from October 2023), and data on below threshold contracts, which publication may be required by the domestic laws of the Member States, or entirely voluntary for contracting authorities.

Given that above threshold procurement data is already (in the process of being) captured at EU level, the PPDS is very much about data on procurement not covered by the EU rules—which represents 80% of all public procurement contracts. As the PPDS Communication stresses

To unlock the full potential of public procurement, access to data and the ability to analyse it are essential. However, data from only 20% of all call for tenders as submitted by public buyers is available and searchable for analysis in one place [ie TED]. The remaining 80% are spread, in different formats, at national or regional level and difficult or impossible to re-use for policy, transparency and better spending purposes. In order (sic) words, public procurement is rich in data, but poor in making it work for taxpayers, policy makers and public buyers.

The PPDS thus intends to develop a ‘technical fix’ to gain a view on the below-threshold reality of procurement across the EU, by ‘pulling and pooling’ data from existing (and to be developed) domestic public contract registers and transparency portals. The PPDS is thus a mechanism for the aggregation of procurement data currently not available in (harmonised) machine-readable and structured formats (or at all).

As the PPDS Communication makes clear, it consists of four layers:
(1) A user interface layer (ie a website and/or app) underpinned by
(2) an analytics layer, which in turn is underpinned by (3) an integration layer that brings together and minimally quality-assures the (4) data layer sourced from TED, Member State public contract registers (including those at sub-national level), and data from other sources (eg data on beneficial ownership).

The two top layers condense all potential advantages of the PPDS, with the analytics layer seeking to develop a ‘toolset including emerging technologies (AI, ML and NLP)‘ to extract data insights for a multiplicity of purposes (see below 3), and the top user interface seeking to facilitate differential data access for different types of users and stakeholders (see below 4). The two bottom layers, and in particular the data layer, are the ones doing all the heavy lifting. Unavoidably, without data, the PPDS risks being little more than an empty shell. As always, ‘no data, no fun’ (see below 5).

Importantly, the top three layers are centralised and the European Commission has responsibility (and funding) for developing them, while the bottom data layer is decentralised, with each Member State retaining responsibility for digitalising its public procurement systems and connecting its data sources to the PPDS. Member States are also expected to bear their own costs, although there is EU funding available through different mechanisms. This allocation of responsibilities follows the limited competence of the EU in this area of inter-administrative cooperation, which unfortunately heightens the risks of the PPDS becoming little more than an empty shell, unless Member States really take the implementation of eForms and the collaborative approach to the construction of the PPDS seriously (see below 6).

The PPDS Communication foresees a progressive implementation of the PPDS, with the goal of having ‘the basic architecture and analytics toolkit in place and procurement data published at EU level available in the system by mid-2023. By the end of 2024, all participating national publication portals would be connected, historic data published at EU level integrated and the analytics toolkit expanded. As of 2025, the system could establish links with additional external data sources’ (at 2). It will most likely be delayed, but that is not very important in the long run—especially as the already accrued delays are the ones that pose a significant limitation on the adequate rollout of the PPDS (see below 6).

3. PPDS’ expected functionality

The PPDS Communication sets expectations around the functionality that could be extracted from the PPDS by different agents and stakeholders.

For public buyers, in addition to reducing the burden of complying with different types of (EU-mandated) reporting, the PPDS Communication expects that ‘insights gained from the PPDS will make it much easier for public buyers to

  • team up and buy in bulk to obtain better prices and higher quality;

  • generate more bids per call for tenders by making calls more attractive for bidders, especially for SMEs and start-ups;

  • fight collusion and corruption, as well as other criminal acts, by detecting suspicious patterns;

  • benchmark themselves more accurately against their peers and exchange knowledge, for instance with the aim of procuring more green, social and innovative products and services;

  • through the further digitalisation and emerging technologies that it brings about, automate tasks, bringing about considerable operational savings’ (at 2).

This largely maps onto my analysis of likely applications of digital technologies for procurement management, assuming the data is there (see here).

The PPDS Communication also expects that policy-makers will ‘gain a wealth of insights that will enable them to predict future trends‘; that economic operators, and SMEs in particular, ‘will have an easy-to-use portal that gives them access to a much greater number of open call for tenders with better data quality‘, and that ‘Citizens, civil society, taxpayers and other interested stakeholders will have access to much more public procurement data than before, thereby improving transparency and accountability of public spending‘ (at 2).

Of all the expected benefits or functionalities, the most important ones are those attributed to public buyers and, in particular, the possibility of developing ‘category management’ insights (eg potential savings or benchmarking), systems of red flags in relation to corruption and collusion risks, and the automation of some tasks. However, unlocking most of these functionalities is not dependent on the PPDS, but rather on the existence of procurement data at the ‘right’ level.

For example, category management or benchmarking may be more relevant or adequate (as well as more feasible) at national than at supra-national level, and the development of systems of red flags can also take place at below-EU level, as can automation. Importantly, the development of such functionalities using pan-EU data, or data concerning more than one Member State, could bias the tools in a way that makes them less suited, or unsuitable, for deployment at national level (eg if the AI is trained on data concerning solely jurisdictions other than the one where it would be deployed).

In that regard, the expected functionalities arising from PPDS require some further thought and it can well be that, depending on implementation (in particular in relation to multi-speed datafication, as below 5), Member States are better off solely using domestic data than that coming from the PPDS. This is to say that PPDS is not a solid reality and that its enabling character will fluctuate with its implementation.

4. Differential procurement data access through PPDS

As mentioned above, the PPDS Communication stresses that ‘Citizens, civil society, taxpayers and other interested stakeholders will have access to much more public procurement data than before, thereby improving transparency and accountability of public spending’ (at 2). However, this does not mean that the PPDS will be (entirely) open data.

The Communication itself makes clear that ‘Different user categories (e.g. Member States, public buyers, businesses, citizens, NGOs, journalists and researchers) will have different access rights, distinguishing between public and non-public data and between participating Member States that share their data with the PPDS (PPDS members, …) and those that need more time to prepare’ (at 8). Relatedly, ‘PPDS members will have access to data which is available within the PPDS. However, even those Member States that are not yet ready to participate in the PPDS stand to benefit from implementing the principles below, due to their value for operational efficiency and preparing for a more evidence-based policy’ (at 9). This raises two issues.

First, and rightly, the Communication makes clear that the PPDS moves away from a model of ‘fully open’ or ‘open by default’ procurement data, and that access to the PPDS will require differential permissioning. This is the correct approach. Regardless of the future procurement data governance framework, it is clear that the emerging thicket of EU data governance rules ‘requires the careful management of a system of multi-tiered access to different types of information at different times, by different stakeholders and under different conditions’ (see here). This will however raise significant issues for the implementation of the PPDS, as it will generate some constraints or disincentives for an ambitions implementation of eForms at national level (see below 6).

Second, and less clearly, the PPDS Communication evidences that not all Member States will automatically have equal access to PPDS data. The design seems to be such that Member States that do not feed data into PPDS will not have access to it. While this could be conceived as an incentive for all Member States to join PPDS, this outcome is by no means guaranteed. As above (3), it is not clear that Member States will be better off—in terms of their ability to extract data insights or to deploy digital technologies—by having access to pan-EU data. The main benefit resulting from pan-EU data only accrues collectively and, primarily, by means of facilitating oversight and enforcement by the European Commission. From that perspective, the incentives for PPDS participation for any given Member State may be quite warped or internally contradictory.

Moreover, given that plugging into PPDS is not cost-free, a Member State that developed a data architecture not immediately compatible with PPDS may well wonder whether it made sense to shoulder the additional costs and risks. From that perspective, it can only be hoped that the existence of EU funding and technical support will be maximised by the European Commission to offload that burden from the (reluctant) Member States. However, even then, full PPDS participation by all Member States will still not dispel the risk of multi-speed datafication.

5. No data, no fun — and multi-speed datafication

Related to the risk that some EU Member States will become PPDS members and others not, there is a risk (or rather, a reality) that not all PPDS members will equally contribute data—thus creating multi-speed datafication, even within the Member States that opt in to the PPDS.

First, the PPDS Communication makes it clear that ‘Member States will remain in control over which data they wish to share with the PPDS (beyond the data that must be published on TED under the Public Procurement Directives)‘ (at 7), It further specifies that ‘With the eForms, it will be possible for the first time to provide data in notices that should not be published, or not immediately. This is important to give assurance to public buyers that certain data is not made publicly available or not before a certain point in time (e.g. prices)’ (at 7, fn 17).

This means that each Member State will only have to plug whichever data it captures and decides to share into PPDS. It seems plain to see that this will result in different approaches to data capture, multiple levels of granularity, and varying approaches to restricting access to the date in the different Member States, especially bearing in mind that ‘eForms are not an “off the shelf” product that can be implemented only by IT developers. Instead, before developers start working, procurement policy decision-makers have to make a wide range of policy decisions on how eForms should be implemented’ in the different Member States (see eForms Implementation Handbook, at 9).

Second, the PPDS Communication is clear (in a footnote) that ‘One of the conditions for a successful establishment of the PPDS is that Member States put in place automatic data capture mechanisms, in a first step transmitting data from their national portals and contract registers’ (at 4, fn 10). This implies that Member States may need to move away from manually inputted information and that those seeking to create new mechanisms for automatic procurement data capture can take an incremental approach, which is very much baked into the PPDS design. This relates, for example, to the distinction between pre- and post-award procurement data, with pre-award data subjected to higher demands under EU law. It also relates to above and below threshold data, as only above threshold data is subjected to mandatory eForms compliance.

In the end, the extent to which a (willing) Member State will contribute data to the PPDS depends on its decisions on eForms implementation, which should be well underway given the October 2023 deadline for mandatory use (for above threshold contracts). Crucially, Member States contributing more data may feel let down when no comparable data is contributed to PPDS by other Member States, which can well operate as a disincentive to contribute any further data, rather than as an incentive for the others to match up that data.

6. Ambitious eForms implementation as the PPDS’ Achilles heel

As the analysis above has shown, the viability of the PPDS and its fitness for purpose (especially for EU-level oversight and enforcement purposes) crucially depends on the Member States deciding to take an ambitious approach to the implementation of eForms, not solely by maximising their flexibility for voluntary uses (as discussed here) but, crucially, by extending their mandatory use (under national law) to all below threshold procurement. It is now also clear that there is a need for as much homogeneity as possible in the implementation of eForms in order to guarantee that the information plugged into PPDS is comparable—which is an aspect of data quality that the PPDS Communication does not seem to have at all considered).

It seems that, due to competing timings, this poses a bit of a problem for the rollout of the PPDS. While eForms need to be fully implemented domestically by October 2023, the PPDS Communication suggests that the connection of national portals will be a matter for 2024, as the first part of the project will concern the top two layers and data connection will follow (or, at best, be developed in parallel). Somehow, it feels like the PPDS is being built without a strong enough foundation. It would be a shame (to put it mildly) if Member States having completed a transition to eForms by October 2023 were dissuaded from a second transition into a more ambitious eForms implementation in 2024 for the purposes of the PPDS.

Given that the most likely approach to eForms implementation is rather minimalistic, it can well be that the PPDS results in not much more than an empty shell with fancy digital analytics limited to very superficial uses. In that regard, the two-year delay in progressing the PPDS has created a very narrow (and quickly dwindling) window of opportunity for Member States to engage with an ambitions process of eForms implementation

7. Final thoughts

It seems to me that limited and slow progress will be attained under the PPDS in coming years. Given the undoubted value of harnessing procurement data, I sense that Member States will progress domestically, but primarily in specific settings such as that of their central purchasing bodies (see here). However, whether they will be onboarded into PPDS as enthusiastic members seems less likely.

The scenario seems to resemble limited voluntary cooperation in other areas (eg interoperability; for discussion see here). It may well be that the logic of EU competence allocation required this tentative step as a first move towards a more robust and proactive approach by the Commission in a few years, on grounds that the goal of creating the European data space could not be achieved through this less interventionist approach.

However, given the speed at which digital transformation could take place (and is taking place in some parts of the EU), and the rhetoric of transformation and revolution that keeps being used in this policy area, I can’t but feel let down by the approach in the PPDS Communication, which started with the decision to build the eForms on the existing regulatory framework, rather than more boldly seeking a reform of the EU procurement rules to facilitate their digital fitness.

Doing your best, and yet feeling like failing -- let's talk more about challenges for academics be(com)ing parents

(c) Evangeline Gallagher/Guardian.

(c) Evangeline Gallagher/Guardian.

I have recently had a few exchanges with younger academic colleagues that have become parents. Given my own experience during the just over three years since I became a dad, I was not surprised (but still deeply saddened) to hear them express frustration at the lack of time to engage with research and intellectual stimulation in the way they wanted, and a consequent certain loss of their identity and sometimes sense of self-worth, and fears and worries about the impact that juggling new childcare responsibilities (which everyone found to be extremely fulfilling and rewarding, though) will have on careers and reputations, or even job stability.

What did surprise me, however, is that most colleagues felt that the situation was made worse because nobody talks about it, which fuels feelings of isolation and imposter syndrome (which I very much experience myself too), or can even push some to try to hide or certainly not volunteer the fact of their imminent or recent parenthood. So this post just tries to start a conversation and to say to each and every one of my academic colleagues facing a similar struggle, that I see you and I am always happy to talk about it. Please do reach out if you feel like it.

I am, of course, consciously aware of my privileged position as a middle-class, white, male professor, but I am also acutely aware of the fact that I got to this stage in my career before becoming a parent and I am also entirely convinced that I would not have progressed so quickly in academia if I had been a parent at a younger age. As a result of this, in my mind, I hold very complicated and contradictory thoughts and feelings: I have no reason to complain or to expect things to be any better, but I also do not deserve my position because it is one reflective of the merits and contribution of an Albert that no longer exists (the one always available, willing to overwork, to travel, the one that ‘was everywhere’ and was the first one to react to developments in my field). I feel bad that I cannot make the same sort of contribution I used to. And that is because I left it (and the reputation, prestige, or simply ego resulting from it) define me. I am no longer that person, so who am I and how can I still occupy the same space or have the same aspirations as the Albert that no longer is?

I am very happy that I took extended periods of shared parental leave to bond with and take care of my kids when they were babies, but I also struggled a fair bit during those periods of absence from academia. Especially during my second shared parental leave because I took it 'solo' (my partner went back to work) and I found myself craving some 'adult' / 'intellectual' conversation regularly. This led me to accept invitations to participate in training programmes and webinars during my period of leave, as I thought that would make the feeling subside. But, to the contrary, after each event I was left exhausted and feeling that I had both failed as an academic (my performances were well below what I would have liked due to sleep deprivation, mental rustiness and the unavoidable distractions of ‘zooming with a baby on your arms’) and, worse, that I had neglected my child and robbed her of some precious quality time.

And this has not stopped. To be 100% honest, I keep struggling with my new identity of parent academic (and increased imposter syndrome that comes with the need to say no even more than before, with the prioritisation of parent over academic) after having returned from the second leave a few months ago. I still have serious difficulty facing (and are yet to accept) the prospects of a more constrained academic life that really needs to be balanced with (a lovely) family. And this is not helped by the fact that I had set the bar so high for myself (both in my head and regarding institutional expectations), that I cannot but keep failing in my futile attempts at trying to clear it. I am honestly doing my best, and yet, every day, I feel I am failing.

When I can take a step back from those feelings (and it is hard not to swim, or even indulge in them), I can see that most of these feelings are probably in common with everyone else that becomes a parent and therefore sees their lives decentered (or recentered), but I think that perhaps this is particularly challenging for academics given ‘the way the system now works’ and the underappreciated role of self-confidence and self-believe in enabling us to perform our jobs at the level of ‘continuous and ever-increasing excellence’ expected from us.

I also think that the challenges are particularly acute for academics becoming parents because it is a major shock that probably puts a mirror in front of (most of) us that reflects how unsustainable and unbalanced our work/research/life was, although of course the challenges remain for academics being parents (at least for a good few years, I hear from most colleagues further advanced in their parenthoods).

And I also think this is probably only getting worse given the perverse dynamics of permanent assessment and benchmarking of our performance, as well as a de facto ‘up or out’ system where you are seen to fail unless you go from promotion to promotion in short periods of time — because, in the end, the social status of the profession has been degraded so significantly that there is a worrying perception that *just* having a permanent entry-level academic job (Assistant Professor or Lecturer, depending on the system) does not really recognise you as a weighty expert in your field (which it does, in my opinion).

So, here it is. At least I have emptied my brain. And I hope someone, somewhere will find some value in the reflection. And perhaps a conversation will start. I am here, and I am listening.

Further thoughts on data and policy indicators a-propos two recent papers on procurement regulation & competition: comments re (Tas: 2019a&b)

The EUI Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies’ working papers series has two interesting recent additions on the economic analysis of procurement regulation and its effects on competition, efficiency and value for money. Both papers are by BKO Tas.

The first paper: ‘Bunching Below Thresholds to Manipulate Public Procurement’ explores the effects of a contracting authority’s ‘bunching strategy’ to seek to exercise more discretion by artificially estimating the value of future contracts just below the thresholds that would trigger compliance with EU procurement rules. This paper is relevant to the broader discussion on the usefulness and adequacy of current EU (and WTO GPA) value thresholds (see eg the work of Telles, here and here), as well as on the regulatory decisions that EU Member States face on whether to extend the EU rules to ‘below-threshold’ contracts.

The second paper: ‘Effect of Public Procurement Regulation on Competition and Cost-Effectiveness’ uses the World Bank’s ‘Benchmarking Public Procurement’ quality scores to empirically test the positive effects of improved regulation quality on competition and value for money, measured as increases in the number of bidders and the probability that procurement price is lower than estimated cost. This paper is relevant in the context of recent discussions about the usefulness or not of procurement benchmarks, and regarding the increasing concern about reduced number of bids in EU-regulated public tenders.

In this blog post, I reflect on the methodology and insights of both papers, paying particular attention to the fact that both papers build on datasets and/or indexes (TED, the WB benchmark) that I find rather imperfect and unsuitable for this type of analysis (regarding TED, in the context of the Single Market Scoreboard for Public Procurement (SMPP) that builds upon it, see here; regarding the WB benchmark, see here). Therefore, not all criticisms below are to the papers themselves, but rather to the distortions that skewed, incomplete or misleading data and indicators can have on more refined analysis that builds upon them.

Bunching Below Thresholds to Manipulate Procurement (Tas: 2019a)

It is well-known that the EU procurement rules are based on a series of jurisdictional triggers and that one of them concerns value thresholds—currently regulated in Arts 4 & 5 of Directive 2014/24/EU. Contracts with an estimated value above those thresholds are subjected to the entire EU procurement regulation, whereas contracts of a lower value are solely subjected to principles-based requirements where they are of ‘cross-border interest’. Given the obvious temptation/interest in keeping procurement shielded from EU requirements, the EU Directives have included an anti-circumvention rule aimed at preventing Member States from artificially splitting contracts in order to keep their award below the relevant jurisdictional thresholds (Art 5(3) Dir 2014/24). This rule has been interpreted expansively by the Court of Justice of the European Union (see eg here).

‘Bunching Below Thresholds to Manipulate Public Procurement’ examines the effects of a practice that would likely infringe the anti-circumvention rule, as it assesses a strategy of ‘bunching estimated costs just below thresholds’ ‘to exercise more discretion in public procurement’. The paper develops a methodology to identify contracting authorities ‘that have higher probabilities of bunching estimated values below EU thresholds’ (ie manipulative authorities) and finds that ‘[m]anipulative authorities have significantly lower probabilities of employing competitive procurement procedure. The bunching manipulation scheme significantly diminishes cost-effectiveness of public procurement. On average, prices of below threshold contracts are 18-28% higher when the authority has an elevated probability of bunching.’ These are quite striking (but perhaps not surprising) results.

The paper employs a regression discontinuity approach to determine the likelihood of bunching. In order to do that, the paper relies on the TED database. The paper is certainly difficult to read and hardly intelligible for a lawyer, but there are some issues that raise important questions. One concerns the authors’ (mis)understanding of how the WTO GPA and the EU procurement rules operate, in particular when the paper states that ‘Contracts covered by the WTO GPA are subject to additional scrutiny by international organizations and authorities (sic). Accordingly, contracts covered by the WTO GPA are less likely to be manipulated by EU authorities’ (p. 12).  This is simply an acritical transplant of considerations made by the authors of a paper that examined procurement in the Czech Republic, where the relevant threshold between EU covered and non-EU covered procurement would make sense. Here, the distinction between WTO GPA and EU-covered procurement simply makes no sense, given that WTO GPA and EU thresholds are coordinated. This alone raises some issues concerning the tests designed by the author to check the robustness of the hypothesis that bunching leads to inefficiency in procurement expenditure.

Another issue concerns the way in which the author equates open procedures to a ‘first price auction mechanism’ (which they are not exactly) and dismisses other procedures (notably, the restricted procedure) as incapable of ensuring value for money or, more likely, as representative of a higher degree of discretion for the contracting authority—which is a highly questionable assumption.

More importantly, I am not sure that the author understood what is in the TED database and, crucially, what is not there (see section 2 of Tas (2019a) for methodology and data description). Albeit not very clearly, the author presents TED as a comprehensive database of procurement notices—ie, as if 100% of procurement expenditure by Member States was recorded there. However, in the specific context of bunching below thresholds, the TED database is very likely to be incomplete.

Contracting authorities tendering contracts below EU thresholds are under no obligation to publish a contract notice (Art 49 Dir 2014/24). They could publish voluntarily, in particular in the form of a voluntary ex ante transparency (VEAT) notice, but that would make no sense from the perspective of a contracting authority that seeks to avoid compliance with EU rules by bunching (ie manipulating) the estimated contract value, as that would expose it to potential litigation. Most authorities that are bunching their procurement needs (or, in simple terms) avoiding compliance with the EU rules will not be reflected in the TED database at all, or will not be identified by the methodology used by Tas (2019a), as they will not have filed any notices for contracts below thresholds.

How is it possible that TED includes notices regarding contracts below the EU thresholds, then? Well, this is anybody’s guess, but mine is that a large proportion of those notices will be linked to either countries with a tradition of full transparency (over-reporting), to contracts where there are any doubts about the potential cross-border interest (sometimes assessed over-cautiously), or will be notices with mistakes, where the estimated value of the contract is erroneously indicated as below thresholds.

Even if my guess was incorrect and all notices for contracts with a value below thresholds were accurate and justified by the existence of a potential cross-border interest, the database cannot be considered complete. One of the issues raised (imperfectly) by the Single Market Scoreboard (indicator [3] publication rate) is the relatively low level of procurement that is advertised in TED compared to the (putative/presumptive) total volume of procurement expenditure by the Member States. Without information on the conditions of the vast majority of contract awards (below thresholds, unreported, etc), any analysis of potential losses of competitiveness / efficiency in public expenditure (due to bunching or otherwise) is bound to be misleading.

Moreover, Tas (2019a) is premised on the hypothesis that procurement below EU thresholds allows for significantly more discretion than procurement above those thresholds. However, this hypothesis fails to recognise the variety of transposition strategies at Member State level. While some countries have opted for less stringent below EU threshold regimes, others have extended the EU rules to the entirety of their procurement (or, perhaps, to contracts up to and including much lower values than the EU thresholds, to the exception of some class of ‘micropurchases’). This would require the introduction of a control that could refine Tas’ analysis and distinguish those cases of bunching that do lead to more discretion and those that do not (at least formally)—which could perhaps distinguish between price effects derived from national-only transparency from those of more legally-dubious maneuvering.

In my view, regardless of the methodology and the math underpinning the paper (which I am in no position to assess in detail), once these data issues are taken into account, the story the paper tries to tell breaks down and there are important shortcomings in its empirical strategy that, in my view, raise significant issues around the strength of its findings—assessed not against the information in TED, but against the (largely unknown, unrecorded) reality of procurement in the EU.

I have no doubt that there is bunching in practice, and that the intuition that it raises procurement costs must be right, but I have serious doubts about the possibility to reliably identify bunching or estimate its effects on the basis of the information in TED, as most culprits will not be included and the effects of below threshold (national) competition only will mostly not be accounted for.

(Good) Regulation, Competition & Cost-Effectiveness (Tas: 2019b)

It is also a very intuitive hypothesis that better regulation should lead to better procurement outcomes and, consequently, that more open and robust procurement rules should lead to more efficiency in the expenditure of public funds. As mentioned above, Tas (2019b) explores this hypothesis and seeks to empirically test it using the TED database and the World Bank’s Benchmarking Public Procurement (in its 2017 iteration, see here). I will not repeat my misgivings about the use of the TED database as a reliable source of information. In this second part, I will solely comment on the use of the WB’s benchmark.

The paper relies on four of the WB’s benchmark indicators (one further constructed by Djankov et al (2017)): the ‘bid preparation score, bid and contract management score, payment of suppliers score and PP overall index’. The paper includes a useful table with these values (see Tas (2019b: Table 4)), which allows the author to rank the countries according to the quality of their procurement regulation. The findings of Tas (2019b) are thus entirely dependent on the quality of the WB’s benchmark and its ability to capture (and distinguish) good procurement regulation.

In order to test the extent to which the WB’s benchmark is a good input for this sort of analysis, I have compared it to the indicator that results from the European Commission’s Single Market Scoreboard for Public Procurement (SMSPP, in its 2018 iteration). The comparison is rather striking …

Source: own elaboration.

Source: own elaboration.

Clearly, both sets of indicators are based on different methodologies and measure relatively different things. However, they are both intended to express relevant regulators’ views on what constitutes ‘good procurement regulation’. In my view, both of them fail to do so for reasons already given (see here and here).

The implications for work such as Tas (2019b) is that the reliability of the findings—regardless of the math underpinning them—is as weak as the indicators they are based on. Likely, plugging the same methods to the SMSPP instead of the WB’s index would yield very different results—perhaps, that countries with very low quality of procurement regulation (as per the SMSPP index) achieve better economic results, which would not be a popular story with policy-makers…  and the results with either index would also be different if the algorithms were not fed by TED, but by a more comprehensive and reliable database.

So, the most that can be said is that attempts to empirically show effects of good (or poor) procurement regulation remain doomed to fail or , in perhaps less harsh terms, doomed to tell a story based on a very skewed, narrow and anecdotal understanding of procurement and an incomplete recording of procurement activity. Believe those stories at your own peril…