reasons for the deduction of points at tender evaluation must be fully disclosed to their last detail: AG MENGOZZI ON DUTY TO MOTIVATE PROCUREMENT DECISIONS (C-376/16 P)

AG Mengozzi has put pressure on the Court of Justice (ECJ) to continue pushing for excessive transparency in the context of procurement litigation. On this occasion, the AG has invited the ECJ to establish an extremely stringent requirement for the disclosure of detailed comparisons of the evaluation reports to the level of award sub-criteria, without assessing the extent to which the contracting authority can have legitimate reasons to withhold parts of the evaluation.

In my view, this approach would create significant imbalances between the duty to provide reasons to disappointed tenderers and the duty to preserve competition for public contracts and sufficient protection of business and commercial information, which is problematic [for discussion, see K-M Halonen, 'Disclosure Rules in EU Public Procurement: Balancing between Competition and Transparency’ (2016) 16(4) Journal of Public Procurement 528; A Sanchez-Graells, ‘The Difficult Balance between Transparency and Competition in Public Procurement: Some Recent Trends in the Case Law of the European Courts and a Look at the New Directives’ (2013) Univ. of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 13-11]. Therefore, I argue that the ECJ should deviate from the Opinion of AG Mengozzi in its final Judgment in this case.

It is worth noting that the case is subjected to a previous version of the procurement rules in the EU Financial Regulation, but the ECJ's Judgment will be more generally relevant, both in the context of the current Financial Regulation controlling EU Institutional procurement and, more generally, for procurement controlled by the rules in the 2014 EU Public Procurement Package.

The AG Opinion

In his Opinion of 28 September 2017 in case EUIPO v European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others, C-376/16 P, EU:C:2017:729, AG Mengozzi has once more attempted a delineation of the obligation to state reasons for a decision to reject a tender and, in particular, "with regard to the correlation between the specific negative assessments set out in the evaluation report and the deductions of net points made by the contracting authority" (para 19). Or, in other words, AG Mengozzi has indicated the way in which the case law of the Court of Justice (ECJ) on the duty to provide justifications in the context of procurement debriefing applies to the reasons for the deduction of points on the basis of negative judgements of the evaluation committee [for general discussion of this obligation, see A Sanchez-Graells, “Transparency in Procurement by the EU Institutions”, in K-M Halonen, R Caranta & A Sanchez-Graells (eds), Disclosure Rules within Public Procurement Procedures and During Contract Period, vol 9 EPL Series (Edward Elgar, forthc.)].

This point of law was raised by EUIPO against the previous finding of the General Court (GC) that, despite the fact that contracting authorities are not required to provide unsuccessful tenderers with a detailed summary of how each aspect of their tenders was taken into account for its evaluation, however,

when the contracting authority makes specific assessments as to the manner in which the tender in question fulfils or otherwise [award] criteria and sub-criteria, which are clearly relevant to the overall score of the tender, the duty to state reasons necessarily includes the need to explain how, in particular, negative assessments gave rise to the deduction of points (Judgment of 27 April 2016 in European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others v EUIPO, T-556/11, EU:T:2016:248, para 250).

In the specific case, the GC considered it particularly important because the evaluation method included relative measures, so that "any deduction of net points in respect of certain sub-criteria automatically resulted, under the formula applied by the contracting authority, in the increase in the number of gross points to be allocated to the successful tenderers’ tenders in respect of their technical quality" (AGO C-376/16 P, para 24 & T-556/11, para 251).

The circumstances of the case where such that EUIPO disclosed the overall score for each of the three technical or qualitative criteria used in tender evaluation, but not the detailed breakdown for each of the award sub-criteria taken into consideration by the evaluation committee. In those circumstances, the GC found that "it was impossible, both for [the disappointed tenderer] and for the Court, to understand the calculation or precise breakdown of the points deducted for each sub-criterion, or even for each of the sub-points, and that it was therefore also not possible to verify whether and to what extent those deductions actually corresponded to the negative assessments made in the evaluation report and, accordingly, whether they were justified or not, or, at the very least, sufficiently plausible" (AGO C-376/16 P, para 26 & T-556/11, para 252).

EUIPO opposed that finding, and the more general point of law made by the GC, on the basis that neither the applicable rules, nor the case law of the CJEU required the debriefing information provided to a disappointed tenderer to include a demonstration of "which negative comment led to which deduction of points for each specific sub-criterion or sub-point" (AGO C-376/16 P, para 28 - for details of the reasons, see paras 29-31).

Thus, the main point of contention concerns the limits of the duty to disclose details of the evaluation process and report. Or, as AG Mengozzi put it, the question is "in essence, whether the [GC] was right in holding that the decision to reject the tender did not satisfy the requirements to state reasons stemming from [the applicable rules], as interpreted by the case-law, or whether the [GC] applied an overly strict test compared with the aforementioned provisions and the relevant case-law of the [ECJ]" (AGO, C-376/16 P, para 32). 

After a short restatement of the ECJ case law on the limits of the obligation to provide reasons and disclose relevant parts of the evaluation report, and despite stressing that "the contracting authority [is not] under an obligation to provide an unsuccessful tenderer, upon written request from it, with a full copy of the evaluation report" (AGO, C-376/16 P, para 36), in short, AG Mengozzi has invited the ECJ to establish that the right disclosure standard is one where

(i) the extracts of the evaluation reports disclosed by the [contracting authority] [make] it possible to deduce the number of points obtained by the appellant in question in comparison with the successful tenderer, broken down each time for each sub-criterion, and the weight of each sub-criterion in the overall evaluation, and (ii), the comments of the evaluation committee which [are] disclosed [explain], for each award criterion, on the basis of which sub-criteria the [contracting authority] had found the tender of the successful tenderer or that of the appellant in question to be the best (AGO C-376/16 P, para 47, emphases in the original).

AG Mengozzi suggests that this would have already been implicitly established in the Judgment of 4 October 2012 in Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, C-629/11 P, EU:C:2012:617, para 11, where the circumstances of the case reflected this level of disclosure.

Criticism

In my view, this is not an adequate test.

First of all, I struggle to see where the boundary lies between having to disclose the evaluation report in full and having to provide an absolutely broken down comparative assessment of the evaluation of the disappointed tenderers' tender and that of the preferred tenderer. To be fair, the previous case law is riddled with such tensions and it is difficult to establish clear boundaries on the obligation to disclose information contained in the evaluation report. However, in my view, the step taken by AG Mengozzi (and previously by the GC) comes to nullify the general (minimum) safeguard that contracting authorities are not required to disclose the evaluation report in full.

Secondly, I am not sure that in the assessment of these issues enough consideration is given to the fact that the relevant rules allow contracting authorities not to disclose certain details where disclosure would hinder application of the law, would be contrary to the public interest or would harm the legitimate business interests of public or private undertakings or could distort fair competition between those undertakings. In my view, there is a clear case to be made for restricting the level of disclosure of the points given to competing tenderers to a level of generality (eg award criteria rather than sub-award criteria) that strikes a balance between allowing for the review of the procurement decision while preserving competing interests. If the case law of the ECJ develop in the direction suggested by AG Mengozzi, it will be almost impossible for contracting authorities to protect legitimate interests in the context of procurement, and this will have chilling effects on participation.

Third, such a test would potentially make sense in terms of disclosure between the contracting authority and the review body or court, but not in relation to the disappointed tenderer. It would make much more sense to allow for disclosure limited to the level of award criteria at debriefing stage and, only in case the disappointed tenderer is not satisfied and launches an administrative or judicial review, for that information to be released to the review body of court, with stringent rules on access to that confidential information (for example, along the lines of the guidelines recently adopted in England). In the absence of this differential access to sensitive information, the adoption of the test proposed by AG Mengozzi is excessive and creates structural risks for abuse and competitive distortions--which makes it an undesirable test.

On the whole, I think that this Opinion and the previous decision by the GC show that the logic and operation of the rules on disclosure of information in the context of procurement litigation require a careful reassessment. In a case such as this one, where the record shows that EUIPO made significant efforts to disclose information to the disappointed tenderer, while still (maybe implicitly) aiming to protect sensitive information, the imposition of higher levels of disclosure obligations seems to me excessive. Once more, this militates in favour of the regulation of specific procedural steps to assess issues of confidentiality and, in particular, the need to create some asymmetrically opaque review mechanisms that allow for proper scrutiny of procurement decisions in a way that does not jeopardise competition in the market or anyone's legitimate business and commercial interests.

 

Interesting guidance on confidentiality of commercial secrets in procurement litigation issued by the TCC

3058489_Technology-and-Construction-Court.JPG

In July 2017, the Technology and Construction Court (a sub-division of the Queen's Bench Division, part of the High Court of Justice for England and Wales) adopted new guidance on procedures for public procurement litigation (see Appendix H to the Technology and Construction Court Guide; the TCC guidance).

The TCC guidance includes two interesting sets of recommendations. One concerns an invitation to exhaust the possibilities for alternative dispute resolution before proceeding to full-fledged litigation (see paras [4] to [8]). The other concerns the disclosure of confidential information between the parties of the dispute (see paras [27] to [48]).

The latter is an issue that raises difficult problems for the protection of business secrets, and I find the TCC guidance interesting in the balance it tries to achieve between ensuring that disappointed tenderers gain access to the information they need to support their claims, and the broader considerations surrounding the need to ensure adequate protection of business secrets in order not to deter participation in public tenders (which is a tricky issue facing all EU jurisdictions, including the rules applicable to procurement carried out by the EU Institutions, and on which we are concentrating in the on-going research of the EPLG).

As the TCC guidance puts it, indeed, "[c]onfidentiality is not a bar to disclosure. However, the need to protect confidential information needs to be balanced by the basic principle of open justice", at para [27]. The TCC guidance aims to achieve such balance through practical approaches and general criteria for the balancing of interests. The approaches adopted by the TCC have been praised for being less restrictive than some of the decisions previously adopted in the context of procurement litigation in England and Wales (Kotsonis & Williams). 

In my view, beyond the effects it can have in litigation in England and Wales, the TCC guidance can be useful as a benchmark for the treatment of confidential information in other jurisdictions -- provided that the practical solutions that derive from the peculiarities of the British legal culture are adapted to domestic idiosyncrasies.

In particular, there are three aspects that I would identify as best practice susceptible of replication or adaptation in other legal contexts:

1. Promotion of the use of redacted versions of documentation rather than absolute bans on the disclosure of materials, as the use of redacted documents enables documents to be more widely disclosable (see paras [32]-[33]), and thus avoids decisions on confidentiality being taken on an 'all-or-nothing' basis for each of the documents. The guidance also indicates the best way of preparing and submitting to the court redacted versions of documents containing confidential information in a manner that allows for scrutiny and a speedy narrowing down of any discrepancies between the parties on the need to redact any specific bits of information.

2. Creation of one- or two-tier confidentiality rings. TCC guidance defines confidentiality rings as comprising persons to whom documents containing confidential information may be disclosed on the basis of their undertakings to preserve confidentiality, at para [34]. Importantly, the guidance indicates both that the party's external legal advisors will need to be included in the confidentiality ring (para [37]) and that the inclusion of personnel of the parties, including their in-house lawyers, will need to be assessed on the basis of relevant factors likely to include "that party’s right to pursue its claim, the principle of open justice, the confidential nature of the document and the need to avoid distortions of competition and/or the creation of unfair advantages in the market (including any retender) as a result of disclosure" (para [39], emphasis added). In reaching a decision about a specific individual, account needs to be taken of "his/her role and responsibilities within the organisation; the extent of the risk that competition will be distorted as a result of disclosure to them; the extent to which that risk can be avoided or controlled by restrictions on the terms of disclosure; and the impact that any proposed restrictions would have on that individual (for example by prohibiting them from participating in a re-tender or future tenders for a period of time)" (para [40], emphasis added). Similar reasoning would apply to other specialist advisors (such as accountants or other experts) (see para [43]).

Interestingly, the TCC guidance clarifies that employee representatives may need to be "admitted to a confidentiality ring on different terms from external representative" (para [41]), this giving rise to two-tier confidentiality rings--which administration can take different forms: ie, either court administered, with the judicial body establishing the conditions of access by different categories of representatives of the parties, or by delegating the management of the access to the confidentiality ring to the external advisors of the parties, who would then act as gatekeepers of the confidential information (para [42]). This second possibility may be foreign to practice and legal culture in other jurisdictions, but the first (court-administered) possibility for a two-tier confidentiality ring seems quite promising to me.

3. Establishment of (enforceable) undertakings to prevent unauthorised uses of the information gained as part of a confidentiality ring. TCC guidance establishes that access to confidential information will only be allowed where the members of confidentiality rings provide undertakings that "will preclude the use of the relevant material other than for the purposes of the proceedings and prevent disclosure outside the ring" (para [44]). More importantly, the TCC guidance explicitly contemplates the possibility for additional undertakings to be necessary "where there are concerns that disclosure could have an impact on competition and/or any subsequent procurement", and that such additional measures can include: "(1) Preventing employee representatives from holding copies of documents at their place of work and requiring them to inspect the material at a defined location (such as the offices of their external lawyers) ; (2) Limiting the involvement of a recipient of a document in any re-procurement of the contract which is the subject of the litigation; (3) Limiting the role which a recipient can play in competitions for other similar contracts for a fixed period of time in a defined geographic area; and/or (4) Preventing the recipient from advising on or having any involvement in certain matters, again for a fixed period of time" (para [45], emphasis added).

Of course, the monitoring of such undertakings will be complex and there can be very difficult evidentiary issues linked to claims of undue subsequent use of confidential information gained in the context of previous procurement litigation. On that issue, the TCC guidance establishes a strict proportionality test, whereby "[w]hilst the Court will give weight to the need to protect competition in the market, the more onerous the proposed restriction is, the more clearly it will need to be justified" (para [46]). In my view, this will play both ways. On the one hand, high risks of competition distortions will be able to justify the imposition of heavy restrictions on future activity of the employee concerned. On the other, an in reverse reasoning, the Court will have to ensure that future restrictions are not disproportionate to the value of the information and the position of the employee within its organisation.

However, there is a third implication that may bear spelling out, which is that some risks of future distortions of competition will be so high, that no acceptable restrictive measure can be designed--in which case I would argue against the inclusion of the relevant person in the confidentiality ring (eg I would not grant the CFO of a company access to the detailed financial schedule of any of its competitors).

* * * * 

Overall, I think that the TCC guidance will be useful and it will be interesting to see to what extent the practical roll-out of these recommendations provide an even more detailed case study that can serve as benchmark in other jurisdictions seeking to regulate the disclosure of confidential information in the context of public procurement litigation.

The curious case of the open envelope inside the envelope - a propos GC's Gfi PSF v Commission Judgment (T-200/16)

The General Court of the Court of Justice of the European Union (GC) has issued Judgment in case Gfi PSF v Commission, T-200/16, EU:T:2017:294 (available in French only). This is a curious case about the physical formalities imposed in a procurement procedure carried out by the European Commission (Publications Office), which required a set of envelopes to be enclosed in multiple layers so as to avoid their tampering prior to the official opening of bids. It is also interesting because it raises some issues around the difficulties in the fact finding of processes dominated by formal documentary evidence.

I am also afraid that the factual circumstances of the case are probably rather common in practice (they remind me of the submission of a tender for a multi-million concession contract that had to be submitted in suitcases locked with padlocks in Mexico some 10 years ago), and I guess that the case also reflects some of the advantages that could be gained by a proper migration to e-procurement (or at least to electronic submission of tenders).

In the case at hand, tenderers had to prepare their tenders in two separate envelopes. An envelope (a) containing their technical offer and an envelope (b) containing their financial offer. Both envelopes then had to be enclosed in a third envelope (c) marked as "Tender - not to be opened by the internal mail service" and placed in a fourth envelop (d), which had to be sent by registered mail or courier service, or be submitted in the offices of the European Commission as indicated in the letter of invitation to tender.

Gfi PSF prepared its tender in accordance with these instructions and sent it to the European Commission via UPS. However, t is worth noting that, inside envelope (c), Gfi PSF did not only include envelopes (a) and (b), but also several binders including additional information. The tender was submitted in time and there is an electronic receipt issued by UPS with a signature from a Commission official. However, an acknowledgement of receipt was also prepared by the mail service of the European Commission indicating that the offer had been received, but not in good state, and also including the following:

two headings, relating respectively to the "first container" and the "second container". In the section on the first container, the pre-printed indications "open" and "damaged" have both been checked. In the section on the second container, the same information was also checked. This last heading also contains the words "did not include the words "Do not open by the mail office"" and "there were no double envelopes", which were not checked (T-200/16, para 7, own translation from French).

After proceeding to the formal opening of the tenders, Gfi PSF's was rejected on the basis that the tender was already open when the contracting authority received it, which is a cause for rejection under Art 111(4)(b) of the Financial Regulation. After Gfi PSF challenged this decision and asked for additional details, the European Commission wrote a letter indicating that

even if the electronic receipt [issued by UPS] did not contain any remarks as to the status of the consignment containing the applicant's tender, this was because of the technical constraints of the terminal used by the courier acting for UPS. The [Commission's] note of receipt acknowledging the damage of the consignment was signed jointly by the same courier and a representative of the [Commission]. Copies of this note and a photograph of the said item were annexed to the" Commission's letter (T-200/16, para 13, own translation from French).

After inspecting the envelopes still in the custody of the Commission, counsel for Gfi PSF challenged the time, the content, and the probationary value of this acknowledgement of receipt issued by the Commission. It also sought to prove that the document had been issued unilaterally by the Commission because it was not clear that UPS had signed the note (which is however later proven wrong by the GC, see paras 53-54), and submitted that in any case the state of the offer resulted from improper handling by the Commission's mail services, rather than as a result of defective compliance with the physical requirements for the submission of the offer by Gfi PSF at the time of its expedition.

The Commission opposed this interpretation of the documents (in particular the lack of signature by a UPS representative) and the physical evidence (ie damaged envelopes), and provided additional evidence downloaded from UPS' tracking webpage, where the following remarks appeared from entries logged in the weeks following the delivery of the package to the Commission:

"[t] he goods are lacking. UPS will notify the additional details to the consignor / goods entrusted to the consignee "; and ... " [t]he damage to the contents of the packages has been reported [;] We will notify the consignor / We are investigating the claim for damages" (T-200/16, para 18, own translation from French).

Overall, then, the dispute concerns the factual circumstances of the delivery, the documentation of its receipt, as well as the ensuing investigation of the Commission's claim that the package was delivered by UPS. It is hard to imagine the physical state of the envelopes (it would have helped to have the pictures attached to the GC's Judgment), but it is certainly plausible that the envelopes where stacked in such a way that opening envelop (d) also ripped envelop (c) (particularly if they were of similar sizes). Be it as it may, the reasoning of the GC is interesting beyond the specific issues leading to the discrepancy in the state of the offer at the time of submission and of the formal opening of the tenders, which exonerates the Commission from any responsibility.

In the GC's view

... the acknowledgement of receipt is of significant probative value, since its content is attested by the signatures, on the one hand, of a person subject to the contracting authority and, on the other hand, by a third party not directly involved in the procurement tender, but rather acting indirectly on behalf of the tenderer whose tender is considered irregular by the contracting authority. However, the acknowledgement of receipt contains indications that both the first and second containers were both open and damaged, and that the second container displayed the words "Not to be open by the mail office" and contained a double envelope (T-200/16, paras 57-58, own translation from French).

This would create a difficulty in establishing the moment in which envelop (c) had been opened despite including the prescribed label against it. However, given the very peculiar circumstances of the case, where envelop (c) contained not only envelops (a) and (b)--which may not have been compromised--but also the binders including additional information, the GC found a way out by adopting a functional approach to the rules in Art 111(4)(b) Financial Regulation from the perspective of the integrity of the process. In that regard, it stressed that the submission instructions and Art 111(4)(b) aimed to ensure the confidentiality of all tenders until they are simultaneously open. From that perspective, the factual circumstances of the case led to the assessment that

On the one hand, the applicant does not claim that the binders were themselves placed in a closed envelope, the binders being visible in the photograph to which it refers, annexed to the letter of [the Commission sent during the debriefing and complaints procedure]. Furthermore, the fact that the binders were placed by the applicant in an envelope on which it indicated that it had affixed the words 'invitation to tender - not to be opened by the courier' [ie envelop (c)], which is established by the acknowledgment of receipt, shows that in the applicants' own view, the binders contained documents constituting its tender. Consequently, and due to the fact that it must be held that the outer envelope and the intermediate envelope of the item containing the applicant's tender had been presented open on the premises of the [European Commission], it must be found that certain data forming part of the applicant's offer were directly accessible. Consequently, it appears that the applicant's tender was submitted in such a way that its confidentiality, as required by Article 111 (1) of the Financial Regulation, was not guaranteed, as it was "already open" within the meaning of paragraph 4 (b) of that Article. Consequently, this offer was regularly rejected (T-200/16, paras 65-66, own translation from French).

This is important because the GC has no interest in (and probably no possibility to) establishing the way in which envelope (c) came to be open despite it being labelled as not to be open by the mail service. This fits with the burden of proof derived from a claim for damages based on Art 340 TFEU, which was the relevant underlying legal basis for this case. However, this leaves important questions unanswered, such as what would have happened if the binders were sealed in envelops, so that the opening of envelope (c) would not have made any of the contents of the offer directly accessible. In that case, the rejection of the offer on the basis that it had already been opened would be very problematic and would probably have required further investigation of how this came to be.

On balance, it seems that the GC places the burden of ensuring that the offers remain confidential on the tenderers, at least implicitly, by supporting a broad approach to the rejection of offers which confidentiality may have been compromised. As a matter of general trend, this seems preferable to the opposite. However, this also shows the unavoidable limitations of paper-based procurement procedures. Had the Commission been running an e-procurement (or at least electronic submission) process, this situation could have been easily avoided. It seems that, once more, the adaptation of procurement (and administrative activity, more generally) to new technologies cannot come quickly enough.

Difficult balance between #transparency and #competition in #publicprocurement

This paper stresses the negative impact that the excessive levels of transparency imposed by public procurement rules can have on competition for public contracts and, more generally, on the likelihood of cartelisation of the markets where public procurement takes place. The paper critically assesses some recent Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the General Court from this perspective and shows how the top EU Courts are still oblivious to the fact that excessive transparency may diminish the effectiveness of procurement by reducing competition. It also indicates that the case law itself has unused balancing tools that may help reduce the negative impact of excessive transparency, particularly if coupled with a reduction of the financial incentives offered to litigants that have no other claim than a 'mere' lack of compliance with full transparency. The paper concludes that a reform in the enforcement and oversight mechanisms oriented towards the setting up of a semi-opaque review system would overcome some of the deficiencies identified in the current case law from a law and economics perspective.
Sánchez Graells, A 'The Difficult Balance between Transparency and Competition in Public Procurement: Some Recent Trends in the Case Law of the European Courts and a Look at the New Directives' (November 2013). University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 13-11. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2353005.

Again on the protection of confidentiality in procurement evaluation: A step forward? (T-339/10 and T-532/10)

In its Judgment of 29 January 2013 in Joined Cases T‑339/10 and T‑532/10 Cosepuri Soc. Coop. pA v European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the General Court has ruled again on the topical issue of the protection of confidentiality and business secrets in tender evaluation--and, in principle, has shown a more balanced approach than in previous Judgments concerned with transparency at debriefing stage

However, in my opinion, the case law in this area still falls short from guaranteeing a proper balance between transparency and protection of business secrets and continues to promote excessive disclosure.

In the case at hand, Cosepuri challenged the EFSA's evaluation procedure on the basis of the confidential treatment of financial assessment. The GC has taken no issue with the degree of confidentiality imposed by EFSA, but on a series of grounds that still seem (partially) inadequate:

32 First, the applicant calls into question the fact that Part II.8.2 of the tender specifications provided that the tender evaluation procedure was to be confidential. It should be noted in that regard that the applicant has the right to challenge, as an incidental plea, the lawfulness of the specifications in the present action (see, to that effect, Case T495/04 Belfass v Council [2008] ECR II781, paragraph 44). […]
33 Article 89(1) of the Financial Regulation provides that all public contracts financed in whole or in part by the budget are to comply, inter alia, with the principle of transparency. In the present case, it must be noted that Part II.8.2 of the specifications, which provides that the procedure for the evaluation of the tenders is to be conducted in secret, satisfies the requirement of preserving the confidentiality of the tenders and the need to avoid, in principle, contact between the contracting authority and the tenderers (see, on this point, Article 99 of the Financial Regulation and Article 148 of the Implementing Rules). The principle of transparency, referred to in Article 89(1) of the Financial Regulation, which is invoked by the applicant, must be reconciled with those requirements. Accordingly, there is no basis on which it can be concluded that Part II.8 of the specifications is vitiated by unlawfulness.
34 Second, the applicant challenges the fact that it was not able to ascertain the price proposed by the successful tenderer. In particular, the applicant states that EFSA ensured that it would not be possible for any subsequent verification to be carried out by redacting from the evaluation report the price offered by the successful tenderer. In that regard, without there being any need to rule in the present case on whether the price proposed by the successful tenderer formed part of the information which the contracting authority should have communicated to the unsuccessful tenderers (sic), it is clear from the evidence submitted that the applicant was in a position to ascertain the price in questionIt is apparent from Section 2.4 of the evaluation committee report that the applicant and the successful tenderer offered the same price in respect of points 2 to 7 of the financial bid, both obtaining the maximum score of 15 points. The price offered by the successful tenderer in respect of points 2 to 7 of the financial bid is therefore abundantly clear from the evaluation committee report. Moreover, with regard to point 1 of the financial bid, the evaluation committee report indicated the price offered by the applicant and the mark obtained. Although it does not expressly refer to the price offered by the successful tenderer, that report specifies the mark obtained by it. Taking account of those factors, it was possible to calculate, without any difficulty, the price proposed by the successful tenderer in respect of point 1 of the financial bid, as submitted by EFSA in connection with the second plea. Furthermore, the Court has been able to verify, by way of the measure of inquiry adopted at the hearing (see paragraph 16 above), that the price mentioned by EFSA in its written pleadings was in fact the price proposed by the successful tenderer. In view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court considers that, even if EFSA had erred by failing to indicate expressly to the applicant the price proposed by the successful tenderer, such an error would have had no effect on the lawfulness of EFSA’s decision to reject the applicant’s tender and award the contract at issue to another tenderer whose bid was considered to be better, since the applicant was in a position to ascertain that price. The applicant’s arguments in that regard must therefore be rejected.
35 Third, with regard to the principle of sound administration relied on by the applicant, according to caselaw, guarantees afforded by the European Union legal order in administrative proceedings include, in particular, the principle of sound administration, which entails the duty on the part of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case (see the judgment of 15 September 2011 in Case T407/07 CMB and Christof v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 182 and the caselaw cited). In the present case, the arguments put forward by the applicant in the first plea, which essentially consist in criticising the fact that it was not granted access to the financial bid of the successful tenderer, do not demonstrate that EFSA failed to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the case. In the absence of more detailed evidence, the applicant’s arguments in that regard must be rejected. (T-339/10 and 532/10 at paras. 32 to 35, emphasis added).

In my view, paragraphs 33 and 35 of the Cosepuri Judgment must be welcome, as they set a more balanced framework for the assessment of the obligation to disclose confidential information and business secrets under the principles of transparency and good administration.

On the contrary, paragraph 34 deserves a clear rejection, given that the GC keeps a very formalistic approach to the protection of confidential information and takes no issue with the fact that such sensitive information as price can be disclosed indirectly, and considers that that does not infringe either the rights of the 'disclosed' undertaking to protection of its business secrets, nor the procedural rights of the disappointed bidder that is granted indirect access to that information.

I think that the GC should have taken a stronger position and clearly confirmed that both direct and indirect disclosure of price elements and financial evaluations can be restricted or excluded on grounds of protection of confidentiality. Otherwise, the incentives continue to push contracting authorities for an excessive degree of transparency in public procurement settings--which creates significant risks of collusion [Sánchez Graells, "Public Procurement and Competition: Some Challenges Arising from Recent Developments in EU Public Procurement Law" in Bovis (ed) Research Handbook on European Public Procurement  (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2206502].