#publicprocurement in price regulated markets: you cannot have your cake and eat it too, Mme. Spanish Minister of Health

The Spanish press has just reported that the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality has mandated some pharmaceutical companies to lower the prices of certain common use drugs. This would not be in the news but for the important detail that the Ministry has adopted this decision in retaliation for the low bids submitted by those pharmaceutical companies in a centralized procurement process run by the Andalusian Health Department in 2012 (which re-run is currently taking place). 

The Spanish Health Minister was upset to see that, as a result of the centralized purchase of drugs, the Andalusian regional authorities were receiving better offers than the Ministry and other (regional) Health Authorities had managed to secure from the same pharmaceutical companies. Moreover, the prices offered in the Andalusian tender were significantly lower than those charged in the 'private' market to users whose medication is not covered by Social Security.

Instead of learning the proper lessons and exploring the potential benefits of more efficient procurement techniques (which remain to be seen in the long run, particularly in terms of sustainability of low prices, rate of innovation, protection of effective competition, etc--of which I am personally highly skeptical), the Ministry adopted a rather childish and short-sighted strategy whereby it has sought to punish the drug manufacturers by damaging their revenue stream.

In today's reported decision, the Ministry is forcing the unruly pharma companies to lower their prices for the affected drugs to levels even lower than those offered in Andalusia.  The Ministry can impose such a price reduction as part of its general regulatory powers. In my opinion, this is an enormous mistake. The use of price regulation powers as a poison pill against pharma companies that bid aggressively in public tenders is simply nonsensical.

The only message that pharma companies should take home is the following: never, ever again, compete on prices. Surely, in the immediate future, the safest position for pharmaceutical companies will be to always bid the maximum authorized price, in order to avoid a downward revision every time they offer a discount in a public procurement procedure. And, in order to protect their revenue stream, to then lobby the Ministry to protect (or raise) the level of authorized prices. 

Could one think of a worse outcome in terms of effective market competition and efficiency of public procurement? I can't. But I am sure that the Spanish Ministry of Health may surprise me in the future...

Impossible dialogue on EU #publicprocurement reform? Council and Parliament follow parallel roads

I may be about to show how naive I am, but I have just astonishingly discovered that the EU Institutions in charge of discussing the European Commission's 2011 Proposal for a new general Directive on public procurement are working in parallel and do not seem to be talking to each other at all.

While the Council has been negotiating intensely and trying to find a compromise and common position for over a year (the most recently publicly available compromise text is dated 2 October 2012), the European Parliament's Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection has been looking at the 2011 Proposal independently and has published a Report that includes several hundred amendments to the original proposal (dated 11 January 2013). So far so good. Everybody seems to be doing its homework.

What is astonishing and a proof of the weak governance mechanisms in the EU Institutions is that the European Parliament's IMCO Committee has not incorporated the changes negotiated between Member States at the Council (which were disclosed, at least, on 24 July 2012 and again in the latest October 2012 compromise text). 

At this point, when the Council and the EU Parliament's representatives meet to discuss the amendments each institution wants to make on the Commission's 2011 Proposal, they will simply be speaking different languages. In some cases, the EU Parliament has proposals that concern articles the Council wants completely eliminated. Reversely, the Council has managed to reach a compromise on articles the Parliament wants to suppress. And all other types of inconsistent proposals can be found in both rather lengthy documents. It is plain to see that a first effort will need to be made to focus the terms of the discussion and work on a single basis text (which seems likely to be the one prepared by the Council, in my opinion). Therefore, waste of time and energies is sadly guaranteed.

In this situation, it is hard to anticipate that the new Directive can be adopted in early 2013 (which would already be a delay on the initial goal of having it published in the OJ by the end of 2012) and that it can be fully effective any time before 2016. Moreover, it is hard to see how such a scattered and uncoordinated legislative process can lead to a consistent and coherent final text--which imperfections can only be magnified at transposition stage, particularly if Member States use any ambiguities to include their preferred policy options.

All in all, I guess I am just puzzled by the fact that two institutions that have to cooperate in the adoption of new legislation can work in such a parallel and disconnected manner. Again, this just probably shows how naive I am. Or maybe it is an indicator that the system does not really work... 


Again on the protection of confidentiality in procurement evaluation: A step forward? (T-339/10 and T-532/10)

In its Judgment of 29 January 2013 in Joined Cases T‑339/10 and T‑532/10 Cosepuri Soc. Coop. pA v European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the General Court has ruled again on the topical issue of the protection of confidentiality and business secrets in tender evaluation--and, in principle, has shown a more balanced approach than in previous Judgments concerned with transparency at debriefing stage

However, in my opinion, the case law in this area still falls short from guaranteeing a proper balance between transparency and protection of business secrets and continues to promote excessive disclosure.

In the case at hand, Cosepuri challenged the EFSA's evaluation procedure on the basis of the confidential treatment of financial assessment. The GC has taken no issue with the degree of confidentiality imposed by EFSA, but on a series of grounds that still seem (partially) inadequate:

32 First, the applicant calls into question the fact that Part II.8.2 of the tender specifications provided that the tender evaluation procedure was to be confidential. It should be noted in that regard that the applicant has the right to challenge, as an incidental plea, the lawfulness of the specifications in the present action (see, to that effect, Case T495/04 Belfass v Council [2008] ECR II781, paragraph 44). […]
33 Article 89(1) of the Financial Regulation provides that all public contracts financed in whole or in part by the budget are to comply, inter alia, with the principle of transparency. In the present case, it must be noted that Part II.8.2 of the specifications, which provides that the procedure for the evaluation of the tenders is to be conducted in secret, satisfies the requirement of preserving the confidentiality of the tenders and the need to avoid, in principle, contact between the contracting authority and the tenderers (see, on this point, Article 99 of the Financial Regulation and Article 148 of the Implementing Rules). The principle of transparency, referred to in Article 89(1) of the Financial Regulation, which is invoked by the applicant, must be reconciled with those requirements. Accordingly, there is no basis on which it can be concluded that Part II.8 of the specifications is vitiated by unlawfulness.
34 Second, the applicant challenges the fact that it was not able to ascertain the price proposed by the successful tenderer. In particular, the applicant states that EFSA ensured that it would not be possible for any subsequent verification to be carried out by redacting from the evaluation report the price offered by the successful tenderer. In that regard, without there being any need to rule in the present case on whether the price proposed by the successful tenderer formed part of the information which the contracting authority should have communicated to the unsuccessful tenderers (sic), it is clear from the evidence submitted that the applicant was in a position to ascertain the price in questionIt is apparent from Section 2.4 of the evaluation committee report that the applicant and the successful tenderer offered the same price in respect of points 2 to 7 of the financial bid, both obtaining the maximum score of 15 points. The price offered by the successful tenderer in respect of points 2 to 7 of the financial bid is therefore abundantly clear from the evaluation committee report. Moreover, with regard to point 1 of the financial bid, the evaluation committee report indicated the price offered by the applicant and the mark obtained. Although it does not expressly refer to the price offered by the successful tenderer, that report specifies the mark obtained by it. Taking account of those factors, it was possible to calculate, without any difficulty, the price proposed by the successful tenderer in respect of point 1 of the financial bid, as submitted by EFSA in connection with the second plea. Furthermore, the Court has been able to verify, by way of the measure of inquiry adopted at the hearing (see paragraph 16 above), that the price mentioned by EFSA in its written pleadings was in fact the price proposed by the successful tenderer. In view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court considers that, even if EFSA had erred by failing to indicate expressly to the applicant the price proposed by the successful tenderer, such an error would have had no effect on the lawfulness of EFSA’s decision to reject the applicant’s tender and award the contract at issue to another tenderer whose bid was considered to be better, since the applicant was in a position to ascertain that price. The applicant’s arguments in that regard must therefore be rejected.
35 Third, with regard to the principle of sound administration relied on by the applicant, according to caselaw, guarantees afforded by the European Union legal order in administrative proceedings include, in particular, the principle of sound administration, which entails the duty on the part of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case (see the judgment of 15 September 2011 in Case T407/07 CMB and Christof v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 182 and the caselaw cited). In the present case, the arguments put forward by the applicant in the first plea, which essentially consist in criticising the fact that it was not granted access to the financial bid of the successful tenderer, do not demonstrate that EFSA failed to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the case. In the absence of more detailed evidence, the applicant’s arguments in that regard must be rejected. (T-339/10 and 532/10 at paras. 32 to 35, emphasis added).

In my view, paragraphs 33 and 35 of the Cosepuri Judgment must be welcome, as they set a more balanced framework for the assessment of the obligation to disclose confidential information and business secrets under the principles of transparency and good administration.

On the contrary, paragraph 34 deserves a clear rejection, given that the GC keeps a very formalistic approach to the protection of confidential information and takes no issue with the fact that such sensitive information as price can be disclosed indirectly, and considers that that does not infringe either the rights of the 'disclosed' undertaking to protection of its business secrets, nor the procedural rights of the disappointed bidder that is granted indirect access to that information.

I think that the GC should have taken a stronger position and clearly confirmed that both direct and indirect disclosure of price elements and financial evaluations can be restricted or excluded on grounds of protection of confidentiality. Otherwise, the incentives continue to push contracting authorities for an excessive degree of transparency in public procurement settings--which creates significant risks of collusion [Sánchez Graells, "Public Procurement and Competition: Some Challenges Arising from Recent Developments in EU Public Procurement Law" in Bovis (ed) Research Handbook on European Public Procurement  (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2206502]. 

A bunch of perfectly useless deposit-guarantee schemes will do ( EFTA Court E-16/11 #icesave )

In its recent Judgment of 28 January 2013 in Case E-16/11 EFTA Surveillance Authority and Commission v Iceland (Icesave Judgment), the EFTA Court has given an interpretation to Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes (even as amended by Directive 2009/14/EC) that significantly reduces the potential effectiveness of EU/EEA/EFTA banking and security deposit-guarantee schemes. This is worrying.

According to the EFTA Court,
135 [...] pursuant to Article 3 of the Directive, EEA States have to introduce and officially recognise a deposit-guarantee scheme. Moreover, they have to fulfil certain supervisory tasks in order to ensure the proper functioning of the deposit-guarantee scheme. However, it is not envisaged in that provision that EEA States have to ensure the payment of aggregate deposits in all circumstances.
139 It appears that under the new version of the provision EEA States are obliged to ensure a certain level of coverage. Whether this obligation is limited to a banking crisis of a certain size would require further assessment. However, that question can be left open here since […] Directive 2009/14 is not applicable in the present case.
140 At any rate, the rewording of Article 7 of the Directive shows that the European legislature considered substantial change necessary to extend the responsibility of the EEA States beyond the establishment of an effective framework.
141 This supports the view that the obligation on the EEA States under the version of the provision applicable in the case at hand is limited to ensuring that national rules which require a coverage level of at least EUR 20 000 are maintained or adopted.
144 […] it must be held that Article 7 of the Directive does not lay down an obligation on the State and its authorities to ensure compensation if a deposit-guarantee scheme is unable to cope with its obligations in the event of a systemic crisis.
148 […] an obligation on the State and its national authorities to ensure compensation if a deposit-guarantee scheme is unable to cope with its obligations under exceptional circumstances such as in a systemic crisis cannot be derived from that provision [Article 10 of the Directive].
172 […] recital 24 in the preamble to the Directive states that liability of a State and its competent authorities in respect of depositors is precluded “if they have ensured that one or more schemes guaranteeing deposits or credit institutions themselves and ensuring the compensation or protection of depositors under the conditions prescribed in this Directive have been introduced and officially recognized.”
176 […] the reservation set out in recital 24 in the preamble to the Directive aims expressly to preclude an excessive shifting to the State of the costs arising from a major banking failure.
178 In view of the above, the Court holds that the Directive does not envisage that the defendant itself must ensure payments to depositors in the Icesave branches in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, in accordance with Articles 7 and 10 of the Directive, in a systemic crisis of the magnitude experienced in Iceland. (E-16/11 at paras 135 to 178, emphasis added).
In my view, this jeopardises the effectiveness of deposit-guarantee schemes (DGS) by allowing Member States and their supervision entities to shield behind formalities linked to the design of such DGS and to reject any liability potentially derived from their errors of assessment or insufficient solvency requirements in case of a systemic crisis. The issue of State liability is discussed in such formalistic terms that the Icesave Judgment seems completely disconnected from the general supervisory trends required in an area where risk assessment and risk-avoidance / risk-mitigation policies impose a much more sophisticated exercise to all other players (namely, the banks and the DGSs themselves). 

The simplicity of the analysis, which omits any appraisal of the proportionality of the regulatory measures carried out by the State (both in terms of their suitability and their sufficiency), sets a bad precedent in an area where the incentive to set per-se rules in discharge of State liabilities seem already excessive.

Moreover, regardless of the attempt to restrict these findings to the 'pre-2009' version of the Directive, the extremely broad wording of paragraphs 144, 172 and 176 of the Icesave Judgment indicate otherwise. Particularly in view of the fact that at paragraph 139 the EFTA Court hints at the inapplicability of the 'post-2009' version to 'a banking crisis of a certain size[, which] would require further assessment'--and, indeed, this seems to be the most plausible (future) interpretation, unless a significant reversal of the Icesave Judgment is intended.

In this day and age, it looks implausible to have (significant) non-systemic banking crises (which, at any rate, would not be a significant problem if the existing mechanisms are properly in place and States keep any type of financial muscle). And, after the Icesave Judgment, I think that the most optimistic assessment is that, in cases of (ever more likely) systemic crises, the current 'guarantees' are perfectly useless and leave savers and investors unprotected and on their own. And this does not seem to be the best way to trigger investor confidence and to support the reconstruction of the banking industry.


Coupled with the recent reduction of capital requirements derived from the delayed start of Basel III, this 'new configuration' of DGS' as absolute safeguards of Member States' liability  (limited, seemingly, to setting them up even if improperly or insufficiently), seems a worrying sign that the banking industry and, what is worse, its supervision is back to business as usual. I think I will start looking for a way to burn my limited savings before somebody else does it for me.

Public Procurement and Competition: Some Challenges Arising from Recent Developments in EU Public Procurement Law


I have just published on SSRN a new paper on "Public Procurement and Competition: Some Challenges Arising from Recent Developments in EU Public Procurement Law": http://ssrn.com/abstract=2206502.


The paper updates some of my previous commentary to the competition law implications of the ongoing reforms of EU public procurement rules, particularly in view of the 2 October 2012 revised Compromise Text published by the EU Council: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st14/st14418.en12.pdf 

This is the abstract:
The relationship between public procurement and competition has recently been receiving an increasing amount of attention, both in academic and policy-making circles. It is becoming common ground that public procurement holds a complex and bidirectional relationship with market competition and that, consequently, a tighter link between public procurement and competition law enforcement needs to be established.
This paper explores the recent OECD push for more competition in public procurement and its role as an influential factor in the ongoing reform of EU public procurement rules. Afterwards, it critically assesses three of the main challenges to keeping public procurement precompetitive: (i) the difficult balance in terms of procurement transparency created by the clash between competition and corruption concerns; (ii) the magnification of the undesired (potential) anticompetitive effects of public procurement that centralised procurement may generate, as well as its increasing use as an improper tool of market regulation; and (iii) the possible competitive distortions and the potential advantages resulting from the generalization of eProcurement. The conclusions extract some common patterns derived from the previous analysis and suggest some policy recommendations mainly oriented at boosting oversight and professionalization of procurement.
The paper is due to appear in C Bovis (ed) Research Handbook on European Public Procurement (Elgar Publishing, 2013).

Who is an interested undertaking in procurement and State aid cases? (T-182/10)

The recent Judgment of the General Court of 15 January 2013 in case T-182/10 Aiscat v Commission (not available in English) raises a relevant question for the EU system of oversight of public procurement procedures that may have State aid implications--in the case at hand, due to the direct award of a works concession contract, as well as in view of the terms of the remuneration paid to the works concessionaire. 

In particular, the Aiscat Judgment establishes who is to be considered an "interested undertaking" and, consequently, who can act as complainant before the Commission and, eventually, challenge its Decisions in a State aid procedure based on Regulation 659/1999. In my view, a detailed analysis of the position of the GC in Aiscat shows certain inconsistencies between the (broad) concept of "disappointed bidder" under the EU public procurement regime and the concept of "affected undertaking" under State aid rules--which can diminish the effectiveness of a coordinated enforcement of both sets of rules.

In Aiscat, the Italian association of road concessionaires challenged the direct award of a works concession in the Padua region. The complaint submitted to the European Commission had a dual set of legal grounds. On the one hand, a "pure" public procurement claim that challenged the legality of the direct award of the contract under the in-house provision doctrine (which the Commission dismissed by considering that the awardee was in fact a "Teckal" entity controlled by the Italian contracting authorities). And, on the other hand, a State aid claim whereby the (illegal) direct award of the works concession contract and its terms of remuneration were considered an undue economic advantage in breach of Article 107 TFEU (which was also dismissed by the European Commission on the basis of the previously declared legality of the award and the absence of "direct" public funding).

Aiscat challenged the State aid decision of the Commission before the GC, which the Commission opposed on the basis of lack of active standing on the part of the association. In my view, the analysis conducted by the GC regarding the standing of the association to challenge the direct award of the contract is particularly relevant:
61 [...] with respect to the area of ​​State aid, persons other than the recipients who question the merits of the decision appraising the aid are considered individually concerned by that decision if their market position is substantially affected by the aid analysed in the decision in question (see, to that effect, Cofaz/ Commission [169/84, ECR p. 391] paragraphs 22 to 25, and Commission / Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum, [C-78/03, ECR I-10737] paragraphs 37 and 70).
62 This issue should be examined separately with respect to each of the two measures challenged by the applicant before the General Court, namely the award of the concession contract of the Passante without competitive bidding and increasing toll on the Tangenziale [which was the undue advantage identified by the appellant].
- The award without competitive bidding for the concession on the Passante
63 In the absence of any indication of the parties on the relevant market, it must be identified as that of motorway concessions in Italy, a market in which the 23 members of the applicant association that operate toll roads represent the demand, while the the State, represented by ANAS, which awards grants, represents the offer. According to statistics presented by the applicant, in November 2009, the toll road network in Italy extended over about 5,500 km.
64 As regards the determination of a substantial impairment of the market position, the Court of Justice has observed that the mere fact that an act such as the contested decision could influence the competitive relationships existing in market in question, and that the affected undertaking is in a competitive relationship of any kind with the beneficiary of that act does not suffice to conclude that it is of concern to that undertaking (see, to that effect, Case Justice of 10 December 1969, Eridania and others / Commission, 10/68 and 18/68, ECR p. 459, paragraph 7, the order of the Court of Justice of 21 February 2006, Deutsche Post and DHL Express / Commission, C-367/04 P, not published in the ECR, paragraph 40, and the judgment of the Court of 22 November 2007, Spain / Lenzing, C-525/04 P, ECR p. I-9947 , paragraph 32).
65 Therefore, an undertaking cannot rely solely on its status as a competitor of the beneficiary, but must also prove that it is in a factual situation that individualises it just as much as the beneficiary (judgment of the Court of May 23, 2000, Comité d'entreprise de la Société française de production and others / Commission, C-106/98 P, ECR p. I-3659, paragraph 41; Deutsche Post and DHL Express / Commission, cited in paragraph 64 above, paragraph 41, and judgment in Spain / Lenzing, cited in paragraph 64 above, paragraph 33).
66 However, the evidence that the position of a competitor in the market was significantly affected cannot be limited to the presence of certain elements indicating a worsening of its commercial or financial results, but may result from demonstrating the existence of a loss of revenue or less favorable business evolution than would have taken place had such aid not been granted (judgment in Spain / Lenzing, cited in paragraph 64 above, paragraph 35).
67 In the present case, in what respects the substantial affectation of the market position of the members of the applicant association due to the award of the concession on the Passante without competitive bidding, it should be noted that the applicant states in the claim the reasons why it considers that such direct award constitutes a breach of the principle of prohibition of State aid. As part of its observations on the objection of inadmissibility, the applicant claims an interest of its 23 members, as they were allegedly deprived from the opportunity to participate in a public tender for the award of the contract for the management and exploitation of the Passante.
68 However, in a market that consists of 5,500 km of toll roads, although the award without competitive bidding for the concession on a stretch of highway of about 32 km may have some impact on competition because other operators have not had the opportunity to increase the length of the networks that each exploits, it cannot be regarded that as such, this constitutes a substantial impairment of the competitive position of those other operators. Therefore, the applicant association has not demonstrated that the contested decision affected its members differently than all other operators wishing to exploit the concession on the Passante.
69 Consequently, the Court concludes that, with respect to the award of the concession on the Passante without competitive bidding, the contested decision did not affect the individual members of the applicant association. Consequently, they are not entitled to bring an action themselves to that effect and the applicant association also lacks standing to bring an action on behalf of those interests. (T-182/10, paras 61 to 69, own translation, emphasis added).

This is a very narrow analysis of the actual interest of potential bidders to participate in a tender and it follows a "de minimis-like approach" that does not match (easily) the requirements of Art 1(3) of Directive 2007/66/EC on public procurement remedies, which requires that "Member States shall ensure that the review procedures are available, under detailed rules which the Member States may establish, at least to any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement". In my view [Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011) 354], this means that
Directive 2007/66 requires Member States to adopt a broad approach to the setting of detailed rules regulating active standing to access bid protests and review procedures (as clearly indicated by the requirement of making these procedures available ‘at least’ to potentially affected parties—which seems to be oriented towards not excluding systems granting universal standing); and to do so attending both to the criterion of participation in the tender, and to the criterion of the effects generated or potentially generated by the alleged infringement.
To be sure, an alternative reading could suggest a more restrictive approach, requiring a potential challenger to meet simultaneously participation and harm requirements in order to have standing in bid protest and review procedures. However, from a logical perspective, configuring both requirements in a cumulative manner seems superfluous—since it would be very difficult to envisage a situation where a person having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract would not risk being harmed by an alleged infringement of public procurement rules. Moreover, it would seem an overly restrictive measure—particularly in cases where compliance with the first criterion is factually impossible, eg because a given contract was awarded without tender. Along the same lines, a systematic interpretation of Directive 2007/66 seems to exclude the possibility of restricting the standing for review to the candidates and tenderers that have participated in the tender, which are defined as ‘tenderers and candidates concerned’ [art 2a(2) dir 89/665 and art 2a(2) dir 92/13 (both as amended by dir 2007/66)]. The use of a much broader wording as regards the rule on standing [art 1(3) dir 89/665 and art 1(3) dir 92/13 (both as amended by dir 2007/66)] seems to clearly depart from its narrow construction. Moreover, it is submitted that such a restrictive approach would be undesirable from the perspective of guaranteeing the effectiveness of EU public procurement directives in general—and the embedded principle of competition in particular—and, therefore, would be contrary to the main goal of Directive 2007/66. Therefore, as anticipated, in our view, the best reading of the standing requirements imposed by Directive 2007/66 is that Member States have to adopt a broad approach to the setting of detailed rules regulating active standing to access bid protests and review procedures, and that they have to do so attending both to the criterion of participation in the tender, and to the criterion of the effects actually or potentially generated by the alleged infringement—so that bid protest and review procedures are open to any party that has taken part in the tender or that can otherwise prove that it has been harmed or risks being harmed as a result of the alleged infringement, regardless of its actual participation (or lack of it) in the specific tender that gave rise to it.
Therefore, by requiring a "singular" negative effect of the direct award on a complainant to allow it to raise a challenge on the basis of State aid rules generates frictions in the system. In some scenarios, it is not hard to see how an undertaking may be unable to challenge a direct award of a contract both under "pure" public procurement and State aid rules. And, certainly, this is not a situation that leads to effective enforcement of either of these important sets of EU economic law.
 
In my view, a revision of the Aiscat Judgment by the CJEU would be desirable in order to broaden the active standing of "disappointed bidders" (broadly conceived), and would also give the CJEU an opportunity to clarify its unclear decision in case C-496/99 Succhi di Frutta [2004] ECR I-3801 (where it seemed to adopt a similarly restrictive approach to active standing contrary to the posterior criteria of Directive 2007/66/EC).

CJEU puts a noose around its neck: Again on hypertrophy of Art 267 TFEU (C-416/10)

In its Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 15 January 2013 in case C-416/10 Križanand Others, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has reiterated its constant case law whereby internal constitutional rules cannot trump or diminish its role as the only authentic interpreter of EU Law (art 267 TFEU). 

The protection that CJEU has built around its ultimate jurisdiction concerning EU Law interpretation has been strengthened in several decisions adopted since 2010 and, in my view, the wording of the Križanand Judgment is definitive:
68 A rule of national law, pursuant to which legal rulings of a higher court bind another national court, cannot take away from the latter court the discretion to refer to the Court of Justice questions of interpretation of the points of European Union law concerned by such legal rulings. That court must be free, if it considers that a higher court’s legal ruling could lead it to deliver a judgment contrary to European Union law, to refer to the Court of Justice questions which concern it (Case C378/08 ERG and Others [2010] ECR I1919, paragraph 32; and [Case C-173/09 Elchinov [2010] ECR I8889], paragraph 27).
69 At this stage, it must be noted that the national court, having exercised the discretion conferred on it by Article 267 TFEU, is bound, for the purposes of the decision to be given in the main proceedings, by the interpretation of the provisions at issue given by the Court of Justice and must, if necessary, disregard the rulings of the higher court if it considers, in the light of that interpretation, that they are not consistent with European Union law (Elchinov, paragraph 30).
70 The principles set out in the previous paragraphs apply in the same way to the referring court with regard to the legal position expressed, in the present case in the main proceedings, by the constitutional court of the Member State concerned in so far as it follows from well-established case-law that rules of national law, even of a constitutional order, cannot be allowed to undermine the unity and effectiveness of European Union law (Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, paragraph 3, and Case C-409/06 Winner Wetten [2010] ECR I-8015, paragraph 61). Moreover, the Court of Justice has already established that those principles apply to relations between a constitutional court and all other national courts (Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 Melki and Abdeli [2010] ECR I5667, paragraphs 41 to 45). [...]
72 Finally, as a supreme court, the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky [Slovak Supreme Court] is even required to submit a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice when it finds that the substance of the dispute concerns a question to be resolved which comes within the scope of the first paragraph of Article 267 TFEU. The possibility of bringing, before the constitutional court of the Member State concerned, an action against the decisions of a national court, limited to an examination of a potential infringement of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the national constitution or by an international agreement, cannot allow the view to be taken that that national court cannot be classified as a court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU. (C-416/10 paras 68 to 72, emphasis added).
In my view, paragraph 72 of the Križanand Judgment broadens the scope of the obligations of national Supreme Courts and imposes a counterintuitive (and somehow extensive) interpretation of the concept of domestic court "against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law" (interpreting "remedy" as "full review", I would say). A straightforward reading of the Križanand Judgment seems to imply that all Supreme Courts and all Constitutional Courts of the Member States (where both of them exist) are bound to submit preliminary references under Article 267 TFEU, regardless of the system of checks and balances between both institutions established under the relevant national constitution.

This seems a logic consequence of the supremacy of EU Law and the central position of the CJEU in its interpretation. However, it may generate an even larger number of preliminary references to CJEU--which volume is already generating significant management difficulties. As I already indicated, the preliminary reference system is under significant pressure and risks hypertrophy. 

 In my view, this implies that we need to allow all domestic courts, including the highest courts of the Member States against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law to "ask responsibly". Otherwise, we face a significant risk of hypertrophy of the preliminary ruling instrument. Therefore, in my opinion, the  boundless wording of the Križanand Judgment scenifies the CJEU putting a noose around its own neck.

A vueltas con las costas judiciales excesivas (Martinsa v Fadesa II)

Acabo de leer en Expansion.com que las costas del conocido proceso de Martinsa contra los antiguos administradores de Fadesa por sobrevaloración de activos podrían ascender a más de 85 millones de Euros tras la desestimación de la apelación.

Honestamente, no tengo mucho que añadir a lo que ya dije aquí sobre las costas excesivas en este tipo de pleitos. Únicamente que la transformación del sistema de determinación de costas es urgente (mucho más que otras de las reformas proyectadas por el Ministerio de Justicia, aunque igual de controvertida, por lo que debería ser del gusto del Ministro Gallardón).

Creo que es urgente reducir las oportunidades de pleitos dirigidos (al menos en parte) por los intereses financieros derivados de las actuales reglas sobre costas de abogados y procuradores. También en esto, por decirlo claro, creo que debemos abandonar la cultura del pelotazo. No deja de ser otra burbuja que, si no desinflamos, puede estallarnos en las manos. Y ya son tantas...

Un poco de sensatez: el problema está en los partidos políticos


Creo que artículos como “Las críticas de los ciudadanos no encuentran vehículo legal” de Expansion.com  pueden generar un alarmismo innecesario al lanzar mensajes tan rotundos como “No existe ningún mecanismo en el derecho español o europeo al que los ciudadanos puedan recurrir para detener las reformas impulsadas por el Gobierno con las que no están de acuerdo”. Siendo realistas, por fortuna, las cosas no son así.

En realidad, como el propio artículo menciona (aunque de forma sesgada), existen múltiples mecanismos por los que los ciudadanos pueden tratar de promover medidas de oposición a las decisiones del Gobierno o de las Cortes. Es justo reconocer que no son mecanismos ágiles ni fáciles de poner en marcha pero, en un sistema democrático basado en la representación indirecta (no todos podemos participar en la toma de todas y cada una de las decisiones, salvo las excepcionalmente importantes, que se deben someter a referéndum general), no puede ser de otra manera. Si los ciudadanos pudieramos actuar directamente en contra de las decisiones del Gobierno o de las Cortes, el coste del sistema seria inasumible (incluso obviando la crisis económica) y el bloqueo sería inevitable.

Esto no significa que el sistema funcione bien. Probablemente nada más lejos de la realidad. Pero el problema no está (principalmente) en el diseño del sistema, sino en el funcionamiento de sus principales actores: los partidos políticos. Nos guste o no (la historia ha demostrado que no  hay alternativas realmente viables), el cauce natural de participación ciudadana en nuestro sistema es a través de los partidos. Cuando los dos partidos mayoritarios gobiernan y hacen oposición de espaldas a los ciudadanos o, simplemente, hacen dejación de funciones y se embarcan en cortinas de humo estériles que resucitan discusiones trasnochadas y que no llevan a ninguna parte, el problema no está en que los ciudadanos no puedan oponerse a ellos desde fuera, sino en que no puedan dinamitarlos y reformarlos desde dentro.


[http://ivanevsky.blogspot.co.uk/2012/01/reforma-electoral.html]

Mientras no se produzca una revolución dentro de los partidos, no hay nada que hacer. Pero no tendría sentido cambiar el sistema “sólo” porque los partidos no funcionan. La cadena debe romperse por el eslabón más débil y, en su configuración actual, está claro que lo que hay que romper es el bipartidismo mayoritario y el funcionamiento opaco y, en última instancia, antidemocrático de los partidos. Si los partidos no sirven a la sociedad, si los políticos no escuchan y toman en consideración los claros mensajes de su electorado, lo que debemos hacer es librarnos de ellos. La próxima oportunidad podrían ser las próximas elecciones generales, pero sólo si antes se reforman la ley electoral y la ley de partidos para dar una oportunidad real al cambio. 

¿Por qué no exigimos a PP y PSOE que, como mínimo acto de servicio al interés público y de verdadera voluntad de refundación y representatividad, garanticen que las próximas elecciones sean, realmente, una oportunidad para que las críticas de los ciudadanos encuentren su adecuado cauce a través de las urnas? Quizá es que nos hemos acabado creyendo que el único problema “es la Economía, estúpido”, cuando en realidad el problema es que los partidos políticos (mayoritarios) nos toman por borregos. ¿Podemos pedir un poco de sensatez? Si no, me temo que todos los ciudadanos que puedan seguirán votando con los pies... y buscando oportunidades en otra parte... Todos perdemos.

In-house providing and (minimum) "effective" public control: Sunset or breaking dawn for purely public (commercial) service providers? (C‑182 and 183/11)

In its Judgment of 29 November 2012 in Joined Cases C‑182/11 and C‑183/11, Econord SpA v Comune di Cagno and Comune di Varese (C-182/11) and Comune di Solbiate and Comune di Varese (C-183/11), the Court of Justice of the EU has offered a succinct reminder of its case law on in-house providing as an exception to the applicability of the EU public procurement Directives.  

According to this line of case law, contracting entities can award contracts directly (ie without a competitive tender) where they exercise over the contractor a control similar to that which they have over their own departments, and the contractor carries out the essential part of its activities with the contracting authorities to which it belongs. In those cases, it is assumed that there is no potential for competition and that the market is not affected by the decision of the contracting authority to retain the activity "in-house".

However, in Econord, the CJEU has taken an additional step in the fine tuning of the concept of "similar control" required under the in-house providing exception. In its Judgment, the CJEU has stated that:
27 According to settled case-law, there is ‘similar control’ where the entity in question is subject to control enabling the contracting authority to influence that entity’s decisions. The power exercised must be a power of decisive influence over both the strategic objectives and the significant decisions of that entity (Parking Brixen, paragraph 65; Coditel Brabant, paragraph 28; and Sea, paragraph 65). In other words, the contracting authority must be able to exercise a structural and functional control over that entity (Commission v Italy, paragraph 26). The Court also requires that this control should be effective (Coditel Brabant, paragraph 46).
28 According to the case-law, where use is made of an entity jointly owned by a number of public authorities, the ‘similar control’ may be exercised jointly by those authorities, without it being essential for such control to be exercised individually by each of them (see, to that effect, Coditel Brabant, paragraphs 47 and 50, and Sea, para. 59). 
29 It follows that, if a public authority becomes a minority shareholder in a company limited by shares with wholly public capital for the purpose of awarding the management of a public service to that company, the control that the public authorities which are members of that company exercise over it may be categorised as similar to the control they exercise over their own departments when it is exercised by those authorities jointly (Sea, para. 63). 
30 In those circumstances, although, where a number of public authorities make use of a common entity for the purposes of carrying out a common public service task, it is certainly not essential that each of those authorities should in itself have an individual power of control over that entity, nevertheless, if the very concept of joint control is not to be rendered meaningless, the control exercised over that entity cannot be based solely on the controlling power of the public authority with a majority holding in the capital of the entity concerned
31 Where the position of a contracting authority within a jointly owned successful tenderer does not provide it with the slightest possibility of participating in the control of that tenderer, that would, in effect, open the way to circumvention of the application of the rules of EU law regarding public contracts or service concessions, since a purely formal affiliation to such an entity or to a joint body managing it would exempt the contracting authority from the obligation to initiate a tendering procedure in accordance with the EU rules, even though it would take no part in exercising the ‘similar control’ over that entity (see, to that effect, Case C-231/03 Coname [2005] ECR I-7287, paragraph 24).
32 Consequently, in the cases before the referring court, it is for that court to verify whether the signing, by the Comune di Cagno and the Comune di Solbiate, of a shareholders’ agreement conferring on them the right to be consulted, to appoint a member of the supervisory council and to nominate a member of the management board, in agreement with the other authorities concerned by that shareholders’ agreement, can enable those municipal councils to contribute effectively to the control of Aspem.
33 In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that where, in their capacity as contracting authority, a number of public authorities jointly establish an entity with responsibility for carrying out their public service mission, or where a public authority subscribes to such an entity, the condition established by the case-law of the Court to the effect that, in order to be exempted from their obligation to initiate a public tendering procedure in accordance with the rules of EU law, those authorities must jointly exercise over that entity control similar to the control they exercise over their own departments, is fulfilled where each of those authorities not only holds capital in that entity, but also plays a role in its managing bodies. (Joined Cases C‑182/11 and C‑183/11, paras. 27 to 32, emphasis added).
In my view, the Judgment of the CJEU must be interpreted in a functional manner and has refined the requirement for similar control and transformed it into a requirement for "similar, active and effective control". The requirement for contracting authorities to "play a role" in the management bodies of the entities that are considered to remain "in-house" must be active and effective, and it will not suffice that they (jointly) "take a seat" in the relevant boards (as that would fall short for ensuring that they have (more than) "
the slightest possibility of participating in the control of that tenderer" and that they "
take [...] part in exercising the ‘similar control’ over that entity"
.

Therefore, the answer in view of the specific circumstances of the cases joined in Econord, where the contracting authorities merely entered into "a shareholders’ agreement conferring on them the right to be consulted, to appoint a member of the supervisory council and to nominate a member of the management board, in agreement with the other authorities concerned", should be that they do not exercise a similarly effective control over the contractor as they do with their own administrative units.

If that is the correct interpretation of the Econord Judgment, it would generate difficulty for the creation of purely public (commercial) service providers, whereby a public authority would create and retain majority control of an entity entrusted with the provision of SGEIs, SSGIs or other local services and then offer its services to other contracting entities that would acquire a minority stake and not get involved in its day to day operations. In my view, such development would be welcome and a consistent complement to the competition rules in articles 106 and 107 TFEU. If contracting authorities want to cooperate directly (thorugh public-public partnerships) or indirectly (through instrumental entities), they need to remain actively engaged in the provision of the services contracted out (in-house). 

Otherwise, if the contracting authorities want to disengage from the direct management of those services and take the back seat (eg in a board of directors), there is no reason to see why public contractors should be shielded from the competition of private contractors, since both would be offering a commercial relationship to the outsourcing contracting authority and there would be an effective risk of generating relevant distortions of competition [see Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011) 240-242]. Therefore, in the lack of a sufficiently active involvement, in the absence of an actual organic link between the contracting authority and the "in-house" entity, there is no good reason to exclude the application of the EU public procurement rules, as the CJEU has quite clearly stressed.

Therefore, it will be interesting to see what is the final decision of the Italian courts in the domestic cases leading to Econord, but a decision that upheld the applicability of the in-house exception would be, in my opinion, an inappropriate reading of the CJEU's Judgment.

GC on non-disclosure of ECB documents: Carte blanche to public market manipulation? (T-590/10)

Today's Judgment of the General Court of the EU in case T-590/10 Gabi Thesing and Bloomberg Finance LP v ECB has provided clarification on the reasons that the ECB (and, by analogy, other EU Institutions) can provide to reject a request of access to its documents. The GC has backed the ECB in its non-disclosure decision on the basis of the protection of public interest and has adopted a broad view of such an exception. 

In general terms, the position of the ECB and the GC seem appropriate to grant  sufficient administrative discretion to the EU Institutions in their assessment of the public interest at stake. However, the specifics of the GC Judgment are a bit troubling, if one takes the position of the GC to its logical extreme. In my view, the following bears emphasizing:
43 [...] the ECB must be recognised as enjoying a wide discretion for the purpose of determining whether the disclosure of documents relating to the fields covered by that exception could undermine the public interest. The European Union judicature’s review of the legality of such a decision must therefore be limited to verifying whether the procedural rules and the duty to state reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest error of assessment or a misuse of powers (see, by analogy, Case C‑266/05 P Sison v Council [2007] ECR I‑1233, paragraph 34). [...]
45 [...] with respect to the applicants’ arguments that the ECB incorrectly failed to take account of the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure and that there is a compelling public interest for disclosure of the documents at issue which would in fact further the public interest, the Court notes that the exceptions to the right of access to documents provided for in Article 4(1)(a) of Decision 2004/258 are framed in mandatory terms. It follows that the ECB is obliged to refuse access to documents falling under any one of those exceptions once the relevant circumstances are shown to exist, and no weighing up of an ‘overriding public interest’ is provided for in that provision, in contrast with the exceptions referred to in Article 4(2) and (3) of that decision (see, by analogy, Joined Cases T‑3/00 and T‑337/04 Pitsiorlas v Council and ECB [2007] ECR II‑4779, paragraph 227 and the case-law cited). [...]
51 As regards the issue whether disclosure of the first document would specifically and effectively undermine the protected interest in question, it is common ground [...] that, at the time of the adoption of the contested decision, the European financial markets were in a very vulnerable environment. The stability of those markets was fragile, in particular, because of the economic and financial situation of the Hellenic Republic. It is also common ground that that situation and the related sales of Greek financial assets were causing strong depreciations in the value of those assets, which also triggered losses for Greek and other European holders. The applicants did not dispute that that development had the potential of leading to negative spillover effects on the solvency and funding conditions of other issuers and countries in the euro area. In such an environment, it is clear that market participants use the information disclosed by central banks and that their analyses and decisions are considered a particularly important and reliable source to assess current and prospective financial market developments. Moreover, the ECB was entitled to find that public confidence is an essential element affecting the proper functioning of the financial markets. The ECB was not indeed contradicted in this respect by the applicants. [...]
56 [...] the fact that, on 21 October 2010, the data contained in the first document were outdated and that they gave only a snapshot of the factual situation at the time that the document was drafted does not permit the conclusion that, in the event of disclosure of that document, financial market participants would also have regarded as outdated and therefore of no value ECB staff assumptions and views regarding the impact of off-market swaps on government deficit and on government debt which are contained in that document.
57 Although it is true that those participants are professionals who can be expected to use information taken from documents in the context of their work, the fact remains that they consider assumptions and views originating from the ECB to be particularly important and reliable for assessing the financial market. It cannot reasonably be precluded that, even if those assumptions and views were made on the basis of data available well before 21 October 2010, they would have been regarded as still valid on that date. Moreover, it can be assumed that, by relying on those assumptions and views that were based on a certain known factual situation, those professionals might have inferred, on the basis of additional data, assumptions and views allegedly held by the ECB regarding the government deficit and government debt at the time that the ECB definitively refused access to that document. In this respect, any clarification by the ECB on the disclosed version of that document, indicating that the information contained therein was no longer up to date, would not have been able to prevent disclosure of that document from misleading the public and financial market participants in particular on the situation regarding the government deficit and government debt as assessed by the ECB.
58 In the light of the very vulnerable environment in which the financial markets found themselves at the time of adoption of the contested decision, the assessment that such an error would undermine the economic policy of the Union and the Hellenic Republic cannot be rejected as manifestly incorrect. Indeed, such an error might have had negative consequences on access, in particular for that Member State, to the financial markets and might therefore have affected the effective conduct of economic policy in the Hellenic Republic and the Union. (T-590/10, paras 43 to 58, emphasis added).
In my view, to put it clearly, the reasoning of the GC diminishes the analytical capacity of the financial sector and disregards the ability of professional financial advisors and analysts to separate the chaff from the grain and boldly assumes that panic and shortsightedness would have dominated the analysis of the documents which disclosure was requested (a rather strong assumption, at any rate). Moreover, in its analysis of the cumulative impact that disclosure may have had, the GC basically opposes all basic tenets that financial markets can only work effectively on the basis of full disclosure of any potentially relevant information [an assumption that, on the other hand, is strongly defended under EU rules on market abuse]. 

All in all, in an (acknowledged) extreme reading of the GC's Thesing Judgment, the ECB (and other EU Institutions) may have been given carte blanche to manipulate financial markets (by withholding information) if they deem such manipulation in the public interest. That can surely not be acceptable under EU Law. Therefore, a correction of the Thesing broad reasoning seems desirable, in order to keep any degree of effectiveness in the provisions of article 15 TFEU -- and so that everything is not effectively lost in the field of EU governance.

EPA's ban on BP: A reminder that we need a suspension and debarment regime in EU public procurement

The US Environmental Protection Agency, EPA has suspended BP plc and other companies in the BP group from new federal contracts until they demonstrate they can meet federal business standards (see Reuters press report). The decision is a consequence of the misbehaviour and lack of business integrity shown by the company in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010. 

According to EPA, "The BP suspension will temporarily prevent the company and the named affiliates from getting new federal government contracts, grants or other covered transactions until the company can provide sufficient evidence to EPA demonstrating that it meets Federal business standards. The suspension does not affect existing agreements BP may have with the government."

 Given that BP was the 45th largest contractor of the US Federal Government in 2011, and that the value of US government contracts secured by companies within the BP group exceeded USD 1,470 mn, it seems clear that the BP group will invest significant time and effort to try to prove as soon as they can that they do actually meet sound business standards. Surely, the internal cleaning up exercise will not be minor and corporate compliance programs will most likely be improved and strengthened.

This case is, in my view, a strong reminder that we need to introduce a full system of suspension and debarment in the EU public procurement Directives, in order to allow all Member States to avail themselves of such a powerful tool to discipline misbehaviour by public contractors, while guaranteeing a level playing field across the internal market [my proposals, particularly concerned with competition infringers, can be read at Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Oxford, Hart, 2011) 382-385]. It may not be too late to include it in the current revision of the public procurement rules, due to be approved by the end of the year. Hopefully.

Recapitalisation of the Spanish Banks: Or the Commission as a Sectorial Regulator

The European Commission has finally published a memo on its role concerning the recapitalisation of the Spanish banks and its oversight from a State aid perspective, only one day after the CJEU declared in case C-370/12 the EU legality of the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) that is now taking over from the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF).

Of all the information published by the Commission in its memo, I think there is a particular piece that deserves careful scrutiny (and would most likely have required more detail from the Commission). In point 8 of the memo, the Commission offers the following question and answer:
How does the Commission ensure that Member States implement plans to restructure banks that have received state aid?
Member States give the Commission a legal commitment to abide by the restructuring plans which the Commission approves. The Commission has a monitoring system, including periodic reports and possibly a trustee in more complex cases, to ensure that the restructuring plans and commitments are duly implemented. There will be a trustee for BFA/Bankia, NGC Banco and Catalunya Banc [which are the three nationalised banks that are still under State control, after Banco de Valencia was sold to CaixaBank only yesterday].
I think that monitoring such a complex aid scheme will take up a significant part of the European Commission's resources and that its role and functions will be borderline with the supervision competences of the Spanish Central Bank and the Eurosystem authorities. In my opinion, this special supervision scheme designed by the Commission to address the situation of the Spanish banks may have spillover effects on the creation of a single EU bank regulator.

In that regard, and while political negotiations try to overcome the UK's opposition to such development, it may be worth to wait and see how effective the European Commission can be in the supervision of the three most troubled Spanish banks (and, particularly BFA/Bankia, currently immersed in deep legal battles including a major criminal investigation against all former directors and members of executive boards). Surely, this 'pilot' experience will offer lessons and best practices that may contribute to a better design of the future (?) EU banking macroregulator.

New Year's Resolution: Fight Bid Rigging Effectively (OECD Recomm of 17 July 2012)

I know it might be a bit too soon to start thinking about New Year's Resolutions. However, around these dates, well organised public procurement and competition authorities should be planning their activities and enforcement priorities for 2013. Therefore, it might be a good time to suggest that they focus and deploy a sufficient amount of resources in giving effect to the OECD's 17 July 2012 Recommendation on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement.

The OECD's Recommendation captures most of the key elements that can make a public procurement system either pro-competitive or potentially distortive of market competition, and particularly sets out that
Members assess the various features of their public procurement laws and practices and their impact on the likelihood of collusion between bidders. Members should strive for public procurement tenders at all levels of government that are designed to promote more effective competition and to reduce the risk of bid rigging while ensuring overall value for money.
To this effect, officials responsible for public procurement at all levels of government should:
1.   Understand, in co-operation with sector regulators, the general features of the market in question, the range of products and/or services available in the market that would suit the requirements of the purchaser, and the potential suppliers of these products and/or services.
2.   Promote competition by maximising participation of potential bidders by:
i)   establishing participation requirements that are transparent, non-discriminatory, and that do not unreasonably limit competition;
ii)   designing, to the extent possible, tender specifications and terms of reference focusing on functional performance, namely on what is to be achieved, rather than how it is to be done, in order to attract to the tender the highest number of bidders, including suppliers of substitute products;
iii)   allowing firms from other countries or from other regions within the country in question to participate, where appropriate; and
iv)   where possible, allowing smaller firms to participate even if they cannot bid for the entire contract.
3.   Design the tender process so as to reduce the opportunities for communication among bidders, either before or during the tender process. For example, sealed-bid tender procedures should be favoured, and the use of clarification meetings or on-site visits attended personally by bidders should be limited where possible, in favour of remote procedures where the identity of the participants can be kept confidential, such as email communications and other web-based technologies.
4.   Adopt selection criteria designed i) to improve the intensity and effectiveness of competition in the tender process, and ii) to ensure that there is always a sufficient number of potential credible bidders with a continuing interest in bidding on future projects. Qualitative selection and award criteria should be chosen in such a way that credible bidders, including small and medium-sized enterprises, are not deterred unnecessarily from participating in public tenders.
5.   Strengthen efforts to fight collusion and enhance competition in public tenders by encouraging procurement agencies to use electronic bidding systems, which may be accessible to a broader group of bidders and less expensive, and to store information about public procurement opportunities in order to allow appropriate analysis of bidding behaviour and of bid data.
6.   Require all bidders to sign a Certificate of Independent Bid Determination or equivalent attestation that the bid submitted is genuine, non-collusive, and made with the intention to accept the contract if awarded.
7.   Include in the invitation to tender a warning regarding the sanctions for bid rigging that exist in the particular jurisdiction, for example fines, prison terms and other penalties under the competition law, suspension from participating in public tenders for a certain period of time, sanctions for signing an untruthful Certificate of Independent Bid Determination, and liability for damages to the procuring agency. Sanctions should ensure sufficient deterrence, taking into account the country’s leniency policy, if applicable.
All these recommendations, which are further developed in the OECD 2009 Guidelines for fighting bid rigging in public procurement are well-designed and their proper implementation may indeed contribute to strengthen competition for public contracts and to prevent and effectively identify and sanction instances of bid rigging. 

For more detailed proposals, the reader may want to consult my normative recommendations, based on the current EU public procurement rules [Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011)].

Tendering for licences and tendering for contracts: Consistency of the approach (AG in case C‑569/10)

AG Cruz Villalon has delivered his Opinion of 20 November 2012 in case C-569/10 European Commission v Poland, which concerns a potential infringement of Art 3 of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons. The analysis offered in relation to tendering procedures for mining licences resembles that followed in public procurement cases and, consequently, it is interesting to see to what extent the criteria applicable to both types of tendering are being developed consistently by the EU Courts.

According to Art 3 Dir 94/22, Member States must take ‘the necessary measures to ensure that authorisations [for the exercise of the activities of prospecting, exploring for and producing hydrocarbons] are granted following a procedure in which all interested entities may submit applications’ (emphasis added). This requirement was incorporated in Polish law by means of Article 11(2) of the Geological and Mining Law of 4 February 1994, which provides that: ‘Without prejudice to Article 12(1), the creation of mining usufruct rights covering the prospection, exploration for and exploitation of natural gas, oil and its natural derivatives ... shall be preceded by a competitive tendering procedure' (emphasis added). According to such Art 12(1), however,  ‘[a]n undertaking that has explored and documented mineral deposits belonging to the Treasury and has prepared geological documents to the level of accuracy required for the granting of a concession for production of the mineral, may apply for the grant of mining usufruct rights with priority over other parties’ (emphasis added).

Therefore, Polish law creates two sets of independent authorisations: one for exploration (and preparation of the ensuing geological documentation) and one for production rights and, in general, subjects their granting to a prior tendering procedure (which would be in line with the requirements of Art 3 Dir 94/22). However, the priority given to holders of exploration rights (or to subsequent buyers of the ensuing geographical documentation) to obtain the production concession raised an issue of compatibility with EU Law. The European Commission considered that this would exclude any effective tendering for production rights and that, consequently, the Polish system breached Art 3 Dir 94/22. On its part, Poland considered that the existence of a tendering procedure in respect of the granting of the exploration rights was sufficient, as the procedure for granting the production concession is in the nature of a mere ‘formality’, albeit compulsory, involving only the undertaking to which the initial rights had been granted.

AG Cruz Villalon concurs with the Commission's view. In his Opinion, he submits that:
79. In effect, Article 12 of the Geological and Mining Law gives priority – for a period of two years and over any other person – in seeking the creation of mining usufruct rights to the person who has explored and documented mineral deposits and prepared the relevant geological documentation [...]
82. The Polish Government seeks to justify this outcome by arguing that the exclusive rights to the geological documentation and the priority given to the holder of such rights constitute fair remuneration for the investment made at the earlier prospecting and exploration stage.
83. In my opinion, this argument cannot succeed.
84. Much as it may seem fair that the person who has borne the costs involved in preparing the geological documentation should be remunerated, that investment may in no circumstances be rewarded in such a way as to distort the authorisation procedure to the point of rendering illusory the tendering procedures required under Directive 94/22.
85. That is, or at least may be, what happens if the Polish system is applied. The interplay of priorities and exclusive rights introduced by the Geological and Mining Law may give rise to a situation in which the holder of the exclusive rights to the geological documentation obtains the mining usufruct rights without a genuine competitive tendering procedure being held. In fact, it would not be feasible to follow such a procedure if the priority referred to in Article 12(1) means – as the term ‘priority’ would, on the face of it, suggest – a true preferential right to the creation of the usufruct.
86. It would be a different matter (sic) if the ‘priority’ were taken to mean that the investment in the preparation of the geological documentation constitutes a positive factor to be taken into account in the tendering procedure; a positive factor for evaluation, perhaps, but certainly not to the extent of determining the outcome of the tendering procedure. Giving this factor its proper weight may constitute reasonable remuneration for the investment, without going as far as the case put by the Polish Government.
87. In this regard, we should bear in mind that ownership of exclusive rights to the geological documentation may not be as central to the authorisation process as it is under the Polish system. Ownership of such rights does, of course, demonstrate that the holder has the skills needed to prepare geological documentation. Clearly, however, such skills are not necessarily in themselves sufficient to demonstrate the skills relevant for the purposes of granting an authorisation to exploit mineral resources. It seems to me obvious that, basically, the Polish system attributes too much importance to the position of undertakings whose main capability is the production of geological documentation, with the position of other undertakings which can also demonstrate capability in the area of mining being entirely subordinated to the interests of the former.
88. So, the Polish system of ‘authorisation’ within the meaning of Directive 94/22 comprises two stages (the creation of the mining usufruct rights and the concession itself), the outcome of which may be dictated entirely by the exercise of exclusive rights to the geological documentation that is needed in order to obtain the actual authorisation to exploit the mineral resources. Those exclusive rights are granted to the undertaking that has obtained geological documentation through exploration and investigation which, in accordance with Article 33(1) of the Geological and Mining Law, do not always require a concession and would therefore not be the result of a tendering procedure.
89. Consequently, given that in certain circumstances the Polish legislation allows the authorisation required for the activities of prospecting, exploring for and producing to be granted following a procedure which does not involve a genuine tendering procedure, I am of the opinion that the first part of the second plea and the second part of the first plea in the Commission’s application should be upheld in their entirety (AGO C-569/10 at paras 79-89, emphasis added).
As briefly mentioned, in my view, the AG's reasoning resounds of the arguments that prevent direct awards of construction or other works contracts on the basis of the 'mere' development of a design project under EU public procurement rules [Dirs 2004/18 and 2004/17]. In that regard, where the rights or contracts to be awarded non-competitively at the second stage are worthier than the initial rights or contracts, it seems sensible to require a second round of competition to take place. 

However, I do not agree with the AG's obiter dicta remarks in paragraph 86 of his Opinion, where he considers that "It would be a different matter (sic) if the ‘priority’ were taken to mean that the investment in the preparation of the geological documentation constitutes a positive factor to be taken into account in the tendering procedure; a positive factor for evaluation, perhaps, but certainly not to the extent of determining the outcome of the tendering procedure. Giving this factor its proper weight may constitute reasonable remuneration for the investment, without going as far as the case put by the Polish Government." Such preference in the second round of competition would only allow the incumbent to extract unnecessarily advantageous conditions from the contracting / licensing authority. In that regard, I would suggest that it is of the utmost importance to neutralize any first comer advantages in the second round of competition, at least for evaluation purposes, as I have further developed elsewhere [Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Oxford, hart Publishing, 2011) pp. 333-338]. Otherwise, the system may be compliant with the tendering requirements of Dir 94/22 or Dirs 2004/18 and 2004/17, but not (fully) effective competition will arise in the second round of tendering.

Therefore, I would suggest that the CJEU should follow the AG in its final Judgment in case C-569/10, but dismissed the obiter dicta remarks in paragraph 86. Otherwise, the law on (re)tendering risks being developed in a less than (fully) competition-promoting manner.

Protection of IPR and limits of contractual relationships: AG Opinion in Case C-103/11 P

Last 15 Movember 2012, Advocate General Cruz Villalon delivered his Opinion in case in Case C-103/11 P Commission v Systran SA and Systran Luxembourg SA, where he endorsed the position of the European Commission whereby intellectual property related disputes that arise in the broader context of a contractual relationship between rights-holder and infringer are a matter of contractual liability--and, consequently, remain outside the jurisdiction of the EU Courts.

The dispute derived from the disclosure of proprietary Systran know how and other IPR protected data by the European Commission to a third party in the context of the maintenance and linguistic enhancement of a machine translation system initially developed by Systran. Systran brought the case to the General Court and, in 2010 (T-19/07), it held that the dispute could not be considered to be contractual in nature and that it did not therefore lack jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it. It imposed a lump sum payment of €12mn to compensate Systran for the loss of value of its IPR. The Commission appealed.

According to AG Cruz Villalon,  the dispute in question must primarily be examined by the competent national courts, in accordance with the agreements in question and the laws applicable to them.  According to the AG, the General Court made an error in law in its examination of the relationships which were established, in a very marked contractual context, between the Commission and the various companies in the Systran group which have developed or contributed  to the development of the various versions of the Systran software. Therefore, the General Court wrongly declared itself as having jurisdiction to hear and determine the action for compensation for the damage allegedly caused to Systran by the Commission’s conduct. 

The final decision by the CJEU in this case will be of major relevance, since it will deal with the complicated issue (which does not seem to receive homogeneous treatment across the EU) of the vis attractiva of contracts when the parties engage in subsequent tortious behavior. Therefore, the final Judgment in case C-103/11 may have large consequences for the Contract Law of Member States, which leaves me with the question whether the adjudication of this case may not in itself run against the allocation of competences in private law matters that seem to have a weak connection with the internal market (mainly, concerning art 114 TFEU). Definitely, a case to follow with interest and area where some well-meditated research seems required.

Confidentiality and understandability of EU Courts' Judgments: An impossible balance? (T-135/09)

Today's Judgment of the General Court in case T-135/09 Nexans v European Commission offers an example of a case where protection of confidential information makes it very difficult (if not completely impossible) to understand the reasoning followed by the GC to (partially) quash the appealed Decision by the European Commission (in this case, ordering an inspection in a competition law matter).

One of the grounds for appeal was that the European Commission did not have reasonable suspicions of an infringement of the competition rules on the part of the applicants  concerning certain of the products covered by the inspection decision; and, consequently, the decision ordering the inspection was faulty due to lack of a proper motivation. 

The General Court addresses this issue at paras 60 to 94 of the T-135/09 Judgement. However, the substantial suppression of confidential information in some parts of the case (for instance, paras 82 and 86 to 88 are suppressed almost entirely) makes it almost impossible to follow the GC's line of argument and leaves the readers scratching their heads and trying to make some sense out of the context provided by the rest of the Judgment--which may lead to improper conclusions, unfortunately.

In these cases, maybe it would be useful to obtain a less limited confidential version if at all possible, or at least a summary of the (general) reasons for the decision reached by the GC--which help practitioners and scholars make some sense of the case and be able to use it in the future, at least as a matter of principle. Otherwise, such important Judgments (which deal with important matters of due process rights, as in the case at hand) will remain impossible to understand and will not contribute to the development of sound practice and fair adjudication in competition law matters. Nonetheless, proper protection of confidential information and ensuring the understandability of case law may not always be attainable simultaneously...

CJEU on limitation period to claim damages due to tender rejection (C-469/11)

In its Judgment of 8 November 2012 in case C-469/11 Evropaiki Dynamiki v Commission, the CJEU has clearly settled the rules controlling limitation periods applicable to claims for damages resulting from the (illegal) rejection of tender offers. 

The Judgment of the CJEU is straightforward:
39 In the present case, the claim for compensation made by Evropaïki Dynamiki is based on the rejection of the tender which it submitted in a Commission tendering procedure.
40 In such a situation, as the General Court correctly ruled in the order under appeal, without Evropaïki Dynamiki having challenged that finding, the decision of the contracting authority to reject the tender submitted constitutes the loss-causing event capable of giving rise to non-contractual liability on the part of that authority. The adverse effects of such a decision affect the tenderer concerned once its tender has been rejected. Thus, knowledge of such a decision by the tenderer must, in principle, be regarded as constituting the starting point of the limitation period, not knowledge of the grounds therefor (C-469/11 at paras 39 and 40, emphasis added).
The decision reached by the CJEU seems sensible at face value. However, once the specific circumstances of the case are taken into consideration, the strict limitation imposed by the CJEU may seem disproportionate. In view of the CJEU:
42 [...] it is also not relevant that the [rejection] decision of 15 September 2004 was annulled on 10 September 2008 by the Judgment of the General Court in Case T‑465/04 Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission on the ground of deficient reasoning. It is in fact immaterial, as regards the starting point of the period of limitation, whether the European Union’s unlawful conduct has been established by a judicial decision (Judgment in Case C‑282/05 P Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, paragraph 31).
43 In any event, Evropaïki Dynamiki has not argued that it did not have a reasonable time in which to submit its application before the expiry of the limitation period by reason of the fact that the latter began to run from the time at which it became aware of the Commission’s decision rejecting its tender, or even because of the insufficient reasoning of that decision (C-469/11 at paras 42 and 43,emphasis added).
In my view, while the illegality of the rejection has not been declared, it is impractical to think that the aggrieved tenderer can sue for damages with any chance of succeeding before that key point of law is settled. Therefore, the decision of the CJEU seems rather harsh, since the actual possibility to claim for damages did not accrue until after the rejection decision had been declared illegal. Bearing that in mind, the reasoning that the would be claimant has not argued that it did not have a reasonable time in which to submit its application before the expiry of the limitation period does not hold water (precisely, the action against the dismissal of his claim due to the expiry of the limitation period seems to be based on nothing but that argument).

In my opinion, then, we would need to set a two-step limitation period for claims for damages due to the illegal rejection of tenders, which impose a maximum period of (say) 5 years always provided that the claimant has at least (say) 1 year to file a claim from the moment the rejection decision is declared illegal by a resolution having the force of res iudicata. Otherwise, many damages claims can be preempted exclusively as a result of lengthy appeals procedures, which does not seem desirable (nor fair).

CJEU puts a stop to the 'kidnapping' of investors in public undertakings: a broader reading of C-244/11

In its Judgment of 8 November 2012 in case C-244/11 Commission v Greece, the CJEU assessed the compatibility with EU Law of a Greek scheme that required prior authorization for the acquisition of voting rights representing 20% or more of the share capital in certain strategic public limited companies in the utilities sectors which operate national infrastructure networks within a monopoly context. 

Most remarkably, the supervision scheme included a provision for ex post control in regard to the adoption of certain decisions. More specifically, under Article 11 of Law 3631/2008 on the creation of a national fund for social cohesion:
The decisions of those strategic undertakings relating to the [following (?)] subjects shall be subject to authorization by the Minister for Finance for purposes of general interest:
(a) dissolution of the undertaking, its placing in liquidation and the designation of liquidators;
(b) restructuring the abovementioned undertakings: conversion, merger with another company, merger with the creation of a new public limited company, break-up in any form whatsoever or break-up of one or more divisions liable to place in jeopardy the supply of services in the sectors of strategic importance;
(c) transfer, transformation or conversion, disposal, supply as a guarantee, as well as transformation or alteration of the allocation of strategic elements of the assets of the abovementioned undertakings and of the basic networks and infrastructure necessary for the economic and social life of the country as well as its security.
The CJEU assessed the compatibility of such ex post veto scheme controlling the adoption of certain (strategic) decisions of those public limited companies (whose shares are quoted on the stock exchange and may be purchased freely on the market) under the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment and (not surprisingly) found that it was not compatible with EU Law.

According to the CJEU, 
80 As regards […] the arrangements for ex post control of certain decisions taken by the strategic public limited companies at issue, such as provided for in Article 11(3) of Law 3631/2008, the Hellenic Republic maintains that it must be accepted, as it is similar to the scheme at issue in Case C-503/99 Commission v Belgium, in respect of which the Court held that it was justified by the objective of guaranteeing the security of energy supply in the event of a crisis.
81 The Court has held that it results from paragraphs 49 to 52 of the Judgment in Case C-503/99 Commission v Belgium that the national scheme at issue was characterized by the fact that it specifically listed the strategic assets concerned and the management decisions which could be challenged in any given case. Finally, the intervention by the administrative authorities was strictly limited to cases in which the objectives of the energy policy were jeopardized  Any decision taken in that context had to be supported by a formal statement of reasons and was subject to an effective review by the courts (Judgment in Case C‑463/00 Commission v Spain, paragraph 78). 
82 However, following the example of the schemes examined by the Court in its Judgments in Case C-463/00 Commission v Spain and in Case C‑326/07 Italy v Commission, the scheme at issue in the present case, even it if it is of an ex post nature and is therefore less restrictive than an ex ante scheme, cannot be justified in the light of the criteria stemming from the Judgment in Case C-503/99 Commission v Belgium. 
83 First, as for the decisions listed in Article 11(3)(a) and (b) of Law 3631/2008, the Court has already held that such decisions do not constitute, contrary to the decisions which formed the background to Case C-503/99 Commission v Belgium (paragraph 50), specific management decisions but decisions fundamental to the life of an undertaking (Judgment in Case C-463/00 Commission v Spain, paragraph 79). 
84 Next, the specification in Article 11(3)(b) and (c), according to which it applies to decisions in so far as they are ‘capable of jeopardizing the supply of services in sectors of strategic importance’ or they concern the ‘allocation of strategic elements of the assets of the abovementioned undertakings and of the basic networks and infrastructure necessary for the economic and social life of the country as well as its security’, may hardly be considered to be a specific list of the strategic assets concerned
85 Finally, even if, as the Hellenic Republic claims, Article 11(3) of Law 3631/2008 must be understood as meaning that the right to object which it provides may be exercised only to guarantee the continuity of services supplied and the operation of networks, the fact remains that, with no details of the actual circumstances in which the right to object may be exercised, the investors are not able to know when it may be applicable
86 Accordingly, as the Commission maintains, the circumstances in which the right to object may be exercised are potentially numerous, undetermined and indeterminable and leave the national authorities too much discretion
87 Consequently, it must be stated that […] the Hellenic Republic has failed to fulfill its obligations under Article 43 EC on the freedom of establishment. (CJEU in C-244/11, at paras 80 to 87, emphasis added).
In my view, this new Judgment clearly indicates that the CJEU is ready to prevent any type of ex post intervention by Member States in the adoption of decisions that can be seen as fundamental to the life of an undertaking, and that any intervention schemes based on public interests need to be predefined, specific enough and amenable to effective judicial review.

This should be taken into consideration in the redesign of regulatory schemes in some Member States (such as Spain, where some ex post intervention competences are planned to be transferred back to the sectorial Ministry and out of the current independent regulators' hands), since most generic ex post decisions may fall short of meeting the stringent criteria set by the CJEU in C-244/11 Commission v Greece

This would should also generate trust on the side of investors in 'strategic' companies (generally in the utilities sector) and may contribute to keep their ability to undertake long term investments (in infrastructure, R&D, etc) without fearing undue governmental intervention. In general, preservation of investors' freedom in these sectors seems to be the clear bet made by the CJEU, and this shall prevent a new wave of public intervention (which could easily result from the structural reforms that the economic crisis is triggering).