Some resources on procurement debarment from a global perspective can help clarify issues with eu law

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There is no question that one of the key aspects in seeking to ensure the integrity of public procurement procedures and the legitimacy of the corresponding expenditure of public funds requires contracting authorities to exclude (suspend or debar, depending on terminology) unreliable companies whose professional integrity prevents them from doing business with the public sector.

The topic of exclusion (and self-cleaning) of unreliable contractors continues to cause some difficulties after the implementation of the 2014 EU Public Procurement Package, where it featured as an area of significant legal reform—as discussed at length in A Sanchez-Graells, 'Exclusion, Qualitative Selection and Short-listing', in F Lichère, R Caranta & S Treumer (eds), Modernising Public Procurement. The New Directive, vol. 6 European Procurement Law Series (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2014) 97-129; and in A Sanchez-Graells, L Butler and P Telles, 'Exclusion and Qualitative Selection of Economic Operators under Public Procurement Procedures: A Comparative View on Selected Jurisdictions', in M Burgi, S Treumer & M Trybus (eds), Qualification, Selection and Exclusion in EU Procurement, vol. 7 European Procurement Law Series (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2016) 245-274.

For example, in Spain, and amidst doubts as to the fitness for purpose of the 2017 implementation of the 2014 EU rules, the National Competition and Markets Commission has sent waves of concern after two recent decisions, where it adopted a debarment decision (prohibición de contratar) against companies that had engaged in bid rigging but refused to determine the duration of the debarment, thus passing the hot potato on to the central national register of public contractors. Given the recent clarification by the CJEU that the exclusion period for infringements of competition law starts to run at the time of the adoption of the relevant administrative decision (see Vossloh Laeis, C-124/17, EU:C:2018:855), the situation is resulting in a (potential) implicit reduction of the maximum debarment period due to difficult to understand competence and procedural issues that are, let’s say it, rather parochial.

No doubt, this is just an example of many more complicated situations derived from the limited experience with the rules in the new Directive, which understanding is not always as full as would be desirable. In this context, there are two recent contributions to global literature that can help us reflect on the (mal)functioning of the proto-systems developed in some Member States after the implementation of the EU rules and (why not?) rethink them and improve them.

One of these contributions is the recent World Bank report on the pilot project ‘A Global View of Debarment: Understanding Exclusion Systems Around the World‘ (April 2019), which provides useful comparative information on 11 jurisdictions (including the EU and some of the Member States, such as Germany, Italy, Spain or the UK).

Another, more substantive contribution can be found in the recent paper by Christopher R Yukins and Michal Kania, 'Suspension and Debarment in the U.S. Government: Comparative Lessons for the EU’s Next Steps in Procurement' (2019) 19(2) UrT 47-73. In this paper, Yukins and Kania rely on the US’ extensive experience in suspension and debarment of government contractors to propose three very specific areas of improvement for European systems: ‘a broader reliance on corporate compliance among contractors, centralizing authority over the exclusion of contractors, and the use of administrative agreements and independent monitors as an alternative to debarment’.

As they stress, the two first proposals are already broadly aligned with (best) practice in some Member States. Their proposal to use administrative agreements and independent monitors is certainly worth pondering, although its fit with some administrative law traditions may be slightly difficult to square.

Additional Austrian postal services to be exempted from compliance with EU (utilities) procurement rules (T-463/14) -- a warning of procedural rebalancing under dir 2014/25?

In its Judgment of 27 April 2016 in Österreichische Post v Commission, T-463/14, EU:T:2016:243 (not available in English), the General Court (GC) of the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled on judicial review of the Commission Implementing Decision exempting certain services in the postal sector in Austria from the application of Directive 2004/17 on utilities procurement, in particular as carried out by Österreichische Post AG (the Austrian national universal service provider, under public ownership of 52.8% of its capital).

The GC quashed the Commission's Decision regarding the denial of exemption for cross-border postal services for addressed (‘outbound’) business to business and business to consumer letters ('B2X letters'), as well as for addressed (‘outbound’) letters between private customers and between private customers and business customers ('C2X letters')--ie, in relation with the activities covered in paras [43]-[50].

The Commission's Decision was based on Art 30 Dir 2004/17, which allowed for utilities procurement linked to activities directly exposed to competition to be exempted from compliance with the otherwise applicable EU public procurement rules. The same regime is now foreseen in Art 34 of Directive 2014/25 on utilities procurement. Thus, the GC's Judgment in Österreichische Post v Commission is interesting in order to gain a better understanding of the procedure (and evidentiary requirements) for the exemption of activities directly exposed to competition from compliance with the revised EU utilities public procurement rules.

the contested decision

In its Implementing Decision, the Commission had considered that

(46) Competition for cross-border letter post is very different for private persons and for companies. Private persons generally have no real choice but to send international mail with their national universal service provider. The volumes sent by private persons are generally too low to offer incentives for new entrants into the market.

(47) It is noted that the competitive situation depends also on the size/population of each city due to the fact that cross-border service providers do not maintain a nationwide access network but generally collect the mail directly at the customer's premises. 

(48) Previous Commission practice... made a distinction between the cross-border postal services for addressed B2X letters market and the cross-border postal services for addressed C2X letters market. 

(49) There is no evidence that the situation is different in Austria,  therefore, for the purposes of this Decision and without prejudice to competition law, two separate product markets will be considered, namely the cross-border postal services for outbound B2X addressed letters and the cross-border postal services for outbound C2X addressed letters. 

(50) Austrian Post could not provide detailed information ... on its relevant shares in each market, nor the market shares of its main competitors. In the absence of information on the degree of competition in each of those markets, it is not possible to conclude that the conditions for granting an exemption under Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/17/EC to cross-border postal services for outbound B2X addressed letters and to cross-border postal services for outbound C2X addressed letters in Austria are met. Consequently, Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/17/EC does not apply to contracts intended to enable the pursuit of those activities in Austria (Implementing Decision 2014/184/EU, paras 46-50, references omitted).

In reviewing this argumentation, which seems to fundamentally rely on the ultimate ratio that Österreichische Post had not discharged the burden of proof imposed by Art 30 Dir 2004/17 (now Art 34 Dir 2014/25), the GC raises some important issues about the level of detail with which the Commission needs to assess estimated figures provided by applicants for exemption from compliance with EU public procurement rules:

(161) ... the applicant states that, following its own argument, the Commission should have exempted at least the B2X international market from the application of Directive 2004/17. It adds that, given that, according to paragraph 46 of the contested decision, its services were not substitutable in the C2X international market, its market share in the B2X international market should be significantly below [confidential]%, which it also corresponded with the Commission's assessment contained in paragraph 47 of the contested decision that the applicant's competitors were mainly in urban areas.

(162) This argument must be accepted. Indeed, on the one hand, the Commission did not dispute that the market share of the applicant in the market for postal services for addressed ['outbound'] B2X and C2X letters at international level was below [confidential]%, as stated in ... the application of the applicant. Moreover, as stated by the applicant, recital 46 of the contested decision shows that the services in question were not substitutable in the C2X international market, since, according to the Commission, private persons generally have no real choice but to send international mail with their national universal service provider. It follows that the market share of the applicant in the market for postal services for addressed B2X letters at international level should be well below [confidential]%, which the Commission did not take into account when considering that those postal services were not directly exposed to competition. In view of these considerations, it must be concluded that the Commission incurred in a manifest error of assessment in not exempting postal address for addressed B2X letters at international level from the application of Directive 2004/17.

(163) Accordingly, the fourth plea must be upheld in so far as it relates to the postal services for addressed B2X letters at international level and dismissed as regards postal services for addressed C2X letters at international level (T-463/14, paras 161-163, own translation from Spanish).

Cracking the specifics of the reasoning is complicated due to the confidential nature of the initial application for exemption under Art 30 Dir 2004/17, as well as the confidentiality of the market share data used by the GC. However, it seems clear that the Commission is subjected to a very demanding standard of data assessment and that it is obliged to use any information provided by the applicants in order to make educated guesses where market intelligence is insufficient to support a direct analysis. Looking to the future, this stringent approach highlights one of the differences between the 'old' regime of Art 30 Dir 2004/17 and the 'new' rules of art 34 Dir 2014/25, which may well make the Commission's life easier.

what Dir 2014/25 has changed

Under the procedural provisions of Art 30(6) Dir 2004/17, 'For the adoption of a Decision [exempting activities directly exposed to competition from compliance with Dir 2004/17] the Commission shall be allowed a period of three months commencing on the first working day following the date on which it receives the notification or the request. However, this period may be extended once by a maximum of three months in duly justified cases, in particular if the information contained in the notification or the request or in the documents annexed thereto is incomplete or inexact or if the facts as reported undergo any substantive changes'.

Conversely, Dir 2014/25 now has a new Art 35 on the procedure applicable for exemption decisions for activities exposed to competition under Art 34. And this is complemented by the additional rules in Annex IV, according to which second paragraph, 'The Commission may require the Member State or the contracting entity concerned or the independent national authority referred to under paragraph 1 or any other competent national authority to provide all necessary information or to supplement or clarify information given within an appropriate time limit. In the event of late or incomplete answers, the periods set out in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 shall be suspended for the period between the expiry of the time limit set in the request for information, and the receipt of the complete and correct information'.

The change of the extension of the maximum period for a decision to exempt activities exposed to competition for a suspension of the period to adopt such decision is important because, both under the old [Art 30(4)(II) Dir 2004/17] and the new rules [Art 35(3)(II)(b) Dir 2014/25], in the absence of a decision within the specified time period (3 months in the old rules, and 90 working days under the new ones), the Directive ceases to apply to contracts intended to enable the activity exposed to competition. Consequently, a combination of a ticking time limit and the impossibility to reject claims based on what the Commission may have considered unreliable or insufficient evidence, would have resulted in significant pressure on the Commission under the old rules. Thus, it seems clear that, under the new rules and with the ability to 'stop the clock', the Commission will be able to relocate the burden of proof squarely onto the applicant's shoulders, which may well minimise or neutralise the tough approach indicated by the GC in its Österreichische Post v Commission Judgment.