Can a requirement to furnish financial guarantees (performance bonds) be considered a selection criterion based on economic and financial standing (C-76/16)?

In his Opinion of 21 March 2017 in INGSTEEL and Metrostav, C-76/16, EU:C:2017:226, Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona addressed the compatibility of tender requirements aimed at ensuring the (future) provision of performance guarantees related to the execution of a works contract with the rules of the 2004 EU public procurement directive (Dir 2004/18). He submitted to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that such requirements are compatible with EU law and, in particular, with the rules on selection criteria based on the economic and financial standing of economic operators seeking to be awarded public contracts under Art 47 Dir 2004/18. In doing so, he rejected the European Commission’s submission that such requirements, inasmuch as they affected the phase of execution of the contract, ought to be assessed in accordance with the rules on the setting of conditions for the performance of contracts under Art 26 Dir 2004/18.

AG Campos also addressed a point on the time-sensitivity of remedies’ availability (ie whether challenges by disappointed tenderers are barred where the performance of the contract by the awardee is almost complete) under the EU Remedies Directive (Dir 89/665 as amended by Dir 2007/66). He considered that, as interpreted in connection with Art 47 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, the procedural rights created by the Remedies Directive do not lapse simply due to the fact that the successful tenderer has almost completed performance of the contract at the time the disappointed tenderer launches its challenge, or the review authority or court is to issue its ruling.

While I fully agree with AG Campos concerning the procedural aspects of his Opinion (which I would have thought both clear and uncontroversial), I think that his analysis of the substantive issues improperly characterises the requirement for the (future) provision of a performance guarantee as a valid selection criterion based on the economic operator’s economic and financial standing. On that point, I consider the analytical framework proposed by the European Commission (partially) preferable. This post develops the reasons why I think the ECJ should not follow AG Campos on the substantive points of his INGSTEEL and Metrostav Opinion.

In the case at hand, “the contract notice required a ‘statement by the bank (loan agreement or credit facility agreement) recording the bank’s undertaking to the effect that the tenderer, in the event of acceptance of its tender, will be in a position to provide a guarantee of EUR 3,000,000 to ensure performance of the contract. The evidence must show that the funds will be available to the tenderer after conclusion of the contract. The evidence must be certified by a person authorised by the bank for that purpose.’” (para 15, emphasis added).

It is hard to make sense of the requirement (which may be a translation issue), but this seems to concern the need to provide a stand-by financial guarantee to the benefit of the contracting authority, which the issuing bank commits to firm up upon award of the contract.

Be it as it may, the disappointed tenderer did not provide such a bank statement, but rather proof of the opening of a current-account credit facility for an amount exceeding EUR 5,000,000 and a sworn statement that, if awarded the contract, they would keep a minimum of EUR 3,000,000 for the duration of the contract (para 17). It is not clear from the factual description in the Opinion whether there was any commitment to provide a guarantee using those funds as collateral, but it does not seem to be the case.

The contracting authority did not accept these documents as evidence of the economic and financial standing of the tenderer and thus excluded it from further participation. The rejection was eventually challenged before the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, and the preliminary reference to the ECJ derives from a procedure mainly aimed at assessing (i) whether the contracting authority could introduce this requirement in compliance with the rules on economic and financial standing (Art 47(1)(a) and (4) Dir 2004/18); and (ii) whether the contracting authority should have accepted the documentation as alternative to the specified bank certificate (Art 47(5) Dir 2004/18). Only the first point deserves analysis.

It is important to note here that the European Commission has challenged the legal subsumption of the material facts under Art 47 Dir 2004/18 and submitted that “Article 47 of Directive 2004/18 relates to the economic and financial standing of the tenderer at the time of award of the contract. However, the tenderer’s economic and financial standing during performance of the contract is governed by Article 26 of that directive, concerning conditions for performance of the contract. At all events, in the light of the wording of the question, the Commission suggests that the condition imposed on the tenderer should be examined under both Article 26 and Article 47 of Directive 2004/18” (para 28).

Further, the Commission indicated that “Article 26 of Directive 2004/18 provides that the conditions for performance must appear in the contract notice, a requirement fulfilled in this case, and must be compatible with EU law. Citing the case-law of the Court, the Commission argues that, as Directive 2004/18 does not exhaustively govern the special conditions for performance, those conditions may be assessed in accordance with primary EU law” (para 29, emphasis added).

AG Campos disagreed with the Commission and considered that the approach of assessing the requirement as a performance clause was incorrect. He emphasised that Art 26 Dir 2004/18 is concerned with other issues “and applies, in particular, to social and environmental objectives” (para 43). More importantly, he considered that “in requiring certain minimum levels of economic and financial standing, the presumption in Articles 44 and 47 of Directive 2004/18 is that the proof of that standing must refer to the period of performance of the contract. It would not be reasonable to require economic and financial standing only at the time of award of the contract and for the contracting authority not to have the right to request guarantees that the future successful contractor will retain its economic and financial standing during the period of performance of the contract” (para 44 emphasis added).

Furthermore, after creating an analogy with the case law concerned with reliance on third party capacities, he gave significant weight to the functional criterion that “[w]hen financial or economic resources are concerned, it is reasonable that these should not be ephemeral but should last until the contractual obligations have been performed” (para 48). In any case, AG Campos explicitly saved the requirement due to the fact that the value (EUR 3,000,000) “was related and proportionate to the subject-matter of the contract” and that the duration of the financial guarantee “was the same as the period of performance of the contract” (para 50). However, he did not provide any reasons for the finding that a 12% financial guarantee is proportionate (the estimated value of the contract was just above EUR 25,000,000), or why a duration of 48 moths without a reduction in the value of the guarantee did not need to be assessed in relation to the potential evolution (ie reduction) of risk as the completion of the contract progressed.

In my view, even if the outcome of the analysis may be seen as defensible (of which I am not convinced), the analysis itself is technically flawed. Put simply, the EU public procurement directives (both the 2004, as well as the 2014 generation) do not regulate the possibility for contracting authorities to demand financial guarantees from economic operators participating in tender procedures – neither tender/participation guarantees, nor performance/completion guarantees [see A Sanchez-Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 326-7 & 425-6]. This not regulated as part of the assessment of the economic operator’s economic and financial standing for selection purposes – which is designed as an information-based screening process, not as a phase where the contracting authority can secure financial rights for itself –and this is also not related to the conditions for the performance of the contract. Moreover, a reinterpretation of the selection rules on economic and financial standing (but also on professional or technical standing) that made them forward looking would create significant distortions in the system created by EU public procurement law, as well as potentially make it impossible to assess.

In the absence of rules on financial guarantees in the relevant EU public procurement directives (ie Dir 2004/18), the analysis of requirements for economic operators to furnish them to the contracting authority should be analysed in accordance with primary EU law – as the Commission rightly stressed, although on the basis of the applicability of Art 26 Dir 2004/18, with which I disagree. In that context, the AG (and in the immediate future, the ECJ) should have assessed whether the requirement of providing a 12% financial guarantee for a duration of 48 months is a barrier to free movement – which I think it is – and whether it can be justified – which I am not sure it can be, as both (i) the public interest in reducing the financial exposure of contracting authorities engaging in public contracts is questionable, and (ii) it may well be (strictly) disproportionate due to the impact it can have on SME access to procurement.

Therefore, the analysis of proportionality need not be intra-tender or confined to the terms of the contract (which could already make it fail), but rather of a higher level of generality, concerning the policy of demanding financial guarantees and its justification from a public interest perspective. Given its detrimental effects for competition, I would not think that demanding these guarantees is necessarily exemptable under free movement rules, at least in relation with contracts that do not raise specific or extraordinary risks.

From that perspective, the proportionality assessment carried out by AG Campos in INGSTEEL and Metrostav almost obiter may not necessarily cover all bases, as it is carried out from the perspective of the link of the requirement to the subject matter of the contract, rather than the perspective of seeking to justify a restriction of a fundamental internal market freedom. But, even if the same result was to be achieved, the analytical path would still be important—ie the limited scope of the exercise of assessing economic operators’ economic and financial standing should not be unduly extended.

This can have major relevance, not least because of the change that the consolidation of the principle of competition in Art 18(1) Dir 2014/24 has brought about. In the future (ie, where Dir 2014/24 is applicable to the case), in my opinion, the inclusion of requirements to provide financial guarantees should be subjected to assessment from the perspective of a potential artificial narrowing of competition. If, in a case such as INGSTEEL and Metrostav, the contracting authority excludes a tenderer on the basis of some (seemingly) formal deviation of the way in which it proposes to provide financial assurance to the contracting authority, this is bound to infringe the requirements of the competition principle. Surely, this analysis could be carried out even if the requirement was considered to pertain to the assessment of the economic operator’s economic and financial standing, but the consolidated recognition of the contracting authorities’ discretion to set those requirements in the first place may muddy the analysis. It seems conceptually preferable to consider it an independent issue, and thus subject to general principles.

Therefore, I would urge the ECJ not to follow AG Campos’ Opinion in INGSTEEL and Metrostav and rather determine that the requirement of financial guarantees was not covered by the 2004 EU public procurement rules and must thus be subjected to a standard assessment under primary EU law (and a strict proportionality test). I would also submit that, under those rules, the requirement was contrary to EU law.

CJEU pushes for flexibility for teaming agreements under EU public procurement rules: what implications for the interpretation of Arts 19 & 63 Dir 2014/24? (C-234/14)

In its Judgment of 14 January 2016 in Ostas celtnieks, C-234/14, EU:C:2016:6, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) stressed the flexibility that the EU public procurement rules on teaming and reliance on third party capacity impose on contracting authorities. 

In the case at hand, the Latvian municipality of Talsi had approved tender documents requiring tenderers relying on the capacities of other contractors to 'mention all those contractors and provide evidence that it has the necessary resources at its disposal. If that tenderer is to be awarded the contract, it must have concluded a cooperation agreement with the contractors concerned before the award and forwarded this to the contracting authority'. One of the main obligations under such agreement would have been to include 'a clause stipulating that each party is to be jointly and severally liable for the performance of the contract'.  The requirement for a pre-award agreement was challenged.

In an unsurprising decision, the CJEU stressed that the relevant rules (then Arts 47 and 48 Dir 2004/18), precluded a contracting authority from imposing on a tenderer which relies on the capacities of other entities the obligation, before the contract is awarded, to conclude a cooperation agreement with those entities or to form a partnership with them. Indeed, the CJEU recalled that it is settled case law that 'Articles 47(2) and 48(3) of Directive 2004/18 recognise the right of every economic operator to rely, for a particular contract, upon the capacities of other entities, "regardless of the nature of the links which it has with them", provided that it proves to the contracting authority that it will have at its disposal the resources necessary for the performance of the contract' (para 23, with reference to Swm Construzioni, C-94/12, EU:C:2013:646; see here). The CJEU stressed that such 'interpretation ... is consistent with the aim of the widest possible opening-up of public contracts to competition pursued by the relevant directives to the benefit not only of economic operators but also of contracting authorities. In addition, that interpretation also facilitates the involvement of small- and medium-sized undertakings in the contracts procurement market' (para 24).

This was clearly set out in the pre-existing case law of the CJEU and therefore, hardly deserves any comment. However, in proceeding with its reasoning, the Court engaged in a clarification that can raise significant doubts as to the interpretation of the new rules on teaming and group bidding in Arts 19 and 63 of Dir 2014/24. The CJEU stressed that 'the tenderer is free to choose ...the legal nature of the links it intends to establish with the other entities on whose capacities it relies in order to perform a particular contract and, on the other, the type of proof of the existence of those links' (para 28, emphasis added). 

On the basis of this freedom of organisation recognised by the CJEU (which rings of the freedom to conduct a business under Art 16 of the EUCFR, even if it is not mentioned), the CJEU determined that '[i]n the present case, ... the contracting authority requires a tenderer ... which relies on the capacities of other entities for the performance of the contract concerned, to establish links of a precise legal nature with those entities, so that only those particular links are capable, in the eyes of the contracting authority, of proving that the contract does in fact have the resources necessary to perform that contract ... a rule such as that ... of the tender specifications manifestly deprives the provisions of Articles 47(2) and 48(3) of Directive 2004/28 of their effectiveness' (paras 30 and 33, emphasis added).

The reason I find the Judgment in Ostas celtnieks troubling for the interpretation of Arts 19  and 63 of Dir 2014/24 is that, going beyond the requirements and limits of Arts 47 and 48 Dir 2004/18, a new provision in Art 63 Dir 2014/24 now establishes that despite the fact that groups of economic operators, including temporary associations, may participate in procurement procedures and they shall not be required by contracting authorities to have a specific legal form in order to submit a tender or a request to participate [Art 19(2)],  and that contracting authorities may require groups of economic operators to assume a specific legal form only once they have been awarded the contract, and to the extent that such a change is necessary for the satisfactory performance of the contract [Art 19(3)], Art 63(1) in fine Dir 2014/24 foresees that '[w]here an economic operator relies on the capacities of other entities with regard to criteria relating to economic and financial standing, the contracting authority may require that the economic operator and those entities be jointly liable for the execution of the contract.'

In view of the Judgment in Ostas celtnieks, it seems clear that either the enforcement of Art 63 Dir 2014/24 will require a change of tack in the development of the flexible case law applicable to teaming agreements, or Art 63 Dir 2014/24 will trigger a potential nightmare of legal discussion about the limits of the possibility to request assurances to guarantee that the economic operator and those entities on which financial and economic capacities it relies be jointly liable for the execution of the contract, while not forcing it to 'establish links of a precise legal nature with those entities, so that only those particular links are capable, in the eyes of the contracting authority, of proving that the contract does in fact have the resources necessary to perform that contract'.

This builds up on my previous criticism of the liability requirement created by Art 63 Dir 2014/24, which was along different lines:
... the ... requirement of joint liability for the execution of the contract can make it very difficult to reach subcontracting agreements or similar arrangements for the reliance on third parties for the partial execution of a minor part of the contract. Moreover, it can result in complicated structures of side letters of indemnity that raise the legal costs linked to participation. In my opinion, in relation to both requirements, the contracting entity should be satisfied with the liability of the main contractor and, if need be, ‘self-protect’ through requirements for adequate professional risk indemnity insurance under article 58(3) of Directive 2014/24. Therefore, a pro-competitive interpretation of these rules requires subjecting their use to very strict proportionality tests in order to avoid unnecessary restrictions of the ability of tenderers to rely on third party capacities in ways that fall short of teaming and bidding jointly for contracts [ A Sanchez Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 317-18].
In my view, the Judgment in Ostas celtnieks strengthens the argument for a very exceptional use of Art 63(1) in fine Dir 2014/24 by contracting authorities.