AG Kokott Advocates Restrictive Interpretation of Security-Based Derogations of EU Procurement Law (C-187/16)


In her Opinion of 20 July 2017 in case Commission v Austria, C-187/16, EU:C:2017:578, AG Kokott assessed the limits of the exemption on security grounds, under Article 346 TFEU and the Rules on Defence and Security Procurement (Directive 2009/81/EC), from the obligation to carry out a tender procedure for the award of a contract for the manufacture of identity and other official documents (such as biometric passports, driving licences or residence permits).

Even if based on previous generations of EU public procurement rules (both the 1992 and the 2004 procurement directives controlling the award of service contracts), the Opinion and future decision by the Court of Justice will be important for the coordination of the 2014 Public Procurement Package and the rules on Defence and Security Procurement.

As AG Kokott aptly put it, the main legal issue in the dispute requires ascertaining whether Member States are justified in directly awarding contracts for the manufacture of such documents to undertakings they 'consider to be particularly trustworthy' (para 2), in particular if they happen to be 'formerly State-owned undertaking[s] which [have] now been privatised' (para 3, which triggers considerations on the limits of the in-house exemption as well, see paras 29 and ), on the basis of the undisputed argument that such documents 'must be manufactured in compliance with particular secrecy and security requirements, as the issue of such documents is an expression of the exercise of fundamental State functions. The documents are used as part of everyday life and the importance of public confidence in their authenticity and veracity is not to be underestimated. Consequently, highest priority is given to security of supply, protection against counterfeiting and responsible handling of these documents, including of data processed in their manufacture, and abuse must be effectively prevented' (para 1)--all of which are ultimately incarnated in the rules of Regulation 2252/2004/EC on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States (see paras 13-14). Regardless of the peculiarities of the documents, the position taken by the European Commission is that it is 'perfectly possible to organise a public invitation to tender in such a way that only undertakings which [specialise] in the manufacture of documents subject to special security requirements and [are] supervised accordingly could be successful' (para 21). Austria, as the defending Member State in the case, opposes this reasoning and defends its use of the Article 346 TFEU exemption on the basis of the need to ensure the 'protection of essential national security interests. Protection of secret information, safeguarding of the authenticity and veracity of the documents concerned, security of supply and guaranteed protection of sensitive data' (para 20).

On that note, in her Opinion, AG Kokott also stresses that the case will give the Court of Justice an opportunity to go beyond procurement and provide further clarification of the limits of the security-based derogations from EU law that Member States can undertake under Article 346 TFEU (para 4). I am not necessarily convinced that the Court will follow that route, for it tends to avoid making general declarations on the meaning and interpretation of EU law, and it is clearly possible for the Court to take a narrow approach and provide a decision solely for the case at hand, without aiming to establish bright lines on the scope of Article 346 TFEU more generally. In any case, the Court's approach can in itself be interesting.

On the specific issue whether there was an obligation to tender the contract for the manufacturing of the official documents, AG Kokott suggests that the Court of Justice should declare the existence of such an obligation and, therefore, a breach of EU procurement law by Austria. Her main arguments are that:

  • The award of the contracts that gave rise to the dispute was covered by an obligation to launch an EU-wide tender procedure where the relevant value thresholds were exceeded (ie for all but one type of official documents) (paras 30-32).
  • The undeniably sensitive nature of the documents object of the contract does not justify the invocation of a public security exemption compatible with either the specific rules of the procurement directives (based on the fact that their performance requires compliance with special security measures, or on requirements linked to the protection of essential interests of the State), or with Article 346 TFEU more generally (paras 40-45).
    • A derogation from EU law based on the protection of essential national security interests requires Member States 'to offer substantiated evidence to show precisely which national security interests are affected and to what extent compliance with certain obligations under EU law would in practice be contrary to those security interests' (para 48).
    • Where the State shows the existence of a sufficient national interest at stake, the derogation from EU law, being an exception to fundamental internal market freedoms, needs to be interpreted strictly--and this applies to both derogations based on Article 346 TFEU in general, and to any specific derogations under secondary EU law, including the procurement directives (para 53). The test ultimately requires the 'Member State to prove that it is necessary to have recourse to the measures taken by it in order to protect its essential national security interests' (para 54).
    • In the case at hand, neither (i) the need for centralised performance of the printing contracts (paras 56-58), (ii) the need for effective official controls (paras 59-63), or (iii) the need to ensure the trustworthiness of the contractor (paras 64-72), are sufficient to demonstrate the necessity of directly awarding the contract because, in relation with each of the requirements, the Member State had a satisfactory less restrictive alternative measure available.
      • AG Kokott does not consider the need for centralised performance a good enough reason to exclude the tendering of the contract because, even if security justifications based on the easier control or one than several undertakings, and the ensuing reduced risk of access to security arrangements or sensitive materials by unauthorised parties are convincing, because that 'can ultimately only explain why the printing contracts at issue are only ever awarded to a single undertaking (and not to several at the same time). On the other hand, there is no plausible justification, based on the need for centralisation, why it should be necessary, in order to protect essential national security interests, to commission only ever the same undertaking' (para 57).
      • She also dismisses the argument based on the need to carry out special official controls because it is largely based on restrictions self-imposed on Austrian authorities by Austrian legislation (paras 61 and 63) and because, in any case, the need for the official controls does not justify the absolute exclusion of EU procurement rules because it is disproportionate (paras 62 and 63).
      • Finally, and in a very clear manner, AG Kokott dismisses claims based on the need to preserve on-going 'special relationships of trust' between public authorities and specific contractors. As she eloquently puts it: 'it would run flagrantly counter to the basic principle underpinning the European internal market in general and public procurement law in particular if a Member State almost arbitrarily classified a single undertaking — especially its formerly State-owned and now privatised ‘historic’ provider in a certain area — as particularly reliable and trustworthy according to the motto ‘tried and tested’, whilst a priori denying or at least questioning the reliability and trustworthiness of all other undertakings' (para 66, references omitted).
      • To stress the restrictions on the possibility for the Member State to derogate from EU law in order to avoid disclosure of security-related information to foreign undertakings or undertakings controlled by foreign nationals (paras 69-70), AG Kokott highlights the need for such concerns to inform Member State decisions in a 'consistent and systemic manner'. In that regard, AG Kokott dismisses Austria's claim on the basis that 'Austria has not ... taken precautions which could effectively prevent [its formerly State-owned undertaking] falling under the control of foreign shareholders or becoming a subsidiary of a foreign legal person. The Austrian State has neither stipulated, for reasons of security, voting rights in [its formerly State-owned undertaking] in the form of a special share (‘golden share’) nor made the sale of shares in [its formerly State-owned undertaking] subject to any restrictions on security grounds' (para 70, references omitted).

On the whole, I think that AG Kokott's Opinion is well-argued and her arguments are convincing. From the public procurement perspective, it seems clear that in cases where the Member State can resort to less restrictive measures--such as carrying out a tender with high requirements embedded in the relevant selection criteria (including an exceptional obligation to carry out the performance of the contract in the territory of the contracting authority; see para 63 and the cited Judgment of 4 December 1986, Commission v Germany, C-205/84, EU:C:1986:463) and imposing extensive confidentiality obligations--the possibility to exclude compliance with EU law should be excluded.

There are other aspects of the Opinion that seem more open to opposing arguments, such as the need to ensure watertight consistency in the use of derogations based on Article 346 TFEU (where warranted), or some of the (implicit) elements of mutual trust and recognition between Member States in the context of their cooperation in security issues. In my view, it is not likely that the Court of Justice will engage with them in detail. If I were to guess, I would expect a short Judgment in this case, simply stating that Austria's interpretation of the exemptions from the EU public procurement rules was too wide and that, in any case, the direct award of the contract fails a strict proportionality assessment. We will know soon enough.

Another State aid decision by GC follows restrictive approach to standing of interested parties (T-118/13)

Following its previous restrictive case law on the granting of active standing to challenge State aid decisions to competitors of their beneficiaries (see here), the General Court (GC) of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) reiterated this position in its Judgment of 22 June 2016 in case Whirlpool Europe v Commission, T-118/13, EU:T:2016:365.

The case at hand is a long-lasting saga where producers of large household appliances (Electrolux and by Whirlpool) have been challenging France's restructuring aid to one of their competitors (Fagor France). In this iteration of the approval of the aid and its ensuing challenge, the Commission has adopted the strategy of challenging on of the competitors' standing. Whirlpool has opposed this approach on several basis, including the fact that its legal standing had not been challenged in the previous iteration of approval / challenge, that its market share is affected by keeping Fagor in the market, and due to Whirlpool's very close involvement in the case throughout.

The Commission dismisses all arguments. In the Commission's view,

the fact that an undertaking’s views were heard and that the conduct of the procedure was largely determined by its observations, although a factor which is relevant to the assessment of locus standi, does not relieve that undertaking of having to show that the aid at issue is liable to result in its market position being ‘substantially affected’. As regards that ‘substantial effect’, the Commission states that, in accordance with the case-law, it cannot suffice, in order to prove that the undertaking at issue is individually concerned, to establish that the aid at issue may exercise ‘an influence’ on the competitive relationships and that the undertaking concerned is in a competitive relationship with the addressee of the aid. On the contrary, it should be demonstrated that the applicant was particularly affected by the aid in relation to its competitors (T-118/13, para 28, emphasis added).

In short, the GC has accepted the Commission's arguments and, in particular, stressed that

44 Where an undertaking calls into question the merits of the decision appraising the aid ... the mere fact that it may be regarded as concerned within the meaning of Article 108(2) TFEU cannot suffice to render the action admissible. It must go on to demonstrate that it has a particular status within the meaning of the judgment of 15 July 1963 in Plaumann v Commission (25/62, EU:C:1963:17) ... That applies in particular where its market position is substantially affected by the aid to which the decision at issue relates (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 December 2005 in Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum, C‑78/03 P, EU:C:2005:761, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
45 In that regard, not only the undertaking in receipt of the aid but also the undertakings competing with it which have played an active role in the procedure initiated pursuant to Article 108(2) TFEU in respect of an individual aid have been recognised as individually concerned by the Commission decision closing that procedure, provided that their position on the market is substantially affected by the aid which is the subject of the contested decision. An undertaking cannot therefore rely solely on its status as a competitor of the undertaking in receipt of aid but must additionally show, in the light of its participation in the procedure and the magnitude of the harm to its position on the market, that its factual circumstances distinguish it in a similar way to the undertaking in receipt of the aid (see order of 7 March 2013 in UOP vCommission, T‑198/09, not published, EU:T:2013:105, paragraphs 25 and 26 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 28 January 1986 in Cofaz and Others v Commission, 169/84, ECR, EU:C:1986:42, paragraph 25, and order of 27 May 2004 in Deutsche Post and DHL v Commission, T‑358/02, EU:T:2004:159, paragraphs 33 and 34).
46 As regards establishing such an effect, the Court of Justice has had occasion to explain that the mere fact that a measure such as the contested decision may have some influence on the competitive relationships existing on the relevant market and that the undertaking concerned was in a competitive relationship with the addressee of that measure cannot in any event suffice for that undertaking to be regarded as individually concerned by that measure (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 December 1969 in Eridania and Others v Commission, 10/68 and 18/68, EU:C:1969:66, paragraph 7, and 22 December 2008 in British Aggregates v Commission, C‑487/06 P, EU:C:2008:757, paragraph 47).
47 According to settled case-law, the applicant must provide evidence to establish the particularity of its competitive situation (order of 27 May 2004 in Deutsche Post and DHL v Commission, T‑358/02, EU:T:2004:159, paragraph 38, and judgment of 10 February 2009 in Deutsche Post and DHL International v Commission, T‑388/03, EU:T:2009:30, paragraphs 49 and 51) and demonstrate that its competitive position is substantially affected in comparison with the other undertakings competing in the market at issue (see, to that effect, order of 27 May 2004 in Deutsche Post and DHL v Commission, T‑358/02, EU:T:2004:159, paragraph 41; see also, to that effect, judgments of 10 February 2009 in Deutsche Post and DHL International v Commission, T‑388/03, EU:T:2009:30, paragraph 51; 13 September 2010 in TF1 v Commission, T‑193/06, EU:T:2010:389, paragraph 84; 15 January 2013 in Aiscat v Commission, T‑182/10, EU:T:2013:9, paragraph 68; 5 November 2014 in Vtesse Networks v Commission, T‑362/10, EU:T:2014:928, paragraph 55; and 3 December 2014 in Castelnou Energía v Commission, T‑57/11, EU:T:2014:1021, paragraphs 35 to 37) (T-118/13, paras 44 to 47, emphasis added).

Once more, the substantive analysis in which the GC engages in Whirlpool Europe v Commission results in a threshold of 'comparatively more adverse substantive negative competitive impact' that is almost impossible to discharge. This is bound to keep on restricting the number of State aid cases that can be successfully challenged, which will continue to contribute to a reduction in the effectiveness of the State aid control system [as criticised in A Sanchez-Graells, 'Digging itself out of the hole? A critical assessment of the Commission’s attempt to revitalise State aid enforcement after the crisis' (2016) 4(1) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 157-187]. Thus, this Judgment must also receive criticism for its disproportionately restrictive assessment of the conditions to grant active standing to challenge State aid decisions under Art 263 TFEU.

Are future (lease) contracts covered by the EU public procurement directives? (C-213/13)

In his Opinion of 15 May 2014 in case C-213/13 Impresa Pizzarotti (not available in English, so the following discussion is based on my reading of the Spanish version), Advocate General Nils Wahl has addressed the tricky issue whether future lease contracts, or contracts for the lease of buildings that are yet to be constructed, are covered by the EU public procurement Directives (in particular, by Directive 2004/18, but the interpretation will remain relevant under the new Directive 2014/24, which scope has not changed as far as works contracts are concerned).
The factual background of the case is rather complicated as the Commune di Bari and the Italian Ministry of Justice kept changing the conditions of the financial arrangements concerned with the building and rental of Bari's new city of justice; but, as AG Wahl indicates in his Opinion, the legal issue to be addressed is whether transactions relating to future buildings may fall within the exception to the application of the rules on public contracts--as foreseen in Article 16(a) of Directive 2004/18 [or art 10(a) Dir 2014/24], which indicates that the Directive "shall not apply to public service contracts for: (a) the acquisition or rental, by whatever financial means, of land, existing buildings or other immovable property or concerning rights thereon".
In his view, the exception in Art 16(a) Directive 2004/18 [and now art 10(a) Dir 2014/24] can under no circumstances be interpreted in a way that covers works which execution has not yet started (para 54). On the ultimate basis of the principles of the protection of the internal market's fundamental freedoms and the promotion of effective competition (para 56), AG Wahl clearly argues that
With respect to the exclusion relating to the acquisition or lease of real estate, understood in the broad sense, I believe that it can only refer to existing assets. Indeed, a tender under the application of the rules on public procurement will have little purpose when referred to the lease or sale of an existing and well determined bulding, which is inappropriate for a confrontation with others because of its unique character. Furthermore, it appears from some preparatory works that the exclusion of contracts for lease or purchase of real estate was initially motivated by the local and non cross-border nature of these contracts. However, given that the activities in question involve the future construction of real estate and, therefore, the execution of works, the tendering process and transparency required by these rules are not inappropriate at all and therefore should be applied. Further, in my view, the reference that the provisions in question make to "other (immovable) property" should be understood in the sense that it relates to assets other than land and buildings, and not to goods whose construction has yet to be conducted. [...] In the event that a public administration chooses, within the framework of the installation of certain services, for a formula for the purchase or lease of a work to be constructed, this operation shall be subject to the procurement procedures established by the relevant regulation (Opinion in C-213/13 at paras 60 and 61, own translation from Spanish, references ommitted and emphasis added).
This reasoning must be shared, given the need to interpret the exclusions to the Directives in a restrictive manner (as the AG stresses in his Opinion, at para 58). Incidentally, it is also interesting to stress that in AG Wahl's Opinion, the fact that the aggregated consideration for the lease of the future building does not cover the costs of its construction is insufficient to alter any conclusion as to the existence of a works contracts that should have been tendered under the relevant EU rules (para 80).
In my view, this is an important case, as the adoption of the interpretation suggested by AG Wahl would come to limit the possibilities to exclude certain types of contracts that fall within the broad category of public-private cooperation from the remit of the procurement directives, and seems to put some pressure on the (increased) use of either design contests or full-fledged procurement procedures (probably, from now on, the competitive procedure with negotiation under art 29 dir 2014/24) when contracting authorities seek to have dedicated buildings constructed. Let's hope that the CJEU follows this Opinion.