Interesting twist on the interpretation of extremely urgent procurement rules -- re [2022] EWHC 46 (TCC)

One of the most awaited court decisions in the PPE procurement litigation saga in the UK was handed down yesterday—see R (Good Law Project and EveryDoctor) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2022] EWHC 46 (TCC). The case concerned, among other things, the interpretation of the authorisation to use a negotiated procedure without prior publication on grounds of extreme urgency, and its limits, under reg.32(2)(c) and 32(4) of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (‘PCR2015’), which transpose Art 32(2)(c) of Directive 2014/14/EU verbatim.

The case required an EU law conforming interpretation due to the procurement predating the end of the Brexit transition period (see para [308]). The High Court thus engaged in an analysis of CJEU case law and a functional interpretation of reg.32(2)(c) and 32(4) PCR2015 that is directly of interest regarding the interpretation of Art 32(2)(c) Dir 2014/14/EU (on which see P Bogdanowicz, ‘Article 32’ in R Caranta and A Sanchez-Graells, European Public Procurement. Commentary on Directive 2014/24/EU (Edward Elgar, 2021) 350-362]. There are two points worth highlighting in the Judgment (see also Pedro Telles’ hot take yesterday).

First, the High Court confirmed the ‘blanket approach’ interpretation that the pandemic, in its early stages, was itself sufficient justification to ‘deactivate’ procurement rules through the exception to competitive requirements in reg.32(2)(c) and 32(4) PCR2015 / Art 32(2)(c) Dir 2014/24’EU (paras [329]-[331]). This has been the position of the UK Cabinet Office and the European Commission in their ‘pandemic procurement’ guidelines of March and April 2020, respectively, and one that I share (see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Procurement in the time of Covid-19’ (2020) 71(1) NILQ 81-87, at 83; see also Bogdanowicz, above, at 32.23, contra Telles, above).

Second, and more interesting, the High Court considered whether the authorisation to carry out a negotiated procedure without prior publication is still subject to some of the requirements of the PCR2015 (and, by analogy, Directive 2014/24/EU). The High Court found that, under certain circumstances, extremely urgent procurement is still bound to respect the equal treatment requirement of reg.18 PCR2015 / Art 18 Dir 2014/24/EU. The High Court’s reasoning was that

It is … necessary to consider whether there are any constraints on the permissible approach by a contracting authority when acting under regulation 32; in particular, whether there is an irreducible minimum standard of objective fairness that applies to such procurements, even in the absence of open competition (at [334], emphasis added).

and that

Regulation 18 provides that contracting authorities shall treat economic operators equally and without discrimination and shall act in a transparent and proportionate manner. Regulation 32 does not expressly disapply the obligations set out in regulation 18. … the question that arises is whether there is any implicit exclusion, or modification, of this provision arising from operation of the negotiated procedure without notice (at [340], emphasis added).

Within this framework, and taking into account the peculiar circumstances of the case — ie the fact that the UK Government ‘operated a high priority lane (“the High Priority Lane”, also referred to as … “the VIP Lane”), whereby suppliers who had been referred by Ministers, [Members of Parliament] and senior officials were afforded more favourable treatment, significantly increasing their prospects of being awarded a contract or contracts’ (at [4]) — the High Court established that

It is reasonably clear that where there is only one economic operator who can provide the works, supplies or services, the principle of equal treatment can have no application. Where there is no alternative source, there will be no comparative exercise carried out and no question of any discrimination arises. However, where the contracting authority considers bids from more than one economic operator, whether at the same or at different times, there is no obvious rationale for disregarding the principle of equal treatment in terms of the criteria used to decide which bidders should be awarded a contract. Dispensing with a competition does not justify arbitrary or unfair selection criteria where more than one economic operator could satisfy the demand (at [341]).

I have two comments here. The first one is that the analysis at para [341] is partially flawed when it initially refers to the existence of a single supply source, as that is covered by the grounds in reg.32(2)(b) PCR2015 / Art 32(2)(b) Dir 2014/24/EU. A proper analysis under ground (c) on extreme urgency should have triggered a different logic, as the presence of extreme urgency allows contracting authorities to simply choose a provider regardless of the existence of alternative providers, precisely because the supply, works or services are so urgent that there is no time to consider alternatives. The choice of the specific supplier to which the contract will be awarded is discretionary, and subject only to documentary requirements primarily concerned with the concurrence of the circumstances justifying the use of the negotiated procedure without prior publication (see Sanchez-Graells, above, 83).

If this premise is correct, on the basis of a maiore ad minus logic, the argument is difficult to extend to a situation where the contracting authority makes repeated choices for the direct award of contracts. That does not mean that unequal treatment is allowed, but rather that the source of the requirement for equal treatment can hardly be found in reg.18 PCR2015 / Art 18 Dir 2014/24/EU in relation to reg.32(2)(c) PCR2015 / Art 32(2)(c) Dir 2014/24/EU because its exclusion is implicit in the authorisation to directly and discretionarily choose the economic operator to be tasked with the extremely urgent supply, service provision or works—regardless of whether there is only one possible source or not, as that is covered in ground (b) of those rules instead.

The High Court dismissed this argument as follows:

The Defendant submits that, as he was not constrained to implement any competitive tender process, it was lawful for the Defendant to elect to approach an economic operator of his choice and negotiate directly with such economic operator for the purposes of awarding any individual public contract. In those circumstances, it is submitted, the principle of equal treatment did not apply. In my judgment that submission goes too far. It would be open to the Defendant to justify the selection of one economic operator but only: (i) where he could bring himself within the conditions set out in regulation 32(2)(b), for example where only one economic operator could source the required PPE; or (ii) where he could justify the extent of such derogation from the principles in regulation 18 under regulation 32(2)(c), for example where only one economic operator could source the PPE within the required timescale. That interpretation is consistent with the guidance issued by the European Commission on 1 April 2020 [at [346]).

I submit that the legal analysis of the High Court in this point is incorrect, simply because there is no single source requirement in reg.32(2)(c) PCR2015 (or in Art 32(2)(c) Dir 2014/24), even if this can be a matter of policy, as reflected in the European Commission’s guidance (at 1 and 2.3). And the absence of a sole source requirement is entirely justified on operational grounds. Imagine a situation where the contracting authority with the extremely urgent need identifies a potential provider and successfully and quickly reaches an agreement to get its urgent need satisfied. It would defy all logic to require the contracting authority to then check whether ‘only [that] undertaking is able to deliver within the technical and time constraints imposed by the extreme urgency‘ (in terms of the Commission’s guidance) and, if not, then engage with additional negotiations with the other/s, which would only generate further delay in getting the extremely urgent (public) need satisfied. Sole source requirements simply make no sense in this setting. In fact, the Commission’s guidance was (contradictorily?) clear that ‘as set out in Art. 32 of Directive 2014/24/EU (the ‘Directive’), public buyers may negotiate directly with potential contractor(s) and there are no publication requirements, no time limits, no minimum number of candidates to be consulted, or other procedural requirements. No procedural steps are regulated at EU level. In practice, this means that authorities can act as quickly as is technically/physically feasible – and the procedure may constitute a de facto direct award only subject to physical/technical constraints related to the actual availability and speed of delivery‘ (emphasis added), with this requirement logically only meaning that the awardee of the contract needs to be able to actually deliver at speed (which was the flaw with eg the ventilator challenge, see here).

Conflating both requirements constitutes an improper interpretation that runs contrary to the CJEU case law on extreme urgency grounds for the use of the negotiated procedure without prior publication. This may seem like a technical point, but I think it is important. It is also a rather unnecessary point for the High Court to have made, as the Judgment does not rest on it. At paras [348] and [350], the Court is clear that the equal treatment requirement emerged from the way in which the discretion was exercised, because the VIP Lane created a procedure that was structurally and unavoidably discriminatory.

Linked to that, my second comment is that the exclusion of reg.18 by reg.32(2)(c) PCR2015 (and EU equivalents) should not have pre-empted the finding of an ‘irreducible minimum standard of objective fairness’ in the organisation of a system to make repeated or multiple direct awards in the context of an extremely urgent need (the VIP Lane). However, such requirements should derive from general administrative law rules or principles and, in particular in the context of procurement covered (and authorised to be carried out via a negotiated procedure without prior publication) by EU law, from the duty of good administration in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (‘Charter’) — although, admittedly, the relevance of Art 41 Charter to procurement carried out by the Member States is controversial (in favour, AG Sharpston, Opinion in Varec, C-450/06, EU:C:2007:643, at 43; cfr. AG Bobek, Opinion in HUNGEOD, C‑496/18 and C‑497/18, EU:C:2019:1002, at 50).

And, although I am not an expert in UK public law, I would also have thought that general requirements of administrative decision-making should apply to that effect, such as the requirement for decision-makers to consider all issues which are relevant to a decision and not to consider any issues which are not [for discussion in the context of automated decision-making, and with references to case law, see J Cobbe, ‘Administrative law and the machines of government: judicial review of automated public-sector decision-making’ (2019) 39 Legal Studies 636-655, at 650]. However, the High Court also dismissed this argument, although seemingly on the specific factual circumstances of the case (at [456]-[459]).

So it could be that the stringency of the English case law’s approach to the control of objectivity in administrative decision-making provides an explanation for the, in my view, improper interpretation of the requirements that can be attached to procurement via a negotiated procedure without prior publication on grounds of extreme urgency. Whether the CJEU is likely to follow a similar approach to the imposition of equal treatment requirements in the interpretation of Art 32(2)(c) Dir 2014/24/EU in the future is thus difficult to assess.

NHS commissioning and procurement - 2 short lectures and a reading list

I have recorded a series of short lectures on NHS commissioning and procurement for my blended teaching at the University of Bristol Law School this coming academic year. In case they are of any interest, I am sharing two of them here.

The first one covers the organisation and regulation of NHS commissioning and procurement and primarily concentrates on the commissioning of health care services. The second lecture covers the centralisation of ‘hospital procurement’ through the NHS Supply Chain. They should be accessible through the click-through images at the end of the blog post.

The two short lectures aim to provide a (hopefully) accessible introduction to the issues covered in more detail in the accompanying reading list, which mainly comprises the following papers for each of the topics:

1. Organisation and regulation of NHS internal market, with a focus on commissioning and procurement

  • A Maynard and M Dixon, ‘Should the NHS abolish the purchaser-provider split?’, BMJ 2016;354:i3825, available at https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.i3825.

  • C Paton, ‘Garbage-Can Policy-Making Meets Neo-Liberal Ideology: Twenty-five years of redundant reform of the English National Health Service’ (2014) 48(3) Social Policy & Administration 319-342.

  • L Jones, M Exworthy and F Frosini, ‘Implementing Market-based Reforms in the English NHS: Bureaucratic coping strategies and social embeddedness’ (2013) 111(1) Health Policy 52-59.

  • B Collins, ‘Procurement and Competition Rules. Can the NHS be exempted?’ (2015) King’s Fund briefing, available at https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/nhs-procurement-competition-rules.

  • M Guy, ‘Between “Going Private” and “NHS Privatisation”: Patient choice, competition reforms and the relationship between the NHS and private healthcare in England’ (2019) 39(3) Legal Studies 479-498.

  • P Allen et al, ‘Public Contracts as Accountability Mechanisms: Assuring quality in public health care in England and Wales’ (2016) 18(1) Public Management Review 20-39.

  • D Osipovič et al, ‘Interrogating Institutional Change: Actors' Attitudes to Competition and Cooperation in Commissioning Health Services in England’ (2016) 94(3) Public Administration 823-838.

  • P Allen et al, ‘Commissioning through Competition and Cooperation in the English NHS under the Health and Social Care Act 2012: Evidence from a qualitative study of four clinical commissioning groups’, BMJ Open 2017;7:e011745, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2016-011745.

  • M Sanderson, P Allen and D Osipovič, ‘The Regulation of Competition in the National Health Service (NHS): what difference has the Health and Social Care Act 2012 made?’ (2017) 12(1) Health Economics, Policy and Law 1-19.

  • D Osipovič et al, ‘The Regulation of Competition and Procurement in the National Health Service 2015–2018: Enduring hierarchical control and the limits of juridification’ (2020) 15(3) Health Economics, Policy and Law 308-324.

2. Centralisation of NHS procurement

Feedback and suggestions on additional readings most welcome: a.sanchez-graells@bristol.ac.uk.

Another wrong decision on what is subjected to (EU) public procurement rules (QSRC v NHSE, [2015] EWHC 3752)

I was at the South West Administrative Lawyers Association (SWALA) meeeting yesterday and this gave me an opportunity to catch up with colleagues practising procurement before English courts, who are always an excellent source for updates regarding a body of (growing) national case law that is not always easy to find, despite the excellent BAILII.

Talking to Emily Heard about the Falk Pharma case (see here), she mentioned that there was a recent English case that could be of interest from the perspective of 'what is prourement' or 'what should be subjected to the (EU) procurement rules'. She was right, and the case of QSRC Ltd ("Qsrc"), R (on the application of) v National Health Service Commissioning Board ("NHS England") & Anor [2015] EWHC 3752 (Admin) (21 December 2015) deserves some comments. Of course, the opinion below is solely my own.

In QSRC v NHSE, the procurement dispute arose from the decision by the relevant contracting authority not to enter into a contract for the provision of specialised medical services (gamma knife treatment, a particular type of radiosurgical treatment) with QSRC while extending previous contracts for the provision of those services with existing suppliers.

The factual background of the case is very complex due to the fact that the initial decision not to enter into such contract took place towards the end of 2012, at the time when NHS procurement was being reformed in preparation for the entry into force of the National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No 2) Regulations 2013.

However, as I read the facts and for analytical purposes, the relevant issues were that the relevant contracting authority, by deciding to extend the contracts with pre-existing suppliers and not tendering more fully (on the justification that such fuller procurement would take place in the near future once the new system was operational) incurred in the direct award of (implicit) public contracts to the pre-existing providers. Moreover, that by rejecting to enter into a contract with QSRC as well, it treated potential providers unequally.

Then, the main dispute for the purposes of our discussion was to determine whether, by not running a tender for the provision of the interim services, the relevant contracting authority had breached the then applicable Public Contracts Regulations 2006 (which transposed Directive 2004/18, and have since been replaced by the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 in transposition of Directive 2014/24). Linked to that, it was also contentious whether by not entering into a direct award with QSRC as well, the contracting authority breached its obligations under reg.3(2) NHS Procurement (No 2) 2013 Regs to act transparently and proportionately, and not to discriminate between providers.

Again, the claim is complicated due to the overlap betwen the NHS Procurement (No 2) 2013 Regs and the PCR2006 (and currently the PCR2015), but the relevant issue is that compliance with PCR2006 (and now PCR2015) is mandatory to the extent that they are applicable to the procurement of goods and services for the purposes of the NHS, which is otherwise (or additionally) regulated by the NHS Procurement (No 2) 2013 Regs.

The further complication is that the position of the parties is slightly odd. The Claimant was not interested in relying on the PCR2006 because it would imply that its claim was out of time and should thus be rejected without substantive analysis. Conversely, the Defendant wanted to insist on its (alleged) breach under PCR2006, so as to time bar the action.

Thus, in short, the High Court (Foskett J) had to determine whether there had been a breach of the PCR2006 in the decision not to run a tender for the provision of interim services, which would oddly have resulted in an end of the analysis due to time limitation rules (which could explain the outcome of the analysis...).

The relevant paragraph is [115], where it is established that:

The issue, therefore, is whether, as the Defendant contends, the decision made not to contract with the Claimant was "governed by the Public Contracts Regulations 2006" or whether, as the Claimant contends, it was not. [The Defendant] submitted that the essence of the claim is that the Defendant should have procured ... services from the Claimant instead of merely from Barts and the Cromwell ... and contends that "the refusal to do so is a decision the legality of which may be affected by duties owed to [the Claimant] under" the 2006 Regulations. It seems to me that the issue is not whether the decision "may be affected" by the Regulations, but whether they are governed by them. [The Claimant] submits that they are not so governed, but they are governed by the 2013 Regulations. He accepts that in some respects there may be a degree of overlap, but argues this was not a situation where the "contracting authority" was seeking offers in relation to a proposed public supply contract (see Regulation 5) and, accordingly, the Regulations did not apply. Indeed he emphasises that no offers have yet been sought. He submits that no decision was taken under the 2006 Regulations which is or was capable of challenge pursuant to its terms (first emphasis in the original, second emphasis added).

Foskett J concluded that the Claimant's 'submissions [were] correct in the circumstances of this case'. It would then seem that the decision to consider the PCR2006 as not applicable is heavily influenced by the willingness of the Court to engage in a substantive assessment of the situation and to circumvent the time bar that would derive from the opposite conclusion. However, the argument simply does not hold even a mild degree of scrutiny.

In simple terms, the argument is that procurement rules apply when contracting authorities actually seek offers from potential providers, but not when they 'merely' (or potentially) ought to seek those offers. This would immediately exclude all cases of direct award of contracts that should have been tendered from review due to a breach of the applicable procurement rules. This is simply flagrantly in conflict with the purposes not only of the substantive EU Directives (2004/18 and 2014/24) as transposed byt he PCR2006 and now the PCR2015, but in radical opposition to the aims and mandates of the Remedies Directive (Dir 89/665/EEC, as amended by Dir 2007/66)--seeing that it goes at great lengths to stress that the direct award of contracts is the most egregious violation of (EU) public procurement rules and therefore triggers the strictness of sanctions: ineffectiveness [Art 2d(1)(a)].

Consequently, regardless of the outcome of the QSRC v NHSE case, which is not relevant now, the reasons for the decision to consider the direct award of the interim services contract not within the scope of the PCR2006 (and probably exempted but from minimum formal requirements due to the nature of the services as Annex II B services), must be criticised as plainly incorrect. It is wrong to enter into a logical argument that results in a circular test whereby compliance with the (EU) public procurement rules is only required if the contracting authority actually decides to engage in a procurement exercise, without assessing whether it had such an obligation to do so precisely under those rules. Or, even in simpler terms, it is wrong to accept that a decision not to comply with the applicable (EU) procurement rules shields the contracting authority from challenges on the basis of the infringed rules.

More generally, then and going back to the link with Falk Pharma, it seems that the proper understanding of what procurement is and when the (EU) public procurement rules should apply to market interactions by the public buyer is not yet satisfactorily settled, which is odd in a discipline that has been around for almost 45 years at EU level and for centuries in some of its Member States (acknowledgedly, not in the UK). More work should be done in this area, and I will try to rope in some of the colleagues participating in Procurement Week 2016 in such a project. Watch this space.