CJEU rejects avoidance of litigation as a valid 'overriding reason in the public interest' justifying a direct award of a concession contract (C-212/12)

In its Judgment of 14 November 2013 in case C-221/12 Belgacom, the CJEU has rejected that the avoidance of litigation can be considered a valid 'overriding reason in the public interest' justifying a direct award of a concession contract. In other terms, the fact that the award of the services concession forms part of a settlement agreement is irrelevant for the purposes of determining compliance with the EU primary law requirements applicable to the award of such contracts.

 

In very clear terms, the CJEU has indicated that

37 [...] since such a concession is of certain cross-border interest, its award, in the absence of any transparency, to an undertaking located in the Member State to which the contracting authority belongs, amounts to a difference in treatment to the detriment of undertakings which might be interested in that concession but which are located in other Member States. In excluding those undertakings, that difference in treatment works primarily to their detriment and therefore amounts to indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality, which is, in principle, prohibited by Articles 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU (see, to that effect, ASM Brescia, paragraphs 59 and 60 and the case-law cited).

38 Such a measure might, exceptionally, be allowed on one of the grounds set out in Article 52 TFEU or justified by overriding reasons in the public interest, in accordance with the Court’s case-law (see, by analogy, Engelmann, paragraphs 51 and 57 and the case-law cited, and Joined Cases C‑357/10 to C‑359/10 Duomo Gpa and Others [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited). On this last point, it is clear from a combined reading of paragraphs 51 and 57 of Engelmann that no distinction need be drawn between objective circumstances and overriding reasons in the public interest. Objective circumstances must, ultimately, be accepted as overriding reasons in the public interest.

39 The grounds put forward in the application in the present case, whether considered separately or together, cannot be regarded as being overriding reasons in the public interest.

40 The principle of legal certainty, which is a general principle of European Union law, provides ample justification for observance of the legal effects of an agreement, including – in so far as that principle requires – in the case of an agreement concluded before the Court has ruled on the implications of the primary law on agreements of that kind and which, after the fact, turn out to be contrary to those implications (see, to that effect, ASM Brescia, paragraphs 69 and 70). However, that principle may not be relied on to give an agreement an extended scope which is contrary to the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination and the obligation of transparency deriving therefrom. It is of no import in that regard that that extended scope may offer a suitable solution for putting an end to a dispute which has arisen between the parties concerned, for reasons outside their control, as to the scope of the agreement by which they are bound (Case C-221/12 at paras 37-40, emphasis added).

This is a very important finding, as it comes to limit the discretion of contracting authorities to (re)negotiate contract awards and to extend the scope of contracts in order to settle arising legal disputes. It may be seen as a significant restriction of sensible contract and dispute management strategies in the altar of transparency, but the CJEU seems to have opted to err on the cautious side of the balance--which I consider appropriate, given that renegotiations are an area prone to massive manipulation and rule avoidance in public procurement in many Member States.

 

However, the practical effects of the Belgacom Judgment may be relatively limited once the future procurement Directives are adopted, as they will expressly regulate contract modification and set clear limits that will trigger the obligation to retender the contract (see art 72 of the new public sector procurement Directive and art 42 of the new Concessions Directive).

CJEU kicks new #concessions Directive in the shins (C-388/12)

In its Judgment of 14 November 2013 in case C-388/12 Comune di Ancona, the CJEU has put forward an argument for the existence of cross-border interest in the award of (public service) concession contracts that openly challenges the quantitative rationale followed by the planned new Directive on Concessions.

The new Directive on Concessions is premised on the basis that cross-border interest will (only?) exist where the value of the contract is above €5 million, calculated as the estimated total turnover of the concessionaire generated over the duration of the contract, net of VAT (art 6). This is clearly indicated in its Recital (10):

This Directive should only apply to concession contracts whose value is equal to or greater than a certain threshold, which should reflect the clear cross-border interest of concessions to economic operators located in other Member States (emphasis added).

Such a quantitative approach to determining the existence of a cross-border interest may be difficult to reconcile with the qualitative approach followed by the CJEU in Comune de Ancona.

In the case at hand, a concession for the management of a European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)-supported portuary infrastructure (a slipway) was directly awarded by the Comune di Ancona to the local fishermen cooperative. The justification provided for the direct award was, rather simply, that 'it was not necessary, for the purposes of granting a concession for management of the slipway, to publish a call for tenders, in so far as no operators apart from the Pescatori cooperative were interested in that concession' (C-388/12 at para 16). In part, one of the reasons to consider that there would be no other bidder for the concession was that the concession was awarded

subject to a number of conditions. These included the obligation to pay the Comune di Ancona an annual charge calculated in such a way as to avoid substantial net revenue being generated for either the concession-granting authority or the concessionaire; a prohibition on modifying the implementation conditions of the operation eligible for funding; a prohibition on engaging in profit-making activity; the obligation to comply with all the applicable EU directives and standards; and the obligation to maintain the public-service function and intended use of the structure at issue. It was also stated that the slipway was to remain, in any event, the property of the Comune di Ancona (C-388/12 at para 12).

In a thoughtful and market-realistic approach to the existence of potential (corporate) interest in being awarded a non-revenue generating concession as a first step into a new market, the CJEU has clearly indicated that

50 [...] the Comune di Ancona has not invoked any objective facts capable of explaining the lack of any transparency in the award of the concession. On the contrary, it maintained that the concession was not liable to interest undertakings located in other Member States, in so far as the concession granted to the Pescatori cooperative was designed so as not to be capable of generating substantial net revenue for its beneficiary or an undue advantage for the latter or for the municipality.

51 However, the fact that a concession is not capable of generating substantial net revenue or an undue advantage for an undertaking or for a public body does not, in itself, support the inference that the concession is of no economic interest for undertakings located in Member States other than that of the contracting authority. In the context of an economic strategy to extend part of its activities to another Member State, an undertaking may take the tactical decision to seek the award in that State of a concession despite the fact that that concession is incapable as such of generating sufficient profit, since that opportunity could nevertheless enable the undertaking to establish itself on the market of that State and to make itself known there with a view to preparing its future expansion.

52 [...] in circumstances such as those of the case before the referring court, EU law does not preclude the award, without a call for tenders, of a public service concession relating to works, provided that that award is consistent with the principle of transparency, observance of which, without necessarily entailing an obligation to call for tenders, must make it possible for an undertaking located in the territory of a Member State other than that of the contracting authority to have access to appropriate information regarding that concession before it is awarded, so that, if that undertaking so wishes, it would be in a position to express its interest in obtaining that concession (C-388/12 at paras 50-52, emphasis added).

In my view, the argument used by the CJEU in para 51 of Comune di Ancona is sound in terms of business strategy and makes perfect sense. However, even if it focusses on 'net revenue' and the threshold of Art 6 of the future Concessions Directive only refers to 'total turnover' (hence, they are not in stark conflict, as the threshold may catch concessions with a high turnover but very low operational or commercial margins), the qualitative approach followed by the CJEU should trigger some red flags.

 

I find that this shows that the quantitative approach adopted by the future Directive on Concessions will not mark the end of the story in the ongoing discussion regarding the rules and requirements applicable to contracts not covered by the procurement Directives--and, more specifically, to services concessions. It seems to me that a dual legal regime will persist between 'Directive concessions' and 'Ancona concessions', where the CJEU will continue pointing out to the potential existence of cross-border interest for concessions with a value below €5mn (or in the excluded and preferential sectors, such as water or social services).

 

If that is so, the passing of the new Directive on Concessions will only have increased legal complexity in this area and should not be seen as a necessarily positive development [as discussed in A Sánchez Graells, 'What Need and Logic for a New Directive on Concessions, Particularly Regarding the Issue of Their Economic Balance?' (2012) European Public Private Partnerships Law Review 2: 94-104]. I guess that, once more, we will need to keep an eye on further developments of the CJEU case law.

Difficult balance between #transparency and #competition in #publicprocurement

I have just uploaded a new paper on SSRN on 'The Difficult Balance between Transparency and Competition in Public Procurement: Some Recent Trends in the Case Law of the European Courts and a Look at the New Directives'. The abstract is as follows:

This paper stresses the negative impact that the excessive levels of transparency imposed by public procurement rules can have on competition for public contracts and, more generally, on the likelihood of cartelisation of the markets where public procurement takes place. The paper critically assesses some recent Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the General Court from this perspective and shows how the top EU Courts are still oblivious to the fact that excessive transparency may diminish the effectiveness of procurement by reducing competition. It also indicates that the case law itself has unused balancing tools that may help reduce the negative impact of excessive transparency, particularly if coupled with a reduction of the financial incentives offered to litigants that have no other claim than a 'mere' lack of compliance with full transparency. The paper concludes that a reform in the enforcement and oversight mechanisms oriented towards the setting up of a semi-opaque review system would overcome some of the deficiencies identified in the current case law from a law and economics perspective.

Sánchez Graells, A 'The Difficult Balance between Transparency and Competition in Public Procurement: Some Recent Trends in the Case Law of the European Courts and a Look at the New Directives' (November 2013). University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 13-11. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2353005.

GC rules on two-part State aid measures and selectivity under Art 107(1) TFEU (T-499/10)

In its Judgment of 12 November 2013 in case T-499/10 MOL v Commission, the General Court has found that an authorisation agreement that froze the mining fees payable for the explotaition of hydrocarbon reserves and that exempted the beneficiary from complying with a posterior law that increased the applicable mining fees does not constitute State aid incompatible with the internal market. In my view, the Judgment is interesting for the guidance it provides regarding the analysis of two-part or complex State aid measures.

 

In the case, MOL and the Hungarian State entered into an authorisation agreement in 2005 whereby the mining rights assigned to MOL were extended and the mining fees payable in return were determined on a non-revisable basis for the period 2005-2020. Later, a 2008 law reform significantly increased the mining fees that would have been payable for the exploitation of those same fields. However, in view of the 2005 agreement, MOL was exempted from topping up the mining fees it was liable to pay. Competitiors and potential new entrants were subject to the revised (higher) fees.

 

The Commission took the view that, given the way the 2005 agreement and the provisions of the 2008 amendment had been designed, they should be regarded as part of the same measure and it concluded that their combined effect conferred an unfair advantage to MOL.

 

According to the Commission, even if the 2005 agreement was concluded in accordance with the Mining Act then in force and even if it was up to the Member State to set the mining fees, the effects produced were not necessarily compatible with the State aid rules of the Treaty, although, taken in isolation, neither the 2005 agreement nor the 2008 amendment was contrary to these rules.

 

It is important to stress that MOL was the only operator in the hydrocarbons sector to have obtained an extension of its mining rights, since other extension agreements concerned undertakings extracting solid minerals, for which mining fees were not amended.  The Commission considered that the measure fulfilled the criteria enshrined in Article 107(1) TFEU and should be considered as State aid, and that there was nothing to indicate that it could be compatible with the internal market.

 

The Hungarian authorities challenged the Commission's position arguing that the measure did not constitute State aid, since the 2005 agreement conferred MOL no advantage and was not selective, as the company received no preferential treatment resulting from that agreement. Hungary further stressed that undertakings making large investments in mining projects require long‑term certainty in respect of the applicable mining fees and charges and that, consequently, mining fees subject to agreement should be fixed and stable for the entire duration of the respective agreement.

  

 

The GC has reviewed the Commission's decision and, mainly on the basis of the 'selectivity' requirement under Article 107(1) TFEU, has found that:

46 [...] although the Commission considered that the contested measure had, in those two constituent elements, favoured the applicant, it drew attention to the fact that the extension agreement was, by itself, selective, on account of the manner in which it had been negotiated and concluded [...]. In stating that the 2005 agreement and the 2008 amendment had resulted in the applicant’s benefiting from lower mining fees than those of the other operators until 2020, the Commission drew attention to the selective nature of the 2005 agreement vis-à-vis the applicant only [...], since the benefit of such mining fees stems solely from the agreement, which sets the rate of the increased mining fee for each of the fifteen years of duration of the agreement, and which provides that the rates thus set will be determined solely in accordance with its provisions and that those rates will stay unchanged [...]. Moreover, by concluding that the applicant was subject to a specific regime shielding it from any increase in mining fees [...], the Commission necessarily took the view that the criterion of selectivity of the contested measure had been met, on the ground that, in the light of its characteristics mentioned above, the 2005 agreement was selective. [...]

54 With respect to the selective nature of the aid measure, it must also be observed that Article 107(1) TFEU does not distinguish between measures of State intervention by reference to their causes or their aims but defines them in relation to their effects (Case C‑409/00 Spain v Commission [2003] ECR I‑1487, paragraph 46). It follows that the application of that provision only requires it to be determined whether under a particular statutory scheme a State measure is such as to favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ over others which are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in question (see Spain v Commission, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited). If so, the aid measure satisfies the condition of selectivity which defines State aid as laid down by that provision. [...]

62 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that the contested measure consists of two elements, namely the 2005 agreement, which sets mining fee rates for all the applicant’s fields, whether in production or the subject of extension, for each of the fifteen years of duration thereof, and the 2008 amendment, which increases mining fee rates for all hydrocarbon fields under authorisation, but does not contain any provisions relating to fields that have already been the subject of an extension agreement.

63 In that regard, it should be noted at the outset that the Commission was right to state [...] that the 2005 agreement is not contrary to the State aid rules. Since the fees stipulated by the 2005 agreement, which were applicable to both fields already in production and fields concerned by extension of authorisation, were higher than the statutory fees applicable at the time of its conclusion, that agreement did not involve any State aid element for the purposes of Article 107 TFEU.

64 Next, the Court considers that, where a Member State concludes with an economic operator an agreement which does not involve any State aid element for the purposes of Article 107 TFEU, the fact that, subsequently, conditions external to such an agreement change in such a way that the operator in question is in an advantageous position vis‑à‑vis other operators that have not concluded a similar agreement is not a sufficient basis on which to conclude that, together, the agreement and the subsequent modification of the conditions external to that agreement can be regarded as constituting State aid.

65 In the absence of such a principle, any agreement that an economic operator might conclude with a State which does not involve any State aid element for the purposes of Article 107 TFEU would always be open to challenge, where the situation on the market on which the operator party to the agreement is active evolves in such a way that an advantage is conferred on it [...] or where the State exercises its regulatory power in an objectively justified manner following a market evolution whilst observing the rights and obligations resulting from such an agreement.

66 However, a combination of elements such as that observed by the Commission in the contested decision may be categorised as State aid where the terms of the agreement concluded were proposed selectively by the State to one or more operators rather than on the basis of objective criteria laid down by a text of general application that are applicable to any operator. In that regard, it must be pointed out that the fact that only one operator has concluded an agreement of that type is not sufficient to establish the selective nature of the agreement, since that may result inter alia from an absence of interest by any other operator.

67 Moreover, it should be recalled that, for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU, a single aid measure may consist of combined elements on condition that, having regard to their chronology, their purpose and the circumstances of the undertaking at the time of their intervention, they are so closely linked to each other that they are inseparable from one another (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑399/10 P and C‑401/10 P Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others and Commission v France and Others [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 103 and 104). In that context, a combination of elements such as that relied upon by the Commission in the contested decision may be categorised as State aid where the State acts in such a way as to protect one or more operators already present on the market, by concluding with them an agreement granting them fee rates guaranteed for the entire duration thereof, whilst having the intention at that time of subsequently exercising its regulatory power, by increasing the fee rate so that other market operators are placed at a disadvantage, be they operators already present on the market on the date on which the agreement was concluded or new operators.

68 It is in the light of those considerations that it is necessary to examine whether, in the present case, the Commission was entitled to consider that the contested measure was selective, on the ground that, in so far as the 2005 agreement sets the rate of the increased mining fee for each of the fifteen years of its duration and provides that the rates thus set would remain unchanged, it was selective (T-499/10 at paras 46-68, emphasis added).

On the basis of the very specific circumstances of the case, the GC finds that the 2005 agreement was not selective that its combination with the 2008 amendment does not alter this finding and, consequently, annuls the Commission's incompatibility Decision.

 

Beyond the specific circumstances of the case, I think that the analytical framework sketched by the GC includes some useful guidance [such as the stress on the close chronological requirement, or the selectivity element (implicitly) required in all the components of a two-stage or complex State aid measure] but also some troubling hints at a less than objective assessment.

 

In that respect, regardless of the emphasis put on the standard legal position that 'Article 107(1) TFEU does not distinguish between measures of State intervention by reference to their causes or their aims but defines them in relation to their effects' (para 54), the GC goes on to stress that 'a combination of elements such as that relied upon by the Commission in the contested decision may be categorised as State aid where the State acts in such a way as to protect one or more operators already present on the market, by concluding with them an agreement granting them fee rates guaranteed for the entire duration thereof, whilst having the intention at that time of subsequently exercising its regulatory power, by increasing the fee rate so that other market operators are placed at a disadvantage' (para 67). Therefore, the GC does build in an element of (reverse) causality or, probably more accurately, of volition or intention that seems extraneous to the State aid control system.

 

If Article 107(1) TFEU is meant to avoid distortions of competition in the internal market, when confronted with sequential, two-part or complex aid measures, the fact that they all formed part of a 'master plan' from the outset or are the 'random or supervening' result of discrete interventions should be irrelevant. Otherwise, the burden of proving 'distortive intent' from the outset may simply make it impossible to pursue these cases. However, it may well be that the remarks made by the GC in para 67 of MOL v Commission will remain a 'mere' obiter dictum and that the assessment of two-part or complex measures will remain much more objective in the future (as indeed, is the case with the rest of the Judgment).

Is Costa v Enel forgotten? CJEU trips over supremacy and direct effect in case concerning Art 41(2)(c) CFREU (C-313/12)

In its Judgment of 7 Movember in case C-313/12 Romeo, the Court of Justice of the EU issued an important ruling concerned with the extension of the obligation to state reasons derived from Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU in purely domestic situations.

 

In the case at hand, the CJEU was especifically presented with a query regarding the compatibility with Article 41(2)(c) CFREU (and, more generally, with the case law on the duty to state reasons) of an Italian rule whereby faulty administrative decisions would not be quashed if the authorities supplemented their statement of reasons in subsequent court proceedings.

 

In my view, the reasons offered by the CJEU to decline jurisdiction to respond to the questions referred by the Italian court show a poor understanding of (or a lack of willingness to give effect to) the changed nature of the Charter after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. As very clearly stated, 'the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is now legally binding, having the same status as primary EU law' [for discussion, see S Douglas-Scott, 'The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon' (2011) Human Rights Law Review 11(4): 645-682].

 

In that regard, keeping in mind that Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union now very clearly indicates that 'The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of  [...] which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties' (emphasis added), it is very hard to understand how the CJEU can have unblinkingly held that:

it cannot be concluded that [...] Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter or indeed other rules of European Union law concerning the obligation to state reasons for acts have been made directly and unconditionally applicable (sic), as such, by [the relevant Italian rules], so that internal situations and situations relating to European Union law are treated in the same way. Therefore it must be held that, in the present case, there is no clear European Union interest in a uniform interpretation of provisions or concepts taken from European Union law, irrespective of the circumstances in which those provisions or concepts are to apply (C-313/12 at para 37, emphasis added).

I cannot get my head around the fact that, as no one would doubt, the CJEU has kept for time immemorial the position that the Treaties (now including the Charter of Fundamental Rights  for these purposes) are supreme and directly effective without any need for internal measures that receive them or recognise that they are directly and unconditionally applicable in all EU Member States--and, yet, it shows a stark resistance to apply these principles to the Charter (see also C-482/10 Cicala).

 

As very clearly summarised in Costa v Enel,

A Member State's obligation under the [Treaty], which is neither subject to any conditions nor, as regards its execution or effect, to the adoption of any measure either by the States or by the Commission, is legally complete and consequently capable of producing direct effects on the relations between Member States and individuals. Such an obligation becomes an integral part of the legal system of the Member States, and thus forms part of their own law, and directly concerns their nationals in whose favour it has created individual rights which national courts must protect (6/64, summary, point 7).

This, together with Art 6(1) TEU surely determines the supremacy and direct effect of the Charter--as also supported by an a contrario interpretation of Protocol No 30 on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and the United Kingdom (what would be the purpose of the Protocol if not precisely to exclude such supremacy and direct effect regarding the UK and Poland?). Then, if the CJEU has not forgotten Costa v Enel, the only relevant question is: how are Judgments like Cicala and Romeo possible? Why is the CJEU (suddenly) so averse to (continuying to) act as constitutional court at EU level?

Missed opportunity for the CJEU to confirm 'non bis in idem' in State aid enforcement (C-560/12 P and C-587/12 P)

In contrast to its very recent Judgment in case C-77/12 P Deutsche Post, where the CJEU clearly barred the European Commission from adopting an indefinite number of 'follow up' decisions concerned with a single State aid investigation (in what I read as an incipient 'ne bis in idem principle' in State aid enforcement); in its  twin Judgments of 7 November 2013 in case C-560/12 P Wam Industriale v Commission and in case C-587/12  P Italy v Commission (only available in French and Italian), the CJEU has brushed aside a similar argument on the basis of its insufficient development by the appellant (C-560/12 P) and (implicitly) on the basis of the lack of independent legal effects of the fresh assessment carried out by the European Commission of the evidence on file after the initial decision had been quashed at judicial review (C-587/12 P). In my view, the Deutsche Post and (the set of) Wam Judgments are difficult to reconcile

 

In Wam, the European Commission had adopted a 2004 decision declaring the unlawfulness of State aid granted by the Italian State to support market expansion projects in Japan, Korea and China. After the quashing of the Commission's 2004 Decision by the GC in 2006 (T-304/04 and T-316/04) and the confirmation of that decision in 2009 by the CJEU (C-494/06), the Commission adopted a new incompatibility Decision in 2010.

 

In its challenge against the Commission's 2010 Decision (C-560/12 P), Wam argued that

the contested [2010] decision is not [merely] vitiated either by a 'procedural irregularity' or a 'formal defect', since the failure to state reasons does not constitute such a defect, but it rather lacks an "essential element", which effectively determines its nullity. In this case, therefore, there is a subjective claim preclusion between the parties [res iudicata] and, accordingly, the Commission, being under the obligation to give effect to the judgments of the Court in Italy and Wam v Commission [T-304/04 and T-316/04] and Commission v Italy and Wam [C-494/06], could not "in any way have adopted a new decision on the matter". The Court should therefore "for this [reason] only", have annulled the contested decision (C-560/12 P, para 6, own translation from Italian).

The argument sounds very similar to the one raised by Deutsche Post (although in that case the 'follow up' decision was not concerned with a full reassessment of the same measures, but with a fresh assessment of measures not expressly considered in the initial Decision eventually quashed), which the CJEU analysed in detail and actually backed in C-77/12 P.

However, in Wam the CJEU does not show the same appetite for the development of a strong limit on the Commission's ability to reopen a case after losing it on appeal (a sort of procedural estoppel or ne bis in idem), and dismisses the argument on the (very formal basis) that

15 By the first part of the first plea, it should be noted that the applicant merely submits that, for the mere fact [of the existence of] the judgments of the Court in Italy and Wam v Commission and Commission v Italy and Wam, the Commission would have been in any case precluded from adopting a new decision.
16 In that regard it should be noted that the argument concerning that matte is limited to a dozen lines on pages 26 and 27 of the appeal, the substance of which is taken up in paragraph 7 [sic, 6] of this judgment.
17 However, such an argument, marred by a lack of precision, clearly does not fulfill the conditions laid down in Article 169, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. Consequently, it must be rejected as inadmissible (C-560/12 P, paras 15-17, own translation from Italian).

In my view, in adopting this approach, the CJEU has been too keen to take an easy way out and has missed an opportunity to reaffirm and give further guidance on the limits applicable to the reopening of State aid investigations by the European Commission. However, the CJEU does look into more detail to a similar submission made by Italy in the other Judgment concerned with the same State aid measures, of the same date (C-587/12 P).

According to the Italian Republic,

7 [ ...] the Court erred in holding that the Commission did not have an obligation to open a new contradictory investigation procedure with the national authorities. Contrary to what the Court found, the point would not have been to establish, in general and in theory if, after a judgment of annulment for failure to state reasons, the Commission could or could not take up the procedure from the adoption of the [annulled] act.
8 The Italian Republic considers that, given that the Commission has "renew[ed] completely" the examination of all matters in the contested decision, introducing new facts, it has hence recognized that the "defects criticized", despite being considered as defects of the duty to state reasons, actually had substantial implications that made ​​it necessary to "redo from scratch" the 2004 decision.
9 The Italian Republic considers that the [...] factual elements consisting of the alleged "relative strengthening" of Wam and the alleged "freeing up of resources" could never have been deducted from the [initial] investigation procedure. Consequently, them being decisive elements for the demonstration of the existence of aid, the Commission should have opened a new adversarial procedure with the parties concerned [...]
10 The Commission claims that the first part of the first plea is unfounded. It points out that the annulment of the 2004 decision was based on a lack of motivation because [...] that decision did not explain in what way the aid in question could affect competition and trade between Member States. On the contrary, the Court failed to criticize the inquiry into the matter as carried out during the administrative procedure, nor did it identify any deficiency in this regard (C-587/12 P, paras 7-10, own translation from Italian).

The CJEU sides with the European Commission in the following terms:

11 It should be remembered that in the judgment of the Court in Italy and Wam v Commission as well as in the judgment in Commission v Italy and Wam, the investigation conducted by the Commission on the aid in question was not at all criticized.
12 [...] the General Court correctly pointed out that, according to settled case-law, the procedure for replacing an unlawful act that has been cancelled can be resumed at the point at which the illegality occurred, that the cancellation of a Union act does not necessarily affect the preparatory acts and, furthermore, that the annulment of an act that puts an end to an administrative proceeding which comprises several stages does not necessarily entail the annulment of the entire procedure prior to the adoption of  the contested measure for whatever reason, procedural or substantive, taken into account in the judgment of annulment.
13 [...] the Court also correctly pointed out that if, despite of the investigations that enable a comprehensive analysis of the compatibility of the aid, the Commission's analysis is found to be incomplete, and it involves the illegality of the decision, the procedure for replacing such a decision may be resumed at that point making a new analysis of the investigatory measures.
14 As regards the present case [...] the Court stated that the illegality of the 2004 decision [...] concerned the inadequate statement of reasons thereof. [...] the Court has, in fact, merely stated that this decision did not contain sufficient arguments that would allow the conclusion that they met all the conditions for the application of Article 107, paragraph 1, TFEU which was confirmed by the Court in its judgment in Commission v Italy and Wam. The illegality of the 2004 decision did not affect the proceedings before it. No argument leads to the conclusion that that procedure was, in itself, vitiated by any illegality.
15 As to the argument put forward by the applicant's claim that the Court failed to take account of the fact that the Commission has completely revisited the examination of all the evidence in the file and introduced new elements, it should be noted that this argument is not supported by anything which could demonstrate a misrepresentation of the facts relating to it by the Court.
16 As regards the applicant's claim that the Court, in the remainder of its reasoning, ignored any arguments to refute the conclusion set out in paragraph 50 of the judgment under appeal, the Court notes that, in paragraph 57 of that judgment, the Court stated that the circumstances relating to the strengthening of Wam's position and the release of resources were correctly assessed in the contested decision. The Court added in such a point that, in any case, it was not new factual circumstances, but considerations arising from the analysis of the Commission, based on elements with respect to which nothing allowed it to believe that they were not known at the time when the decision was taken in 2004. [...]
19 In these conditions [...] the General Court correctly concluded that the execution of the judgment of the Court in Italy and Wam v Commission and the judgment in Commission v Italy and Wam did not require the Commission to take on again the whole process provided for in Article 108 TFEU and that the Commission had erred, as a result of the same judgment, by not initiating a new formal investigation procedure.
20 The first part of the first plea is therefore unfounded (C-587/12 P, paras 11-20, own translation from Italian, emphasis added).

In my view, this is contradictory with Deutsche Post. There, the CJEU basically prevented the Commission from conducting a fresh (additional) assessment of the facts already contained in the file because, even if they were present from the beginning and known by the parties, because the initial decision adopted had exhausted the procedure and closed the investigation completely. Following the same line of reasoning, the Judgment in Wam should have been pointing in that direction by preventing the Commission from adopting a fresh 'theory of harm' on the basis of the facts already on file, as that would equally alter the legal position of the parties and would disregard the fact that the Commission had completely closed the investigation when adopting the initial (now quashed) incompatibility decision.

 

Effectively, Deutsche Post denied the Commission a second bite of the cherry, whereas Wam basically (potentially) allows for multiple bites. I find this inconsistency insatisfactory and, as I said already I would advocate for an approach where once a measure has been analysed and the Commission reaches a final decision, then the same measure should not be subjected to additional enquiries and no new findings of incompatibility should be acceptable.

 

In maybe more blunt terms, the Commission should have one shot (and only one) at each controversial State aid measure, in order to protect legal certainty and as an (implicit) requirement of the principle of good administration.

 

Overall, I would consider such a general principle a positive development in EU State aid law. It remains to be seen, however, whether there is true CJEU appetite for such a development.

Spanish competition watchdog CNMC issues report on health care outsourcing procurement

The Spanish Competition Authority has recently published a report on the application of its Guide on Public Procurement and Competition to public health care provision-related procurement in Spain (only available in Spanish: Aplicación de la Guía de Contratación y Competencia a los procesos de licitación para la provisión de la sanidad pública en España). 

The report is interesting to read and it identifies some common trends in competition-reductive procurement practices (if not fully suppressive of meaningful competition) and areas for massive improvement in Spanish health care-related procurement. 

Some of them may offer valuable insights for other countries that also organise their health care provision around a national health system. These are some of the aspects of the report that I find more interesting:

1. The report is mainly concerned with outsourcing processes, whereby the competent (regional) public authorities tender contracts for the construction and management, or only the management, of health care facilities (mainly hospitals). This is an area that will remain lightly regulated in the future EU Directive on concessions (Art 17) and in the new version of the Directive on public sector procurement (Arts 74 to 76a). Consequently, the recommendations and best practices identified in the CNMC report may help in the construction of a fuller set of (binding and non-binding) guidelines for health care management outsourcing.

2. The report offers a radiography of the hospital sector in Spain, which shows that it is rather large and that there is a very relevant presence of private investment in the sector. Overall, there are 789 hospitals in Spain (162,070 beds), which means that each hospital serves an average of roughly 59,300 inhabitants (290 inh/bed). 

However, there are significant regional differences in availability of total hospital services, ranging from Andalusia at 378 inh/bed to Catalonia at 218 inh/bed. Furthermore, it is also interesting that only 325 of the 789 hospitals are public (41%), but they accumulate almost 67% of available beds--which means that the availability of public hospital services actually ranges between Catalonia at 523 inh/bed and Aragon at 308 inh/bed. All regions have schemes of arrangement with private hospitals, so that they extend 'public' coverage through private hospitals (49% of private hospitals are included in such schemes, again with large variations ranging from 100% of private hospitals being included in the 'extended public network' in La Rioja to only 22% of private hospitals in Catalonia). 

The big discrepancies between the availability of total and public hospital services shows large regional differences in private investment and alternative (ie non-public) health care management strategies. This also seems to show that private hospitals tend to be smaller than public hospitals (116 v 334 beds on average)--and, probably, easier (but more expensive) to manage, at least in terms of general costs if economies of scale are properly exploited in the public system (a big if, I think, although the report offers no data to test this). It may also be worth stressing that 21% of private hospital capacity (by number of beds) is controlled and run by the Catholic church and religious organisations. The next larger private (or non-public) player only reaches 4%.

The distribution by areas of activity is also relevant, and it is worth noting that generalist, geriatric and psichiatric hospitals accumulate almost 90% of the available beds--which seems to indicate that there is room for further specialisation in the sector.

The report also offers more detailed analysis of the regions where there has already been some outsourcing of public health care management: Catalonia, Madrid, Valencia, La Rioja and Navarra.

3. The main body of the report focusses on the 5 aspects of health care management outsourcing that are more susceptible to create distortions of competition: (i) the design of the tender procedure and the setting up of the technical specifications, (ii) the setting up of selection criteria, (iii) the choice and weighting of award criteria, particularly those related to (non-measurable) qualitative elements, and (iv) issues related to contract modification.

It is remarkable that, in all of these areas, the CNMC has identified specific examples of very clear distortions of competition. It is worth noting, for instance, that:

a) There has been an excessive degree of bundling of specialist and general services in hospital outsourcing (sometimes forcing the hospital concessionaire to enter into existing public services contracts with third party providers of specialist services, such as image diagnostics or laboratory analysis).

b) Regional authorities have not availed themselves of proper strategic division of tenders into lots and the dominant strategy (one lot, one hospital) may have facilitated collusion.

c) Initial contract duration may have been excessive, with a median of 30+ years for works concessions (building + managing hospitals) and 10 years for service concessions/public service contracts (management only of an existing hospital). Some of them also include relatively generous extension/renewal provisions.

d) Of the 19 contracts that included health management (others were limited to the management of the premises, but included no sanitary provision), 15 were awarded to the only tenderer submitting an offer. In the other 4 instances, only 2 offers were received. This seems to indicate that participation requirements were exceedingly restrictive (or, in an alternative and very personal view, that there was no expectation of effective competition, either due to the existence of a market sharing agreement or widespread corruption, particularly in the case of Valencia and Madrid, where criminal investigations are underway).

e) The setting of very demanding selection criteria (particularly in terms of financial standing and previous experience) have limited dramatically the number of potential offerors and been particularly alienating for temporary unions of undertakings, as a relevant part of the tender documents required that each of the undertakings individually considered met all of the requirements. This is a stark breach of procurement law and, as such, should have been the object of legal challenges.

f) There was an insufficient publicity and advertisement of the tendering for public service concessions worth Eur 4,000 mn in the Madrid region (advertised only in the region itself). This indicates that, in reality, there may be some need for the extension of publicity requirements to concession contracts as the future Directive aims to do. However, this may also have been a breach of EU law requirements, given that the contracts seem to have (at least potential) cross border interest.

g) There was an insufficient disclosure of information with relevant financial implications, such as the personnel costs to be assumed by concessionaires of existing hospitals, or the system of mutual invoicing between public hospitals (which made it difficult to calculate the cost and revenue structure of the concession, particularly for relatively unexperienced tenderers). The information asymmetries were even higher when it came to disclosure of health planning and other requirements.

h) There was widespread misuse of the price criterion as one of the key elements to award the contract. Price assessment formulae based on average prices, or that gave a very low weight to prices (of 30% in construction concessions), or that included irrelevant criteria (such as giving 30% of weight to the establishment of a stock-option scheme by the concessionaire) might have limited the ability of regional authorities to obtain value for money in the outsourcing of hospital management.

i) There were several instances of double-count of elements as both selection and award criteria, particularly as previous experience is concerned. This is another blatant breach of procurement law and, as such, should have been the object of legal challenges.

j) Insufficient or too basic quality control mechanisms and penalties for breaches thereof were included in a significant number of concession schemes. Also, remuneration was always calculated on a per capita basis, so that concessionaires and public service providers would always be remunerated almost regardless of the level of quality or actual provision of services (80% of the per capita support working as a common floor or minimum remuneration).

k) Most tender documentation either imposed or facilitated subcontracting of up to 50-60% of the contract and no proper oversight mechanisms were in place, so that concessionaires were basically free to subcontract very significant parts of their contracts as they saw fit.

l) Excessive resort to contractual modifications: "Of the 38 contracts for which information is available, there have been changes in 24 of them (64%). In 7 of the 24 contracts modified there have been two changes to the contract."

4. In its conclusions (a bit too mild in my opinion, particularly in view of the major irregularities documented in the report), the CNMC recommends, among others, the following measures (see press release in English):

• When designing tender processes, the open procedure must be used whenever possible, as that procedure is the most conducive to competition and precludes contracts that cannot be justified on account of the pay-back times for investments.
• As regards access to tenders for participants, publication should be more widespread in order to open up access to the highest number of potential bidders possible.
• With respect to the weighting of criteria and the procedure for the award of contracts, a suitable weighting should be attached to the variables to avoid leaving excessive discretion to the award body. In the case of healthcare services, the overarching goal is to ensure quality in the provision of services to patients, so that a balance must be struck between competition in the price variable and the quality of the service.
• Lastly, as regards the implementation of contracts, it is proposed, among other recommendations, that the specifications should describe the elements that define the quality of contract performance and should contain credible and robust mechanisms for monitoring and penalising failures to meet the requirements of those elements. The specifications should also lay down remuneration and transparency mechanisms that encourage the awardee to provide high quality services (emphasis added).

In my view, this Report brings to light a very serious problem and a massive challenge in the modernisation and reform of health care management in Spain. I started wondering if a sectoral regulator would not be necessary, as the ones existing in England (Monitor) or The Netherlands (NZa), as this sector seems to really be crying for some close scrutiny...

Unacceptable pull back of Erasmus grants in Spain

The Spanish government has decided to change the rules applicable to Erasmus funding for exchange students midway the academic year. It has now announced a cut in its contribution to the Erasmus fund that will leave thounsands of Spanish students currently enrolled in programmes abroad without funding that had been pre-approved (see the coverage by The Guardian).

 

In my view, this is a myopic measure that breaches the most basic guarantee of legal certainty and legitimate expectations. It also shows a significant disregard for one of the most popular mechanisms of development of a true European demos and one of the more palpable examples of the potential implications of the European Citizenship enshrined in Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Deplorable!

OFT takes a close look at ICT procurement

As a part of its ongoing market study on Supply of information and communications technology to the public sector, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) is seeking information and evidence on the perceived restrictions of competition in the markets for the supply of ICT products to the public sector.

 

More specifically, the OFT is seeking confirmation or an alternative explanation of the issues identified in its Report on the findings of the call for information into the supply of ICT to the public sector of 15 October 2013. The market study is particularly concerned with the supply of commercial off the shelf software and IT outsourcing. Submissions can be made until 20 December 2013 by emailing ict.consultation@oft.gsi.gov.uk.

 

For academics and practitioners in general, it will be interesting to read the final report, expected to be released in March 2014.

Clouds in the horizon of Spanish airport operator privatisation?

According to recent press reports (for instance, Reuters or CincoDias), the Spanish government is seeking to privatise 50%+ of the capital of AENA, the Spanish airport operator. This process of privatisation and the strategy apparently devised by the government raise some issues of compatibility with EU Law that, in my view, might be highly relevant--particularly after the recent CJEU Judgment in Essent, where the application of free movement of capital to privatisation processes has been re-energised.

 

According to the most complete account of the government's strategy, up to 60% of AENA's capital would be privatised. A first package of around 30% would be divided between 3 to 5 'core (institutional) investors' and the other 30% would be floated in the (Madrid?) stock exchange.

 

The worrying part of the privatisation strategy lies, in my view, on the conditions of selection and participation of the 'core (institutional) investors'. These would be chosen on the basis of a restricted (tender) procedure, whereby they would be assigned 5-10% capital packages on the basis of the price offered and their commitments to both hold the investment at that level and not to increase it above 10% for the longest possible time period.

 

 

Therefore, the main selection criteria (other than price) will revolve around a 'voluntary' refusal to exercise investment freedom (both in terms of acquiring additional shares and divesting the ones acquired in the privatisation process). This clearly rings a bell of similarity with the Essent case, where an absolute prohibition to dispose of the shares (ie an absolute prohibition on privatisation) was subjected to a proportionality analysis.

 

The Spanish government's intention behind this privatisation strategy is to retain a sort of 'joint' control over AENA despite reducing its shareholding to 40% of the capital, and it (seems to) expect the selected 'core (institutional) investors' to remain faithful and to support the government's airport management strategy. In my view, there seems to be no clear public interest justifying such a strategy, as airport management can (easily) be regulated and there are clear indications of successful privatisation in other EU countries (pertinently enough, the privatisation of the London Luton airport, precisely managed by AENA).

 

Further, even if such a public interest could be fleshed out by the Spanish government, the (contractual) restrictions on the disposition of the investments (or their enlargement) by the 'core (institutional) investors' will now need to be subjected to a proportionality test under the Essent line of authority. In my view, the Spanish government's strategy is unlikely to pass legal muster. Only time will tell if the CJEU will have an opportunity to rule on this one.

"Ne bis in idem" in State aid control? CJEU quashes Deutsche Post decision (C-77/12 P)

In its Judgment of 24 October 2013 in case C-77/12 P Deutsche Post v Commission, the Court of Justice of the EU quashed a Judgment of the General Court (T-421/07) and (indirectly) questioned a decision taken by the European Commission concerning the State aid granted by Germany to Deutsche Post in the 1990s. The Commission had adopted an initial negative decision in 2002 (ultimately quashed by the CJEU in C-399/08 P) and, following a request by the initial complainants to look into the matter in more detail, it decided to extend the scope of the original investigation in a 'follow-up' enquiry carried out in 2007 (while the GC was still considering the legality of the original negative decision).

 

Germany challenged the decision of the European Commission on the general basis that, contrary to its allegations, this 'follow-up' enquiry would alter the legal effects of the initial decision (now annulled) and that such an enforcement strategy would be against the most fundamental principles of due process and good administration.

 

The GC (T-421/07) took no issue with the opening of the 'follow-up' investigation, as it considered that such a decision did not alter the legal standing of the State aid measures under investigation, since they had already been flagged as potentially illegal in the initial decision to open an investigation that the Commission adopted in 1999 (and regardless of the fact that they were not included in the original negative decision of 2002). In even more controversial terms, the GC brushed aside the argument that the annulment of the 2002 negative decision should also be taken into consideration in order to bar any 'follow-up' investigation that ultimately had the same origin. As the CJEU summarises,

In addition, the [General] Court observed in paragraphs 77 and 79 of the contested judgment, that this conclusion is not undermined by the judgment in Deutsche Post / Commission [...]. Indeed, this decision did not rule on the question whether the formal investigation procedure initiated in 1999 in respect of the disputed measures has been closed. The Court further considersed that this decision had the effect of retroactively eliminating the 2002 negative decision, so that "this decision can in no way affect the conclusion that the 2002 [negative] decision had no impact on the existence of any independent legal effects generated by [the contested decision] (C-77/12 P at para 37, own translation from French).

On the basis of those considerations, the GC considered that the 2007 decision to carry out a 'follow-up enquiry' was not open to an annulment action under Article 263(4) TFEU and, consequently, dismissed Deutsche Post's challenge. The CJEU has taken a different view.

 

I find it interesting to stress that the CJEU has argued that:

52 As regards, in particular, the binding legal effects of a decision to initiate the procedure provided for in Article [108], paragraph 2 [TFEU] with respect to a measure running and qualified as new aid, such a decision necessarily changes the legal status of the measure, as well as the legal position of the beneficiaries, particularly in regard to its implementation. After the adoption of such a decision, there is at least a significant doubt about the legality of this measure, which must lead the Member State to suspend the payment, since the opening of the procedure laid down in Article [108], paragraph 2 [TFEU] excludes an immediate decision on the compatibility with the common market that would allow for the regular execution of the measure. Such a decision could be invoked before a national court called upon to draw all the consequences of the violation of Article [108], paragraph 3, last sentence, [TFEU]. Finally, it is likely to lead beneficiaries of the measure to refuse in any event new payments or to provision the necessary funds for any subsequent repayments. The beneficiaries will also be affected in their relations with other agents, which will take into consideration the weakened legal and financial situation of the former (see judgment of 9 October 2001, Italy / Commission, C-400/99, Rec . P. I- 7303, paragraph 59).

53 It should be added that […] such a decision to open an investigation with respect to a measure that the Commission describes as new aid is not simply a preparatory step in that it has independent legal effects, particularly with regard to the suspension of the measure under consideration.

54 In this case, it should be noted that […] in the contested decision, the Commission qualified as new aid the transfer payments made by DB-Telekom and the system of public guarantees. Furthermore, as regards the public pension fund, this institution has expressed its doubts about the extent to which this funding granted an economic advantage to [Deutsche Post]. The Commission also pointed out […] that Germany was under the obligation to suspend the measures challenged by the decision.

55 It follows that the 2007 opening decision is an act that is likely to affect the interests of [Deutsche Post] by altering its legal status and, therefore, it meets all the elements of an act within the meaning of Article [263 TFEU].

56 Contrary to what the Court considered […] that finding is not challenged by the existence of the decision to open an investigation in 1999, by which the Commission opened the procedure laid down in Article [108], paragraph 2 [TFEU] in respect of a series of measures being implemented.

57 Indeed, it is clear that, in any event, the Commission, by its negative decision of 2002, closed the formal investigation procedure in 1999.

58 In this regard, it should be noted that the Commission dealt in its negative decision of 2002, of all the measures challenged by the opening 1999 decision, as argued rightly [Deutsche Post] (C-77/12 P at paras 52-58, own translation from French, emphasis added).

Even if this may not be the end of the story in this particular case, which has been sent back to the GC, I think that the principle established by the CJEU could be read as a sort of 'ne bis in idem' in the area of State aid enforcement. Once a measure has been analysed and the Commission reaches a final decision, then the same measure should not be subjected to additional enquiries and no new findings of incompatibility should be acceptable.

 

In maybe more blunt terms, the Commission has one shot (and only one) at each controversial State aid measure, in order to protect legal certainty and as an (implicit) requirement of the principle of good administration.

 

Overall, I would consider such a general principle a positive development in EU State aid law. It remains to be seen, however, whether this reasoning is only case-specific or the CJEU is willing to flesh out such a general principle in even clearer terms, should the opportunity arise in the future.

Maybe not such a global appraisal of State aid after all: CJEU backtracks from a truly economic approach (C-124/10)

In an interesting recent paper, Pablo Ibáñez Colomo conducts a very detailed statistical overview of State Aid Litigation before EU Courts (2004–2012) [Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (2013) doi: 10.1093/jeclap/lpt057]. One of his relevant findings is that the 'private investor test' and its application by the European Commission was one of the most litigated areas of EU State Aid law in that period and that '[a]nnulments were more likely where the ‘private investor test’ was raised as a ground'.

 

In its Judgment of 24 October 2013 in Joined Cases C-214/12 P, C-215/12 P and C-223/12 P Land Burgenland v Commission, the Court of Justice of the EU has been confronted again with the test--this time in the mirror image of the ‘private vendor test'--and, on this occasion, has upheld the approach taken by the European Commission. In my opinion, there are several passages of the Judgment that bear stressing, particularly because the CJEU is backtracking from a much more economically oriented assessment of State aid that was (at least) suggested in Commission v EDF (C-124/10 P).

 

The case involved the existence of State aid in the privatisation of HYPO Bank Burgenland AG, where the relevant Austrian authorities decided to sell the bank to GRAWE despite the fact that the price it offered (EUR 100.3 million) was significantly lower than the price offered by a competing Austro-Ukrainian consortium (EUR 155 million). As the CJEU explains:

The decision was based, in particular, on a [...] recommendation by HSBC  [which] essentially states that, although on the basis of the proposed purchase price the decision should be made in favour of the Consortium, it was recommended that BB be sold to GRAWE, in view of the other selection criteria, namely the reliability of the purchase price payment, the continued operation of BB while avoiding the use of Ausfallhaftung [ie the Austrian performance guarantee system for public credit institutions], capital increases and transaction security (C-214/12 P at para 9).

Not surprisngly, the Consortium challenged the decision claiming that the Republic of Austria had infringed State aid rules during the privatisation of BB and stressing that, amongst other irregularities, the tender procedure had been unfair, untransparent and discriminatory towards it--which resulted in the sale of BB not to the highest bidder, namely the Consortium, but to GRAWE.

The European Commission found that Austria had indeed granted illegal State aid to GRAWE in the privatisation Bank Burgenland because it failed to meet the requirements of the 'private investor test'. In the Commission's view, a private seller would only reject the highest bid in two circumstances: either where it is obvious that the sale to the highest bidder is not realisable, or where consideration of factors other than the price is justified, subject to the proviso that only those factors which would have been taken into consideration by a private vendor are taken into account.

The key aspect then becomes whether the (likely) avoidance of the use of the Ausfallhaftung that would follow the sale to GRAWE rather than to the Consortium was a valid justification under the second scenario (ie whether it was a risk which avoidance justified the transaction). The Commission clearly considered that according the private investor test excludes risks stemming from potential liability to make payment under a guarantee which has to be classified as State aid, such as Ausfallhaftung. The reasoning was similar to the one followed (or, at least, the one I identified) in Commission v EDF, where the CJEU rejected a similarly formalistic approach followed by the Commission.

 

In that case, the CJEU found that

in view of the objectives underlying [Article 107(1) TFEU] and the private investor test, an economic advantage must – even where it has been granted through fiscal means – be assessed inter alia in the light of the private investor test, if, on conclusion of the global assessment that may be required, it appears that, notwithstanding the fact that the means used were instruments of State power, the Member State concerned conferred that advantage in its capacity as shareholder of the undertaking belonging to it (C-124/10 P, para 92, emphasis added).

 

In essence, this supported the approach followed by the General Court, which had ruled that

the purpose of the private investor test is to establish whether, despite the fact that the State has at its disposal means which are not available to the private investor, the private investor would, in the same circumstances, have taken a comparable investment decision. It follows that neither the nature of the claim, nor the fact that a private investor cannot hold a tax claim, is of any relevance (C-124/10 P, at para. 37, emphasis added).

In that regard, it would seem that in the Burgenland case, the GC and the CJEU should also reject the Commission's argument and, consequently, allow the selling authorities to integrate the total potential costs of the use of the Ausfallhaftung as a valid reduction of the nominal price offered by the Consortium and, dependeing on the result of such an assessment, potentially award the contract to GRAWE, as they effectively did. It would have been expected, as the Austrian authorities claimed, that the nature and origin of potential liabilities would be considered irrelevant and that a gloabl (economic) appraisal of the offers received for the Burgenland Bank would have been considered in line with EU law.

 

However, the CJEU reexamines the interpretation of the 'private investor (rectius, vendor) test' to take into account this issue and rules in the following terms:

46 In their first argument, the Province of Burgenland, the Republic of Austria and GRAWE claim, in essence, that the General Court failed to appreciate, in the light of Ausfallhaftung’s characteristics, both the role of the Province of Burgenland as owner and shareholder of BB and, therefore, the private investor test, such as it emerges from Spain v Commission and Germany v Commission. […]

48 the General Court found, in line with that case-law that, when applying the private investor test, it must be determined whether the measures in question are those which such an investor, who counts on making a profit in the short or long term, could have granted.

49 Finally, […] the General Court found, in its assessment of the facts which cannot be appealed, that Ausfallhaftung was not entered into on normal market conditions, given its characteristics.

50 In those circumstances, the General Court rightly concluded […] that Ausfallhaftung could not be taken into account when assessing the conduct of the Austrian authorities in the light of the private vendor test (sic) and that, consequently, the Commission could not be criticised for having rejected Ausfallhaftung’s relevance when evaluating the offers submitted by the Consortium and by GRAWE.

51 Further, as regards the impact of Commission v EDF, it must be pointed out that that judgment was principally concerned with whether the private investor test was applicable in the circumstances of that case, which was rejected by the Commission in the decision at issue in that case, and not how that test was applied in the particular case (see Commission v EDF judgment, paragraph 75). However, in the present cases, it is undisputed that the Commission applied the private vendor test and the Province of Burgenland, the Republic of Austria and GRAWE are in actual fact challenging the General Court’s approval of the manner in which the Commission applied that test.

52 As regards the application of that test, Commission v EDF confirmed the case-law which emerges, in particular, from Spain v Commission and Germany v Commission, according to which, in order to assess whether the same measure would have been adopted in normal market conditions by a private vendor in a situation as close as possible to that of the State, only the benefits and obligations linked to the situation of the State as shareholder – to the exclusion of those linked to its situation as a public authority – are to be taken into account (see, to that effect, Commission v EDF, paragraph 79).

53 In Commission v EDF judgment, the Court further made it clear that, when carrying out that assessment, the manner in which the advantage is provided and the nature of the manner by which the State intervenes are irrelevant where the Member State concerned conferred that advantage in its capacity as shareholder of the undertaking concerned (see Commission v EDF, paragraphs 91 and 92).

54 […] The General Court examined whether Ausfallhaftung had to be taken into account when implementing the private vendor test and found that a private vendor would not have entered into such a guarantee (sic).

55 The Province of Burgenland, the Republic of Austria and GRAWE do not put forward any argument liable to put that finding into doubt, but claim themselves that Ausfallhaftung is a State aid, as the Commission had moreover found in Decision C(2003) 1329 final.

56 In those circumstances, and since, by granting aid, a Member State pursues, by definition, objectives other than that of making a profit from the resources granted to an undertaking belonging to it, it must be held that those resources are, in principle, granted by the State exercising its prerogatives as a public authority.

57 In so far as the Province of Burgenland, the Republic of Austria claim that, through Ausfallhaftung, the Province of Burgenland was none the less seeking to make profit or, at the very least, attempting to do so in addition to its other objectives, it must be recalled that, if a Member State relies on a test such as the private vendor test, it must, where there is doubt, establish unequivocally and on the basis of objective and verifiable evidence that the measure implemented is to be ascribed to the State acting as shareholder (see, to that effect, Commission v EDF, paragraph 82).

58 That evidence must show clearly that, before or at the same time as conferring the economic advantage, the Member State concerned took the decision to make an investment, by means of the measure actually implemented, in the public undertaking (Commission v EDF, paragraph 84).

59 In that regard, it may be necessary to produce evidence showing that the decision is based on economic evaluations comparable to those which, in the circumstances, a rational private vendor in a situation as close as possible to that of the Member State would have had carried out, before making the investment, in order to determine its future profitability (see, to that effect, Commission v EDF, paragraph 84).

60 It is only in cases where the Member State concerned provides the Commission with the necessary evidence that the onus is on the Commission to carry out a global assessment, taking into account – in addition to the evidence provided by that Member State – all other relevant evidence enabling it to determine whether the Member State took the measure in question in its capacity as shareholder or as a public authority (see, to that effect, Commission v EDF, paragraph 86).

61 However, neither during the administrative procedure nor before the General Court did the Province of Burgenland, the Republic of Austria or GRAWE put forward any evidence showing that the introduction or retention of Ausfallhaftung was based on economic evaluations carried out by the Province of Burgenland for the purposes of establishing its profitability. It follows that the Commission was not required to undertake such a global assessment as regards Ausfallhaftung and that the Burgenland and GRAWE judgments were not vitiated by any errors in that regard (C-214/12 P at paras 46-61, emphasis added).

 

 

I am puzzled by the findings of the CJEU. If it rightly held in Commission v EDF that the fiscal nature of the credit converted into capital was irrelevant for the assessment of the transaction as a whole, why is it now relevant that the potential liability incurred in the use of the Ausfallhaftung by the disappointed Consortium derives from a public law system? Surely, if it was not questioned that 'the General Court [rightly] rejected the Commission’s argument that the private investor test could not be applied to the conversion into capital of a tax claim, since a private investor could never hold a tax claim against an undertaking, but only a civil or commercial claim' (C-124/10 P, at paras 37 and 95), it should not be now relevant that a private investor could have not entered into a guarantee scheme such as the Ausfallhaftung (C-214/12 P at para 54).

 

Moreover, an economic assessment should be carried out regardless of the subjective intentions of the State authority (cfr. C-214/12 P at para 59) and, in any case, it was cristal clear in the Burgenland case that an (independent) economic evaluation was carried out by (HSBC), which clearly indicated that, all factors considered, the rational decision was to enter into the transaction with the lowest bidder. Why is the CJEU now not willing to assess the economic transaction as a whole is something I cannot come to grips with.

 

I guess that this will be an area that, as Ibáñez Colomo's study shows, will continue to occupy a significant amount of cases and, possibly, remain one of the obscure areas of State aid litigation for quite some time.

Planning for US DOD pharmaceutical benefits procurement: A need to think outside the box and a lesson for the EU

The US Department of Defense (DOD) offers health care coverage through its TRICARE program. DOD contracts with managed care support contractors to provide medical services, and separately with a pharmacy benefit manager to provide pharmacy services that include the TRICARE mail-order pharmacy and access to a retail pharmacy network. Its current contract for the management of pharmaceutical benefits expires in the fall of 2014 and DOD has already started planning the next stage of procurement.

 

According to the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report of 30 September 2013,

During acquisition planning for the upcoming TRICARE pharmacy services contract, DOD solicited feedback from industry through its market research process to align the contract requirements with industry best practices and promote competition. For example, DOD issued requests for information (RFI) in which DOD asked questions about specific market trends, such as ensuring that certain categories of drugs are distributed through the most cost-effective mechanism. DOD also issued an RFI to obtain information on promoting competition, asking industry for opinions on the length of the contract period. DOD officials told [GAO] that responses indicated that potential offerors would prefer a longer contract period because it would allow a new contractor more time to recover any capital investment made in implementing the contract. The request for proposals for the upcoming contract, issued in June 2013, included a contract period of 1 base year and 7 option years. DOD also identified changes to contract requirements in response to legislative changes to the TRICARE pharmacy benefit. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2013 required DOD to implement a mail-order pilot for maintenance drugs for beneficiaries who are also enrolled in Medicare Part B. DOD officials incorporated this change in the requirements for the upcoming pharmacy services contract.

At first sight, this looks like a proper exercise of procurement planning and one that is specifically concerned with promoting effective competition in the next stage of pharmaceutical benefits management procurement. However, GAO has very high standards and considers that the exercise carried out by DOD is insufficient and that the Department needs to think outside of the box (of the current structure of benefit management contracts) to see if an even better scenario is achievable. In that regard, GAO considers that

DOD has not conducted an assessment of the appropriateness of its current pharmacy services contract structure that includes an evaluation of the costs and benefits of alternative structures. Alternative structures can include incorporating all pharmacy services into the managed care support contracts—a carve-in structure—or a structure that incorporates certain components of DOD’s pharmacy services, such as the mail-order pharmacy, into the managed care support contracts while maintaining a separate contract for other components. DOD officials told GAO they believe that DOD’s current carve-out contract structure continues to be appropriate, as it affords more control over pharmacy data that allows for detailed data analyses and cost transparency, meets program goals, and has high beneficiary satisfaction. However, there have been significant changes in the pharmacy benefit management market in the past decade, including mergers and companies offering new services that may change the services and options available to DOD. GAO has previously reported that sound acquisition planning includes an assessment of lessons learned to identify improvements. Additionally, GAO has reported that a comparative evaluation of the costs and benefits of alternatives can provide an evidence-based rationale for why an agency has chosen a particular alternative. Without this type of evaluation, DOD cannot effectively demonstrate that it has chosen the most appropriate contract structure in terms of costs to the government and services for beneficiaries.

DOD is now required to conduct an evaluation of the potential costs and benefits of alternative structures for the TRICARE pharmacy services contract, and incorporate such an evaluation into acquisition planning. GAO will report again once this additional exercise is completed.

 

In my view, this case shows how important it is to develop effective and demanding standards of market investigation and procurement planning in order for contracting authorities to reap all the benefits of effective market competition. It may well be that the result of the enquiry shows that current structures are the most efficient. But, even in that case, the additional market research would not have been an sterile exercise. By avoiding path dependency and seeking for alternative modes of provision (ie by actually knowing the markets where they contract from), contracting authorities can obtain true value for money.

 

Hence, this type of mandatory market intelligence should be seen as best practice and, in my opinion, imported into the procurement systems of many European countries (and, definitely, Spain). Only in that way will public procurement really contribute to smart growth and be truly aligned with the Europe 2020 strategy. Hopefully the revision of the domestic procurement systems as a part of the process for the transposition of the soon to be adopted new EU rules on procurement will offer Member States an opportunity to also reflect on these issues and to strengthen their market intelligence requirements and infrastructures.

Neutrality of ownership is not unconditional: CJEU sets red lines for privatisation prohibitions (C-105/12 to C-107/12)

In its Judgment of 22 October 2013 in Joined Cases C-105/12 to C-107/12 Essent and Others, the Court of Justice of the EU has explored the boundaries of Article 345 TFEU--which has, so far, remained (and still is) an obscure provision of the Treaties [see B Akkermans & E Ramaekers, 'Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 EC), Its Meanings and Interpretations' (2010) European Law Journal 16(3): 292-314].

 

In Essent, the CJEU was concerned with the compatibility with EU law of an absolute privatisation ban. More specifically, it had to analyse a Dutch rule whereby shares in companies that operate distribution networks of electricity and gas can be transferred only within the circle of public authorities, ie cannot be privatised (for a comment, see here).

 

Advocate General Jaaskinen had considered the absolute ban on privatisation compatible with both Article 345 TFEU and Article 63 TFEU on free movement of capital (see his Opinion, not available in English, here). The CJEU has reached the same conclusions.

 

In my view, one of the most interesting legal points of the Essent Judgment is that Article 345 TFEU does not write Member States a blank check when they regulate their property systems or, put othewise, that the principle of neutrality of ownership enshrined in that provision is not unconditional.

 

Hence, the reasoning of the CJEU should be seen as an exercise to draw some red lines that Member States cannot overstep when designing their property systems and that, fundamentally, boil down to full compliance with the rules on free movement of capital.

29 Article 345 TFEU is an expression of the principle of the neutrality of the Treaties in relation to the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership.
30 In that regard, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that the Treaties do not preclude, as a general rule, either the nationalisation of undertakings (see, to that effect, Case 6/64 Costa [1964] ECR 585, at 598) or their privatisation (see, to that effect, Case C‑244/11 Commission v Greece [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 17).
31 It follows that Member States may legitimately pursue an objective of establishing or maintaining a body of rules relating to the public ownership of certain undertakings.
32 […] the prohibition of privatisation, within the meaning of the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, allows, in essence, the transfer of shares held in a distribution system operator only to the authorities and to legal persons owned, directly or indirectly, by those authorities, since any transfer which has the result that the shares become the property of persons other than such authorities and legal persons is prohibited.
33 It follows that the prohibition of privatisation precludes ownership by any private individual of shares in an electricity or gas distribution system operator active in the Netherlands. Its objective is therefore to maintain a body of rules relating to public ownership in respect of those operators.
34 Such a prohibition falls within the scope of Article 345 TFEU. […]36 However, Article 345 TFEU does not mean that rules governing the system of property ownership current in the Member States are not subject to the fundamental rules of the FEU Treaty, which rules include, inter alia, the prohibition of discrimination, freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital (see, to that effect, Case 182/83 Fearon [1984] ECR 3677, paragraph 7; Case C‑302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I‑3099, paragraph 38; Case C‑452/01 Ospelt and Schlössle Weissenberg [2003] ECR I‑9743, paragraph 24; Case C‑171/08 Commission v Portugal [2010] ECR I‑6817, paragraph 64; Case C‑271/09 Commission v Poland [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 44; and Commission v Greece, paragraph 16).
37 Consequently, the fact that the Kingdom of the Netherlands has established, in the sector of electricity or gas distribution system operators active in its territory, a body of rules relating to public ownership covered by Article 345 TFEU does not mean that that Member State is free to disregard, in that sector, the rules relating to the free movement of capital (see, by analogy, Commission v Poland, paragraph 44 and the case‑law cited).
38 Accordingly, the prohibition of privatisation falls within the scope of Article 63 TFEU and must be examined in the light of that article […] (C-105/12 ti C-107/12 at paras 29-38, emphasis added).

This finding of the CJEU effectively subjects the principle of neutrality of ownership to a proportionality test and, generally, seems to restrict its scope--actually, it seems to me that the Essent Judgment makes Article 345 TFEU less than neutral in that it imposes a justification burden on the ownership systems designed at Member State level.

This may be an opening door for a stricter control of ownership rules in the Member States and, once more, for an implicit redistribution of competences between the EU and the Member States [see the interesting discussion by F Losada Fraga et al, 'Property and European Integration: Dimensions of Article 345 TFEU' (2012) Helsinki Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17]. However, more clarification will be necessary, particularly in cases where the public interest justifications for restrictions of (private) ownership are less clear cut than in the Essent case and that, consequently, will be likely to result in an effective restriction of domestic rules on (public) ownership.

European Procurement Law Series

Allow me some marketing of the European Procurement Law Series that a group of colleagues and I are developing. The latest issue (fifth) on the Award of Contracts in EU Procurements is in print and will be available shortly. In my opinion, it provides an interesting overview of practical issues concerned with the award of public contracts, as the abstract stresses:

The award phase is of crucial importance for the outcome of the competition for the contract and it is therefore not surprising that it has been considered in thousands of public procurement disputes in the Member States of the EU.
The subject of this book has for obvious reasons already received scholarly attention in the many books and articles on EU public procurement law. However, the existing literature has seldom been based on a comparative approach covering a broad range of Member States of the European Union with diversified national approaches to EU public procurement law. The present publication is original in this sense and consequently provides the reader with an insight that cannot be found elsewhere.

Not a gold pot: Free allocation of greenhouse gas emission allowances in Spain (C-566/11)

In its Judgment of 17 October 2013 in Joined cases C-566/11, C-567/11, C-580/11, C-591/11, C-620/11 and C-640/11 Iberdrola and Gas Natural, the Court of Justice of the EU has analysed and upheld a Spanish system whereby the remuneration of electricity production was reduced by an amount equivalent to the value of the emission allowances allocated free of charge to electricity producers in accordance with the 2005-2007 National Allocation Plan.

 

The rationale of the system (which actually manipulates/adjusts downwards the energy prices resulting from the Spanish wholesale electricity market) had been clearly spelled out by the Spanish executive, which clearly indicated that, given the fact that electricity producers opted for the incorporation as an additional production cost of the value of the emission allowances allocated free of charge, those prices needed to be adjusted to prevent an unfair enrichment or double whammy by energy producers.

 

In terms of Royal Decree-Law 3/2006, it was indeed justified to

[take] into account of the value of the [emission allowances] in the formation of prices in the wholesale electricity market is intended to reflect [that integration] by reducing, by equivalent amounts, the remuneration payable to the generating units concerned. Furthermore, the sharp increase in tariff deficit during 2006 makes it advisable to deduct the value of the emission allowances for the purposes of determining the amount of that deficit. The existing risk of high prices in the electricity-generation market, with their immediate and irreversible negative effects on end-consumers, justifies the urgent adoption of the provisions laid down in the present measure and the exceptional nature of those provisions (C-566/11 at para 17).

It is clear to see that, ultimately, the decision was aimed at avoiding a double transfer of resources to energy producers from the general budget and from consumers through tariff deficit compensation charges: first, by allocating emission allowances for free [which could then be immediately traded in the corresponding market or used as collaterial in financial deals; see Martín Baumeister & Sánchez Graells, (2012) "Algunas Reflexiones en Torno a Las Garantías Pignoraticias Sobre Derechos de Emisión de Gases de Efecto Invernadero y Su Ejecución" Revista de Derecho Bancario y Bursátil 127: 191-210] and, secondly, by also compensating higher tariff deficits (inflated) by the integration of the (non-zero, commercial) value of those emission rights in the wholesale energy prices.

 

 

 

However, the Spanish Supreme Court harboured doubts on the compatibility of this mechanism with Directive 2003/87. Indeed, according to the Tribunal Supremo, those measures could have the effect of neutralising the ‘free of charge’ nature of the initial allocation of emission allowances and undermining the very purpose of the scheme established by Directive 2003/87, which is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by means of an economic incentive mechanism (C-566/11 at para 23).

 

In my view, the analysis that the CJEU carries out in order to analyse this complicated situation must be praised, both for its clarity and brevity:

33 The Spanish electricity producers in question have incorporated, in the selling prices that they offer on the wholesale electricity market, the value of the emission allowances, in the same way as any other production cost, even though those allowances had been allocated to them free of charge.

34 As the referring court explains, that practice is undoubtedly cogent from an economic point of view, in so far as an undertaking’s use of emission allowances allocated to it represents an implied cost, known as an ‘opportunity cost’, which consists in the income that the undertaking has forgone by not selling those allowances on the emission allowances market. However, the combination of that practice with the pricing system on the electricity generation market in Spain results in windfall profits for electricity producers.

 35 It should be noted that the on-the-day electricity trading market in Spain is a ‘marginalist’ market in which all producers whose offers have been accepted receive the same price, that is, the price offered by the operator of the last production unit to be admitted to the system. Since, during the period concerned, that marginal price was determined by the offers from operators of combined gas and steam power plants – technology attracting free emission allowances – the incorporation of the value of the allowances into the selling prices offered is passed on in the overall market price for electricity.

 36 Accordingly, the reduction in remuneration provided for in Ministerial Order ITC/3315/2007 applies not only to undertakings that have received emission allowances free of charge, but also to power plants that do not need allowances, such as hydroelectric and nuclear power plants, as the emission allowance value incorporated in the costs structure is passed on in the price for electricity, which is received by every producer active on the wholesale electricity market in Spain.

 37 Furthermore, as can be seen from the documents before the Court, the rules at issue in the main proceedings take into account factors other than the quantity of allowances allocated: in particular, the type of power plant and its emission factor. The reduction in remuneration for electricity production provided for under those rules is calculated in such a way that it absorbs only the extra charged as a result of the opportunity costs relating to emission allowances being incorporated in the price. This is confirmed by the fact that the levy is not incurred where power plant operators sell allowances allocated free of charge on the secondary market.

 38 Accordingly, the aim of the rules at issue in the main proceedings is not subsequently to impose a fee for the allocation of emission allowances, but to mitigate the effects of the windfall profits accrued through the allocation of emission allowances free of charge on the Spanish electricity market.

 39 It should be noted, in that regard, that the allocation of emission allowances free of charge under Article 10 of Directive 2003/87 was not intended as a way of granting subsidies to the producers concerned, but of reducing the economic impact of the immediate and unilateral introduction by the European Union of an emission allowances market, by preventing a loss of competitiveness in certain production sectors covered by that directive (C-566/11 at paras 33-39, emphasis added).

The CJEU recognises that, somehow, the Spanish price adjustment mechanism anticipates a correction which introduction was necessary in the revision of Directive 2003/87/EC:

insufficient competitive pressure to limit the extent to which the value of emission allowances is passed on in electricity prices has led electricity producers to make windfall profits. As can be seen from recitals 15 and 19 to Directive 2009/29, it is in order to eliminate windfall profits that, with effect from 2013, emission allowances are to be allocated by means of a full auctioning mechanism (C-566/11 at para 40).

 

Moreover, the CJEU stresses what, indeed, is the key to this case and, ultimately, indicates the problem of using 'free market' arguments in regulated industries such as energy production, where (wholesale) markets are actually a mere fiction:

since, on the Spanish electricity generation market, a single price is paid to all producers and the end consumer has no knowledge of the technology used to generate the electricity that he consumes and the tariff for which is set by the State, the extent to which electricity producers may pass on in prices the costs associated with the use of emission allowances has no impact on the reduction of emissions (C-566/11 at para 57, emphasis added).

 

 

Finally, in a very congruent manner, the CJEU has ruled that

Article 10 of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC must be interpreted as not precluding application of national legislative measures, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the purpose and effect of which are to reduce remuneration for electricity production by an amount equal to the increase in such remuneration brought about through the incorporation, in the selling prices offered on the wholesale electricity market, of the value of the emission allowances allocated free of charge( C-566/11 at para 59).

In my view, this a valuable Judgment and one that stresses the new rationality of the allocation scheme implemented by Directive 2009/29. Moreover, it makes clear (indirectly) that Member States must avoid granting unfair advantages and subsidies (ie State aid) to energy producers as a result of the the way they operate their greenhouse gas emission allowances allocation mechanims.

Public procurement and competition: a Swedish perspective

In a recent paper, Robert Moldén offers an interesting overview of a wide array of issues concerned with the intersection of public procurement and competition law from a Swedish perspective (ie, in their treatment by Swedish Courts).**

 

The paper is only available on a subscription basis (http://www.ert.se/content.asp?id=60#) but it offers an interesting summary of several cases where the Swedish courts have attempted an interpretation of the principle of competition that may be relevant (and influential) for the future construction of the soon to be enacted Article 15 of the new EU public sector procurement Directive.

 

It is interesting to note, for example, the Judgment of the Stockholm Administrative Court of Appeal of 2 February 2011 in case 6528-10m where it clearly spelled out that

The main purpose of EU public procurement law is freedom of movement for goods and services and that the area shall be opened for non-distorted competition. Both [the Swedish Public Procurement Act] and the EU Directives aim at public procurement proceedings to be conducted by utilizing existing competition in the best way. The provisions aim both at making use of competition in a given procurement proceeding and developing effective competition (para 4, Moldén's translation at p. 598 of his paper).

 

Robert Moldén extensively quotes some of my thoughts in Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011), particularly as the principle of competition in procurement is concerned--which obviously implies that we see things in a very similar manner. Indeed, I fully subscribe his submission that

The competition principle embodied in the Classical Sector Directive imposes an active obligation to ensure that the way they conduct public procurement proceedings is pro-competitive and not anti-competitive. Swedish administrative courts should therefore not treat the Directive's pro-competition provisions as soft law but as hard law, in the sense that infringements of the principle of competition should be considered as infringements of the Swedish Public Procurement Act, in the same way as infringements of, e.g. the principles of proportionality and equality (p. 602).

 

Despite such commonality of views, I do not think it is biased for me to recommend reading his piece, particularly to any academic or practitioner interested in trying to anticipate the implications of the abovementioned (emerging) general principle of EU public procurement law: ie the principle of competition, as formulated in  Article 15 of the new Directive

Contracting authorities shall treat economic operators equally and without discrimination and shall act in a transparent and proportionate manner. The design of the procurement shall not be made with the intention of excluding it from the scope of this Directive or of artificially narrowing competition. Competition shall be considered to be artificially narrowed where the design of the procurement was made with the intention of unduly favouring or disadvantaging certain economic operators.

 

** I am thankful to Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui for bringing this paper to my attention.

3 more instalments in the Evropaïki Dynamiki saga: one successful appeal (T-638/11)

Today, the General Court has issued three Judgments that add to the 'Evropaïki Dynamiki saga'. In two of them (T-474/10 and T-457/10), the famous challenger of EU Institutions' procurement decisions has lost the appeals and been condemned to bear the costs. Generally, none of this two cases raises signifcantly new issues (although one touches upon a complicated aspect of the prevention of fraud and corruption where a holding company of one of the members of the consortium was involved) and the GC is concerned once (actually, twice) more with the duties to state reasons and the contours of the manifest error of assessment of contracting authorities when they assess tenders and award contracts. However, in a third case (T-638/11 European Dynamics Belgium and Others v EMA), the appellant has been successful.

 

In the 'successful' case, the GC quashes EMA's decision on the basis of the poor explanations provided in the debriefing following the assessment of the tenders from a technical perspective. The GC finds that the reasons provided do not allow participating tenderers to understand the marks obtained for their technical proposals and make them unable to compare their assessment against that of the awardee (since the feedback received was vague and of a general nature).

 

Moreover, and maybe more interestingly, the GC engages in an analysis of the degree of disclosure that contracting authorities must ensure where there have been doubts as to the existence of an abnormally low tender. In the case at hand, the winning consortium had been requested to provide additional explanations and to justify that its tender was not abnormally low. The contracting authority was satisfied with those clarifications and proceeded to award the contract in those (not abnormally low) terms. The appellant sought to have access to those explanations and justifications in order to challenge the decision to finally award the contract to that particular consortium. However, the contracting authority had declined to disclose that information on the basis that it constituted a business secret of the winning tenderer.

The GC threads quite lightly and tries to establish an intermediate solution by stressing that:

In addition, EMA argues that by providing detailed information on compliance with the regulations for the protection of workers and working conditions or about the particular economy of the services offered by the consortium S., it would damage the legitimate commercial interests of the latter. However, to require the contracting authority to disclose the grounds upon which it has decided that an offer should not be considered abnormally low does not require it to disclose detailed information on the technical and financial aspects of the offer, such as the prices offered, the resources available to the contractor or the ways in which the successful bidder proposes to provide the services it offers. In order to provide sufficient motivation for this aspect of the tender, the contracting authority shall state the reasoning which led it to conclude that, on the one hand , given its main financial characteristics, such offer is in compliance with the laws of the country in which the services should be performed for staff salaries, contribution to social security and standards of safety and health at work; and, secondly, that it was verified that the proposed prices integrated all the costs generated by the technical aspects of the successful tender (T-638/11 at para 68, own translation from French).

Therefore, the GC does require some kind of 'high level' explanation as to why the contracting authority has been finally satisfied that the offer retained is not abnormally low, but always provided that it protects the confidentiality of the specific details that should remain under business secrecy. Surely, the test envisaged by the GC is not very clearly delineated and requires some further precision, but it is yet another push for the disclosure of information that may make tenderers reluctant to provide very specific information when they are being investigated for having submitted an apparently abnormally low offer (given that, even at some high level, certain information may still be commercial sensitive). I hope that future case law will offer more specific guidance as to how to strike this difficult balance.

A jigsaw of qualifications or a procurement puzzle?: CJEU launches a depth charge against certification systems (C-94/12)

In its Judgment of 10 October 2013 in case C-94/12 Swm Costruzioni 2 and Mannocchi Luigino, the Court of Justice of the EU has followed the Opinion of AG Jääskinen (which I praised and supported here) and expanded its antiformalistic case law on the interpretation of the rules controlling participation and selection requirements in public procurement covered by the EU Directives. In my view, this Judgment is a (well-aimed?) depth charge against certification systems based on Article 52 of Directive 2004/18.

 

More specifically, the CJEU was presented with a request for a preliminary reference concerning the compatibility with EU law of an Italian provision applicable to all works contracts with a value in excess of 150,000 Euro, whereby undertakings that needed to 'team up' and rely on the abilities of other undertakings in order to tender for public works contracts could only do so on a one-to-one basis (ie main contractors were not allowed to build up a 'jigsaw' of qualifications provided by several subcontractors, but had to rely exclusively on the abilities of one subcontractor that was able to deliver the whole of the performance for that given category of works concerned).

 

Under the controversial Italian rule, "For works contracts, the tenderer may rely on the capacities of only one auxiliary undertaking for each qualification category. The invitation to tender may permit reliance on the capacity of more than one auxiliary undertaking having regard to the value of the contract or the special nature of the services to be provided" (emphasis added).

 

The CJEU rephrased the question referred by the Italian court and understood that, in essence, it had to rule wheter Articles 47(2) and 48(3) of Directive 2004/18 must be interpreted as precluding a national provision which prohibits, as a general rule, economic operators participating in a tendering procedure for a public works contract from relying on the capacities of more than one undertaking for the same qualification/certification category.

 

Interestingly, the CJEU spells out that its analysis is based on the final goal of maximising competition (in particular, by means of facilitating SME participation) and finds that:

33 […] it must be held that Directive 2004/18 permits the combining of the capacities of more than one economic operator for the purpose of satisfying the minimum capacity requirements set by the contracting authority, provided that the candidate or tenderer relying on the capacities of one or more other entities proves to that authority that it will actually have at its disposal the resources of those entities necessary for the execution of the contract.
34 Such an interpretation is consistent with the objective pursued by the directives in this area of attaining the widest possible opening-up of public contracts to competition to the benefit not only of economic operators but also contracting authorities (see, to that effect, Case C‑305/08 CoNISMa [2009] ECR I‑12129, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). In addition, as the Advocate General noted at points 33 and 37 of his Opinion, that interpretation also facilitates the involvement of small- and medium-sized undertakings in the contracts procurement market, an aim also pursued by Directive 2004/18, as stated in recital 32 thereof.
35 It is true that there may be works with special requirements necessitating a certain capacity which cannot be obtained by combining the capacities of more than one operator, which, individually, would be inadequate. In such circumstances, the contracting authority would be justified in requiring that the minimum capacity level concerned be achieved by a single economic operator or, where appropriate, by relying on a limited number of economic operators, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 44(2) of Directive 2004/18, as long as that requirement is related and proportionate to the subject-matter of the contract at issue.
36 However, since those circumstances constitute an exception, Directive 2004/18 precludes that requirement being made a general rule under national law, which is the effect of a provision such as [the controversial Italian provision] (C-94/12, paras 33-36, emphasis added).

 

In my view, the Swm Costruzioni Judgment should be welcome as it concerns the anti-formalistic and possibilistic interpretation of the rules on selection of contractors in Directive 2004/18--which are about to be modernised in the new procurement directive, also as 'teaming up' provisions are concerned (see my recent paper: "Exclusion, Qualitative Selection and Short-listing in the New Public Sector Procurement Directive").

 

Moreover, it is worth noting that the Judgment does (inadvertently? and) implicitly throw a depth charge against national certification systems. Taking the logic behind the Swm Costruzioni Judgment to its logical extremes, those certification systems should only be in place to cover those contracts where objective circumstances justify the need for the contracting authority to make sure that a single undertaking carry out a specific contract.

 

Certification systems, then, should only cover "works with special requirements necessitating a certain capacity which cannot be obtained by combining the capacities of more than one operator" as, otherwise, the whole certification system is completely superficial if the contracting authority must (as indeed it shall) accept any 'jigsaw' of (partial) certifications presented by a group of undertakings (or by an uncapable main contractor that enters into subcontract agreements) in order to prove that they have sufficient (aggregate) economic, technical and financial standing [something I advocated for in Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011) 266-268].

 

Therefore, in my view, the Swm Costruzioni Judgment is actually raising a red flag and stressing that such requirements to be certified or included in the list of pre-approved contractors will ultimately only be compliant with EU law if the specific characteristics of the works to be tendered do justify the need for a single (or very limited number) of undertakings to carry out the project.

 

Now, this will be puzzling in many jurisdictions that strongly rely on certification systems and pre-approved lists of contractors fro all types (and almost all values) of works contracts, but the (implicit) message seems clear. Therefore, procurement authorities may be better off dismantling those existing systems altogether and bracing themselves (ie getting training and staffing themselves properly) for the revolution that the European Single Procurement Document (ESPD, effectively a set of self-declarations) is about to bring upon.

CJEU flexibilises treatment of formally non-compliant bids in public procurement (C-336/12)

In its Judgment of 10 October 2013 in case C-336/12 Manova, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has  followed its own approach in Slovensko and created some room for the flexible interpretation of the rules on formal compliance of bids submitted in public procurement procedures.

 

In Manova, the contracting authority had requested some of the tenderers to provide financial statements that had not been included in their bids after the deadline for their submission had ellapsed. Given that this decision was challenged on the grounds of a potential breach of the principle of equal treatment, the referring court decided to request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU, which was asked "whether the principle of equal treatment is to be interpreted as precluding a contracting authority from asking a candidate, after the deadline for applying to take part in a tendering procedure, to provide documents describing that candidate’s situation – such as a copy of its published balance sheet – which were called for in the contract notice, but were not included with that candidate’s application".

 

In rather clear terms (although some caveats may have been dispensed with, in my opinion), the CJEU ruled that:

the principle of equal treatment must be interpreted as not precluding a contracting authority from asking a candidate, after the deadline for applying to take part in a tendering procedure, to provide documents describing that candidate’s situation – such as a copy of its published balance sheet – which can be objectively shown to pre-date that deadline, so long as it was not expressly laid down in the contract documents that, unless such documents were provided, the application would be rejected. That request must not unduly favour or disadvantage the candidate or candidates to which it is addressed (C-336/12 at para 42).

In my view, the Manova Judgment must be welcome, both for its functional approach and for its alignment with domestic practices in a significant number of EU Member States--as discussed in Sánchez Graells, A, "Rejection of Abnormally Low and Non-Compliant Tenders in EU Public Procurement: A Comparative View on Selected Jurisdictions", in S Treumer and M Comba (eds), Award of Public Contracts under EU Procurement Law, vol. 5 European Procurement Law Series, (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2013) 267-302. This seems a good step in the direction of avoiding that overly strict formal requirements get in the way of actual good public procurement practices.