Will the ECJ mandate protectionism in procurement -- comments on AG Collins' Kolin Opinion (C-652/22)

In the Opinion in Kolin Inşaat Turizm Sanayi ve Ticaret (C-652/22, EU:C:2024:212, hereafter ‘Kolin’), Advocate General Collins has argued that only economic operators established in countries party to international agreements on public contracts that bind the EU may rely on the provisions of Directive 2014/25/EU. This would imply that economic operators established in other countries are not entitled to participate in a public contract award procedure governed by Directive 2014/25/EU and, consequently, are unable to rely on the provisions of that Directive before Member State courts. In my view, this interpretation is both protectionist and problematic. The ECJ should not follow it. In this blog I sketch the reasons for this view.

Limited (international law) obligation of equal treatment does not imply a general (EU) obligation to exclude or discriminate

The Kolin Opinion concerns the interpretation of Art 43 of Directive 2014/25/EU, which could be relevant to the interpretation of Art 25 of Directive 2014/24/EU (on which see A La Chimia, ‘Article 25’ in R Caranta and A Sanchez-Graells (eds), European Public Procurement. Commentary on Directive 2014/24/EU (Edward Elgar 2021) 274-286. Art 43 of Dir 2014/25/EU establishes that:

In so far as they are covered by Annexes 3, 4 and 5 and the General Notes to the European Union’s Appendix I to the GPA and by the other international agreements by which the Union is bound, contracting entities within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) shall accord to the works, supplies, services and economic operators of the signatories to those agreements treatment no less favourable than the treatment accorded to the works, supplies, services and economic operators of the Union.

AG Collins considers that

It follows that economic operators from non-covered third-countries do not fall within the scope ratione personae of Directive 2014/25 ... Since the applicant is not entitled to participate in a procedure for the award of a public contract governed by Directive 2014/25, it cannot seek to rely on the provisions thereof before a Member State court. The referring court therefore cannot obtain a response to a reference for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of those provisions, since any answer that the Court might give to its request would not have binding effect. That reason suffices to justify a finding that this reference for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible (para 33, emphases added).

This position implies a logical jump in the reasoning. While it is plain that only economic operators from covered third-countries have a legally enforceable right to participate in public tenders on equal terms, it is by no means clear that other economic operators must necessarily be excluded from participation. If that was the plain interpretation and implication of that provision (and Art 25 Dir 2014/24/EU), the Commission would not have needed to develop the International Procurement Instrument (IPI) to establish circumstances in which exclusion of economic operators from non-covered third countries can be mandated. Along the same lines, AG Rantos argued in the Opinion in CRRC Qingdao Sifang and Others (C-266/22, EU:C:2023:399, not available in English) that ‘Member States can grant less favourable treatment to economic operators from non-covered third parties’ (para 65, own translation from Spanish).

In fact, as the Opinion reflects, ‘[a]lmost all of the parties to the procedure before the Court take the view that Member States may regulate the participation of economic operators from third-countries in procedures for the award of public contracts’ (para 35). In particular, the Croatian government submitted ‘that EU law contains no general prohibition on the participation of economic operators from third-countries in procedures for the award of public contracts in the European Union’ and provided sound arguments in support of that, as the ‘Commission’s Guidance on the participation of third-country bidders confirms that proposition where it states that economic operators from third-countries may be excluded from these procedures, without requiring their exclusion’ (para 36). Those arguments are also aligned with AG Rantos’ CRRC Opinion (paras 72-74). Estonia also submitted there is no obligation under EU law to limit participation by economic operators from non-covered third parties (para 38). Denmark, France, and Austria also considered that there is no ban stemming from EU law, even if the Union has exclusive competence in relation to the common commercial policy (paras 39-40). This should have given the AG pause.

Instead, as suggested by the Commission, AG Collins seeks to support the Opinion’s logical jump in an additional legal argument based on the remit of the EU’s competence to regulate the participation of economic operators from third-countries in procurement procedures in the European Union. The key issue here is not whether the EU has an exclusive or a shared competence in procurement, but that AG Collins considers that

by adopting Article 43 of Directive 2014/25, the European Union has exercised its competence in relation to economic operators established in a country party to the GPA or to another international agreement on the award of public contracts by which the European Union is bound. … economic operators established in Türkiye do not come within that category. Although the European Union has not exercised its exclusive competence to establish whether economic operators from non-covered third-countries may participate in such procedures, Member States may not rely on that fact in order to regain competence to act in that area (para 50, emphases added).

Since the European Union does not appear to have exercised its exclusive competence to determine access by economic operators from non-covered third-countries to procedures for the award of public contracts, Member States wishing to take steps to that end may inform the competent EU institutions of their proposed course of action with a view to obtaining the requisite authorisation. Nothing in the Court’s file indicates that Croatia has taken such a step. Second, unilateral action by Member States could undermine the European Union’s bargaining position in the context of its efforts to open, on a reciprocal basis, markets for public contracts in third countries. Third, it could interfere with the uniform application of EU law, since in such circumstances the application of Directive 2014/25 ratione personae could vary from one Member State to another. (para 52, emphases added).

In my view, AG Collins is conflating normative and positive analysis. It is clear that dissimilar approaches in the Member States undermine the Commission’s bargaining position—thus the need to bring in the IPI as well as other instruments such as the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR)—and can lead an absence of uniformity in the application of the Directive. However, these are normative issues. From a positive standpoint, it is in my view incorrect to state that the EU has exercised its competence in relation to GPA and other covered third country operators through Article 43 of Directive 2014/25/EU or, for that matter, Article 25 of Directive 2014/24/EU. The exercise of the relevant competence concerns the entering into those international treaties, not the internal legislative measures put in place to promote their effectiveness.

To me, it is clear that the obligation to grant equal treatment to GPA and other covered economic operators stems from the GPA or the relevant international treaty, not the Directive. Art 43 Dir 2014/25/EU (and Art 25 Dir 2014/24/EU are mere reminders of the obligations under international law and cannot alter them. Their omission would not have made any difference in covered third country economic operators’ legal position. By the same token, their inclusion cannot serve to prejudice the position of non-covered third country economic operators. As above, the whole process leading to the IPI and FSR would have been entirely superfluous. In my view, the Kolin Opinion follows too closely the dangerously protectionist policy approach pushed by the Commission, and does so in a way that is not legally persuasive (or accurate, in my view).

‘Tolerance’ of third country economic operators’ participation must engage legal protection under the CFR

Moreover, the Kolin Opinion would open a very dangerous path in terms of rule of law and upholding the effectiveness of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, especially Articles 41 and 47—and allow contracting authorities two bites of the cherry in relation to tenders submitted by economic operators from non-covered third countries. Contracting authorities could ‘tolerate’ participation of non-covered third country economic operators to see if those are the ones providing the most economically advantageous offer and, if not, or if other (industrial policy) considerations kicked in, they could simply reject or set aside the tender. This would happen in a context of insufficient guarantees.

Even assuming there was an obligation to exclude under Art 43 of Directive 2014/28/EU or Art 25 of Directive 2014/24/EU, which there is not, contracting authorities would be bound by the duties under Art 41 CFR in relation to EU and covered third-country economic operators. The relevant duty would require an immediate exclusion of the not covered economic operators to protect the (in that case) participation rights of those covered. A contracting authority that had not carried out such exclusion could seek to benefit from the advantages provided by the third country economic operator in breach of its duties, which is not permissible.

Conversely, a contracting authority that had not discharged its duty to exclude would be allowed to still benefit from its inaction by discriminating against and eventually excluding at a later stage the tender of the third-country economic operator without the latter having legal recourse. This would also not be in line with the effectiveness of Arts 41 and 47 CFR and certainly not in line with the doctrine of legitimate expectations. Once an economic operator or tenderer is not excluded or rejected at the first opportunity, there is a positive and very specific representation made by the contracting authority that the economic operator and/or its tender is in the run for the contract. This must trigger legal protection—although the specific form is likely to depend on domestic administrative law.

In the case at hand, like in many other cases in daily practice, despite Kolin not being eligible for equal treatment under Art 43 of Directive 2014/24/EU—and thus not having an enforceable right to participate in the tender and to equal treatment within it deriving from international law—the contracting authority had ‘tolerated’ its participation. The Opinion is plain that, following the receipt of tenders, the contracting authority ‘concluded that 6 out of the 15 tenders submitted fulfilled the selection criteria. [Kolin], a company established in Türkiye, submitted one of the tenders selected’ (para 16). However, the Opinion does not grant Kolin any rights because of such tolerance.

Contrary to the view held by AG Collins, ‘The Austrian Government contends that, although, in principle, Directive 2014/25 does not apply to economic operators from non-covered third-countries, such operators may rely on that directive once a contracting authority has permitted their participation in a procedure for the award of a public contract award’ (para 26). I share this view. Crucially, this is not an issue the Opinion explicitly addresses. But this is the main reason why the ECJ should not follow the Opinion.

Are the EU Institutions (about to start) breaching Art 50 TEU & EU public procurement law in the context of Brexit?

The Financial Times has reported that "Brussels starts to freeze Britain out of EU contracts ~ Commission memo tells staff to prepare to ‘disconnect’ UK". According to the FT, an internal European Commission memorandum urges its senior officials to start introducing Brexit considerations in their decision-making, seemingly to avoid “unnecessary additional complications”. As public procurement is concerned, the FT indicates that 

Where legally possible, the [C]ommission and its agencies will be expected in all activities to “take account” of the fact that Britain may be “a third country” within two years, including in appointing staff and in awarding billions of euros of direct contracts for research projects or services.

“Apart from the legal requirement for a contracting party to be established in the EU, there may be political or practical reasons that speak in favour of contracting parties established in a specific member state, not only at the conclusion of the contract, but also throughout the duration of the contract,” the note states.

The FT piece lacks the necessary detail for a full legal assessment and the caveat that this strategy should be undertaken "where legally possible" may well deactivate it [in legal terms]. However, at least in its thrust, this is a rather clear breach of Article 50(3) TEU.

Inasmuch as it states that "The Treaties shall cease to apply to [a withdrawing Member] State ... from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification" (given by the UK on 29 March 2017), unless this period is extended unanimously by the European Council; Art 50(3) TEU does not allow for any anticipatory effects of a decision to withdraw. Until withdrawal and its terms are actually agreed and legally effective, both the withdrawing Member State and the EU Institutions remain bound by EU law in its supremacy, direct effect and the mandate to respect the rule of law (Art 2 TEU). This is an appropriate measure aimed at the preservation of the rule of law in the form of compliance with EU law during the withdrawal negotiations, not least because nobody knows if withdrawal is legally irreversible and unavoidable -- and, quite frankly, every day that goes by without the EU Institutions (as well as the UK) seeking clarification from the Court of Justice of the European Union is a missed opportunity and another blow to the foundations of the rule of law in the EU.

Such prohibition of anticipatory effect goes both in the direction of preventing the 'freeing up' of the withdrawing Member State from compliance with EU law (which is obvious from Art 50(3) TEU itself), as well as in the opposite direction of preventing the EU Institutions from discriminating against the withdrawing Member State. It is clear to me that EU law will always bind the EU Institutions vis-a-vis a withdrawing Member State all the way up to the point of legal withdrawal - and from then onward, the legal regime setting up mutual duties will be that of any transitory arrangements created by the withdrawal agreement, and/or the legal regime governing the "the framework for [the withdrawing Member States'] future relationship with the Union". Violating the absolute mandate of subjection to EU law up to the point of withdrawal would be an infringement of Art 50(3) TEU by the EU Institutions -- if not by itself, certainly in combination with the duty of non-discrimination and equal treatment between Member States of Art 4(2) TEU, as well as the duty of sincere cooperation of Art 4(3) TEU.

In the specific area of public procurement, just as it was illegal for the UK's Department for International Trade to tender contracts screening contractors on the basis of their commitment to support the delivery of Brexit as a cultural fitness criterion (see here), it is also illegal for the EU Institutions to tender contracts on the basis of "political or practical reasons that speak in favour of contracting parties established in a specific member state, not only at the conclusion of the contract, but also throughout the duration of the contract". Article 102 of the Financial Regulation governing the award of contracts by EU Institutions clearly establishes that "All public contracts financed in whole or in part by the [EU] budget shall respect the principles of transparency, proportionality, equal treatment and non-discrimination". Imposing requirements around the Member State of incorporation, registration or sit of a public contractor runs against these general principles.

There may be some specific circumstances or projects (the FT piece mentions the Galileo project) where it would not be possible for public contractors to be based outside the EU, but these are clearly exceptional and need to be subjected to a very strict proportionality analysis. In most cases, particularly for services and research contracts, there is no need for any physical presence in the EU (or elsewhere). This is clearly demonstrated by the coverage of a good number of Brexit-sensitive services markets in the EU's market access concessions under the World Trade Organisation's Government Procurement Agreement (albeit on a reciprocal basis, for obvious trade policy reasons).

Moreover, the extent to which it would be impossible for UK-based contractors to complete the execution of public contracts post-Brexit depends on the existence or not of transitory arrangements, as well as the framework for the future EU-UK relationship (which may well imply mutual coverage of services procurement in WTO GPA terms). Therefore, a decision made now that determined such impossibility and thus served as the basis for the exclusion of UK tenderers from procedures carried out by the EU Institutions would be legally defective.

Beyond these technical issues, it is shocking and worrying to see the EU Institutions engage in what can be seen as trade war by erecting non-tariff barriers against a withdrawing Member State, just as it was worrying and unacceptable to see the UK do that. If both parties to the withdrawing negotiations "prepare" for a disorderly Brexit in this manner, this will be a self-fulfilling prophecy. And the only stopper to such noxious developments is to be found in the rule of law and the EU's and the withdrawing Member States' obligations under the Treaties to comply with EU law until the withdrawal is effective in terms of Art 50(3) TEU. If the European Commission is itself not able to abide in this manner, then my pessimism about the irreversible effects of Brexit on EU law can only plummet even further....

Brexit, the limits of law and legal scholarship

Brexit has created a very troubling and destabilising environment for legal researchers in the UK and beyond. This is particularly true for those directly concerned with EU and international law, as well as constitutional and public law, but it is quickly expanding to all other areas of legal scholarship, such as human rights law or jurisprudence. Brexit has created shock waves that will continue to hit legal academia at least for the coming 5 to 10 years, and not only in terms of its focus as a discipline.

This not only jeopardises the development of previous research plans and the completion of on-going research projects, but also exposes the limits of law and legal scholarship in a way that I considered unimaginable before 23 June 2016. But then, most of what Brexit has brought had never crossed my mind or seemed outlandish. The following are just a few thoughts of what really worries me at the moment, not only as an EU lawyer, but more generally as a legal scholar. Of course, I am also an EU citizen living in the UK, which adds one layer of implications for me personally. However, I hope I can disentangle both dimensions.

Hard Brexit as a coup against the rule of law

We have been waiting all summer for the dust of the referendum to settle and to see what the UK Government and the UK Parliament made of the result and how they formulated their strategy going forward. What is starting to emerge, particularly from the Government's approach and its toying with the idea of a hard Brexit, is worryingly taking the shape of a coup against the rule of law. It is also starting to encapsulate xenophobic and racist elements of the Brexit campaign that are now presented as reasonable policy choices within mainstream movements, rather than being denounced as extreme and contrary to the very basic values of British society--unless they are now made to represent what they seemed to stand against until very recently.

There is an absolute disregard for the acquired rights of millions of people and the rhetoric that no basic protection is guaranteed and all individual and collective rights are on the table and prone to be used as bargaining chips simply goes against basic principles of legal certainty, prohibition of retroactive effects of rules that significantly impinge on individual rights, good faith and sincere cooperation duties under EU and international law. And the troubling part is that the mechanisms that would ordinarily protect those rights and these principles--mainly, cases brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights--would not only be too slow off the Brexit mark, but also unlikely to provide effective protection against the actions of what is emerging as a bully State (or at least a bully Government) willing to disregard any legal consequences of its ill-thought policies.

Some of this is not strictly speaking a Brexit byproduct, but a result of the added or twin process of departure from European human rights instruments and standards. It is also compounded by the complexities of UK (unwritten) constitutional law and the absence of a domestic constitutional court strictly speaking, which starts to paint a scenario where the UK Government seems to believe that it can shape the future system of protection (or less) of human rights in the UK without any constraint or respect for the status quo. For a country that promoted human rights internationally in the past, this is such a return to the cave that it is hard to believe that this is actually happening. And the UK highest courts seem to be the only ones (potentially) able to bring a torch to the cave and force the Government out of it. Whether they will do it, or at least pass the issue on to Parliament, is everybody's guess.

"The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers" ~ William Shakespeare's Henry VI. 

As lawyers and legal scholars, we are now under the double attack and accusation of being both experts and agitators of the public space. What I would have thought were two of the most precious treasures legal academia and legal practice can protect (knowledge and independence of action) seem to have turned against us. We had to endure the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice spit in our faces that “people in this country have had enough of experts”. The Prime Minister now also wants to protect the British Army (and Government, ultimately) from "activist left wing human rights lawyers"--but, not necessarily because of their ideology, but because they "harangue and harass" Britain's armed forces.

It is obvious that having a dissenting voice (particularly if it is informed and shouts evidence-based arguments), or contributing to the proper functioning of the system of checks and balances that a State based on the rule of law depends upon, now make you a public enemy. This really worries me because legal academia (and legal practice, but maybe to a lesser extent) will now be pushed towards a dangerous path to potentially becoming a place of fear and suppression of ideas and arguments that run contrary to what is now accepted as the official discourse or the policy of the day. We need to react against this and do it quickly, firmly and with all our intellectual might. If we fail to do this, there should be no need to kill all the lawyers, because we will (or should have) committed intellectual suicide already.

Brexit as Moby Dick

The final aspect that really worries me is that we will now probably be obsessed with Brexit. And to some extent we will have to if we are to discharge our moral and social duty of resisting the coup against the rule of law and against legal academia and practice as their stewards--against legal scholars and jurists as a collective that must contribute to keeping the Government in check under the rule of law. But this is very likely to also become our white whale, a permanent chase in a run with a moving finish line, something that is so much bigger than us and our capacities that eventually exhausts us and makes us drown (or feel we are drowning).

This obsession will also impoverish our legal scholarship beyond Brexit and drain our energy and absorb our time in ways that will make us stop pushing the boundaries of knowledge we were exploring before 23 June 2016. This is, in itself, one of the Brexit tragedies. By creating this black hole of legal problems and this immense pressure on the structures for the creation and dissemination of legal knowledge, Brexit has already put a heavy burden on law and legal scholarship. Like the value of the currency, which has been on free fall and already moved back the equivalent of almost the entire span of my lifetime, this will take very many years to recover, and I worry that it may never reach the level it had before the Great Repeal Bill was announced.

A final thought

I wish I got all of this wrong. If I have, then ignore it. Treat it as the dark thoughts of someone too personally affected by Brexit. But if I haven't, then please see this as a call for action. Join the conversation, so we can collectively think about ways of getting out of this.