Centralised purchasing activities and central purchasing bodies are subjected to the rules of reg.37 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (PCR2015), which transposes Art 37 of Directive 2014/14 without any material deviation. Occasional joint procurement is treated separately (see reg.38 PCR2015), and there are some additional rules regarding cross-border centralised purschasing (reg.39 PCR2015) [generally,
on the functional alternatives, GL Albano and M Sparro, ‘Flexible
Strategies for Centralized Public Procurement’ (2010) 1(2) Review of Economics and Institutions art 4. For an overview of the rules, see S Arrowsmith, Law of Public and Utilities Procurement. Regulation in the EU and the UK, Vol. 1, 3rd edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) 373–77 & 535–40]. Do not miss Pedro's critical remarks.
the general lines of facilitating public-public cooperation, but in
relation to ‘cooperate-to-buy’ decisions instrumented through either
centralised procurement or occasional joint procurement, Directive
2014/24 regulates certain possibilities that go beyond the primitive
rules on centralisation of purchases and the creation of central
purchasing bodies contained in article 11 of Directive 2004/18 [for
discussion of certain practical difficulties, see G Racca,
‘Collaborative procurement and contract performance in the Italian
healthcare sector: Illustration of a common problem in European
procurement’ (2010) 19 Public Procurement Law Review 119–33]. In
view of the general adoption of centralised procurement techniques,
these new rules are bound to have significant effects very quickly [see Commission Staff Working Document, Annual Public Procurement Implementation Review 2012 (SWD(2012) 342 final)
25–26, where it is clearly indicated that most Member States have
implemented this option in their national legislation, with the
exception of Estonia, Germany and Luxembourg].
justification for the increased detail in the regulation of centralised
and collaborative procurement can be found in recitals (69) and (70) Dir 2014/24, where the increasing relevance of these procurement
techniques is echoed, and an interesting direct reference is made to the
potential increase in competition that can derive from the use of these
techniques [C Risvig Hamer, ‘Regular purchases and aggregated procurement: the
changes in the new Public Procurement Directive ...’
(2014) 23 Public Procurement Law Review 201, 207–10].
However, it must be borne in mind that generally, the centralisation of
procurement activities also creates significant risks of distortions of
competition, which is acknowledged in recital (59): ‘the
aggregation and centralisation of purchases should be carefully
monitored in order to avoid excessive concentration of purchasing power
and collusion, and to preserve transparency and competition, as well as
market access opportunities for SMEs’ [for discussion, see GL
Albano, ‘Demand aggregation and collusion prevention in public
procurement’, in G M Racca and C R Yukins (eds), Integrity and Efficiency in Sustainable Public Contracts
(Brussels, Bruylant, 2014) 155–70]. Hence, this is an area where
particular care should be exercised in trying to avoid distortions of
The goals of professionalisation, modernisation and increased competition (leading to higher value for money and potential savings) are ranked very highly by Member States in their public sector reform and modernisation agendas, particularly in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Hence, the push for centralisation runs the risk of blindly changing the way procurement is conducted without paying sufficient attention to the risks it poses and the negative impacts it can have in the medium and long term. In view of those risks, the desirability or otherwise of centralisation and aggregation of procurement in all or some cases deserves some comments. The following are extracted from my Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 254-57. All references are to Art 37 Dir 2014/24, but they apply equally to reg.37 PCR2015.
... it is important to stress that the rules of Directive 2014/24 deviate in significant ways from what would be desirable from a competition perspective. Central purchasing bodies are now clearly assigned two alternative roles under Directive 2014/24. On the one hand, they can act in support or on behalf of contracting authorities (ie ‘act as intermediaries by awarding contracts, operating dynamic purchasing systems or concluding framework agreements to be used by contracting authorities’) and, on the other hand, they can act as the actual providers of other contracting authorities (that is, ‘act as wholesalers by buying, stocking and reselling’). This second role should make them fall completely under the umbrella of competition law, but the first one has more diffuse competition law implications. It is now clear that both of these roles are expressly regulated in article 37(1) of Directive 2014/24 (which suppresses any legal uncertainty derived from the silence of dir 2004/18). It is also worth stressing that Member States can make the recourse to the central purchasing body mandatory (art 37(1) in fine dir 2014/24). This latter possibility creates very difficult to anticipate competition effects, as it makes the supply of the goods, works or services to the public sector depend on the running of a ‘two-sided’ platform by the central purchasing body. In that case, depending on the way in which demand is aggregated or bundled, the exclusionary effects on (particularly smaller) suppliers can be very relevant. Moreover, generally, there seems to be no good reason to impose recourse to the central purchasing body if a given contracting authority can obtain better conditions (ie, better value for money) from an alternative provider. In that case, the principle of competition would require carving out an exception from the rule of obligatory recourse to the central body when it is not the one offering the most economically advantageous tender (although, admittedly, this would create practical difficulties if the contracting authority just decides to rely on the central body without carrying out any independent market consultation, under art 40 dir 2014/24 or otherwise).
According to the rules in article 37 of Directive 2014/24, recourse to a central purchasing body exempts the contracting authority from complying separately with public procurement rules (on the assumption, obviously and unavoidably, that the central purchasing body is the one bound by them in its market interactions), unless it directly carries out one or more of the phases involved in the procurement process (as indicated in art 37(2) dir 2014/24). Moreover, contracting authorities can award a public service contract for the provision of centralised purchasing activities to a central purchasing body without applying the procedures foreseen in Directive 2014/24. Such public service contracts may also include the provision of ancillary purchasing activities, which implies that there can be an element of remuneration of the service provided by the central purchasing body.
Therefore, recourse to central purchasing bodies is fundamentally excluded from the scope of application of Directive 2014/24 in a sort of special case allowing for the use of the negotiated procedure without publication (or by analogy with art 32 dir 2014/24), which has a dubious justification, particularly if the centralised purchasing body is a body governed by public law with private capital participation. Under the rules of Directive 2014/24, centralisation of procurement is seen as a clear device to allow (small) contracting authorities to achieve savings [K Karjalainen, ‘Estimating the cost effects of purchasing centralization—Empirical evidence from framework agreements in the public sector’ (2011) 17(2) Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management 87–97], as well as higher standards of professionalization, and to reduce the administrative burden of running procurement procedures by having recourse to the services of the central purchasing body—in a sort of intermediate solution between a public-public cooperation scheme (for which there would clearly not be a sufficient cooperative element) and an in-house arrangement (for which the control criterion would probably be absent). From the competition perspective, this possibility basically moves the focus of the competition concerns to the market activities of the central purchasing body and increases the likelihood of distortions of competition , and it may as well result in the central purchasing body engaging in a sort of ‘market regulation’ activity that is difficult to align with the general requirements of the principle of competition. Consequently, it is a development that causes significant source for concern in terms of the development of a pro-competitive public procurement system.
In my view, these concerns require careful consideration of the implications of procurement centralisation, as well the possibilities available to create 'competition-checks' for the activities of the centralised body. Centralisation can have significant impacts in the way procurement is carried out on a day to day basis, as well as altering the competitive structure of the markets in which the central purchasing body is active. There is thus a clear and increasingly pressing need to strike a proper balance between the expected benefits (economies of scale, professionalisation, increased competition for contracts) and the potential detriments of centralisation (loss of administrative granularity, increased systemic risk, increased litigation risk, knock-on and waterbed effects, limited SME access).
In the UK, for example, the National Audit Office (NAO) published a report on Improving government procurement
(2013) where it made it clear that the Cabinet Office will have to lead
major cultural shift across government if the centralising of buying
goods and services is to deliver the significant benefits on offer.
NAO's report focussed primarily on administrative and governance issues.
There are other important economic risks linked to centralisation that Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui
and I have discussed recently in "Impact of Public Procurement
Aggregation on Competition: Risks, Rationale and Justification for the
Rules in Directive 2014/24" (December 5, 2014) University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 14-35.
Hence, the development of further centralisation policies will have to balance the potential benefits with the potential negative effects that aggregation of procurement can create in the medium and long run. The Directorate on public procurement of DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW) of the European Commission is organising a brainstorming session with experts on aggregation, in particular Central Purchasing Bodies (CPBs), with the objective of contributing to the development of policies in this area. I am honoured for their invitation to contribute to the discussions and look forward to future developments in this area.