Centralised procurement for the health care sector -- bang for your pound or siphoning off scarce resources?

The National Health Service (NHS) has been running a centralised model for health care procurement in England for a few years now. The current system resulted from a redesign of the NHS supply chain that has been operational since 2019 [for details, see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Centralisation of procurement and supply chain management in the English NHS: some governance and compliance challenges’ (2019) 70(1) NILQ 53-75.]

Given that the main driver for the implementation and redesign of the system was to obtain efficiencies (aka savings) through the exercise of the NHS’ buying power, both the UK’s National Audit Office (NAO) and the House of Commons’ Public Accounts Committee (PAC) are scrutinising the operation of the system in its first few years.

The NAO published a scathing report on 12 January 2024. Among many other concerning issues, the report highlighted how, despite the fundamental importance of measuring savings, ‘NHS Supply Chain has used different methods to report savings to different audiences, which could cause confusion.’ This triggered a clear risk of recounting (ie exaggeration) of claims of savings, as detailed below.

In my submission of written evidence to the PAC Inquiry ‘NHS Supply Chain and efficiencies in procurement’, I look in detail at the potential implications of the use of different savings reporting methods for the (mis)management of scarce NHS resources, should the recounting of savings have allowed private subcontractors to also overclaim savings in order to boost the financial return under their contracts. The full text of my submission is reproduced below, in case of interest.

nao’s findings on recounting of savings

There are three crucial findings in the NAO’s report concerning the use of different (and potentially problematic) savings reporting methods. They are as follows:

DHSC [the Department of Health and Social Care] set Supply Chain a cumulative target of making £2.4 billion savings by 2023-24. Supply Chain told us that it had exceeded this target by the end of 2022-23 although we have not validated this saving. The method for calculating this re-counted savings from each year since 2015-16. Supply Chain calculated its reported savings against the £2.4 billion target by using 2015-16 prices as its baseline. Even if prices had not reduced in any year compared with the year before, a saving was reported as long as prices were lower than that of the baseline year. This method then accumulated savings each year, by adding the difference in price as at the baseline year, for each year. This accumulation continued to re-count savings made in earlier years and did not take inflation into account. For example, if a product cost £10 in 2015-16 and reduced to £9 in 2016-17, Supply Chain would report a saving of £1. If it remained at £9 in 2017-18, Supply Chain would report a total saving of £2 (re-counting the £1 saved in 2016-17). If it then reduced to £8 in 2018-19, Supply Chain would report a total saving of £4 (re-counting the £1 saved in each of 2016-17 and 2017-18 and saving a further £2 in 2018-19) […]. DHSC could not provide us with any original sign-off or agreement that this was how Supply Chain should calculate its savings figure (para 2.4, emphasis added).

Supply Chain has used other methods for calculating savings which could cause confusion. It has used different methods for different audiences, for example, to government, trusts and suppliers (see Figure 5). When reporting progress against its £2.4 billion target it used a baseline from 2015-16 and accumulated the amount each year. To help show the savings that trusts have made individually, it also calculates in-year savings each trust has made using prices paid the previous year as the baseline. In this example, if a trust paid £10 for an item in 2015-16, and then procured it for £9 from Supply Chain in 2016-17 and 2017-18, Supply Chain would report a saving of £1 in the first year and no saving in the second year. These different methods have evolved since Supply Chain was established and there is a rationale for each. Having several methods to calculate savings has the potential to cause confusion (para 2.6, emphasis added).

When I read the report, I thought that the difference between the methods was not only problematic in itself, but also showed that the ‘main method’ for NHS Supply Chain and government to claim savings, in allowing recounting of savings, was likely to have allowed for excessive claims. This is not only a technical or political problem, but also a clear risk of siphoning off NHS scarce budgetary resources, for the reasons detailed below.

Submission to the pac inquiry

00. This brief written submission responds to the call for evidence issued by the Public Accounts Committee in relation to its Inquiry “NHS Supply Chain and efficiencies in procurement”. It focuses on the specific point of ‘Progress in delivering savings for the NHS’. This submission provides further details on the structure and functioning of NHS Supply Chain than those included in the National Audit Office’s report “NHS Supply Chain and efficiencies in procurement” (2023-24, HC 390). The purpose of this further detail is to highlight the broader implications that the potential overclaim of savings generated by NHS Supply Chain may have had in relation to payments made to private providers to whom some of the supply chain functions have been outsourced. It raises some questions that the Committee may want to explore in the context of its Inquiry.

1. NHS Supply Chain operating structure

01. The NAO report analyses the functioning and performance of NHS Supply Chain and SCCL in a holistic manner and without considering details of the complex structure of outsourced functions that underpins the model. This can obscure some of the practical impacts of some of NAO’s findings, in particular in relation with the potential overclaim of savings generated by NHS Supply Chain (paras 2.4, 2.6 and Figure 5 in the report). Approaching the analysis at a deeper level of detail on NHS Supply Chain’s operating structure can shed light on problems with the methods for calculating NHS Supply Chain savings other than the confusion caused by the use of multiple methods, and the potential overclaim of savings in relation to the original target set by DHSC.

02. NHS Supply Chain does not operate as a single entity and SCCL is not the only relevant actor in the operating structure.[1] Crucially, the operating model consists of a complex network of outsourcing contracts around what are called ‘category towers’ of products and services. SCCL coordinates a series of ‘Category Tower Service Providers’ (CTSPs), as listed in the graph below. CTSPs have an active role in developing category management strategies (that is, the ‘go to market approach’ at product level) and heavily influence the procurement strategy for the relevant category, subject to SCCL approval.

03. CTSPs are incentivised to reduce total cost in the system, not just reduce unit prices of the goods and services covered by the relevant category. They hold Guaranteed Maximum Price Target Cost (GMPTC) contracts, under which CTSPs will be paid the operational costs incurred in performing the services against an annual target set out in the contract, but will only make a profit when savings are delivered, on a gainshare basis that is capped.

Source: NHS Supply Chain - New operating model (2018).[2]

04. There are very limited public details on how the relevant targets for financial services have been set and managed throughout the operation of the system. However, it is clear that CTSPs have financial incentives tied to the generation of savings for SCCL. Given that SCCL does not carry out procurement activities without CTSP involvement, it seems plausible that SCCL’s own targets and claimed savings would (primarily) have been the result of the simple aggregation of those of CTSPs. If that is correct, the issues identified in the NAO report may have resulted in financial advantages to CTSPs if they have been allowed to overclaim savings generated.

05. NHS Supply Chain has publicly stated that[3]:

  • ‘Savings are contractual to the CTSPs. As part of the procurement, bidders were asked to provide contractual savings targets for each year. These were assessed and challenged through the process and are core to the commercial model. CTSPs cannot attain their target margins (i.e. profit) unless they are able to achieve contractual savings.’

  • ‘The CTSPs financial reward mechanism [is] based upon a gain share from the delivery of savings. The model includes savings generated across the total system, not just the price of the product. The level of gain share is directly proportional to the level of savings delivered.’

06. In view of this, if CTSPs had been allowed to use a method of savings calculation that re-counted savings in the way NAO details at para 2.4 of its report, it is likely that their financial compensation will have been higher than it should have been under alternative models of savings calculation that did not allow for such re-count. Given the volumes of savings claimed through the period covered by the report, any potential overcompensation could have been significant. As any such overcompensation would have been covered by NHS funding, the Committee may want to include its consideration within its Inquiry and in its evidence-gathering efforts.

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[1] For a detailed account, see A Sanchez-Graells, “Centralisation of procurement and supply chain management in the English NHS: some governance and compliance challenges” (2019) 70(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 53-75.

[2] Available at https://wwwmedia.supplychain.nhs.uk/media/Customer_FAQ_November_2018.pdf (last accessed 12 January 2024).

[3] Ibid, FAQs 24 and 25.

External oversight and mandatory requirements for public sector digital technology adoption

© Mateo Mulder-Graells (2023).

I thought the time would never come, but the last piece of my book project puzzle is now more or less in place. After finding that procurement is not the right regulatory actor and does not have the best tools of ‘digital regulation by contract’, in this last draft chapter, I explore how to discharge procurement of the assigned digital regulation role to increase the likelihood of effective enforcement of desirable goals of public sector digital regulation.

I argue that this should be done through two inter-related regulatory interventions consisting of developing (1) a regulator tasked with the external oversight of the adoption of digital technologies by the public sector, as well as (2) a suite of mandatory requirements binding both public entities seeking to adopt digital technologies and technology providers, and both in relation to the digital technologies to be adopted by the public sector and the applicable governance framework.

Detailed analysis of these issues would require much more extensive treatment than this draft chapter can offer. The modest goal here is simply to stress the key attributes and functions that each of these two regulatory interventions should have to make a positive contribution to governing the transition towards a new model of public digital governance. In this blog post, I summarise the main arguments.

As ever, I would be most grateful for feedback: a.sanchez-graells@bristol.ac.uk. Especially as I will now turn my attention to seeing how the different pieces of the puzzle fit together, while I edit the manuscript for submission before end of July 2023.

Institutional deficit and risk of capture

In the absence of an alternative institutional architecture (or while it is put in place), procurement is expected to develop a regulatory gatekeeping role in relation to the adoption of digital technologies by the public sector, which is in turn expected to have norm-setting and market-shaping effects across the economy. This could be seen as a way of bypassing or postponing decisions on regulatory architecture.

However, earlier analysis has shown that the procurement function is not the right institution to which to assign a digital regulation role, as it cannot effectively discharge such a duty. This highlights the existence of an institutional deficit in the process of public sector digitalisation, as well as in relation to digital technology regulation more broadly. An alternative approach to institutional design is required, and it can be delivered through the creation of a notional ‘AI in Public Sector Authority’ (AIPSA).

Earlier analysis has also shown that there are pervasive risks of regulatory capture and commercial determination of the process of public sector digitalisation stemming from reliance on standards and benchmarks created by technology vendors or by bodies heavily influenced by the tech industry. AIPSA could safeguard against such risk through controls over the process of standard adoption. AIPSA could also guard against excessive experimentation with digital technologies by creating robust controls to counteract their policy irresistibility.

Overcoming the institutional deficit through AIPSA

The adoption of digital technologies in the process of public sector digitalisation creates regulatory challenges that require external oversight, as procurement is unable to effectively regulate this process. A particularly relevant issue concerns whether such oversight should be entrusted to a new regulator (broad approach), or whether it would suffice to assign new regulatory tasks to existing regulators (narrow approach).

I submit that the narrow approach is inadequate because it perpetuates regulatory fragmentation and can lead to undesirable spillovers or knock-on effects, whether the new regulatory tasks are assigned to data protection authorities, (quasi)regulators with a ‘sufficiently close’ regulatory remit in relation with information and communications technologies (ICT) (such as eg the Agency for Digital Italy (AgID), or the Dutch Advisory Council on IT assessment (AcICT)), or newly created centres of expertise in algorithmic regulation (eg the French PEReN). Such ‘organic’ or ‘incremental’ approach to institutional development could overshadow important design considerations, as well embed biases due to the institutional drivers of the existing (quasi)regulators.

To avoid these issues, I advocate a broader or more joined up approach in the proposal for AIPSA. AIPSA would be an independent authority with the statutory function of promoting overarching goals of digital regulation, and specifically tasked with regulating the adoption and use of digital technologies by the public sector, whether through in-house development or procurement from technology providers. AIPSA would also absorb regulatory functions in cognate areas, such as the governance of public sector data, and integrate work in areas such as cyber security. It would also serve a coordinating function with the data protection authority.

In the draft chapter, I stress three fundamental aspects of AIPSA’s institutional design: regulatory coherence, independence and expertise. Independence and expertise would be the two most crucial factors. AIPSA would need to be designed in a way that ensured both political and industry independence, with the issue of political independence having particular salience and requiring countervailing accountability mechanisms. Relatedly, the importance of digital capabilities to effectively exercise a digital regulation role cannot be overemphasised. It is not only important in relation to the active aspects of the regulatory role—such as control of standard setting or permissioning or licencing of digital technology use (below)—but also in relation to the passive aspects of the regulatory role and, in particular, in relation to reactive engagement with industry. High levels of digital capability would be essential to allow AIPSA to effectively scrutinise claims from those that sought to influence its operation and decision-making, as well as reduce AIPSA’s dependence on industry-provided information.

safeguard against regulatory capture and policy irresistibility

Regulating the adoption of digital technologies in the process of public sector digitalisation requires establishing the substantive requirements that such technology needs to meet, as well as the governance requirements need to ensure its proper use. AIPSA’s role in setting mandatory requirements for public sector digitalisation would be twofold.

First, through an approval or certification mechanism, it would control the process of standardisation to neutralise risks of regulatory capture and commercial determination. Where no standards were susceptible of approval or certification, AIPSA would develop them.

Second, through a permissioning or licencing process, AIPSA would ensure that decisions on the adoption of digital technologies by the public sector are not driven by ‘policy irresistibility’, that they are supported by clear governance structures and draw on sufficient resources, and that adherence to the goals of digital regulation is sustained throughout the implementation and use of digital technologies by the public sector and subject to proactive transparency requirements.

The draft chapter provides more details on both issues.

If not AIPSA … then clearly not procurement

There can be many objections to the proposals developed in this draft chapter, which would still require further development. However, most of the objections would likely also apply to the use of procurement as a tool of digital regulation. The functions expected of AIPSA closely match those expected of the procurement function under the approach to ‘digital regulation by contract’. Challenges to AIPSA’s ability to discharge such functions would be applicable to any public buyer seeking to achieve the same goals. Similarly, challenges to the independence or need for accountability of AIPSA would be similarly applicable to atomised decision-making by public buyers.

While the proposal is necessarily imperfect, I submit that it would improve upon the emerging status quo and that, in discharging procurement of the digital regulation role, it would make a positive contribution to the governance of the transition to a new model of digital public governance.

The draft chapter is available via SSRN: Albert Sanchez-Graells, ‘Discharging procurement of the digital regulation role: external oversight and mandatory requirements for public sector digital technology adoption’.