Innovation procurement under the Procurement Act 2023 -- changing procurement culture on the cheap?

On 13 November 2023, the UK Government published guidance setting out its ambitions for innovation procurement under the new Procurement Act 2023 (not yet in force, of which you can read a summary here). This further expands on the ambitions underpinning the Transforming Public Procurement project that started after Brexit. The Government’s expectation is that the ‘the new legislation will allow public procurement to be done in more flexible and innovative ways’, and that this will ‘enable public sector organisations to embrace innovation more’.

The innovation procurement guidance bases its expectation that the Procurement Act will unlock more procurement of innovation and more innovative procurement on the ambition that this will be an actively supported policy by all relevant policy- and decision-makers and that there will be advocacy for the development of commercial expertise. A first hurdle here is that unless such advocacy comes with the investment of significant funds in developing skills (and this relates to both commercial and technical skills, especially where the innovation relates to digital technologies), such high-level political buy-in may not translate into any meaningful changes. The guidance itself acknowledges that the ‘overall culture, expertise and incentive structure of the public sector has led to relatively low appetite for risk and experimentation’. Therefore, that greater investment in expertise needs to be coupled with a culture change. And we know this is a process that is very difficult to push forward.

The guidance also indicates that ‘Greater transparency of procurement data will make it easier to see what approaches have been successful and encourage use of those approaches more widely across the public sector.’ This potentially points to another hurdle in unlocking this policy because generic data is not enough to support innovation procurement or the procurement of innovation. Being able to successfully replicate innovation procurement practices requires a detailed understanding of how things were done, and how they need to be adapted when replicated. However, the new transparency regime does not necessarily guarantee that such granular and detailed information will be available, especially as the practical level of transparency that will stem from the new obligations crucially hinges on the treatment of commercially sensitive information (which is exempted from disclosure in s.94 PA 2023). Unless there is clear guidance on disclosure / withholding of sensitive commercial information, it can well be that the new regime does not generate additional meaningful (publicly accessible) data to push the knowledge stock and support innovative procurement. This is an important issue that may require further discussion in a separate post.

The guidance indicates that the changes in the Procurement Act will help public buyers in three ways:

  • The new rules focus more on delivering outcomes (as opposed to ‘going through the motions’ of a rigid process). Contracting authorities will be able to design their own process, tailored to the unique circumstances of the requirement and, most importantly, those who are best placed to deliver the best solution.

  • There will be clearer rules overall and more flexibility for procurers to use their commercial skills to achieve the desired outcomes.

  • Procurers will be able to better communicate their particular problem to suppliers and work with them to come up with potential solutions. Using product demonstrations alongside written tenders will help buyers get a proper appreciation of solutions being offered by suppliers. That is particularly impactful for newer, more innovative solutions which the authority may not be familiar with.

Although the guidance document indicates that the ‘new measures include general obligations, options for preliminary market engagement, and an important new mechanism, the Competitive Flexible Procedure’, in practice, there are limited changes to what was already allowed in terms of market consultation and the general obligations— to eg publish a pipeline notice (for contracting authorities with an annual spend over £100 million), or to ‘have regard to the fact that SMEs face barriers to participation and consider whether these barriers can be removed or reduced’—are also marginal (if at all) changes from the still current regime (see regs.48 and 46 PCR 2015). Therefore, it all boils down to the new ‘innovation-friendly procurement processes’ that are enabled by the flexible (under)regulation of the competitive flexible procedure (s.20 PA 2023).

The guidance stresses that the ‘objective is that the Competitive Flexible Procedure removes some of the existing barriers to procuring new and better solutions and gives contracting authorities freedom to enable them to achieve the best fit between the specific requirement and the best the market offers.’ The example provided in the guidance provides the skeleton structure of a 3-phase procedure involving an initial ideas and feasibility phase 1, an R&D and prototype phase 2 and a final tendering leading to the award of a production/service contract (phase 3). At this level of generality, there is little to distinguish this from a competitive dialogue under the current rules (reg.30 PCR 2015). Devil will be in the detail.

Moreover, as repeatedly highlighted from the initial consultations, the under-regulation of the competitive flexible procedure will raise the information costs and risks of engaging with innovation procurement as each new approach taken by a contracting authority will require significant investment of time in its design, as well as an unavoidable risk of challenge. The incentives are not particularly geared towards facilitating risk-taking. And any more detailed guidance on ‘how to'‘ carry out an innovative competitive flexible procedure will simply replace regulation and become a de facto standard through which contracting authorities may take the same ‘going through the motions’ approach as the process detailed in teh guidance rigidifies.

The guidance acknowledges this, at least partially, when it stresses that ‘Behavioural changes will make the biggest difference’. Such behavioural changes will be supported through training, which the guidance document also describes (and there is more detail here). The training offered will consist of:

  • Knowledge drops (open to everyone): An on-demand, watchable resource up to a maximum of 45 minutes in total, providing an overview of all of the changes in legislation.

  • E-learning (for skilled practitioners within the public sector only): a learning & development self-guided course consisting of ‘10 1-hour modules and concludes with a skilled practitioner certification’.

  • Advanced course deep dives (for public sector expert practitioners only): ‘3-day, interactive, instructor-led course. It consists of virtual ‘deep dive’ webinars, which allow learners to engage with subject matter experts. This level of interaction allows a deeper insight across the full spectrum of the legislative change and support ‘hearts and minds’ change amongst the learner population (creating ‘superusers’).

  • Communities of practice (for skilled and expert practitioners only): ‘a system of collective critical inquiry and reflection into the regime changes. Supported by the central team and superusers, they will support individuals to embed what they have learned.’

As an educator and based on my experience of training expert professionals in complex procurement, I am skeptical that this amount of training can lead to meaningful changes. The 45-minute resource can hardly cover the entirety of changes in the Procurement Act, and even the 10 hour course for public buyers only will be quite limited in how far it can go. 3 days of training are also insufficient to go much further than exploring a few examples in meaningful detail. And this is relevant because that training is not only for innovation procurement, but for all types of ‘different’ procurement under the Procurement Act 2023 (ie green, social, more robustly anti-corruption, more focused on contract performance, etc). Shifting culture and practice would require a lot more than this.

It is also unclear why this (minimal) investment in public sector understanding of the procurement framework has not taken place earlier. As I already said in the consultation, all of this could have taken place years ago and a better understanding of the current regime would have led to improvements in the practice of innovative procurement in the UK.

All in all, it seems that the aspirations of more innovation procurement and more innovative procurement are pinned on a rather limited amount of training and in (largely voluntary, in addition to the day job) collaboration for super-user experienced practitioners (who will probably see their scarce skills in high demand). It is unclear to me how this will be a game changer. Especially as most of this (and in particular collaboration and voluntary knowledge exchange) could already take place. It may be that more structure and coordination will bring better outcomes, but this would require adequate and sufficient resourcing.

Whether there will be more innovation procurement then depends on whether more money will be put into procurement structures and support. From where I stand, this is by no means a given. I guess we’ll have to wait and see.

Emerging technologies and anti-corruption efforts -- re Adam and Fazekas (2021)

(c) Sara Alaica/Flickr.

(c) Sara Alaica/Flickr.

I am working on a paper on digital technologies and corruption in procurement (or rather, trying to work on it in the midst of a challenging start of term). While researching this topic, I have come across this very interesting paper: Isabelle Adam and Mihály Fazekas, ‘Are emerging technologies helping win the fight against corruption? A review of the state of evidence’ (2021) Information Economics and Policy, available on pre-print here.

In their paper, Adam & Fazekas carry out a systematic review ‘of the academic and policy literature on the six most commonly discussed types of ICT-based anti-corruption interventions: (i) Digi- tal public services and e-government, (ii) Crowdsourcing platforms, (iii) Whistleblowing tools, (iv) Transparency portals and big data, (v) DLT and blockchain, and (vi) AI’ (at 2).

The analysis is clear and accessible and offers good insights on the positive and negative impacts that digital technologies can have for anti-corruption efforts, given that technology ‘is not per se a panacea against corruption, and it can also play into the hands of corrupt officials’ (ibid). The paper is well worth reading in full.

One of their insights I found particularly valuable is that ‘ICTs for anti-corruption operate against the background of given societal divides and power relations which are often supported by corruption. They risk further entrenching these unless their design and implementation take into account corruption and associated power imbalances. Hence, it is arguable that the success of ICT interventions against corruption hinges on their suitability for local contexts and needs, cultural backgrounds and technological experience‘ (at 1).

This directly links with Uta Kohl’s view that digital ‘technologies, whether the internet or blockchain, are tightly and on multiple levels interconnected with existing social orders and those interconnections decide upon the configurational latencies of the technological innovation within concrete settings: who uses the technological innovation in what configuration, for what purposes and against whom’ (see here for details).

To my mind, all of this stresses the need to operationalise a gatekeeping function tasked with the analysis of which digital technologies are adopted by the public sector and for what purpose, and this gatekeeping function needs not only consider downstream ethical implications in terms of impacts on citizens and service users, but also upstream implications concerning the way in which technologies will disrupt, support or entrench existing governance dynamics — and in particular those that the adoption of the technology is seeking to remedy.

Bringing this to procurement, these insights show that the public procurement function — to the extent that the adoption of these technologies is subjected to the regulatory framework of innovation procurement — is de facto playing (or failing to play) such gatekeeping function. More than in other settings, the procurement function needs to closely scrutinise the ‘use case’ of the digital technologies it is tasked with procuring. This is arguably a new regulatory function for procurement, and one that is not yet embedded in procurement theory, regulation or practice. But one that is inescapable nonetheless. So one that is worth thinking about.

Some thoughts on the Commission's 2021 Report on 'Implementation and best practices of national procurement policies in the Internal Market'

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In May 2021, the European Commission published its report on the ‘Implementation and best practices of national procurement policies in the Internal Market’ (the ‘2021 report’). The 2021 report aggregates the national reports sent by Member States in discharge of specific reporting obligations contained in the 2014 Public Procurement Package and offers some insight into the teething issues resulting from its transposition—which may well have become structural issues. In this post, I offer some thoughts on the contents of the 2021 report.

Better late than never?

Before getting to the details of the 2021 report, the first thing to note is the very significant delay in the publication of this information and analysis, as the 2021 report refers to the implementation and practice of procurement covered by the Directives in 2017. The original national reports seem to have been submitted by the Member States (plus Norway, minus Austria for some unexplained reason) in 2018.

Given the limited analysis conducted in the 2021 report, one can wonder why it took the Commission so long. There may be some explanation in the excuses recently put forward to the European Parliament for the continued delay (almost 2 and a half years, and counting) in reporting on the economic effect of the 2014 rules, although that is less than persuasive. Moreover, given that the reporting obligation incumbent on the Member States is triggered every three years, in 2021 we should be having fresh data and analysis of the national reports covering the period 2018-2020 … Oh well, let’s work with what we have.

A missing data (stewardship) nightmare

The 2021 report provides painful evidence of the lack of reliable procurement data in 2017. Nothing new there, sadly—although the detail of the data inconsistencies, including Member States reporting ‘above threshold procurement’ data that differs from what can be extracted from TED (page 4), really should raise a few red flags and prompt a few follow-up questions from the Commission … the open-ended commitment to further investigation (page 4) sounding as too little, too late.

The main issue, though, is that this problem is unlikely to have been solved yet. While there is some promise in the forthcoming implementation of new eForms (to start being used between Nov 2022 and no later than Oct 2023), the broader problem of ensuring uniformity of data collection and (more) timely reporting is likely to remain. It is also surprising to see that the Commission considers that the collection of ‘above threshold’ procurement data is voluntary for Member States (fn 5), when Art 85(1) places them under an obligation to provide ‘missing statistical information’ where it cannot be extracted from (TED) notices.

So, from a governance perspective (and leaving aside the soft, or less, push towards the implementation of OCDS standards in different Member States), it seems that the Commission and the Member States are both happy to just keeping shrugging their shoulders at each other when it comes to the incompleteness and low quality of procurement data. May it be time for the Commission to start enforcing reporting obligations seriously and with adequate follow-ups? Or should we wait to the (2024?) second edition of the implementation report to decide to do something then — although it will then be quite tempting to say that we need to wait and see what effect the (delayed?) adoption of the eForms generates. So maybe in light of the (2027?) third edition of the report?

Lack of capability, and ‘Most frequent sources of wrong application or of legal uncertainty’

The 2021 report includes a section on the reported most frequent sources of incorrect application of the 2014 rules, or perceived areas of legal uncertainty. This section, however, starts with a list of issues that rather point to a shortfall of capabilities in the procurement workforce in (some?) Member States. Again, while the Commission’s work on procurement professionalisation may have slightly changed the picture, this is primarily a matter for Member State investment. And in the current circumstances, it seems difficult to see how the post-pandemic economic recovery funds that are being channeled through procurement can be effectively spent where there are such staffing issues.

The rest of the section includes some selected issues posing concrete interpretation or practical implementation difficulties, such as the calculation of threshold values, the rules on exclusion and the rules on award criteria. While these are areas that will always generate some practical challenges, these are not the areas where the 2014 Package generated most change (certainly not on thresholds) and the 2021 report then seems to keep raising structural issues. The same can be said of the generalised preference for the use of lowest price, the absence of market research and engagement, the imposition of unrealistically short tendering deadlines implicit in rushed procurement, or the arbitrary use of selection criteria.

All of this does not bode well for the ‘strategic use’ of procurement (more below) and it seems like the flexibility and potential for process-based innovation of the 2014 rules (as was that of the 2004 rules?) are likely to remain largely unused, thus triggering poor procurement practices later to fuel further claims for flexibilisation and simplification in the next round of revision. On that note, I cannot refrain from pointing to the UK’s recent green paper on the ‘Transformation of Public Procurement’ as a clear example of the persistence of some procurement myths that remain in the collective imagery despite a lack of engagement with recent legislative changes aimed at debunking them (see here, here, and here for more analysis).

Fraud, corruption, conflict of interest and serious irregularities

The 2021 report then has a section that would seem rather positive and incapable of controversy at first sight, as it presents (laudable) efforts at Member State level to create robust anti-fraud and anti-corruption institutions, as well as implementations of rules on conflict of interest that exceed the EU minimum standard, and the development of sophisticated approaches to the prevention and detection of collusion in procurement. Two comments come to mind here.

The first one is that the treatment of conflicts of interest in the Directive clearly requires the development of further rules at domestic level and that the main issue is not whether the statutes contain suitable definitions, but whether conflicts of interest are effectively screened and (more importantly), reacted to. In that regard, it would be interesting to know, for example, how many decisions finding a non-solvable conflict of interest have led to the exclusion of tenderers at Member State level since the new rules came into force. If anyone wanted to venture an estimate, I would not expect it to be in the 1000s.

The second comment is that the picture that the 2021 report paints about the (2017) development of anti-collusion approaches at Member State level (page 7) puts a large question mark on the need for the recent Notice on tools to fight collusion in public procurement and on guidance on how to apply the related exclusion ground (see comments here). If the Member States were already taking action, why did the (contemporaneous) 2017 Communication on ‘Making public procurement work in and for Europe’ (see here) include a commitment to ‘… develop tools and initiatives addressing this issue and raising awareness to minimise the risks of collusive behaviours on procurement markets. This will include actions to improve the market knowledge of contracting authorities, support to contracting authorities careful planning and design of procurement processes and better cooperation and exchange of information between public procurement and competition authorities. The Commission will also prepare guidelines on the application of the new EU procurement directives on exclusion grounds on collusion.’ Is the Commission perhaps failing to recognise that the 2014 rules, and in particular the new exclusion ground for contemporaneous collusion, created legal uncertainty and complicated the practical application of the emerging domestic practices?

Moreover, the 2021 report includes a relatively secondary comment that the national reports ‘show that developing and applying means for the quantitative assessment of collusion risks in award procedures, mostly in the form of risk indicators, remains a challenge’. This is a big understatement and the absence of (publicly-known?) work by the Commission itself on the development of algorithmic screening for collusion detection purposes can only be explained away by the insufficiency of the existing data (which killed off eg a recent effort in the UK), which brings us back to the importance of stronger data stewardship if some of the structural issues are to be resolved (or started to be resolved) any time soon.

SMEs

There is also little about SME access to procurement in the 2021 report, mainly due to limited data provided in the national reports (so, again, another justification for a tougher approach to data collection and reporting). However, there are a couple of interesting qualitative issues. The first one is that ‘only a limited number of Member States have explicitly mentioned challenges encountered by SMEs in public procurement’ (page 7), which raises some questions about the extent to which SME-centric policy issues rank equally high at EU and at national level (which can be relevant in terms of assessing e.g. the also very recent Report on SME needs in public procurement (Feb 2021, but published July 2021). The second one is that the few national strategies seeking to boost SME participation in procurement concern programmes aimed at increasing interactions between SMEs and contracting authorities at policy and practice design level, as well as training for SMEs. What those programmes have in common is that they require capability and resources to be dedicated to the SME procurement policy. Given the shortcomings evidenced in the 2021 report (above), it should be no wonder that most Member States do not have the resources to afford them.

Green, social & Innovation | ‘strategic procurement’

Not too dissimilarly, the section on the uptake of ‘strategic procurement’ also points at difficulties derived from limited capability or understanding of these issues amongst public buyers, as well as the perception (at least for green procurement) that it can be detrimental to SME participation. There is also repeated reference to lack of clarity of the rules and risks of litigation — both of which are in the end dependent on procurement capability, at least to a large extent.

All of this is particularly important, not only because it reinforces the difficulties of conducting complex or sophisticated procurement procedures that exceed the capability (either in terms of skill or, probably more likely, available time) of the procurement workforce, but also because it once again places some big question marks on the feasibiity of implementing some of the tall asks derived from eg the new green procurement requirements that can be expected to follow from the European Green Deal.

Overal thoughts

All of this leads me to two, not in the least original or groundbreaking, thoughts. First, that procurement data is an enabler of policies and practices (clearly of those supported by digital technologies, but not only) which absence significantly hinders the effectiveness of the procurement function. Second, that there is a systemic and long-lasting underinvestment in procurement capability in (most) Member States — about which there is little the European Commission can do — which also significantly hinders the effectiveness of the procurement function.

So, if the current situation is to be changed, a bold and aggressive plan of investment in an enabling data architecture and legal-commercial (and technical) capability is necessary. Conversely, until (or unless) that happens, all plans to use procurement to prop up or reactivate the economy post-pandemic and, more importantly, to face the challenges of the climate emergency are likely to be of extremely limited practical relevance due to failures in their implementation. The 2021 report clearly supports aggressive action on both fronts (even if it refers to the situation in 2017, the problems are very much still current). Will it be taken?