Digital procurement, PPDS and multi-speed datafication -- some thoughts on the March 2023 PPDS Communication

The 2020 European strategy for data ear-marked public procurement as a high priority area for the development of common European data spaces for public administrations. The 2020 data strategy stressed that

Public procurement data are essential to improve transparency and accountability of public spending, fighting corruption and improving spending quality. Public procurement data is spread over several systems in the Member States, made available in different formats and is not easily possible to use for policy purposes in real-time. In many cases, the data quality needs to be improved.

To address those issues, the European Commission was planning to ‘Elaborate a data initiative for public procurement data covering both the EU dimension (EU datasets, such as TED) and the national ones’ by the end of 2020, which would be ‘complemented by a procurement data governance framework’ by mid 2021.

With a 2+ year delay, details for the creation of the public procurement data space (PPDS) were disclosed by the European Commission on 16 March 2023 in the PPDS Communication. The procurement data governance framework is now planned to be developed in the second half of 2023.

In this blog post, I offer some thoughts on the PPDS, its functional goals, likely effects, and the quickly closing window of opportunity for Member States to support its feasibility through an ambitious implementation of the new procurement eForms at domestic level (on which see earlier thoughts here).

1. The PPDS Communication and its goals

The PPDS Communication sets some lofty ambitions aligned with those of the closely-related process of procurement digitalisation, which the European Commission in its 2017 Making Procurement Work In and For Europe Communication already saw as not only an opportunity ‘to streamline and simplify the procurement process’, but also ‘to rethink fundamentally the way public procurement, and relevant parts of public administrations, are organised … [to seize] a unique chance to reshape the relevant systems and achieve a digital transformation’ (at 11-12).

Following the same rhetoric of transformation, the PPDS Communication now stresses that ‘Integrated data combined with the use of state-of the-art and emerging analytics technologies will not only transform public procurement, but also give new and valuable insights to public buyers, policy-makers, businesses and interested citizens alike‘ (at 2). It goes further to suggest that ‘given the high number of ecosystems concerned by public procurement and the amount of data to be analysed, the impact of AI in this field has a potential that we can only see a glimpse of so far‘ (at 2).

The PPDS Communication claims that this data space ‘will revolutionise the access to and use of public procurement data:

  • It will create a platform at EU level to access for the first time public procurement data scattered so far at EU, national and regional level.

  • It will considerably improve data quality, availability and completeness, through close cooperation between the Commission and Member States and the introduction of the new eForms, which will allow public buyers to provide information in a more structured way.

  • This wealth of data will be combined with an analytics toolset including advanced technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), for example in the form of Machine Learning (ML) and Natural Language Processing (NLP).’

A first comment or observation is that this rhetoric of transformation and revolution not only tends to create excessive expectations on what can realistically be delivered by the PPDS, but can also further fuel the ‘policy irresistibility’ of procurement digitalisation and thus eg generate excessive experimentation or investment into the deployment of digital technologies on the basis of such expectations around data access through PPDS (for discussion, see here). Policy-makers would do well to hold off on any investments and pilot projects seeking to exploit the data presumptively pooled in the PPDS until after its implementation. A closer look at the PPDS and the significant roadblocks towards its full implementation will shed further light on this issue.

2. What is the PPDS?

Put simply, the PPDS is a project to create a single data platform to bring into one place ‘all procurement data’ from across the EU—ie both data on above threshold contracts subjected to mandatory EU-wide publication through TED (via eForms from October 2023), and data on below threshold contracts, which publication may be required by the domestic laws of the Member States, or entirely voluntary for contracting authorities.

Given that above threshold procurement data is already (in the process of being) captured at EU level, the PPDS is very much about data on procurement not covered by the EU rules—which represents 80% of all public procurement contracts. As the PPDS Communication stresses

To unlock the full potential of public procurement, access to data and the ability to analyse it are essential. However, data from only 20% of all call for tenders as submitted by public buyers is available and searchable for analysis in one place [ie TED]. The remaining 80% are spread, in different formats, at national or regional level and difficult or impossible to re-use for policy, transparency and better spending purposes. In order (sic) words, public procurement is rich in data, but poor in making it work for taxpayers, policy makers and public buyers.

The PPDS thus intends to develop a ‘technical fix’ to gain a view on the below-threshold reality of procurement across the EU, by ‘pulling and pooling’ data from existing (and to be developed) domestic public contract registers and transparency portals. The PPDS is thus a mechanism for the aggregation of procurement data currently not available in (harmonised) machine-readable and structured formats (or at all).

As the PPDS Communication makes clear, it consists of four layers:
(1) A user interface layer (ie a website and/or app) underpinned by
(2) an analytics layer, which in turn is underpinned by (3) an integration layer that brings together and minimally quality-assures the (4) data layer sourced from TED, Member State public contract registers (including those at sub-national level), and data from other sources (eg data on beneficial ownership).

The two top layers condense all potential advantages of the PPDS, with the analytics layer seeking to develop a ‘toolset including emerging technologies (AI, ML and NLP)‘ to extract data insights for a multiplicity of purposes (see below 3), and the top user interface seeking to facilitate differential data access for different types of users and stakeholders (see below 4). The two bottom layers, and in particular the data layer, are the ones doing all the heavy lifting. Unavoidably, without data, the PPDS risks being little more than an empty shell. As always, ‘no data, no fun’ (see below 5).

Importantly, the top three layers are centralised and the European Commission has responsibility (and funding) for developing them, while the bottom data layer is decentralised, with each Member State retaining responsibility for digitalising its public procurement systems and connecting its data sources to the PPDS. Member States are also expected to bear their own costs, although there is EU funding available through different mechanisms. This allocation of responsibilities follows the limited competence of the EU in this area of inter-administrative cooperation, which unfortunately heightens the risks of the PPDS becoming little more than an empty shell, unless Member States really take the implementation of eForms and the collaborative approach to the construction of the PPDS seriously (see below 6).

The PPDS Communication foresees a progressive implementation of the PPDS, with the goal of having ‘the basic architecture and analytics toolkit in place and procurement data published at EU level available in the system by mid-2023. By the end of 2024, all participating national publication portals would be connected, historic data published at EU level integrated and the analytics toolkit expanded. As of 2025, the system could establish links with additional external data sources’ (at 2). It will most likely be delayed, but that is not very important in the long run—especially as the already accrued delays are the ones that pose a significant limitation on the adequate rollout of the PPDS (see below 6).

3. PPDS’ expected functionality

The PPDS Communication sets expectations around the functionality that could be extracted from the PPDS by different agents and stakeholders.

For public buyers, in addition to reducing the burden of complying with different types of (EU-mandated) reporting, the PPDS Communication expects that ‘insights gained from the PPDS will make it much easier for public buyers to

  • team up and buy in bulk to obtain better prices and higher quality;

  • generate more bids per call for tenders by making calls more attractive for bidders, especially for SMEs and start-ups;

  • fight collusion and corruption, as well as other criminal acts, by detecting suspicious patterns;

  • benchmark themselves more accurately against their peers and exchange knowledge, for instance with the aim of procuring more green, social and innovative products and services;

  • through the further digitalisation and emerging technologies that it brings about, automate tasks, bringing about considerable operational savings’ (at 2).

This largely maps onto my analysis of likely applications of digital technologies for procurement management, assuming the data is there (see here).

The PPDS Communication also expects that policy-makers will ‘gain a wealth of insights that will enable them to predict future trends‘; that economic operators, and SMEs in particular, ‘will have an easy-to-use portal that gives them access to a much greater number of open call for tenders with better data quality‘, and that ‘Citizens, civil society, taxpayers and other interested stakeholders will have access to much more public procurement data than before, thereby improving transparency and accountability of public spending‘ (at 2).

Of all the expected benefits or functionalities, the most important ones are those attributed to public buyers and, in particular, the possibility of developing ‘category management’ insights (eg potential savings or benchmarking), systems of red flags in relation to corruption and collusion risks, and the automation of some tasks. However, unlocking most of these functionalities is not dependent on the PPDS, but rather on the existence of procurement data at the ‘right’ level.

For example, category management or benchmarking may be more relevant or adequate (as well as more feasible) at national than at supra-national level, and the development of systems of red flags can also take place at below-EU level, as can automation. Importantly, the development of such functionalities using pan-EU data, or data concerning more than one Member State, could bias the tools in a way that makes them less suited, or unsuitable, for deployment at national level (eg if the AI is trained on data concerning solely jurisdictions other than the one where it would be deployed).

In that regard, the expected functionalities arising from PPDS require some further thought and it can well be that, depending on implementation (in particular in relation to multi-speed datafication, as below 5), Member States are better off solely using domestic data than that coming from the PPDS. This is to say that PPDS is not a solid reality and that its enabling character will fluctuate with its implementation.

4. Differential procurement data access through PPDS

As mentioned above, the PPDS Communication stresses that ‘Citizens, civil society, taxpayers and other interested stakeholders will have access to much more public procurement data than before, thereby improving transparency and accountability of public spending’ (at 2). However, this does not mean that the PPDS will be (entirely) open data.

The Communication itself makes clear that ‘Different user categories (e.g. Member States, public buyers, businesses, citizens, NGOs, journalists and researchers) will have different access rights, distinguishing between public and non-public data and between participating Member States that share their data with the PPDS (PPDS members, …) and those that need more time to prepare’ (at 8). Relatedly, ‘PPDS members will have access to data which is available within the PPDS. However, even those Member States that are not yet ready to participate in the PPDS stand to benefit from implementing the principles below, due to their value for operational efficiency and preparing for a more evidence-based policy’ (at 9). This raises two issues.

First, and rightly, the Communication makes clear that the PPDS moves away from a model of ‘fully open’ or ‘open by default’ procurement data, and that access to the PPDS will require differential permissioning. This is the correct approach. Regardless of the future procurement data governance framework, it is clear that the emerging thicket of EU data governance rules ‘requires the careful management of a system of multi-tiered access to different types of information at different times, by different stakeholders and under different conditions’ (see here). This will however raise significant issues for the implementation of the PPDS, as it will generate some constraints or disincentives for an ambitions implementation of eForms at national level (see below 6).

Second, and less clearly, the PPDS Communication evidences that not all Member States will automatically have equal access to PPDS data. The design seems to be such that Member States that do not feed data into PPDS will not have access to it. While this could be conceived as an incentive for all Member States to join PPDS, this outcome is by no means guaranteed. As above (3), it is not clear that Member States will be better off—in terms of their ability to extract data insights or to deploy digital technologies—by having access to pan-EU data. The main benefit resulting from pan-EU data only accrues collectively and, primarily, by means of facilitating oversight and enforcement by the European Commission. From that perspective, the incentives for PPDS participation for any given Member State may be quite warped or internally contradictory.

Moreover, given that plugging into PPDS is not cost-free, a Member State that developed a data architecture not immediately compatible with PPDS may well wonder whether it made sense to shoulder the additional costs and risks. From that perspective, it can only be hoped that the existence of EU funding and technical support will be maximised by the European Commission to offload that burden from the (reluctant) Member States. However, even then, full PPDS participation by all Member States will still not dispel the risk of multi-speed datafication.

5. No data, no fun — and multi-speed datafication

Related to the risk that some EU Member States will become PPDS members and others not, there is a risk (or rather, a reality) that not all PPDS members will equally contribute data—thus creating multi-speed datafication, even within the Member States that opt in to the PPDS.

First, the PPDS Communication makes it clear that ‘Member States will remain in control over which data they wish to share with the PPDS (beyond the data that must be published on TED under the Public Procurement Directives)‘ (at 7), It further specifies that ‘With the eForms, it will be possible for the first time to provide data in notices that should not be published, or not immediately. This is important to give assurance to public buyers that certain data is not made publicly available or not before a certain point in time (e.g. prices)’ (at 7, fn 17).

This means that each Member State will only have to plug whichever data it captures and decides to share into PPDS. It seems plain to see that this will result in different approaches to data capture, multiple levels of granularity, and varying approaches to restricting access to the date in the different Member States, especially bearing in mind that ‘eForms are not an “off the shelf” product that can be implemented only by IT developers. Instead, before developers start working, procurement policy decision-makers have to make a wide range of policy decisions on how eForms should be implemented’ in the different Member States (see eForms Implementation Handbook, at 9).

Second, the PPDS Communication is clear (in a footnote) that ‘One of the conditions for a successful establishment of the PPDS is that Member States put in place automatic data capture mechanisms, in a first step transmitting data from their national portals and contract registers’ (at 4, fn 10). This implies that Member States may need to move away from manually inputted information and that those seeking to create new mechanisms for automatic procurement data capture can take an incremental approach, which is very much baked into the PPDS design. This relates, for example, to the distinction between pre- and post-award procurement data, with pre-award data subjected to higher demands under EU law. It also relates to above and below threshold data, as only above threshold data is subjected to mandatory eForms compliance.

In the end, the extent to which a (willing) Member State will contribute data to the PPDS depends on its decisions on eForms implementation, which should be well underway given the October 2023 deadline for mandatory use (for above threshold contracts). Crucially, Member States contributing more data may feel let down when no comparable data is contributed to PPDS by other Member States, which can well operate as a disincentive to contribute any further data, rather than as an incentive for the others to match up that data.

6. Ambitious eForms implementation as the PPDS’ Achilles heel

As the analysis above has shown, the viability of the PPDS and its fitness for purpose (especially for EU-level oversight and enforcement purposes) crucially depends on the Member States deciding to take an ambitious approach to the implementation of eForms, not solely by maximising their flexibility for voluntary uses (as discussed here) but, crucially, by extending their mandatory use (under national law) to all below threshold procurement. It is now also clear that there is a need for as much homogeneity as possible in the implementation of eForms in order to guarantee that the information plugged into PPDS is comparable—which is an aspect of data quality that the PPDS Communication does not seem to have at all considered).

It seems that, due to competing timings, this poses a bit of a problem for the rollout of the PPDS. While eForms need to be fully implemented domestically by October 2023, the PPDS Communication suggests that the connection of national portals will be a matter for 2024, as the first part of the project will concern the top two layers and data connection will follow (or, at best, be developed in parallel). Somehow, it feels like the PPDS is being built without a strong enough foundation. It would be a shame (to put it mildly) if Member States having completed a transition to eForms by October 2023 were dissuaded from a second transition into a more ambitious eForms implementation in 2024 for the purposes of the PPDS.

Given that the most likely approach to eForms implementation is rather minimalistic, it can well be that the PPDS results in not much more than an empty shell with fancy digital analytics limited to very superficial uses. In that regard, the two-year delay in progressing the PPDS has created a very narrow (and quickly dwindling) window of opportunity for Member States to engage with an ambitions process of eForms implementation

7. Final thoughts

It seems to me that limited and slow progress will be attained under the PPDS in coming years. Given the undoubted value of harnessing procurement data, I sense that Member States will progress domestically, but primarily in specific settings such as that of their central purchasing bodies (see here). However, whether they will be onboarded into PPDS as enthusiastic members seems less likely.

The scenario seems to resemble limited voluntary cooperation in other areas (eg interoperability; for discussion see here). It may well be that the logic of EU competence allocation required this tentative step as a first move towards a more robust and proactive approach by the Commission in a few years, on grounds that the goal of creating the European data space could not be achieved through this less interventionist approach.

However, given the speed at which digital transformation could take place (and is taking place in some parts of the EU), and the rhetoric of transformation and revolution that keeps being used in this policy area, I can’t but feel let down by the approach in the PPDS Communication, which started with the decision to build the eForms on the existing regulatory framework, rather than more boldly seeking a reform of the EU procurement rules to facilitate their digital fitness.

New CJEU case law against excessive disclosure: quid de open data? (C‑54/21, and joined C‑37/20 and C‑601/20)

In the last few days, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has delivered two judgments imposing significant limitations on the systematic, unlimited disclosure of procurement information with commercial value, such as the identity of experts and subcontractors engaged by tenderers for public contracts; and beneficial ownership information. In imposing a nuanced approach to the disclosure of such information, the CJEU may have torpedoed ‘full transparency’ approaches to procurement and beneficial ownership open data.

Indeed, these are two classes of information at the core of current open data efforts, and they are relevant for (digital) procurement governance—in particular in relation to the prevention of corruption and collusion, which automated screening requires establishing relationships and assessing patterns of interaction reliant on such data [for discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Procurement Corruption and Artificial Intelligence: Between the Potential of Enabling Data Architectures and the Constraints of Due Process Requirements’ in S Williams & J Tillipman (eds), Routledge Handbook of Public Procurement Corruption (forthcoming)]. The judgments can thus have important implications.

In Antea Polska, the CJEU held that EU procurement rules prevent national legislation mandating all information sent by the tenderers to the contracting authorities to be published in its entirety or communicated to the other tenderers, with the sole exception of trade secrets. The CJEU reiterated that the scope of non-disclosable information is much broader and requires a case-by-case analysis by the contracting authority, in particular with a view to avoiding the release of information that could be used to distort competition. Disclosure of information needs to strike an adequate balance between meeting good administration duties to enable the right to the effective review of procurement decisions, on the one hand, and the protection of information with commercial value or with potential competition implications, on the other.

In a related fashion, in Luxembourg Business Registers, the CJEU declared invalid the provision of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive whereby Member States had to ensure that the information on the beneficial ownership of corporate and other legal entities incorporated within their territory was accessible in all cases to any member of the general public—without the need to demonstrate having a legitimate interest in accessing it. The CJEU considered that the disclosure of the information to undefined members of the public created an excessive interference with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data.

In this blog post, I analyse these two cases and reflect on their implications for the management of (big) open data for procurement governance purposes, in particular from an anti-corruption perspective and in relation to the EU law data governance obligations incumbent on public buyers.

There is more than trade secrets to procurement confidentiality

In Antea Polska and Others (C-54/21, EU:C:2022:888), among other questions, the CJEU was asked whether Directive 2014/24/EU precludes national legislation on public procurement which required that, with the sole exception of trade secrets, information sent by the tenderers to the contracting authorities be published in its entirety or communicated to the other tenderers, and a practice on the part of contracting authorities whereby requests for confidential treatment in respect of trade secrets were accepted as a matter of course.

I will concentrate on the first part of the question on full transparency solely constrained by trade secrets—and leave the ‘countervailing’ practice aside for now (though it deserves some comment because it creates a requirement for the contracting authority to assess the commercial value of procurement information in the wider context of the activities of the participating economic operators, at paras 69-85). I will also not deal with the discrepancy between the concept of ‘trade secret’ under the Trade Secrets Directive and the concept of ‘confidential information’ in Directive 2014/24 (which the CJEU clarifies, again, at paras 51-55).

The issue of full transparency of procurement information subject only to trade secret protection raises an interesting question because it concerns the compatibility with EU law of a maximalistic approach to procurement transparency that is not peculiar to Poland (where the case originated) but shared by other Member States with a permissive tradition of access to public documents [for in-depth country-specific analyses and comparative considerations, see the contributions to K-M Halonen, R Caranta & A Sanchez-Graells, Transparency in EU Procurements. Disclosure Within Public Procurement and During Contract Execution (Edward Elgar 2019)].

The question concerns the interpretation of multiple provisions of Directive 2014/24/EU and, in particular, Art 21(1) on confidentiality and Arts 50(4) and 55(3) on the withholding of information [see my comments to Art 21 and 55 in R Caranta & A Sanchez-Graells, European Public Procurement. Commentary on Directive 2014/24/EU (Edward Elgar 2021)]. All of them are of course to be interpreted in line with the general principle of competition in Art 18(1) [see A Sanchez-Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (2nd edn, hart 2015) 444-445].

In addressing the question, the CJEU built on its recent judgment in Klaipėdos regiono atliekų tvarkymo centras (C‑927/19, EU:C:2021:700), and reiterated its general approach to the protection of confidential information in procurement procedures:

‘… the principal objective of the EU rules on public procurement is to ensure undistorted competition … to achieve that objective, it is important that the contracting authorities do not release information relating to public procurement procedures which could be used to distort competition, whether in an ongoing procurement procedure or in subsequent procedures. Since public procurement procedures are founded on a relationship of trust between the contracting authorities and participating economic operators, those operators must be able to communicate any relevant information to the contracting authorities in such a procedure, without fear that the authorities will communicate to third parties items of information whose disclosure could be damaging to those operators’ (C-54/21, para 49, reference omitted, emphasis added).

The CJEU linked this interpretation to the prohibition for contracting authorities to disclose information forwarded to it by economic operators which they have designated as confidential [Art 21(1) Dir 2014/24] and stressed that this had to be reconciled with the requirements of effective judicial protection and, in particular, the general principle of good administration, from which the obligation to state reasons stems because ‘in the absence of sufficient information enabling it to ascertain whether the decision of the contracting authority to award the contract is vitiated by errors or unlawfulness, an unsuccessful tenderer will not, in practice, be able to rely on its right .. to an effective review’ (C-54/21, para 50).

The Court also stressed that the Directive allows Member States to modulate the scope of the protection of confidential information in accordance with their national legislation, in particular legislation concerning access to information [Art 21(1) Dir 2014/24, C-54/21, para 56]. In that regard, however, the CJEU went on to stress that

‘… if the effectiveness of EU law is not to be undermined, the Member States, when exercising the discretion conferred on them by Article 21(1) of that directive, must refrain from introducing regimes … which undermine the balancing exercise [with the right to an effective review] or which alter the regime relating to the publicising of awarded contracts and the rules relating to information to candidates and tenderers set out in Article 50 and 55 of that directive … any regime relating to confidentiality must, as Article 21(1) of Directive 2014/24 expressly states, be without prejudice to the abovementioned regime and to those rules laid down in Articles 50 and 55 of that directive’ (C-54/21, para 58-59).

Focusing on Art 50(4) and Art 55(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU, the CJEU stressed that these provisions empower contracting authorities to withhold from general publication and from disclosure to other candidates and tenderers ‘certain information, where its release would impede law enforcement, would otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of an economic operator or might prejudice fair competition’ (para 61 and, almost identically, para 60). This led the Court to the conclusion that

‘National legislation which requires publicising of any information which has been communicated to the contracting authority by all tenderers, including the successful tenderer, with the sole exception of information covered by the concept of trade secrets, is liable to prevent the contracting authority, contrary to what Articles 50(4) and 55(3) of Directive 2014/24 permit, from deciding not to disclose certain information pursuant to interests or objectives mentioned in those provisions, where that information does not fall within that concept of a trade secret.

Consequently, Article 21(1) of Directive 2014/24, read in conjunction with Articles 50 and 55 of that directive … precludes such a regime where it does not contain an adequate set of rules allowing contracting authorities, in circumstances where Articles 50 and 55 apply, exceptionally to refuse to disclose information which, while not covered by the concept of trade secrets, must remain inaccessible pursuant to an interest or objective referred to in Articles 50 and 55’ (paras 62-63).

In my view, this is the correct interpretation and an important application of the rules seeking to minimise the risk of distortions of competition due to excessive procurement transparency, on which I have been writing for a long time [see also K-M Halonen, ‘Disclosure rules in EU public procurement: balancing between competition and transparency’ (2016) 16(4) Journal of Public Procurement 528].

The Antea Polska judgment stresses the importance of developing a nuanced approach to the management, restricted disclosure and broader publication of information submitted to the contracting authority in a procurement procedure. Notably, this will create particular complications in the context of the design and rollout of procurement open data, especially in the context of the new eForms (see here, and below).

Transparency for what? Who really cares about beneficial ownership?

In Luxembourg Business Registers (joined cases C‑37/20 and C‑601/20, EU:C:2022:912, FR only—see EN press release on which I rely to avoid extensive own translations from French) the CJEU was asked to rule on the compatibility with the Charter of Fundamental Rights—and in particular Articles 7 (respect for private and family life) and 8 (protection of personal data)—of Article 30(5)(c) of the consolidated version of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AML Directive), which required Member States to ensure that information on the beneficial ownership of corporate and other legal entities incorporated within their territory is accessible in all cases to any member of the general public. In particular, members of the general public had to ‘be permitted to access at least the name, the month and year of birth and the country of residence and nationality of the beneficial owner as well as the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held.’

The CJEU has found that the general public’s access to information on beneficial ownership constitutes a serious interference with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data, which is exacerbated by the fact that, once those data have been made available to the general public, they can not only be freely consulted, but also retained and disseminated.

While the CJEU recognised that the AML Directive pursues an objective of general interest and that the general public’s access to information on beneficial ownership is appropriate for contributing to the attainment of that objective, the interference with individual fundamental rights is neither limited to what is strictly necessary nor proportionate to the objective pursued.

The Court paid special attention to the fact that the rules requiring unrestricted public access to the information result from a modification of the previous regime in the original AML Directive, which required, in addition to access by the competent authorities and certain entities, for access by any person or organisation capable of demonstrating a legitimate interest. The Court considered that the suppression of the requirement to demonstrate a legitimate interest in accessing the information did not generate sufficient benefits from the perspective of combating money laundering and terrorist financing to offset the significantly more serious interference with fundamental rights that open publication of the beneficial ownership data entails.

Here, the Court referred to its judgment in Vyriausioji tarnybinės etikos komisija (C‑184/20, EU:C:2022:601), where it carried out a functional comparison of the anti-corruption effects of a permissioned system of institutional access and control of relevant disclosures, versus public access to that information. The Court was clear that

‘… the publication online of the majority of the personal data contained in the declaration of private interests of any head of an establishment receiving public funds … does not meet the requirements of a proper balance. In comparison with an obligation to declare coupled with a check of the declaration’s content by the Chief Ethics Commission … such publication amounts to a considerably more serious interference with the fundamental rights guaranteed in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, without that increased interference being capable of being offset by any benefits which might result from publication of all those data for the purpose of preventing conflicts of interest and combating corruption’ (C-184/20, para 112).

In Luxembourg Business Registers, the CJEU also held that the optional provisions in Art 30 AML Directive that allowed Member States to make information on beneficial ownership available on condition of online registration and to provide, in exceptional circumstances, for an exemption from access to that information by the general public, were not, in themselves, capable of demonstrating either a proper balance between competing interests, or the existence of sufficient safeguards.

The implication of the Luxembourg Business Registers is that a different approach to facilitating access to beneficial ownership data is required, and that an element of case-by-case assessment (or at least of an assessment based on categories of organisations and individuals seeking access) will need to be brought back into the system. In other words, permissioned access to beneficial ownership data seems unavoidable.

Implications for open data and data governance

These recent CJEU judgments seem to me to clearly establish the general principle that unlimited transparency does not equate public interest, as there is also an interest in preserving the (relative) confidentiality of some information and data and an adequate, difficult balance needs to be struck. The interests in competition with transparency can be either individual (fundamental rights, or commercial value) or collective (avoidance of distortions of competition). Detailed and comprehensive assessment on a case-by-case basis is required.

As I advocated long ago, and recently reiterated in relation to the growing set of data governance obligations incumbent on public buyers, under EU law,

‘It is thus simply not possible to create a system that makes all procurement data open. Data governance requires the careful management of a system of multi-tiered access to different types of information at different times, by different stakeholders and under different conditions. While the need to balance procurement transparency and the protection of data subject to the rights of others and competition-sensitive data is not a new governance challenge, the digital management of this information creates heightened risks to the extent that the implementation of data management solutions is tendentially ‘open access’ (and could eg reverse presumptions of confidentiality), as well as in relation to system integrity risks (ie cybersecurity)’ (at 10, references omitted).

The CJEU judgments have (re)confirmed that unlimited ‘open access’ is not a viable strategy under EU law. It is perhaps clearer than ever that the capture, structuring, retention, and disclosure of governance-relevant procurement and related data (eg beneficial ownership) needs to be decoupled from its proactive publication. This requires a reconsideration of the open data model and, in particular, a careful assessment of the implementation of the new eForms that only just entered into force.

Interesting paper on effects of open procurement data on outcomes: Duguay, Rauter & Samuels (2019)

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A recently published working paper has assessed the impact of increased availability of procurement data on competition for public contracts and on procurement outcomes in the EU context: R Duguay, T Rauter & D Samuels, ‘The Impact of Open Data on Public Procurement’ (November 22, 2019).

Duguay, Rauter & Samuels concentrate on the increased availability of TED data in a (more) user-friendly format in July 2015 (when the data started being available for a bulk download on CSV format) to assess the effects that easier access to procurement data has on the functioning of procurement markets and on procurement outcomes. The paper is very interesting and their results are quite striking.

However, it is important to stress the important caveat that their analysis is still based on TED data and, thus, potentially affected by the quality shortcomings of that data. As mentioned in other occasions, the TED database has problems because it is constructed as a result of the self-declaration of data by the contracting authorities of the Member States, which makes its content very inhomogeneous and difficult to analyse, including significant problems of under-inclusiveness, definitional fuzziness and the lack of filtering of errors—as recognised, repeatedly, in the methodology underpinning the SMSPP itself (see here and here).

With that in mind, however, it is interesting to look closely at their findings.

A seemingly striking insight derived from the paper is that ‘the new European government contracting provisions have anti-competitive effects‘ (at 17). This is in the context of an analysis of the ‘likelihood that government agencies allocate public contracts through an open procedure‘ and should thus not be surprising, given the flexibilisation in the use of procedures involving negotiations. However, even with this regulatory effect, the authors find that more open data triggers more use of open procedures, in particular in EU countries with weaker institutional frameworks (at 18-19, and see below). This could be symptomatic of the fact that more complexity in procurement subjected to higher levels of transparency pushes for a risk-averse approach to procurement compliance. The same would be supported by their finding of higher levels of award of contracts on the basis of price-only award criteria (at 25, and see below).

This tension between procurement complexity and transparency is generally strongly evidenced in the paper.

On the one hand, and in line with claims of the pro-competitive nature of more openness in procurement data (note, not of more openness or transparency of contract opportunities), the authors find that

  • the likelihood of competitive bidding increases sharply for TED contracts around July 2015 and that this increase persists through the end of our sample period [ie to the end of 2018] (at 18);

  • open procurement data leads government officials to implement more competitive bidding processes [ie open procedures], and that this increase in competitive bidding is driven by countries that do not have the institutions to effectively monitor public officials (at 19);

  • the number of bids increases sharply for TED contracts soon after the open data initiative, and this increase persists throughout our sample period (at 20);

  • public officials are 8.7 percentage points more likely to award government contracts to new vendors after the open data initiative (at 21);

  • contract values fall by approximately 8% ... after the open data initiative (at 23).

On the other hand, and also in line with theoretical expectations of a degradation of procurement decisions subjected to higher levels of transparency (and the fact that this transparency does not concern contract opportunities, but more general open procurement data), the authors also find that

  • [the results] are inconsistent with the idea that easier access to procurement data fosters cross-border competition throughout the European Union … open procurement data fosters local competition among vendors by reducing barriers to entry but does not promote cross-border competition across the European single market (at 22);

  • after the open data initiative, the likelihood of a contract modification increases by 2.9 percentage points for contracts above TED publication thresholds (at 24);

  • after the open data initiative, public officials are 38% ... more likely to award contracts above TED publication thresholds exclusively based on price (at 25);

  • the performance ... is significantly worse if price was the only award criterion in the allocation decision (at 26);

  • the increase in modifications is driven by contracts awarded to new government suppliers, consistent with information asymmetries contributing to the observed deterioration in contract performance. Moreover, this evidence suggests that procurement relationships before the open data initiative were not necessarily corrupt or otherwise inefficient (at 26);

  • the decline in contract performance is stronger for complex procurements, consistent with project complexity exacerbating the potential allocative distortions of open procurement data (at 27).

Their overall conclusion is that

Comparing government contracts above and below EU publication thresholds, we find that increasing the public accessibility of procurement data raises the likelihood of having competitive bidding processes, increases the number of bids per contract, and facilitates market entry by new vendors. After the open data initiative, procurement prices decrease and EU government agencies are more likely to award contracts to the lowest bidder. However, the increased competition comes at the expense of lower contract performance, particularly if suppliers are new, procurement projects are complex, and contracts are awarded solely based on price.

Overall, our results suggest that open data on procurement awards facilitates competition and lowers ex-ante procurement prices, but does not necessarily increase allocative efficiency in government contracting (at 27-28, emphases added).

I find these results striking and difficult to assess from the perspective of evidence-based policy-making. There are two issues of particular concern/interest to me.

One, the finding that more availability of data does not generate more cross-border procurement, and that the push for more competitive (ie open) procedures is mostly appreciable in countries with weaker institutional frameworks. This could support the position that institutional robustness is an alternative to data transparency, which would significantly alter the prioritisation of systemic procurement reforms and take the sides of systems that favour strong institutional oversight in a context of relative opacity.

Second, that transparency exacerbates problems at execution phase, in particular in complex projects and/or projects with new suppliers. This would take the wind out of the sails of reform and policy-making approaches concentrating on perceived or apparent competition for the contract at award stage, and rather force a refocus on an analysis of procurement outcomes at the end of the relevant project. This would also side with approaches that would advocate for more robust institutional approaches to contract design and performance management, rather than relying on transparency to correct contract execution problems.

The mixed results of the paper are also interesting in the context of the long-term effect of more open procurement data on competition, as well as on cartelisation and bid rigging risks, which are not assessed in the paper.

On the round, I think that the paper offers some interesting evidence to back up that there is a need to reconsider the level of transparency given to procurement data. I do not think this should stop the development of an improved procurement data architecture in the EU. To the contrary. I think this should reignite and prioritise discussions concerning the level of disclosure or public access to that information (ie its openness), which cannot be simply assumed to be positive in what, in my view, is currently an excessively simplistic approach in leading policy-making and think tank proposals. For more (but not new) discussion, see here and here.