Do public procurement rules apply to "concessions" (rectius, licences or authorisations) for betting and gambling services? (C-225/15)

In his Opinion of 16 June 2016 in case Politano’, C-225/15, EU:C:2016:456 (not available in English), Advocate General Wahl had to assess the applicability of Directive 2004/18 on public procurement, and in particular its Art 47 on economic and financial standing requirements, to a public contest for the award of concessions (ie licences or authorisations) for the provision of betting and gambling services.

In his Opinion, and in very streamlined terms, AG Wahl considered that Art 47 Dir 2004/18 was not applicable to the tendering of such 'concessions' for the provision of betting and gambling services for the following reasons:

a concession for the provision of betting services, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, is not a public service contract within the meaning of Article 1, paragraph 2, point d) of Directive 2004/18. Not only is the "service" under analysis not provided on behalf of the contracting authority but, additionally, the economic operators that tender for such concessions are not remunerated by public funds. Also, the concessionaire bears the entire risk associated with the exercise of the activity of collecting and transmitting bets (para 51, own translation from Spanish).

This analysis is correct. However, it is then surprising that AG Wahl embarks on some considerations about the possible applicability of Art 38(1) of Directive 2014/23 on concession contracts to the award of such concessions (rectius, licences or authorisations) for the provision of betting and gambling services (para 52). It seems clear to me that, exactly for the same reasons established in para 51, Dir 2014/23 would not be applicable. Not least because its Art 5(1)(b) defines a services concession in the following terms:

a contract for pecuniary interest concluded in writing by means of which one or more contracting authorities or contracting entities entrust the provision and the management of services other than the execution of works ... to one or more economic operators, the consideration of which consists either solely in the right to exploit the services that are the subject of the contract or in that right together with payment.

Put simply, the fact that 'the "service" under analysis [is] not provided on behalf of the contracting authority' excludes this type of concession (rectius, authorisation or licence) from the scope of application of Dir 2014/23. Consequently, it may have been better for AG Wahl to completely avoid the consideration of Dir 2014/23 (it was clearly not applicable to the facts of the case anyway) and not provide such obiter comments, which can create confusion.

Indeed, this is an area where there is a floating lack of clarity [for general discussion and analysis, see GS Ølykke, 'Is the granting of special and exclusive rights subject to the principles applicable to the award of concessions? Recent developments in case law and their implications for one of the last sanctuaries of protectionism' (2014) 23(1) Public Procurement Law Review 1-20; CJ Wolswinkel, 'From public contracts to limited authorisations and vice versa: Exploring the EU Court’s corollary approach on award procedures' (2015) 24(5) Public Procurement Law Review 137-163; and I Herrera Anchustegui, 'EFTA Court case E-24/13 Casino Admiral AG v Wolfgang Egger: the obligation of transparency and consequences of its breach when awarding service concessions' (2015) 24(1) Public Procurement Law Review NA1-NA9].

It is relevant to note that Art 10(9) Dir 2014/23 explicitly excludes lottery concessions from the coverage of the Directive, but it does not go as far as preempting the coverage of any betting or gambling services in case they are actually structured in the form of a concession [as defined in Art 5(1)(b)]. The creation of this exclusion was controversial because the European Commission had not included it in its original proposal back in 2011.

The following are my comments to the creation of this exclusion in the forthcoming Brussels Commentary on EU Public Procurement Law, M Steinicke & PL Vesterdorf (eds) (Beck, 2016).

01. This exclusion was lacking in the 2011 proposal and was introduced as a result of the Amendments proposed by the European Parliament (see Amendments 19 and 110). The justification provided for this exclusion was as follows: “Gaming has, in addition, been excluded on account of the highly specific nature of the activities concerned and the need to ensure that Member States can continue to exercise oversight in order to pursue aims in the general interest (combating illegal gambling, fraud, and money laundering; preventing addiction). If gaming were subject to the rules of the directive, Member States would be deprived of flexibility and consequently impeded in their ability to act. National lotteries and similar games will therefore be excluded.” The text of the proposed new recital [proposed as (13a) and now numbered as (35)] and article [proposed as Article 8(5a) and now in Article 10(9)] are different than the ones finally adopted. In the final version, it is clear(er) that the exclusive right on the basis of which the concession is granted must comply with EU law and meet certain minimum requirements. Indeed, the proposed Amendment by the European Parliament would have excluded “service concessions for gambling activities involving a financial risk through investing a sum of money in games of chance (that is to say lotteries or betting), awarded to one or more bodies by one or more Member States on the basis of exclusive rights granted pursuant to applicable national laws, regulations or administrative provisions in accordance with the Treaties”. By contrast, Article 10(9) of the Concessions Directive excludes “service concessions for lottery services, which are covered by CPV code 92351100-7, awarded by a Member State to an economic operator on the basis of an exclusive right. For the purpose of this paragraph, the notion of exclusive right does not cover exclusive rights as referred to in Article 7(2). The grant of such an exclusive right shall be subject to publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.” The main differences seem to be the more clearly limited scope of the exemption by reference to the CPV code and the requirement of EU-wide publication of the exclusive right [which is an improper exclusive right as it must not meet the requirements of the definition in Article 5(10)].
02. As briefly indicated by the European Commission in its factsheet “Concessions: Excluded concessions”, the purpose of this exclusion is to cover lottery services and, more precisely
“Concessions for lottery operating services awarded on the basis of a prior exclusive right which has been granted pursuant to applicable national laws, regulations or administrative provisions in accordance with the Treaties are not covered.
However, in other cases, gambling activities are covered by the Directive when they assume the form of concession contracts (e.g. casino concessions). Gambling activities pursued on the basis of authorisations/licences are not covered.”
Under this interpretation, this specific exclusion is also redundant, as it could have been comprised under the more general exclusion of Article 10(1)—except for the cases where the special or exclusive rights are not awarded following transparent procedures based on objective, proportionate and non-discriminatory criteria, which seems to be the area of regulatory competence that Member States want to protect. Indeed, it should be acknowledged that Member States retain almost unlimited discretion to maintain gambling monopolies in their jurisdictions and that, consequently, the ECJ is likely to interpret this exclusion generously [see Case C-203/08 Sporting Exchange (Betfair) [2010] ECR I-04695]. In that regard, it could well be that the European Commission is interpreting the exclusion in an exceedingly restrictive manner because, in fact, EU law imposes very limited constraints on Member States regulation of gambling (on the basis of directly awarded exclusive rights). Hence, the exclusion of lottery services concessions should come as no surprise and the general situation seems to clearly be that, unless Member States reach a common understanding on the way gambling and lotteries should be regulated, this is an area of the internal market where cross-border competition and regulatory harmonisation cannot be realistically expected any time soon.

In view of AG Wahl's Opinion in Politano’, it may be worth stressing that, in my view, public procurement rules (and Dir 2014/23 in particular) will not be relevant for cases involving authorisations/licences for the provision of betting and gambling services (other than if applied by analogy or used as a benchmark to assess the openness, transparency and soundness of the procedure for their allocation under the general rules on freedom of provision of services and freedom of establishment). Mostly, because the provision of those services will not be 'on behalf of the contracting authority'. The only situation where this seems likely to happen involves lottery monopolies, but these benefit from the explicit exclusion in Art 10(9) Dir 2014/23.

Ultimately, and this seems to be a running topic in recent decisions, the irrelevance of Dir 2014/23 is justified because where the State is authorising the provision of specific services and thus regulating that market by means of a specific system of authorisations or licences (which should stop being called concessions for clarity), there is no procurement.

A conversation with the EFTA surveillance authority on competition, State aid, public procurement and their enforcement

I have the honour and pleasure of having been invited by the EFTA Surveillance Authority to speak at their lunchtime seminar series today. My remarks will be on the interaction between competition, State aid and public procurement rules, and the challenges this creates for the design of an effective enforcement strategy that ensures coordinated substantive assessments across these important rules of EU/EEA internal market law. My slides are available here.

Some (anecdotal) updates on the transposition of the 2014 Public Procurement Package

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At Procurement Week 2016, we had an interesting session on the transposition of the 2014 public procurement package in some of the Member States. So, beyond the official information publicly available through Eur-lex, and for those of you anxiously following the transposition process (or its absence), I thought that it could be interesting to share some additional (anecdotal) updates on the process in the Member States represented in the panel.

Each panelist was asked to report on whether there had been transposition or what are the plans for it, as well as to choose three issues that can be considered controversial in the transposition. My notes of the discussion (responsibility for errors is solely mine) are as follows:

Czech Republic foresees to transpose by 01/10/2016. Their main three worries seem to be around the use of life cycle costing, the use of quality-only tenders in healthcare and the increasing discretion contracting authorities hold in terms of exclusion.

Denmark transposed and this transposition deviated from the previous copy-out approach, which has significantly changed the nature of procurement regulation in Denmark. It was suggested that a number of rules included in the procurement act are unnecessary and the result of specific lobby demands. Main issues pointed out as problematic included: obligation to disclose evaluation method, explicit obligation to terminate when the award decision is annulled, changes in the identity of participants as well as the possibility of the contracting authority to be obliged to accept certain types of changes, and issues concerning criminal records for the purposes of the ESPD.

Estonia has not yet transposed. The bill is in Parliament and there is hope that the transposition will take force by 1 January 2017. Meanwhile, however, the Estonian Ministry of Finance has issued guidelines with regard to parts of the new directives having a direct effect.*

Finland has not transposed and there is no clear time frame. A draft legislative act was promised by government by the end of June, with a view to have transposition in place by the end of 2016, but this does not seem too realistic.** The delay is remarkable because transposition was on track and a project was submitted to public consultation in good time. However, the process was subsequently derailed due to a change in government.*** [I wonder whether this comes to show the political relevance of procurement in Finland (and in Scandinavian countries more generally)]. Secrecy was mandated on civil servants involved in the transposition, which makes this particularly opaque. Some of the issues that are discussed, though, include the need to create an oversight body (probably to be assigned to the competition authority), issues around the non-public turnover limit for in-house and public-public collaboration and its interaction with domestic competition neutrality rules (which lead to the suggestion that the limit could be set anywhere short of 20%, and possibly in the 0-10% range), the need to review remedies despite lack of action at EU level, and possible gold-plating of SME-friendly measures.

Greece has not transposed. There was a series of public consultations in March for a law that would consist of 5 books and would be implementing the new directive. This law would also reform the public contracts regulations in general and this is where things got complicated and started to go wrong: when reforming the way remedies were sought, the legislator tried to create a special entity that would examine bidders' claims in the second instance (first instance is with the CA; second instance is now with a court). However the Greek Council of State found the creation of this new entity to be against the constitution and made requests for this and other provisions to be amended. This is causing further delay.^^^

Ireland transposed on 5 May 2016, except concessions.Their main issues relate to the light-touch regime, retrospective effect of new rules to contracts tendered after 18 April but before 5 May, and many difficulties concerning the implementation of the ESPD, particularly due to their issues with leaving 'suitability' assessments to the end and how this provides wrong incentives to contracting authorities to be 'lax' about selection and exclusion.

Italy transposed 1 day late, but it is not a full transposition and the implementing regulations are not ready yet. There are significant gold-plating issues, such as the prohibition to tender design and construction together (as per Mario's emails), or the limitation of the authorisation to carry out procurement to only 35 CPBs in the whole of Italy, thus banning the activities of individual contracting authorities except for minor contracts.

In the Netherlands, the transposition act was discussed in the Dutch Senate on 14 June and the subsequent vote will take place on 21 June. This would be the last hurdle for implementation, after which publication in the Staatsblad can follow. Therefore, it seems like the planning of the Ministry of Economic Affairs will be met (1 July). Predominant discussions in the Netherlands have related to: (i) In-house procurement and the question whether additional regulation of the make-or-buy decision is necessary. A proposal (motie) has been floored in the Senate on this subject. This relates to a recent trend of the central government to in-source scanning and cleaning activities; (ii) The question whether Dutch ministries and other organisational parts of the Dutch State are separate contracting authorities for the purpose of the in-house doctrine. This was discussed in parliament and at multiple legal conferences; (iii) In light of the recent decentralisation of many social acts (Jeugdwet, Participatiewet and Wmo) to the municipalities, it has been questioned if the introduced procedure for purchasing social services in relation to article 76(1) Directive 2014/24/EU is an adequate implementation of the Directive.****

Norway has not transposed either, but being an EEA State, it has more time. There has been a project since late 2015 and it is expected to come into force relatively shortly (pending the approval by the Parliament). ***** It interesting to note that all EEA Members had initially indicated 'constitutional requirements' for the transposition of the 2014 public procurement package. In particular, despite the fact that the Joint Committee Decision (JCD) no. 97/2016 was adopted on 29. April 2016 to incorporate Directive 2014/23/EC, Directive 2014/24/EC, and Directive 2014/25/EC into Annex XVI of the EEA Agreement, at the point of adoption all the EEA EFTA States indicated constitutional requirements. The JCD can consequently not enter into force until these requirements have been lifted and all the notifications under Article 103 (1) of the EEA Agreement have been made. The Norwegian parliament has now (16.6.16) approved the incorporation and Norway can therefore lift its constitutional requirements. It is now necessary for Iceland and Liectenstein to follow suit.^^

Poland has not transposed. A legislative proposal was published on 13 May with the intention of transposing in June, and this seems to be likely. Indeed, it seems that the classic and utilities directives could be transposed in July and the concessions directive in September.****** Polish procurement law has been reformed 50 times over 10 years, so there is experience (and complaints) about such continuous process of reform. Their main difficulties are in the transposition of rules in-house provision (particularly due to effects on waste management sector), the application of rules to below thresholds contracts related to investment in revitalization zones, the use of the ESPD, as well as rules on labour law requirements.

Portugal has not transposed either, although the Azores (being a devolved administration with competence for the transposition of procurement rules), have. The only rule that Portugal transposed in its entirety in August 2015 was art 22 dir 2014/24, which required an act with over 90 provisions. *******

Romania has completed the transposition.********

Spain has not transposed and transposition any time soon is highly unlikely due to the coming general elections on 26 June, which are not likely to result in the quick formation of a new government. Some regions have started to produce reports on direct effect of some provisions of Dir 2014/24 and, controversially, the region of Catalonia adopted a full transposition act on 31 May despite lacking the powers to do so. This raises complex internal constitutional issues and legal certainty is not necessarily fostered by the adoption of unconstitutional rules. This may have to do with the prospect of future liability for fines imposed by the CJEU for late transposition.

Sweden postponed transposition to 1 January 2017 but even that is unlikely. There is significant discussion on direct effect in the meantime, including for contracts below thresholds and reservable contracts for social and special services. The general discussion surrounding transposition is focusing on issues such as the possibility to use procurement to impose labour standards set in collective agreements, as well as innovation related topics.

UK (Eng & Wales) transposed in 2015 and amended rules in 2016. There is discussion in whether any benefits have been obtained from such early transposition. There is indication of increased use of competitive procedures with negotiations and dynamic purchasing systems. There is also an ongoing discussion concerning conflicts between the text of the regulations and guidance published by the Crown Commercial Services, which creates uncertainty at practical level.

I hope this is interesting/helpful/thought-provoking. Please feel free to use the comments function to provide additional updates on other Member States, or to expand the qualitative discussion on any of those mentioned above.

* Added thanks to Dr Mari Ann Simovart.

^^^ I am grateful to Panos Somalis for this update on Greece.

** Thanks to Dr Kirsi-Maria Halonen for the precision that draft legislation can still be expected this June.

*** Thanks also to Timo Rantanen for his additional insights.

**** Thanks to W. A. (Willem) Janssen for information on the Netherlands.

***** Thanks to Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui for information on Norway and some comments on Portugal.

^^ Thanks to Werner Miguel Kuhn for this detailed update on the EEA process.

****** Thanks to Dr Paweł Nowicki for further details on Poland.

******* Thanks to Dr Pedro Telles for information on Portugal.

******** Thanks to Ioan Baciu for the update on the Romanian transposition.

No special rules for calculation of value thresholds for the tendering of 'light-touch' public contracts

A Swedish colleague recently got in touch and told me that there is an on-going debate on how to deal with contracts for social services and other services below the €750,000 (£ 589,148) value threshold of Art 4(d) of  Dir 2014/24. In particular, there seems to be a discussion on whether the general rules for the calculation of value thresholds [Art 5 Dir 2014/24]--and, in particular, the anti-circumvention prohibition of splitting contracts to avoid their subjection to the EU public procurement rules [Art 5(3) Dir 2014/24]--apply to the new light regime for social services and other services.

My colleague gave me a specific example to illustrate the point:

Lets imagine that there is no regulation for contracts for social services and other services below the threshold of €750,000 in national law.
Contracting authority A decided to sign an agreement with non-profit organization X for the delivery of social services (let’s say for a cultural service) with a value of €500,000 (direct award). The contract is signed for 2 years starting 1 July 2017. Three months later, contracting authority A decides to sign an agreement for the delivery of the same service with another non-profit organization Y for 2 years and with a value of €500,000. Would this mean that contracting authority A has exceeded the threshold stipulated in Art 4(d) of Dir 2014/24? Must the contracting authority add the value of the above mentioned service contracts together? Or should the contracts be seen as separate contracts in the sense that both contracts are below the threshold of €750,000?
Ultimately, how should the value of several contracts, with different service providers, for the same type of social service (each of them below the threshold of €750,000) be considered? This question is quite crucial for the practical implications and scope of the new provisions on social services, and we would appreciate very much if you could share any of your ideas on this issue.

In my view, the answer is very simple. There is nothing in the light-touch regime of Arts 74-77 of Dir 2014/24 that indicates that the rules in Art 5 Dir 2014/24 do not apply to these contracts. On the contrary, it is a logical requirement for the application of the light-touch regime that the contracts need to have a value above the threshold of €750,000 established in Art 4(d) Dir 2014/24. A basic systematic interpretation of the Directive clearly determines that such value needs to be established in accordance with the rules of Art 5 thereof, which sets out explicit rules for that purpose.

Then, it is also clear to me that the anti-splitting prohibition of Art 5(3) Dir 2014/24 applies to the award of these contracts. In that regard, it is important to refresh our knowledge of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in that respect. There are two important aspects to consider: first, the objective requirement to aggregate the value of contracts that are economically, technically or temporarily connected; and, second, the strict rules applicable to the assessment of de facto splits of contracts.

General requirement to aggregate contract value for the purpose of compliance with EU public procurement rules

As I discuss in A Sanchez-Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 262-264, 

Specific rules have been developed to deter such strategic use of public procurement thresholds, or the unjustified resort to ‘unregulated’ public procurement activities. As regards the strategic conduct of public procurement below the thresholds set by the EU directives on public procurement, article 5(3) of Directive 2014/24 expressly states that the object of public contracts may not be subdivided to prevent its coming within the scope of the directive. More specifically, it establishes that the choice of the method used to calculate the estimated value of a procurement shall not be made with the intention of excluding it from the scope of this Directive,[1] and that a procurement shall not be subdivided with the effect of preventing it from falling within the scope of this Directive, unless justified by objective reasons.
The latter caveat allowing for the objective justification of a subdivision of a contract that makes it fall below the relevant thresholds was not present in the equivalent rule of art 9(3) dir 2004/18 (‘No works project or proposed purchase of a certain quantity of supplies and/or services may be subdivided to prevent its coming within the scope of this Directive’). It is submitted that this new caveat is prone to create significant litigation, particularly if the European Commission identifies numerous instances of recourse to ‘objective reasons’ on the part of the Member States and the latter argue for a broad interpretation of the exception—which should be rejected.[2] However, given the additional explanation provided in recital (20) of Directive 2014/24, it is submitted that the addition of the caveat is largely irrelevant and only aimed at a further prevention of the artificial split of contracts in the framework of centralised procurement. In that regard, it is important to take into account that, according to the recital, the rationale for the ‘objectiev reasons’ caveat is that
For the purposes of estimating the value of a given procurement, it should be clarified that it should be allowed to base the estimation of the value on a subdivision of the procurement only where justified by objective reasons. For instance, it could be justified to estimate contract values at the level of a separate operational unit of the contracting authority, such as for instance schools or kindergartens, provided that the unit in question is independently responsible for its procurement. This can be assumed where the separate operational unit independently runs the procurement procedures and makes the buying decisions, has a separate budget line at its disposal for the procurements concerned, concludes the contract independently and finances it from a budget which it has at its disposal. A subdivision is not justified where the contracting authority merely organises a procurement in a decentralised way (emphasis added).
In my view, then, the caveat should be interpreted as creating a strengthened requirement for a justification that intends to escape the rule on prohibited division of contracts on the basis of (allegedly) objective reasons and, particularly, aims to anticipate and prevent potential infringements of the EU rules by contracting authorities that manage (de)centralised procurement systems. Generally speaking, however, the discussion seems to need being re-oriented towards the definition of contracting authority and the recourse to collaborative procurement ...
Generally, though, the anti-split or anti-circumvention rule is clear and establishes a prohibition of strategic use of public procurement thresholds. To be sure, these rules do not prevent contracting authorities from splitting or dividing the contracts into as many lots as they deem fit or objectively justified ..., but rather focus on their obligation to take the aggregate value of those lots into consideration when determining whether the relevant thresholds are met—and, hence, whether their award should be conducted pursuant to the rules of the EU directives on public procurement (see art 5(8) and 5(9) dir 2014/24).[3] Consequently, the prohibition on circumventing the application of the directives is not violated per se by dividing the contracts in lots, but only by failing to treat those lots as a single economic and technical unit and, consequently, by failing to award them in compliance with public procurement rules.[4]
This prohibition has also been clearly interpreted by the EU judicature, which has provided guidance as to what constitutes an ‘artificial’ division of the object of a contract to circumvent public procurement rules—by putting emphasis on the criterion of the economic and technical unity of the object of the various contracts whose award should have been conducted jointly.[5] Therefore, a public buyer that artificially divided into separate contracts or purchases certain of its requirements that should objectively be considered to constitute a single economic and technical unit would be found in breach of the EU directives on public procurement. A different dimension is that of the temporal compatibility between the spread of the needs and the periodicity of the contracts or purchases conducted by the public buyer.[6] Where a significant mismatch can be identified—ie, when purchases below the thresholds occur too often—the public buyer should equally be found in breach of the EU public procurement rules, since the conduct of an excessive number of purchases or the conclusion of an excessive number of contracts should equally be considered an artificial split of the object of the contract in circumvention of the EU rules.
[1] For a discussion on the very problematic use of intentional elements in the 2014 Directives and, in particular, in the context of the principle of competition embedded in art 18 dir 2014/24, see above ch 5, §III.
[2] Case C-394/02 Commission v Greece [2005] ECR I-4713 33; Case C-337/05 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I-2173 57; C-250/07 Commission v Greece [2009] ECR I-4369 17.
[3] It is important to stress that the system allows for certain flexibility and that, despite the rules preventing the artificial split into lots in art 5(8) and 5(9) dir 2014/24, contracting authorities may award contracts for individual lots without applying the procedures provided for under the Directive, provided that the estimated value net of VAT of the lot concerned is less than EUR 80 000 for supplies or services or EUR 1 million for works. However, the aggregate value of the lots thus awarded without applying the Directive shall not exceed 20 % of the aggregate value of all the lots into which the proposed work, the proposed acquisition of similar supplies or the proposed provision of services has been divided (art 5(10) dir 2014/24).
[4] Along the same lines, although with reference to the equivalent provisions in Directive 93/38, see Opinion of AG Jacobs in case C-16/98 Commission v France 34–37. From the opposite perspective, analysing whether the improper or artificial aggregation of contracts that do not constitute a single economic and technical unity could result in a breach of the same provisions, see Opinion of AG Mischo in case C-411/00 Swoboda 53–64. In very clear terms, the ECJ concluded that the purpose that inspires these provisions ‘(the concern to avoid any risk of manipulation) also precludes a contracting authority from artificially grouping different services in the same contract solely in order to avoid the application in full of the directive to that contract’; see Case C-411/00 Swoboda [2002] ECR I-10567 58.
[5] Case C-16/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I-675; and Case C-412/04 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I-619 72. See also Opinion of AG Jacobs in case C-16/98 Commission v France. Similarly, albeit in less elaborated terms, see Opinion of AG Kokott in case C-220/05 Auroux 65 fn 58; Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-412/04 Commission v Italy 85–88; and Opinion of AG Mengozzi in case C-237/05 Commission v Greece 76–79. See also Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Case C-271/08 European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany 165. For recent cases discussing the splitting of contracts, see T-384/10 Spain v Commission [2013] pub. electr. EU:T:2013:277 and T-358/08 Spain v Commission [2013] pub. electr. EU:T:2013:371. Both of them respectively appealed as C-429/13 and C-513/13, which will give the ECJ an opportunity to update its doctrine on the artificial split of contracts.
[6] The temporal dimension was also analysed, although in a limited way, in the Opinion of AG Jacobs in case C-16/98 Commission v France 71.

Strict rules applicable to the assessment of de facto contract splitting

Additionally, it is also worth stressing that the assessment of whether a contracting authority has artificially split contracts and thus excluded them from compliance with the EU public procurement rules is subjected to a strict objective test. As I develop in A Sanchez-Graells,  'Assessing the Public Administration’s Intention in EU Economic Law: Chasing Ghosts or Dressing Windows?', in KA Armstrong (ed), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2016 (Cambridge, CUP, 2017) forthcoming, the case law has been very clear in establishing an objective test to determine infringements of the anti-circumvention rules now located in Art 5(3) Dir 2014/24. In that regard, it is worth stressing that:

Under the applicable rules, it is clear that ‘[t]he choice of the method used to calculate the estimated value of a procurement shall not be made with the intention of excluding it from the scope of this Directive and, in particular, that a ‘procurement shall not be subdivided with the effect of preventing it from falling within the scope of this Directive, unless justified by objective reasons’.[1]
In that regard, it is important to stress that the CJEU departed from the literal wording of that provision—which requires an intentional element identical ...—and clearly adopted an objective assessment based on the effects and consequences of the contracting authorities’ decisions concerning the estimation of the value of contracts that should have been tendered under the applicable EU rules. In a consistent line of case law, the CJEU stressed that the analysis needs to be based on objective elements that create indicia of the intentional artificial split of the contract, such as ‘the simultaneous issuance of invitations to tender … similarities between contract notices, the initiation of contracts within a single geographical area and the existence of a single contracting authority’ all of which ‘provide additional evidence militating in favour of the view that, in actual fact, the separate works contracts relate to a single work’.[2] Indeed, the intentional element has been excluded where, on the basis of such analysis, there were objective reasons that justified the decision adopted by the contracting authority.[3] Moreover, the prohibition of artificially splitting the contract with the intention of circumventing the application of the EU procurement rules has been applied directly to determine the incompatibility of legal rules that objectively diminished the applicability of the relevant directives, without engaging in any sort of subjective assessment (which would have been impossible).[4] ...
It is true that the CJEU has not gone as far as simply presuming the existence of the intention to avoid the applicability of the EU procurement rules in all cases. As aptly put by Advocate General Trstenjak,
Although the Court is decidedly strict in its examination of that prohibition, such intention to circumvent cannot be presumed without more. Each individual case in which a contract was split for the purposes of an award must be examined according to its context and specificities and, in that regard, particular attention must be given to whether there are good reasons pointing in favour of or, on the contrary, against the split ...[5]
However, the need to carry out a case by case analysis does not detract from the fact that the CJEU has excluded any consideration of the subjective intention of the contracting authority or any of its members. This was made exceedingly clear in a recent Judgment, whereby the General Court (GC) stressed that
a finding that a contract has been split in breach of European Union procurement legislation does not require proof of a subjective intention to circumvent the application of the provisions contained therein … it is irrelevant whether the infringement is the result of intention or negligence on the part of the Member State responsible, or of technical difficulties encountered by it … the Court considered that for the purpose of finding [an infringement] it was not necessary … to show beforehand that the Member State concerned intended to circumvent the obligations … by splitting the contract.[6]
Overall, thus, when it comes to the assessment of the seemingly subjective element included in the anti-circumvention provisions in the successive generations of procurement Directives, the existing case law of the CJEU clearly established that the analysis solely needs to be conducted on the basis of objective evidence and arguments regarding two aspects: firstly, whether objectively the conduct of the contracting authority created the effect proscribed by the rule and, secondly, whether there were objective good reasons for such behaviour (ie, an alternative explanation to the then presumed intention to circumvent). It could not be more objective and, clearly, no further proof of a subjective intention to circumvent the application of the EU public procurement rules is required.
[1] See Article 5(3) of Directive 2014/24, which absorbed the content of Article 9(7) of Directive 2004/18 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L 134/114. Previously, see Article 6 of Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts [1993] OJ L 199/54.
[2] As stressed very recently, see Spain v Commission, T-384/10, EU:T:2013:277, paras 65-68 (emphasis added); the Judgment has, however, been set aside on appeal by CJEU on procedural issues (disregard of a time limit by the Commission); see Spain v Commission, C-429/13 P, EU:C:2014:2310. Nonetheless, the same wording had been used in Commission v France, C-16/98, EU:C:2000:541; Commission v Italy, joined cases C-187/04 and C-188/04, EU:C:2005:652; Auroux and Others, C-220/05, EU:C:2007:31; and Commission v Germany, C-574/10, EU:C:2012:145.
[3] Swoboda, C-411/00, EU:C:2002:660, paras 57-60.
[4] Commission v Italy, C-412/04, EU:C:2008:102, paras 72-74.
[5] Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Commission v Germany, C-271/08, EU:C:2010:183, para 165 (emphasis added and references omitted). cf Opinion of AG Jacobs in Commission v France, C-16/98, EU:C:2000:99, para 38, where the AG stresses that the intentional or subjective element cannot be eliminated, but suggests that the applicable test still lies on whether the decision under assessment can be ‘justified on objective grounds’.
[6] Spain v Commission, T-384/10, EU:T:2013:277, para 95 (references omitted).

Overall assessment

Taking all of this into account, it seems clear to me that, unless there are objective (good) reasons for the sequential award of contracts for the provision of social and other specific services, the scenario suggested above would clearly constitute an infringement of EU public procurement law--and, in particular, Art 5(3) Dir 2014/24. In my view, the test applicable to the assessment of any objective reasons provided by the contracting authority cannot cover situations of lack of planning / foresight, purely economic reasons, or the pursuit or any horizontal policies.

Post script. If my intuition is correct and the discussion is catching up in Sweden because these sequential contracts are justified by a claim of emergency / force majeure / imprevisibility linked to the need to tackle the refugee crisis (which has triggered significant issues in Sweden and where the Swedish National Agency for Public Procurement has been issuing relevant guidance, unfortunately not in English), then it would seem clear to me that an overall assessment needs to be carried out of the situation and that it is not acceptable to allow each contracting authority to claim protection from the need to tender those contracts on the basis of unforeseeability and (con)sequential development of new or additional needs. Once the situation has been a source of general concern and operational difficulty across the country, a more general solution needs to be pursued, possibly on the basis of the rules for dynamic purchasing systems. However, this may require further analysis.

Another wrong decision on what is subjected to (EU) public procurement rules (QSRC v NHSE, [2015] EWHC 3752)

I was at the South West Administrative Lawyers Association (SWALA) meeeting yesterday and this gave me an opportunity to catch up with colleagues practising procurement before English courts, who are always an excellent source for updates regarding a body of (growing) national case law that is not always easy to find, despite the excellent BAILII.

Talking to Emily Heard about the Falk Pharma case (see here), she mentioned that there was a recent English case that could be of interest from the perspective of 'what is prourement' or 'what should be subjected to the (EU) procurement rules'. She was right, and the case of QSRC Ltd ("Qsrc"), R (on the application of) v National Health Service Commissioning Board ("NHS England") & Anor [2015] EWHC 3752 (Admin) (21 December 2015) deserves some comments. Of course, the opinion below is solely my own.

In QSRC v NHSE, the procurement dispute arose from the decision by the relevant contracting authority not to enter into a contract for the provision of specialised medical services (gamma knife treatment, a particular type of radiosurgical treatment) with QSRC while extending previous contracts for the provision of those services with existing suppliers.

The factual background of the case is very complex due to the fact that the initial decision not to enter into such contract took place towards the end of 2012, at the time when NHS procurement was being reformed in preparation for the entry into force of the National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No 2) Regulations 2013.

However, as I read the facts and for analytical purposes, the relevant issues were that the relevant contracting authority, by deciding to extend the contracts with pre-existing suppliers and not tendering more fully (on the justification that such fuller procurement would take place in the near future once the new system was operational) incurred in the direct award of (implicit) public contracts to the pre-existing providers. Moreover, that by rejecting to enter into a contract with QSRC as well, it treated potential providers unequally.

Then, the main dispute for the purposes of our discussion was to determine whether, by not running a tender for the provision of the interim services, the relevant contracting authority had breached the then applicable Public Contracts Regulations 2006 (which transposed Directive 2004/18, and have since been replaced by the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 in transposition of Directive 2014/24). Linked to that, it was also contentious whether by not entering into a direct award with QSRC as well, the contracting authority breached its obligations under reg.3(2) NHS Procurement (No 2) 2013 Regs to act transparently and proportionately, and not to discriminate between providers.

Again, the claim is complicated due to the overlap betwen the NHS Procurement (No 2) 2013 Regs and the PCR2006 (and currently the PCR2015), but the relevant issue is that compliance with PCR2006 (and now PCR2015) is mandatory to the extent that they are applicable to the procurement of goods and services for the purposes of the NHS, which is otherwise (or additionally) regulated by the NHS Procurement (No 2) 2013 Regs.

The further complication is that the position of the parties is slightly odd. The Claimant was not interested in relying on the PCR2006 because it would imply that its claim was out of time and should thus be rejected without substantive analysis. Conversely, the Defendant wanted to insist on its (alleged) breach under PCR2006, so as to time bar the action.

Thus, in short, the High Court (Foskett J) had to determine whether there had been a breach of the PCR2006 in the decision not to run a tender for the provision of interim services, which would oddly have resulted in an end of the analysis due to time limitation rules (which could explain the outcome of the analysis...).

The relevant paragraph is [115], where it is established that:

The issue, therefore, is whether, as the Defendant contends, the decision made not to contract with the Claimant was "governed by the Public Contracts Regulations 2006" or whether, as the Claimant contends, it was not. [The Defendant] submitted that the essence of the claim is that the Defendant should have procured ... services from the Claimant instead of merely from Barts and the Cromwell ... and contends that "the refusal to do so is a decision the legality of which may be affected by duties owed to [the Claimant] under" the 2006 Regulations. It seems to me that the issue is not whether the decision "may be affected" by the Regulations, but whether they are governed by them. [The Claimant] submits that they are not so governed, but they are governed by the 2013 Regulations. He accepts that in some respects there may be a degree of overlap, but argues this was not a situation where the "contracting authority" was seeking offers in relation to a proposed public supply contract (see Regulation 5) and, accordingly, the Regulations did not apply. Indeed he emphasises that no offers have yet been sought. He submits that no decision was taken under the 2006 Regulations which is or was capable of challenge pursuant to its terms (first emphasis in the original, second emphasis added).

Foskett J concluded that the Claimant's 'submissions [were] correct in the circumstances of this case'. It would then seem that the decision to consider the PCR2006 as not applicable is heavily influenced by the willingness of the Court to engage in a substantive assessment of the situation and to circumvent the time bar that would derive from the opposite conclusion. However, the argument simply does not hold even a mild degree of scrutiny.

In simple terms, the argument is that procurement rules apply when contracting authorities actually seek offers from potential providers, but not when they 'merely' (or potentially) ought to seek those offers. This would immediately exclude all cases of direct award of contracts that should have been tendered from review due to a breach of the applicable procurement rules. This is simply flagrantly in conflict with the purposes not only of the substantive EU Directives (2004/18 and 2014/24) as transposed byt he PCR2006 and now the PCR2015, but in radical opposition to the aims and mandates of the Remedies Directive (Dir 89/665/EEC, as amended by Dir 2007/66)--seeing that it goes at great lengths to stress that the direct award of contracts is the most egregious violation of (EU) public procurement rules and therefore triggers the strictness of sanctions: ineffectiveness [Art 2d(1)(a)].

Consequently, regardless of the outcome of the QSRC v NHSE case, which is not relevant now, the reasons for the decision to consider the direct award of the interim services contract not within the scope of the PCR2006 (and probably exempted but from minimum formal requirements due to the nature of the services as Annex II B services), must be criticised as plainly incorrect. It is wrong to enter into a logical argument that results in a circular test whereby compliance with the (EU) public procurement rules is only required if the contracting authority actually decides to engage in a procurement exercise, without assessing whether it had such an obligation to do so precisely under those rules. Or, even in simpler terms, it is wrong to accept that a decision not to comply with the applicable (EU) procurement rules shields the contracting authority from challenges on the basis of the infringed rules.

More generally, then and going back to the link with Falk Pharma, it seems that the proper understanding of what procurement is and when the (EU) public procurement rules should apply to market interactions by the public buyer is not yet satisfactorily settled, which is odd in a discipline that has been around for almost 45 years at EU level and for centuries in some of its Member States (acknowledgedly, not in the UK). More work should be done in this area, and I will try to rope in some of the colleagues participating in Procurement Week 2016 in such a project. Watch this space.

ECJ gets first principles of EU public procurement law wrong, as demonstrated by the regulation of dynamic purchasing systems (C-410/14)

In its Judgment of 2 June 2016 in Falk Pharma, C-410/14, EU:C:2016:399, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had to revisit the very concepts of procurement and of public contract for the purposes of the interpretation and application of EU public procurement law. The ECJ decided to approach the issue from a 'first principles' perspective and to work deductively on the basis of the general principles and main aims of EU public procurement in order to delineate the contours of what a public contract is. In my opinion, the result of this process is faulty and needs to be criticised because the ECJ only looked at part of the general principles and aims of EU public procurement law and, more importantly, by avoiding a systematic analysis and ignoring the regulation of dynamic purchasing systems, reached a solution that creates internal inconsistency within the system of EU public procurement regulation.

The dispute in the Falk Pharma case

In the case at hand, the ECJ was requested to interpret whether a so-called 'authorisation system' implemented by German authorities in relation with the acquisition of pharmaceutical products was covered by the EU public procurement rules or not. In simple terms, under the relevant part of German social security law concerned with statutory health insurance, 'in the case of the supply of a medicinal product which has been prescribed by indicating its active ingredient and whose replacement by a medicinal product with an equivalent active ingredient is not excluded by the prescribing doctor, pharmacists must replace the medicinal product prescribed with another medicinal product with an equivalent active ingredient in respect of which a rebate contract has been concluded' (C-410/14, para 11). Or, in other words, when operating under the statutory health insurance scheme, German pharmacists are under an obligation to dispense generics for which a rebate scheme is in place unless the prescribing doctor has insisted on a specific branded product.

In order to establish such a rebate system for a given anti-inflammatory drug used to treat inflammatory bowel disease (mesalazine), in the Falk Pharma case, the relevant authorities 'published in the supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union a notice concerning an "authorisation procedure" for the conclusion of rebate contracts ... concerning medicinal products whose active ingredient is mesalazine. The rebate rate was fixed at 15% of the ‘ex-factory’ price and the period covered ran from 1 October 2013 to 30 September 2015' (para 13). It should be noted that the 'procedure provided for the authorisation of all interested undertakings meeting the authorisation criteria and for the conclusion with each of those undertakings of identical contracts whose terms were fixed and non-negotiable. Furthermore, any other undertaking fulfilling those criteria also had the opportunity of acceding on the same terms to the rebate contract scheme during the contract period' (para 14). The German authorities considered that this scheme was not covered by the EU public procurement rules (para 15).

As a result of the procedure, the German authorities entered into only one rebate contract with Kohlpharma. A competing interested undertaking challenged the setting up of the rebate scheme on the basis that the so-called 'authorisation procedure' was actually a public contract and, consequently, should have been advertised and awarded in compliance with the applicable EU rules (at the time, Directive 2004/18). The referring court explained how German courts were divided on this issue. 'For certain courts a public contract is a contract which gives the chosen operator exclusivity, so that a contract which is concluded with all the operators who wish to conclude such a contract does not constitute a public contract. Other courts take the view that all contracts concluded by a contracting authority are public contracts and that the choice of one of the tenderers, and therefore the grant of exclusivity, is an obligation of a contracting authority' (para 22).

After an elaborate discussion on the arguments both for and against the consideration of these schemes as public contracts (paras 23-30), the basic question posed to the ECJ is to determine 'whether Art 1(2)(a) Dir 2004/18 must be interpreted as meaning that a contract scheme ... through which a public entity intends to acquire goods on the market by contracting throughout the period of validity of that scheme with any economic operator who undertakes to provide the goods concerned on fixed terms, without choosing between the interested operators, and allows those operators to accede to that scheme throughout its period of validity, must be classified as a public contract within the meaning of that directive' (para 32).

The ECJ's position in the Falk Pharma case

The ECJ's first reaction is to stress that '[a]dmittedly, ... such a scheme leads to the conclusion of contracts for a pecuniary interest between a public entity, which could be a contracting authority within the meaning of Directive 2004/18, and economic operators whose objective is to supply goods, which corresponds to the definition of "public contracts" laid down in Article 1(2)(a) of that directive' (para 33). In my view, the analysis should have ended here and the ECJ should have limited itself to declare the authorisation scheme covered by EU public procurement rules (more details on the reasons why, below).

However, in order to answer more fully this seemingly simple question, the ECJ decided to go back to the very basics and interrogate Dir 2004/18 for its general aims and goals. In that regard, and after repeating some standard arguments on the EU procurement rules' goal to avoid favouritism in the award of public contracts (paras 34-36), the ECJ establishes the most controversial part of the Falk Pharma Judgment by finding that:

37 ... where a public entity seeks to conclude supply contracts with all the economic operators wishing to supply the goods concerned in accordance with the conditions specified by that entity, the fact that the contracting authority does not designate an economic operator to whom contractual exclusivity is to be awarded means that there is no need to control, through the detailed rules of Directive 2004/18, the action of that contracting authority so as to prevent it from awarding a contract in favour of national operators.
38      It is therefore apparent that the choice of a tender and, thus, of a successful tenderer, is intrinsically linked to the regulation of public contracts by that directive and, consequently, to the concept of ‘public contract’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of that directive (C-410/14, paras 37 & 38, emphasis added).

I find both points faulty for the reasons explored below. Moreover, I find this position very worrying because of the sweeping implications it has for the definition of public contract and because this understanding of public procurement as an activity necessarily requiring the choice of a successful tenderer will carry over to the interpretation and enforcement of Directive  2014/24 because, according to the ECJ:

40 ... that principle is expressly set out in the definition of the concept of ‘procurement’, now set out in Article 1(2) of Directive 2014/24, in respect of which one aspect is the choice by the contracting authority of the economic operator from whom it will acquire by means of a public contract the works, supplies or services which are the subject matter of that contract (C-410/14, para 40, emphasis added).

What the ECJ got wrong

The absence of risk of protectionism or competitive restriction

Regarding the finding of the ECJ in para 37 of Falk Pharma that there is no need to control the conclusion of this type of contractual mechanisms under the specific rules of the EU public procurement directives because there is no risk of award those contracts in favour of national operators, I submit that the ECJ failed to understand the mechanics of the supply chain involved in the so-called 'authorisation scheme' or 'rebate contracts' and that this led to an improper assessment of the risk of favouritism or protectionism of certain economic operators. Moreover, I also submit that, in any case, this is not the correct logic to follow and that a competition-based assessment should lead to a different conclusion.

These rebate contracts only make sense for entities active in Germany and with working distribution mechanisms whereby their medicine is made available to German pharmacies. The mechanics of the rebate are quite obvious in requiring two pre-conditions for the actual delivery of the medicine by a specific provider. One, it is necessary for the provider to conclude the required rebate contract with the authorities managing the statutory health insurance system. Two, it is necessary for the provider to have its products available in German pharmacies. Even then, there is no guarantee to end up selling the product if a competing supplier has a rebate scheme in place, has its products available at the pharmacy and has a lower selling price because, despite being obliged to grant the same rebate (in the case, 15%) it has a lower ex-factory price (for details on this, see the recent report on pharmaceutical product pricing).

Therefore, in my view and to the extent to which it is possible to grasp the economic reality behind the case on the basis of the pyrrhic information available in the Falk Pharma Judgment, the creation of this rebate scheme still clearly has potential 'protectionistic' effects in that it favours pharmaceutical companies already established and active in Germany over potential suppliers that would need to enter the pharmacy distribution channels in order to take part in the 'authorisation scheme'. Thus, in my view, even from the perpective of limiting EU public procurement rules to an anti-protectionism goal, the ECJ would have gotten the assessment wrong by remaining at a level of generality that masks the fact that the scheme formally open to any willing supplier is actually skewed in favour of pharmaceutical companies already active in Germany--which, in terms of the ECJ's analysis, are more likely to be domestic companies.

But, beyond this, I think that the ECJ's assessment was also affected by tunnel vision and failed to evaluate the situation from the perspective of the pro-competitive orientation of the EU public procurement rules, despite the referring court's stress on the fact that 'EU law on public contracts has always been characterised by an element of competition' (para 25). From this functional perspective, it is criticisable that the ECJ decided to exclude the 'authorisation scheme' from the scope of application of the EU public procurement directives on the basis that it does not constitute a public contract, while at the same time going back to the obscure requirement that its award is based on a procedure that 'in so far as its subject matter is of certain cross-border interest, is subject to the fundamental rules of the [TFEU], in particular the principles of equal treatment and of non-discrimination between economic operators and the consequent obligation of transparency, that obligation requiring that there be adequate publicity. In that regard, Member States have some latitude in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings for the purpose of adopting measures intended to ensure observance of the principles of equal treatment and the obligation of transparency' (para 44).

This only creates legal uncertainty and potentially limits competition for the contract. It would have been preferable for the ECJ to actually look at the entirety of the goals of the EU public procurement rules and, it being clear that the 'authorisation scheme' 'leads to the conclusion of contracts for a pecuniary interest between a public entity ... and economic operators whose objective is to supply goods' (para 33), subject it to compliance with the specific rules of the EU public procurement directives (concerning dynamic purchasing systems, as elaborated below), if nothing else for the purpose of ensuring competition for these contracts.

The need to make a final choice as an essential element of procurement procedures

Furthermore, the ECJ's finding in para 38 of the Falk Pharma Judgment, that 'one aspect [of the concept of procurement] is the choice by the contracting authority of the economic operator from whom it will acquire by means of a public contract the works, supplies or services', should also be criticised. First, because too strict an interpretation of this element of choice of the specific contractor, supplier or service provider (ab initio or from the start of the contractual relationship) by the contracting authority can result in ridiculous results, e.g. where end users are given choice between alternative suppliers, be it within framework agreements or dynamic purchasing systems, or where the contracting authority draws from contractual systems set up by third parties (such as central purchasing bodies, or through other types of collaborative procurement). In many a case, the contracting authority that sets up the general contractual scheme does not necessarily end up choosing the provider itself or in a direct manner. But this should not exclude the applicability of the EU public procurement rules.

Secondly, reliance on the specific wording of Art 1(2) Dir 2014/24 should also be criticised because the ECJ seems to read too much into the definition of procurement created ex novo in this instrument. Remarkably, when the European Commission proposed the text of the new Directive in 2011, it defined procurement in a broader and functional manner by indicating that: 'Procurement within the meaning of this Directive is the purchase or other forms of acquisition of works, supplies or services by one or more contracting authorities from economic operators chosen by those contracting authorities, whether or not the works, supplies or services are intended for a public purpose'. The justification given by the Commission for this introduction was that '[t]he basic concept of "procurement" ... has been newly introduced in order to better determine the scope and purpose of procurement law and to facilitate the application of the thresholds'. However, there is no further explanation of the purpose of this definition.

The final text of Art 1(2) of Dir 2014/24 deviates from the proposal by establishing that 'Procurement within the meaning of this Directive is the acquisition by means of a public contract of works, supplies or services by one or more contracting authorities from economic operators chosen by those contracting authorities, whether or not the works, supplies or services are intended for a public purpose' (the emphasis indicates the differences). This change of drafting originates from the second compromise text of the Council (see here), and the debate seems to only have revolved around the need for a public contract to exist in order to trigger the application of the Directive. To the best to my knowledge, the element of choice of economic operator was not controversial and did not attract any relevant attention in the legislative process--as evidenced, for instance, by the fact that the provision is not dealt with in any detail in relevant scholarship: Constant De Koninck, Thierry Ronse and William Timmermans, European Public Procurement Law. The Public Sector Procurement Directive 2014/24/EU Explained through 30 Years of Case Law by the Court of Justice of the European Union, 2nd edn  (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2015). 

As clearly criticised by Caranta, 'the new definition provided in Article 1(2) of Directive 2014/24 still [leaves] wide margins of ambiguity' and, further, '[t]he legislative drafting technique here leaves much to be desired. The two provisions might easily have been merged, and the distinction between “procurement” and “public contract” is simply lost in most of the other language versions. Moreover, “public contract” is clearly the genus, with “procurement” being the species. The genus should have been defined first, with the specification elements (in writing, acquisition, pecuniary interest, and so on) added at a later stage' [see R Caranta, 'The changes to the public contract directives and the story they tell about how EU law works' (2015) 52(2) Common Market Law Review 391-459, emphasis added]. As Caranta points out, the definition seems to only bring about a change in terms of stressing the requirement for an 'acquisition' to take place (for the reasons he explains), which in the Falk Pharma case is uncontroversial.

Overall, then, I cannot understand why the ECJ got so hung up on the specific wording of Art 1(2) Dir 2014/24 and why it gave such relevance to the need to choose a supplier for procurement to exist. From a functional perspective, it would seem superior to interpret procurement as any contractual mechanism whereby the contracting authority determines which suppliers can supply and under which conditions, regardless of whether there is any element of exclusivity or whether any potential supplier is excluded from the scheme. This functional approach certainly bodes better with the regulation of undisputed (if not too regularly used) EU public procurement mechanisms such as the dynamic purchasing system, which was simply ignored by the ECJ.

How the ECJ ignored the regulation of dynamic purchasing systems

Indeed, beyond the general criticisms above, the Falk Pharma Judgment must also be criticised because the ECJ enters into a very limited systematic analysis of the EU public procurement architecture that ignores the regulation of dynamic purchasing systems, both in Dir 2004/18 and Dir 2014/24. Indeed, the ECJ simply considered that

41 ... it should be noted that the special feature of a contractual scheme, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, namely its permanent availability for the duration of its validity to interested operators and, therefore, its not being limited to a preliminary period in the course of which undertakings are invited to express their interest to the public entity concerned, suffices to distinguish that scheme from a framework agreement. In accordance with Article 32(2), second paragraph, of Directive 2004/18, contracts based on a framework agreement can only be awarded to economic operators who are originally parties to that framework agreement (C-410/14, para 41, emphasis added).

That is true. But the ECJ's analysis flagrantly failed to assess the compatibility of those general features (ie permanent availability of the possibility to opt in to interested operators, despite not having expressed initial interest) with the regulation of dynamic purchasing systems under Art 33 Dir 2004/18, which are precisely this type of contractual arrangement. Granted, the specific rules on the running of the dynamic purchasing system would have required some further assessment and the fact that pharmacists draw from the electronic catalogue resulting from the rebate agreements could have created some difficulties regarding the specific mechanics of the dynamic purchasing systems envisaged in Dir 2004/18 regarding the need for indicative tenders and the mini-competitions for each award (not so much under the revised rules of Art 34 Dir 2014/24, especially if coupled with the rules on electronic catalogues in Art 36 Dir 2014/24), but that should not have excluded from the scope of application of EU public procurement rules (both under Dir 2004/18 and, more importantly, Dir 2014/24) any type of contractual scheme permanently open to economic operators willing to supply for the entirety of its duration. In my view, this is bound to result in a major systematic incongruence--why call something a dynamic purchasing system and comply with EU public procurement rules if you can call it 'authorisation process' or any other creative name and do away those requirements? Definitely not a desirable outcome from the perspective of regulatory consistency.

Final thoughts

For all the reasons explored above, I think that the Falk Pharma Judgment is an undesirable development of EU public procurement law. Moreover, I am puzzled by the absence of an Advocate General Opinion. Given the fundamental relevance of the concept of public contract, and now of procurement itself, for the application of this regulatory system, the worse thing to do is to carry out analyses based on linguistics without exploring the systematic and functional implications of definitional issues. In my view, this is an issue worth resending to the CJEU for clarification at the earliest possible opportunity as soon as any slightly different "authorisation scheme" or "alternative acquisition mechanism" is tendered in any of the Member States, so that the full ECJ and, if possible, on the back of a strong Advocate General Opinion, has the opportunity to fix this--or, on the contrary, continues a dangerous path of recognition (and legitimacy) of "non-procurement acquisition systems" subjected to the basic principles of the EU Treaties and the requirements derived from the internal market fundamental freedoms, but not to the EU public procurement rules, which would extend the difficulties traditionally linked to below-thresholds and not-covered contracts to a whole new dimension of acquisition contractual mechanisms, and which I would certainly find undesirable.

ECJ opens door to remedial possibilities when contracting authorities aim to exclude on the basis of shady participation requirements (C-27/15)

In its Judgment of 2 June 2016 in Pizzo, C-27/15, EU:C:2016:404, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has provided interpretative guidance on some aspects of the qualitative selection process that contracting authorities need to carry out prior to the award of public contracts covered by the relevant EU rules. It is worth noting that, even if the Pizzo Judgment is based on the rules of Directive 2004/18 (Arts 47 and 48), but the functional criteria it sets will be equally relevant under the new rules of Directive 2014/24 (Arts 56 to 58).

In particular, the Pizzo Judgment clarifies the scope of the discretion given to contracting authorities to interpret tender documents in a way that would unfavourably result in the exclusion of economic operators (following Manova, C‑336/12, EU:C:2013:647, see here; and Cartiera dell'Adda, C‑42/13, EU:C:2014:2345, see here), as well as the limits of the possibility given to economic operators to remedy formal shortcomings in the documentation presented in the course of their participation in the tender for a public contract in order to avoid such exclusion.

Pizzo also follows the flexible approach previously established by the ECJ regarding reliance on third party capacities (as per Swm Costruzioni 2 and Mannocchi Luigino, C-94/12, EU:C:2013:646, see here; and in a related fashion to Ostas celtnieks, C-234/14, EU:C:2016:6, see here). 

The case concerned the tender of a public service contract for the management of waste and cargo residues produced on board ships calling at ports within the contracting authority’s territorial jurisdiction (ie the Messina area, in Italy). The contracting authority received four tenders but decided to exclude three tenderers due to the lack of payment of an administrative fee that it considered a mandatory participation requirement, which led the authority to award the contract to the only remaining tenderer (Pizzo).

One of the excluded tenderers (CGRT) appealed the exclusion decision on the basis that the payment of the fee was only mandatory for works contracts, not for services contracts, and that the authority required such payment on the basis of a broad interpretation of the relevant rules and its general powers under Italian administrative law. In CGRT's submission, before proceeding to its exclusion from the tender, the authority should at least have given it the possibility to remedy the situation and pay the fee. CGRT's action was faced with a counterclaim by Pizzo whereby it challenged CGRT's compliance with the economic standing requirements for the participation in the tender due to the fact that it had relied on third party capacities (in the case, those of RIAL). 

Therefore, the case raised two issues: 1) to what extent can a contracting authority engage in a (discretionary) broad interpretation of the tender documents in a way that incorporates the requirement to pay a fee and proceed to the exclusion of those tenderers that had not paid the fee without giving them the opportunity to remedy the situation; and 2) to what extent must contracting authorities follow a flexible approach to the assessment of economic and technical standing requirements when tenderers rely on third party capacities. The first issue is more interesting and controversial than the second one. Thus, let's focus on the second issue first.

Again, on the flexible approach to reliance on third party capacities and how it carries over to new rules of directive 2014/24

In Pizzo, the ECJ revisits its consolidated case law in this area, without adding much to the already clear position that the applicable EU rules create significant flexibility for tenderers to rely on third party capacity, unless the tender documents establish reasonable and proportionate restrictions justified by the subject matter of the contract. In its own terms:

23      The Court has held that EU law does not require that, in order to be classified as an economic operator qualifying for tendering, a person wishing to enter into a contract with a contracting authority must be capable of direct performance using his own resources (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 December 2009 in CoNISMa, C‑305/08, EU:C:2009:807, paragraph 41).
24      ... Article 47(2) and Article 48(3) of Directive 2004/18 does not lay down any general prohibition regarding a candidate or tenderer’s reliance on the capacities of one or more third-party entities in addition to its own capacities in order to fulfil the criteria set by a contracting authority (see Swm Costruzioni 2, paragraph 30).
25      ... those provisions recognise the right of every economic operator to rely, for a particular contract, upon the capacities of other entities, ‘regardless of the nature of the links which it has with them’, provided that it proves to the contracting authority that it will have at its disposal the resources necessary for the performance of the contract (see Ostas celtnieks, paragraph 23).
26      It must therefore be held that Directive 2004/18 permits the combining of the capacities of more than one economic operator for the purpose of satisfying the minimum capacity requirements set by the contracting authority, provided that the candidate or tenderer relying on the capacities of one or more other entities proves to that authority that it will actually have at its disposal the resources of those entities necessary for the execution of the contract (see Swm Costruzioni 2, paragraph 33).
27      Such an interpretation is consistent with the objective pursued by the directives in this area of attaining the widest possible opening-up of public contracts to competition to the benefit not only of economic operators but also contracting authorities (see, to that effect, CoNISMa, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). In addition, that interpretation also facilitates the involvement of small- and medium-sized undertakings in the contracts procurement market, an aim also pursued by Directive 2004/18, as stated in recital 32 thereof (see Swm Costruzioni 2, paragraph 34).
28      ... however ... there may be works the special requirements of which necessitate a certain capacity which cannot be obtained by combining the capacities of more than one operator, which, individually, would be inadequate. It has thus acknowledged that, in such circumstances, the contracting authority would be justified in requiring that the minimum capacity level concerned be achieved by a single economic operator or by relying on a limited number of economic operators as long as that requirement is related and proportionate to the subject matter of the contract at issue. The Court has, however, stated that since those circumstances represent an exception, the requirements in question cannot be made general rules under national law (see, to that effect, Swm Costruzioni 2, paragraphs 35 and 36) (C-27/15, paras 23-28, references shortened).

The only novelty to be found in Pizzo is that the ECJ anticipates the interpretation of Art 63 Dir 2014/24 by stressing that

the specific provisions ... provide that it is possible for the contracting authority to require that the entity which is relied on to satisfy the conditions laid down with regard to economic and financial standing is to be jointly liable (Article 63(1), third subparagraph, of Directive 2014/24) or to require that, with regard to certain types of contracts, certain critical tasks are to be performed directly by the tenderer (Article 63(2) of that directive). Those provisions do not therefore impose specific limits on the possibility of divided reliance on the capacities of third-party undertakings and, in any event, such limits should have been expressly set out for in the call for tenders in respect of the contract at issue, which is not the case in the main proceedings (C-27/15, para 33, emphasis added).

This is in line with the interpretation of Art 63 Dir 2014/24 I hold in Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 315-318, but it is worth stressing that the ECJ has not yet tackled some of the restrictions allowed for under Art 63(2) Dir 2014/24 (ie the requirement that certain critical tasks are to be performed directly by the tenderer) which in my view run contrary to its previous case law. Thus, in this instance, the fact that the ECJ makes obiter comments on the likely future interpretation of the rules of Dir 2014/24 is worrying because there are two possible readings of paragraph 33 in Pizzo: (a) that the ECJ is giving carte blanche to the potential restrictions created by Art 63(1) and (2), or (b), that the ECJ is simply stressing that (regardless of their substantive merit and from a prior formal perspective), for such requirements to apply, they need to be created in the applicable tender documents (which, having not happened in this case, makes them irrelevant). I strongly vouch for (b), but I am certain that there will be claims based on (a) when the issue properly arises in litigation. Thus, in this case, the probably well-intended effort by the ECJ to anticipate the interpretation of the new rules may have created more shadows than lights.

On the tricky issue of the interpretation of tender documents, the duty to seek clarification or, at least, allow for remediation of short-comings leading to exclusion of economic operators

When tackling the challenge of the contracting authority's broad interpretation of the obligation to pay an administrative fee and its decision to exclude, without possibility to remedy such short-coming, the economic operators that had failed to pay it, the rephrased the question to mean 'whether the principle of equal treatment and the obligation of transparency are to be interpreted as precluding an economic operator from being excluded from a procedure for the award of a public contract as a result of that economic operator’s non-compliance with an obligation which does not expressly arise from the documents relating to that procedure or out of the national law in force, but from an interpretation of that law and from the incorporation of provisions into those documents by the national authorities or administrative courts' (C-27/15, para 35).

In that regard, the ECJ makes the following arguments and establishes the following reasoning:

36 ... all the conditions and detailed rules of the award procedure must be drawn up in a clear, precise and unequivocal manner in the contract notice or specifications so that, first, all reasonably informed tenderers exercising ordinary care can understand their exact significance and interpret them in the same way and, second, the contracting authority is able to ascertain whether the tenders submitted satisfy the criteria applying to the contract in question (see, to that effect, Cartiera dell’Adda, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
37      The Court has also held that the principles of transparency and equal treatment which govern all procedures for the award of public contracts require the substantive and procedural conditions concerning participation in a contract to be clearly defined in advance and made public, in particular the obligations of tenderers, in order that those tenderers may know exactly the procedural requirements and be sure that the same requirements apply to all candidates ...
45 ... in the case in the main proceedings, the alleged obligation to pay a fee to the AVCP [the Supervisory Authority on Public Procurement] can be identified only by the interaction between the 2006 Finance Law, the AVCP’s decision-making practice and the judicial practice of the Italian administrative courts in applying and interpreting Law No 266/2005.
46      As the Advocate General points out ... a condition governing the right to participate in a public procurement procedure which arises out of the interpretation of national law and the practice of an authority ... would be particularly disadvantageous for tenderers established in other Member States, inasmuch as their level of knowledge of national law and the interpretation thereof and of the practice of the national authorities cannot be compared to that of national tenderers.
48 ... it is apparent from the order for reference that there is no possibility of rectifying non-compliance with that condition that a fee must be paid.
49      According to paragraph 46 of the judgment in Cartiera dell’Adda ..., the contracting authority may not accept any rectification of omissions which, as expressly provided for in the contract documentation, must result in the exclusion of the bid. The Court stated, in paragraph 48 of that judgment, that the obligation concerned was clearly laid down in the contract documentation, on pain of exclusion.
50      However, in a situation where ... a condition for participating in a procedure for the award of a contract, on pain of exclusion from that procedure, is not expressly laid down in the contract documentation and that condition can be identified only by a judicial interpretation of national law, the contracting authority may grant the excluded tenderer a sufficient period of time in order to rectify its omission (C-27/15, paras 36-50, some references omitted and emphasis added).

I agree with the main reasoning of the ECJ on this issue as it coincides with a possibilistic and functional approach to the management of the exclusion and qualitative selection procedure aimed at minimising exclusion for causes that can be remedied without infringing the principle of equal treatment [for discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells, 'Exclusion, Qualitative Selection and Short-listing', in F Lichère, R Caranta & S Treumer (eds), Modernising Public Procurement. The New Directive, vol. 6 European Procurement Law Series (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2014) 97-129; and ibid, 'Rejection of Abnormally Low and Non-Compliant Tenders in EU Public Procurement: A Comparative View on Selected Jurisdictions', M Comba & S Treumer (eds) Award of Contracts in EU Procurements, vol. 5 European Procurement Law Series (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2013) 267-302].

However, I am not convinced by the way the ECJ has limited the opportunity to remedy the (interpreted) shortcomings in the tender documentation (or material requirements) to a mere possibility. As phrased in the operational part of the Pizzo Judgment, the ECJ has interpreted that

the principle of equal treatment and the obligation of transparency must be interpreted as precluding an economic operator from being excluded from a procedure for the award of a public contract as a result of that economic operator’s non-compliance with an obligation which does not expressly arise from the documents relating to that procedure or out of the national law in force, but from an interpretation of that law and those documents and from the incorporation of provisions into those documents by the national authorities or administrative courts. Accordingly, the principles of equal treatment and of proportionality must be interpreted as not precluding an economic operator from being allowed to regularise its position and comply with that obligation within a period of time set by the contracting authority (C-27/45, para 51, emphasis added).

I find this approach too lenient and I would have expected the ECJ to create a mandatory vis-a-vis procedure similar to the one applicable in case the contracting authority suspects an offer to be abnormally low under Art 69 Dir 2014/24. Generally, I think that rather than focusing solely on the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination, it is worth stressing the relevance of the principle of good administration as well. From that perspective, if the contracting authority identifies a participation requirement that was not obvious from the tender documentation, it should be subjected to a mandatory phase whereby it allows tenderers to remedy the situation. The same would go for the interpretation of Art 56(3) Dir 2014/24 in terms of the possibility (in my view, non-discretionary) to seek clarifications from tenderers and to 'take all appropriate steps to avoid the rejection of candidates on the basis of shortcomings in the available documentation that could be overcome if the contracting authority were to exercise the appropriate level of diligence' [Public procurement and the EU competition rules (2015) 321-323].

Overall, I think that this is an area where the ECJ is avoiding a much needed delineation of the limits (or at least checks and balances) to be imposed on the discretion of the contracting authorities to proceed to exclusion without exhausting the possibilities for clarification or remedy of formal shortcomings in the submission of tenders. This is likely to be an area of continued litigation, particularly as the Pizzo case opens the door to different treatment of participation requirements that directly derive from the tender documentation (where the contracting authority is likely to have its hands tied and not be able to provide any scope for remedial action beyond the very limited possibilities foreseen in Manova and Cartiera dell’Adda) or that indirectly arise from its contextual interpretation (where the Pizzo approach seems to open a rather big door to the enablement of remedial actions). Thus, the last word is certainly not yet written...

Commission issues first salvo to tardy Member States: what next for transposition of public procurement reform?

The European Commission has formally reacted to the tardiness of the vast majority of EU Member States in the transposition of the 2014 public procurement package. 21 out of the 28 Member States have been addressed letters of formal notice whereby the Commission reminds them of their overdue obligation to transpose Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU, and 2014/25/EU into national law. Logically, if the Member States do not react promptly, the Commission should be opening infringement procedures under Art 258 TFEU (maybe after the summer?), which could eventually lead to the imposition of fines to Member States that continue to fail in their obligation to transpose.

This first salvo can be seen as an indication of the seriousness with which the Commission may intend to oversee the transposition of this significant reform, which seems justified by its belief that the 'new rules make it easier and cheaper for small and medium enterprises to bid for public contracts and respect the EU’s principles of transparency and competition. Increased transparency improves accountability and helps combat corruption. The rules also allow the authorities to use public procurement to work towards broader policy objectives, such as environmental and social goals and innovation' [an alternative view seems to emerge from a closer analysis of the rules, though, as will soon be apparent in the contributions to GS Ølykke and A Sanchez-Graells (eds), Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules (Edward Elgar, 2016)].

However, maybe from a more cynical perspective, it also seems like a first indication of the difficulties that lay ahead in terms of the effective transposition of the new procurement rules. Issues such as the transition to full, proper eProcurement, the need to oversee in an effective manner the conduct of an increasing volume of negotiated procedures, the complications derived from aggregation of procurement and cross-border collaboration (if it ever happens), or the need to reform the remedies system to make sure that the new substantive rules have sufficient bite (which the Commission however now seems to have dropped from its regulatory agenda), just to name a few of the relatively obvious issues, are clear points of future friction between the Commission and the Member States.

Also, it seems clear that infringement procedures are unlikely to fix any of these issues in a satisfactory manner, particularly where Member States simply do no have the resources (economic or otherwise, such as an adequately trained workforce) to implement the rules. Thus, all this can lead to is a futile exercise of transposition on paper (passing laws is relatively cheap and can certainly put a lid on the Commission's oversight strategy, unless it is willing to resource it properly on its own end) and maybe hope for private litigation to force its effectiveness--which would be patchy and incomplete in any case.

All in all, I think that the system is close to bursting at the seams (or at least at some of the seams) unless procurement is better resources at Member State level soon, which does not seem to be feasible in the short run. If that does not happen, any illusion of (formal) transposition will be misleading. And the litigation could in any case exist on the basis of the direct and indirect effect of the directives, which already enable a guerrilla strategy for savvy economic operators. Thus, what the Commission aims to achieve with this first salvo is unclear to me. And I am not sure that it has thought its strategy through to its ultimate consequences. Let's see if Member States hurry up to transpose (at least on paper).

CJEU on solo bids by consortium member after partner's bankruptcy: a competition-friendly test? (C-396/14)

In its Judgment of 24 May 2016 in MT Højgaard and Züblin, C-396/14, EU:C:2016:347, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled on whether the principle of equal treatment of economic operators must be interpreted as precluding a contracting entity from allowing an economic operator that is a member of a group of two undertakings which was pre-selected and which submitted the first tender in a negotiated procedure for the award of a public contract, to continue to take part in that procedure in its own name, after the dissolution of that group due to the bankruptcy of the other partner.

This case is important because, even if it is based on the 2004 EU utilities procurement rules (Dir 2004/17), it makes general statements that carry over to public procurement covered by any other set of EU rules (notably Dir 2014/24), or even simply covered by the EU general principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination--thus pervading (almost) all instances of procurement at Member State level. Also of note, the MT Højgaard and Züblin Judgment explores the implications of the application of the principle of equal treatment for intra-tender competition and supports a flexible approach to the modification of bidding consortia that seems to be clearly pro-competitive. However, the CJEU's reasoning in the specific case comes with some difficulties attached, particularly in terms of the desirability of bidding consortia beyond the specific tender and the compatibility of EU public procurement and competition law.

Findings of the Court

In MT Højgaard and Züblin, the CJEU was presented with a case where a contracting authority was running a negotiated procedure with a prior call for competition, and where the contracting authority indicated that it wanted to proceed to negotiations with between four and six candidates. It received expressions of interest from five candidates, which included both the group consisting of MT Højgaard and Züblin (‘the Højgaard and Züblin group’) and the group consisting of Per Aarsleff and E. Pihl og Søn A/S (‘the Aarsleff and Pihl group’). The contracting authority pre-selected all five candidates and invited them to submit tenders. One of the pre-selected candidates subsequently withdrew from the procedure. 

There are some procedural complications due to the parallel existence of the domestic bankruptcy proceedings but, for the purposes of our discussion, the relevant fact is that Pihl entered into bankruptcy prior to the submission of the tender, which de facto implied the dissolution of the Aarsleff and Pihl group, but Aarsleff decided to proceed as a solo tenderer. The contracting authority was thus left with two options: (a) to consider that Aarsleff was not qualified on its own merits and to carry on with the negotiated procedure with 'only' three tenders; or, conversely, (b) to consider that Aarsleff could benefit from the qualification of the group to which it initially belonged and go forward with its desired minimum of four tenders.

After some analysis, the contracting authority 'informed all the tenderers of its decision to allow Aarsleff to continue to take part, alone, in the procedure. [It] explained that decision by stating that Aarsleff, which was the leading contracting company in Denmark in terms of turnover for the financial years 2012 and 2013, satisfied the conditions required for participation in the negotiated procedure, even in the absence of the technical and financial capacities of Pihl . In addition, Aarsleff had taken over the contracts of more than 50 salaried staff of Pihl, including the individuals who were key to the implementation of the project concerned' (C-396/14, para 14). Aarsleff was thus allowed to submit a tender and, after a further round of best and final offers between the three better placed tenderers, it was awarded the contract. Unsurprisingly, the Højgaard and Züblin group challenged the award decision.

As we will see, allowing Aarsleff to progress to the negotiation phase as a solo tenderer raises two separate issues: 1) whether Aarsleff needed to team up with Pihl at all in order to participate in the negotiated procedure [notably because, as confirmed by the referring Danish public procurement complaints board, 'on the basis of the information provided concerning Aarsleff, that company would have been pre-selected if it had sought an invitation to take part in its own name instead of doing so through the intermediary of the Aarsleff and Pihl group', para 18]; and 2) whether Aarsleff's technical standing was being reassessed at a point where no other candidates or potentially interested undertakings were having their technical standing assessed, which would in itself be a competitive advantage. However, the CJEU does not really focus on either of these issues in detail and the test it creates seems to miss some important analytical issues--which assessment is too conveniently left to the referring authority.

Rather, the CJEU focuses on an analysis of the situation as a modification of the composition of the bidding consortium formed by Aarsleff and Pihl. In doing so, the CJEU resorts to its case law in Makedoniko Metro and Michaniki (C‑57/01, EU:C:2003:47) and considers that in the absence of EU and Danish rules on the composition of bidding consortia, 'the question of whether a contracting entity may allow such an alteration must be examined with regard to the general principles of EU law, in particular the principle of equal treatment and the duty of transparency that flows from it, and the objectives of that law in relation to public procurement' (para 36). It then carries on with such an assessment and, fundamentally, determines that

38 The principle of equal treatment of tenderers, the aim of which is to promote the development of healthy and effective competition between undertakings taking part in a public procurement procedure, requires that all tenderers must be afforded equality of opportunity when formulating their tenders, and therefore implies that the tenders of all competitors must be subject to the same conditions ...
41 ...  [the rules on qualitative selection] may be qualified in order to ensure, in a negotiated procedure, adequate competition ...
42 ... the contracting entity considered that there should be at least four candidates in order to ensure such competition.
43 If, however, an economic operator is to continue to participate in the negotiated procedure in its own name, following the dissolution of the group of which it formed part and which had been pre-selected by the contracting entity, that continued participation must take place in conditions which do not infringe the principle of equal treatment of the tenderers as a whole.
44 In that regard, a contracting entity is not in breach of that principle where it permits one of two economic operators, who formed part of a group of undertakings that had, as such, been invited to submit tenders by that contracting entity, to take the place of that group following the group’s dissolution, and to take part, in its own name, in the negotiated procedure for the award of a public contract, provided that it is established, first, that that economic operator by itself meets the requirements laid down by the contracting entity and, second, that the continuation of its participation in that procedure does not mean that the other tenderers are placed at a competitive disadvantage.
45      In the main proceedings, it must, first, be stated that it is apparent  that had Aarsleff, alone, made an application for an invitation to take part in the procedure, it would have been pre-selected ...
47      Last, as regards the fact that, after the dissolution of the Aarsleff and Pihl group, Aarsleff took on the contracts of 50 salaried staff of Pihl, including individuals who were key to the implementation of the construction project concerned, it is for the referring court to determine whether Aarsleff thereby acquired a competitive advantage at the expense of the other tenderers (C-396/14, paras 38-47, references omitted and emphasis added). 

There are some initial remarks to make in view of this. First, the CJEU continues to be largely captured by the trap of tender-specific reasoning when it indicates that 'the aim of [the principle of equal treatment of tenderers] is to promote the development of healthy and effective competition between undertakings taking part in a public procurement procedure' (para 38, emphasis added). This is so because the CJEU fails to take into account that modification of procedural requirements (such as qualitative selection) once the tender is on-going can have discriminatory effects against interested undertakings that decided not to participate in the tender due to the requirements now being modified.

More importantly, the CJEU seems to give great weight to the fact that the contracting authority had determined that, for there to be effective competition in that specific tender, 'there should be at least four candidates in order to ensure such competition' (para 42). This is troubling both because the establishment of a bracket of four to six candidates is an arbitrary decision and it is hard to accept that having three offers is insufficient in the specific tender while the contracting authority decided to have a round of final and best offers precisely with three tenderers only.

Thus, from a material point of view, the way the CJEU conceptualises the relevant competitive framework (as intra-tender, and subject to the minimum participation of four candidates) is very artificial. Nonetheless, these issues do not seem to weigh too heavily in the actual reasoning of the CJEU, which  imposes a flexible approach to the rules on modification of bidding consortia, subject to respect for the qualitative selection requirements imposed by the contracting authority (ie, no selective/preferential waivers), as well as the absence of competitive advantage.

changes in the composition of bidding consortia prior to award,
even when they are only a duo

In abstract and general terms, the approach taken by the CJEU should be welcome because it focuses on the creation of the maximum possible flexibility so as to preserve (intra-tender) competitive pressure. This is something I had broadly advocated for:

Member States should depart from formal criteria based on rigid interpretations of the principle of equal treatment in designing their domestic provisions on bidding consortia—such as rules regulating their composition, their modification, etc. Rules on bidding consortia should adopt a pro-competitive orientation and, consequently, should foster participation of consortia to the maximum possible extent permitted by competition law. In this regard, the general criterion should be to allow the most flexible solutions unless their implementation could be materially negative for the development of the tender process. Along these lines, in relation with, for example, modifications of a group of contractors—such as the inclusion of new members, exclusion or substitution of previous members, re-allocation of shares to the consortium, or of responsibilities and tasks, etc—these should be allowed under national public procurement rules if they are not material, in the sense that the modified composition or internal rules of the consortium have not altered the contracting authority’s decision to qualify the group or to allow it to proceed to any of the stages of the procurement process already conducted. It is submitted that this flexibility should go as far as to allow for the substitution of a consortium with one of its (leading) members, as long as it can prove that it still fulfils all the relevant requirements set by the tender specifications and documents (for instance, by subcontracting to the former members of the consortium or with equally acceptable or equivalent third companies)—since, at least functionally, the group of undertakings involved in the tender would not be materially altered, even though the distribution of risks, responsibilities and benefits amongst them might have significantly changed. Such flexibility is required by the need to favour the continued participation of consortia (or, at least, their core members) in the tender process, since it increases competition and enhances the chances of the public buyer obtaining value for money [A Sanchez-Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 339, footnotes omitted].

However, the issue here is that, in the specific case, it is unclear how Aarsleff could simultaneously have been qualified without resort to Pihl's specialist technical capabilities (particularly, in terms of human resources), and at the same time the fact that it took over the contracts of 50 of Pihl's employees is relevant in terms of ensuring that the changes to the consortium are not material for the purposes of allowing it to proceed as a solo tenderer. Without more details on the case, this is difficult to assess this issue, but it would seem that for Aarsleff's to meet the qualitative selection criteria on its own, it should have demonstrated to have capacity to carry out the specialist bits of the project independently. If this is true, then it would seem that Aarsleff and Pihl's consortium should not have been allowed at all, due to the uncompensated restriction of competition implicit in such type of teaming arrangement (see below).

However, if Aarsleff  had not demonstrated specialist capabilities at qualitative selection stage (because it was not a qualitative selection requirement) and this is only assessed at award stage, it seems that allowing it to rely on the fact that it took over employees from Pihl is a borderline case of conflation of selection and award criteria (not allowed under the rules of Dir 2004/17, but now allowed under the 2014 public procurement package). This can be problematic on its own, but the case does not provide enough information to assess it. At any rate, though, what seems very clear is that the contracting authority seemed to take a "dynamic approach" to the assessment of the technical capabilities of Aarsleff (first as part of the consortium and then on its own, but having taken over part of Pihl's workforce), which seems to create a competitive advantage per se [or, at least, to warrant a very close scrutiny, as stressed by AG Mengozzi in his Opinion (EU:C:2015:774, paras 80-82, not available in English)].

By not establishing this in clear terms and including this concern only as a caveat of the main test created in the MT Højgaard and Züblin Judgment, the CJEU leaves the assessment open to the consideration of the referring Danish complaints board. In that regard, it is important to stress that, in the latter's view,

[the contracting authority] laid down minimum conditions as to quality with respect to the technical capacities of the tenderers and was to undertake a qualitative assessment of the applications only if their number was greater than six. Aarsleff could therefore have been pre-selected in its own name, without being part of the Aarsleff and Pihl group. The fact that Aarsleff took the place of that group had, moreover, no effect on the situation of tenderers, in so far as none of the candidates was excluded in the pre-selection phase and none would have been rejected if Aarsleff itself had applied for an invitation to take part (C-396/14, para 19).

This may well lead the Danish complaints board to conclude that Aarsleff did not gain any competitive advantage over the other candidates participating in the tender. If nothing else, from the beginning, they knew that the capacities of Aarsleff and Pihl would be combined to submit a competing tender. The fact that Aarleff did that under its own name rather than in the name of the group could be seen as a formality without any practical relevance.

However, the broader point is that, once more, this type of reasoning can be affected by the trap of tender-specific reasoning. If it had been foreseeable for undertakings that decided not to participate in the tender that they would only need to demonstrate specialist technical capacity at tender award stage, then this is correct. However, if it would have been the reasonable interpretation that interested economic operators had to demonstrate such specialist capacity at qualitative selection stage, then the analysis would be wrong by failing to identify the discrimination/ disadvantage/ unequal treatment of potentially interested candidates that decided not to participate in the tender.

Thus, it would seem legally sounder to decide the case on the basis of whether the possibility to demonstrate that capacity at tender-specific level (ie award stage) was foreseeable ex ante (and legal, which seems difficult to justify on the basis of Dir 2004/17 and the Lianakis line of case law that controlled its interpretation), rather than whether it is discriminatory ex post. In any case, however, there is the broader issue that the CJEU does not tackle head on, and this is whether the Aarsleff and Pihl's consortium should not have been allowed at all due to its potential incompatibiity with competition law, which requires some attention.

the desirability of bidding consortia more broadly; did the CJEU miss it?

Overall, and from a logical perspective, the discussion on the rules applicable to changes in the composition of bidding consortia and their permissibility necessarily comes second to the broader question of the desirability of bidding consortia in themselves. In my view, this should be assessed under the following framework:

public procurement rules on teaming and joint bidding should be in perfect compliance with article 101 TFEU on agreements between undertakings and its case law—since public procurement rules cannot establish derogations or carve-outs to this fundamental provision of primary EU law ... In this regard, teaming and joint bidding must be seen as instances of collaboration between undertakings and, consequently, should be prohibited if they have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition (ex art 101(1) TFEU), unless (i) they meet the requirements for the legal exemption of article 101(3) TFEU, (ii) they can be considered de minimis, or (iii) they are otherwise exempted from the general prohibition. Of particular relevance here will be the interpretation that should be given to article 101(3) TFEU in the field of public procurement—ie, what requirements should be met by efficient teaming and joint bidding agreements to benefit from the legal exemption. In this regard, it should be noted that—provided the conditions regarding the indispensability of the restrictions derived from the agreement, and regarding the preservation (rectius, non-elimination) of competition in the market are complied with, so that teaming and joint bidding agreements do not distort competition in the market—otherwise restrictive consortia agreements are desirable if they expand the number of candidates or tenderers (ie, if they are concluded between firms that do not have the economic capabilities to undertake the procured contract individually) and/or if they intensify the competition between existing candidates or tenderers (ie, if they improve upon the participants’ efficiency to the benefit of the public buyer). Therefore, the relevant criteria from a competition law perspective seem to be that teaming and joint bidding must contribute to intensifying competition within the tender while not generating significant competitive distortions in the market—eg, not generating significant exclusionary effects or otherwise imposing unnecessary restrictions on the market behaviour of the parties to the consortium agreement [Sanchez-Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules (2015) 338-339, footnotes omitted and emphasis added].

In this specific case, and on the basis of the limited information available in the MT Højgaard and Züblin Judgment, there seems to be a prima facie case to consider that Aarsleff could have participated in the tender on its own and, consequently, there was no justification for it to team up with Pihl if it was a potential competitor, or to prevent the creation of valuable subcontracting relationships between Pihl and third parties. At the very least, Aarsleff should be required to demonstrate and justify the advantages that it intended to achieve with its collaboration with Pihl and how these would have (or indeed have) been passed on to the contracting authority.Thus, a more detailed assessment would be necessary to determine whether the formation of the Aarsleff and Pihl group was in itself restrictive of competition--eg by allowing Aarsleff to 'grab' the specialist technical capabilities of Pihl in order to prevent it from teaming up with a potential competitor or to compete for the contract on its (if it had the necessary capacities)--or not. This is something only the Danish complaints board can do at this stage, if at all.

Final Comments

Overall, it can well be that all the issues discussed here are simply apparent problems derived from the very stylised version of the facts available in the MT Højgaard and Züblin CJEU Judgment. However, in my view, they serve as a cautionary tale against the adoption of seemingly competition-friendly solutions to deal with specific public procurement issues, without previously checking that the competitive situation is not conceived in an artificial manner (ie the need to avoid the trap of tender-specific reasoning) and that the more general compatibility between EU public procurement and competition law is ensured.

Commission Notice on notion of State aid shows contradictions with EU public procurement rules, in particular concerning aid and contracts for local sgei

The European Commission has published the final version of its much awaited Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU (unofficial version available here). The Notice sets out very detailed guidance on the basis of the existing case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), as well as some 'independent' policy options taken by the Commission of its own motion. One such policies where the Commission is developing its own 'innovative' approach (as part of its State aid control 2.0, or trying to be "big on big and small on small") concerns the interpretation of the requirement of 'effect on trade' as part of Art 107(1) TFEU prohibition and, more specifically, a soft approach to ‘purely local’ State aid measures, particularly for services of general economic interest (SGEIs) (see Notice (2016) paras 190 and ff) .

I criticised this development when it was first proposed in the draft Notice published by the Commission in 2014 [see A Sanchez-Graells, 'Digging itself out of the hole? A critical assessment of the European Commission’s attempt to revitalize State aid enforcement after the crisis' (2016) 4(1) J Antitrust Enforcement 157-187] and submitted that:

 In the [draft Notice] ... the Commission revisits the cases of ‘local SGEIs which do not really seem to affect trade between Member States’ and moves away from considering them as relatively isolated cases towards the creation of a general category of exempted (rectius, not covered) interventions, or a new ‘general exception’ to the application of EU State aid rules [a similar development can be identified in the reinterpretation or redefinition of certain other elements of the notion of State aid, such as selectivity. See Nicolaides (2015)]. Indeed, in [the draft Notice], the Commission takes the view that, in accordance with the CJEU case law, such services can in particular circumstances be regarded as not coming within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU. In that regard, the Commission recasts three conditions that it considers to emerge from the decisional practice underlying those cases and that allow it to determine that, due to their specific circumstances, certain activities do not affect trade between Member States. Those conditions are that: (i) the aid does not lead to demand or investments being attracted to the region concerned and does not create obstacles to the establishment of undertakings from other Member States; (ii) the goods or services produced by the beneficiary are purely local or have a geographically limited attraction zone; and (iii) there is at most a marginal effect on the markets and on consumers in neighbouring Member States [draft Notice (2014) para 196].
In my view, this approach implicitly indicates that the Commission considers the existing de minimis regimes (both general and for SGEIs) insufficient to cover all ‘purely local interventions’. However, it has not made this explicit and the inadequacy of the existing framework for SGEI support when it comes to purely local interventions remains unclear—in particular in the case of State aid to providers of local healthcare or social services, which can easily be defined as services of general interest (either of an economic or non-economic nature, depending on the case) [see Sauter (2014) 84–109] and, hence, be covered by those sectoral State aid rules. As a result, blurring the boundaries of the notion of State aid at a conceptual level through such an exemption for ‘purely local interventions’ creates uncertainty as to the limits and scope of application of specific State aid regimes (in particular, the rules applicable to SGEI support) and muddles the legal framework applicable to sponsorship of local public services.
Even if the [draft Notice] is still susceptible to change prior to its delayed approval, the Commission has already been using the ‘purely local intervention exemption’ rather generously. Indeed, framing it as an additional effort to clarify to Member States that certain types of economic interventions do not require ex ante assessment despite not being covered by the 2014 GBER, the Commission has recently ‘packaged’ seven of its Decisions and used them to stress that in cases where support is granted to ‘an activity which has a purely local impact’ and which has ‘no – or at most marginal – foreseeable effects on cross-border investments in the sector or the establishment of firms within the EU’s Single Market’, the measure is deemed not to have an effect on trade ‘e.g. where the beneficiary supplies goods or services to a limited area within a Member State and is unlikely to attract customers from other Member States’ [see Commission (2015)]. This can be seen to create an implicit test of ‘significant probability’ of effect on cross-border trade that deviates from the ‘standard’ approach discussed above for ‘purely local State aid interventions’. Those decisions concerned healthcare; sports services; information, advisory and consultancy services to interested individuals, newly created firms and SMEs; as well as the expansion of port facilities. Almost all of them could have been covered by the SGEIs rules (pp. 177-178, emphasis added).

Taking a broader perspective, I also indicated that 'in some specific cases, the lack of clarity in the Commission’s approach to "purely local interventions" ... creates a clash between State aid rules and other tools of EU economic law, such as public procurement law, which I consider an unwelcome development' [Sanchez-Graells (2016) 179].

The final version of the Notice develops the guidance concerning the assessment of State aid measures' effect on trade beyond the content of the draft Notice and, in particular, alters the wording of para 196, which now reads: 'The Commission has in a number of decisions considered, in view of the specific circumstances of the cases, that the measure had a purely local impact and consequently had no effect on trade between Member States. In those cases the Commission ascertained in particular that the beneficiary supplied goods or services to a limited area within a Member State and was unlikely to attract customers from other Member States, and that it could not be foreseen that the measure would have more than a marginal effect on the conditions of cross-border investments or establishment'. This formulation conflates and reorganises the three criteria identified in the draft Notice, to the effect that criteria ii) and iii) of the draft Notice (ie local products or services, and marginal effect on neighbouring markets) are recombined to require that the aid concerns the supply of 'goods or services to a limited area within a Member State and [is] unlikely to attract customers from other Member States', and criterion i) (ie focus on freedom of establishment) is reworded: whereas the draft Notice required that 'the aid does not lead to demand or investments being attracted to the region concerned and does not create obstacles to the establishment of undertakings from other Member States', the Notice now simply indicates that 'it could not be foreseen that the measure would have more than a marginal effect on the conditions of cross-border investments or establishment'. Therefore, even in more clear terms than in the draft Notice, the Notice on the concept of State aid creates the implicit test of ‘significant probability’ of effect on cross-border trade I had criticised.

incompatibility with eu public procurement law

In my view, the test of ‘significant probability’ of effect on cross-border for 'purely local' State aid interventions (in particular for SGEIs) is problematic because, in addition to the messy situation concerning its compatibility with de minimis regimes, it creates an unclear exemption from the prohibition of Art 107(1) TFEU that Member States need to assess on the basis of their own assessment, which can clearly expose the system to strategic behaviour and makes it extremely weak in terms of effective oversight {issues I discuss in detail in Sanchez-Graells (2016)]. Additionally, this approach creates inconsistency, if not incompatibility, with the approach the CJEU has followed towards identifying the existence of cross-border interest for the purposes of EU public procurement law. Given the interaction between these two bodies of EU economic law, particularly in the commissioning or procurement of SGEIs, this is bound to be problematic.

Firstly, because it creates problems of ex post loading of the Commission’s intervention in the area of State aid enforcement, particularly when one considers cases where the Member States may misapply the still emerging 'purely local intervention' exemption by considering that there is no likely (significant) effect on trade and the Commission disagrees with that assessment (either motu proprio, or as a result of complaint). In those cases, the intervention of the Commission also comes too late and reliance on the interpretation of such unclear soft law regarding the coverage of 'purely local interventions' is bound to create legal uncertainty and litigation. And, secondly, because the development of contradictory criteria to determine coverage by different sets of rules of EU economic law that often need to be complied with cumulatively creates significant difficulties.

A comparison of two recent cases regarding minor port investments exemplifies such contradiction. One of the seven Decisions ‘packaged’ by the Commission to complement the 2014 GBER exemption with a light-touch approach to determining the absence of cross-border effects of “purely local” State aid measures involved investment aid for Lauwersoog port. The summary provided by the Commission is as follows: 'The investment project in the port of Lauwersoog consists in a lengthening of the quay in its fishing port, modernising its marina for pleasure boats and constructing a floating platform for recreational fishing. Lauwersoog port is mainly used by small fishing vessels which choose a port mainly in view of its geographical proximity to the relevant fishing grounds. The investment will not lead to a significant increase in the port’s capacities and, in particular, will not increase its capacity to cater for larger ships. Thus, the investment in the fishing port is targeted at a local market and will not have any significant effect on the patterns of trade between Member States in the sense that it would not provide incentives to fishermen from other Member States to use the Port of Lauwersoog rather than fishing ports in other Member States. The parts of the project aimed at recreational activities are also clearly targeted at a local market (the marina only has 60 moorings) and, as such, will not have any negative effect on cross-border trade' (emphasis added). Hence, in view of its purely local impact and the minimal incentives it creates for cross-border trade, the Commission decided that the investment does not constitute aid.

It is worth contrasting the approach in the Lauwersoog port case with that followed in the area of EU public procurement law by the CJEU [C-388/12, EU:C:2013:734, see here], where the direct award of a concession contract for the construction and management of a European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)-supported portuary infrastructure (a slipway) was directly awarded by the Italian Comune di Ancona to the local fishermen cooperative. The Comune di Ancona justified that it needed not comply with general principles of EU law governing the award of concessions contracts on the basis that the contract was not of cross-border interest (ie, fundamentally, that the award of the contract would not have an effect on intra-EU trade) [it must be noted that the case was decided prior to the adoption of Directive 2014/25 on concession contracts; however, general principles remain relevant; see A Sanchez-Graells, 'The Continuing Relevance of the General Principles of EU Public Procurement Law after the Adoption of the 2014 Concessions Directive' (2015) 10(3) European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review 130-139].

The Comune di Ancona considered that the contract was not of cross-border interest (ie in the framework of the Notice on the concept of State aid, there was no significant probability of effect on cross-border trade) because the management of the slipway was 'subject to a number of conditions. These included the obligation to pay the Comune di Ancona an annual charge calculated in such a way as to avoid substantial net revenue being generated for either the concession-granting authority or the concessionaire; a prohibition on modifying the implementation conditions of the operation eligible for funding; a prohibition on engaging in profit-making activity; the obligation to comply with all the applicable EU directives and standards; and the obligation to maintain the public-service function and intended use of the structure at issue. It was also stated that the slipway was to remain, in any event, the property of the Comune di Ancona' [C-388/12, EU:C:2013:734, para 12].

The CJEU rejected the argumentation and subjected the award to the relevant EU public procurement obligations by clearly rejecting that the contract was of no cross-border interest, stressing that 'the Comune di Ancona has not invoked any objective facts capable of explaining the lack of any transparency in the award of the concession. On the contrary, it maintained that the concession was not liable to interest undertakings located in other Member States, in so far as the concession granted to the Pescatori cooperative was designed so as not to be capable of generating substantial net revenue for its beneficiary or an undue advantage for the latter or for the municipality. However, the fact that a concession is not capable of generating substantial net revenue or an undue advantage for an undertaking or for a public body does not, in itself, support the inference that the concession is of no economic interest for undertakings located in Member States other than that of the contracting authority. In the context of an economic strategy to extend part of its activities to another Member State, an undertaking may take the tactical decision to seek the award in that State of a concession despite the fact that that concession is incapable as such of generating sufficient profit, since that opportunity could nevertheless enable the undertaking to establish itself on the market of that State and to make itself known there with a view to preparing its future expansion' (C-388/12, EU:C:2013:734, paras 50-51, emphasis added).

In my view, at least as a matter of principle, the approach of both cases is diametrically opposed. In the public procurement field, there is no de minimis exemption and any potential impact on cross-border trade, even hypothetical, triggers compliance with public procurement principles (and rules) [see A Sanchez-Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 225-26]. On the contrary, in the field of State aid and with the push for the 'purely local intervention exemption', the Commission seems willing to create such (additional) de minimis exemption from the need for Member States to either fit the aid measure within the applicable block exemption regulation (ie, either the 2014 GBER, general de minimis rules, or the SGEI package) or obtain an individual authorisation from the Commission. Overall, this creates internal inconsistencies in areas of EU economic law that require more convergence, particularly if the direct award of the contract results in the presumption that State aid was illegally granted [see A Sanchez-Graells, 'Public Procurement and State Aid: Reopening the Debate?' (2012) 21(6) Public Procurement Law Review 205-12]; and, more generally, creates a problem for the Commission to identify and properly tackle cases where the Member States improperly apply this (still emerging) 'purely local intervention exemption'. Thus, in my view, this is an unwelcome development of EU State aid policy, and one where I would expect litigation soon to emerge.

 

Interesting short paper on public procurement and competition law: Blažo (2015)

Reading O Blažo, 'Public Procurement Directive and Competition Law - Really United in Diversity?' (2015), I have found some interesting and thought-provoking remarks on the impact of public procurement regulation over the effectiveness of competition law enforcement. The paper focuses 'mainly on three problematic issues: participation of companies of the same economic group in public procurement procedure, disqualification for cartel infringement, attractiveness of leniency programme'.

Multiple bidding by members of an economic group

Blažo's discussion of the issue of multiple participation by companies of the same economic group discusses Assitur (C-538/07, EU:C:2009:317), where the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) declared contrary to EU public procurement law an Italian rule not allowing companies linked by a relationship of control or significant influence to participate, as competing tenderers, in the same procedure for the award of a public contract. The CJEU determined that, 'while pursuing legitimate objectives of equality of treatment of tenderers and transparency in procedures for the award of public contracts, [a national rule that] lays down an absolute prohibition on simultaneous and competing participation in the same tendering procedure by undertakings linked by a relationship of control or affiliated to one another, without allowing them an opportunity to demonstrate that that relationship did not influence their conduct in the course of that tendering procedure' is incompatible with EU public procurement law (para 33, emphasis added). 

Blažo considers that this 'appears as “over-regulation” and “under-regulation” [at] the same time in his context: it does not solve problem of participation of several companies forming of one economic group in one tender procedure and on the other hand outlaws their automatic exclusion'. I would disagree with this critical assessment and submit that the CJEU reached a good balance of competing interests (ie ensuring sufficient intra-tender competition vs avoiding collusion or manipulation risks). As I wrote in Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 341-342 (references omitted): 

the grounds for exclusion based on professional qualities of the tenderers—and the existence of relationships of control between them, or their control structure, is clearly a professional quality—are exhaustively listed in article 57 of Directive 2014/24, which precludes Member States or contracting authorities from adding other grounds for exclusion based on criteria relating to professional qualities of the candidate or tenderer, such as professional honesty, solvency and economic and financial capacity. Nevertheless, it does not preclude the option for Member States to maintain or adopt substantive rules designed, in particular, to ensure, in the field of public procurement, observance of the principle of equal treatment and of the principle of transparency. Given that the extension of the ban on multiple bidding has as its clear rationale the prevention of discrimination between self-standing entities and those integrated in group structures, prima facie it seems to constitute a case of permitted additional ground for the exclusion of tenderers not regulated by article 57 of Directive 2014/24.
However, as also noted, when establishing these additional grounds for the exclusion of tenderers, Member States must comply with the principle of proportionality and the automatic exclusion of tenderers for the sole fact of belonging to the same legal group seems to be in breach of this latter requirement. Interestingly, EU case law seems to be moving in the direction of restricting the scope of this type of (extended) prohibition by outlawing the automatic exclusion from tendering procedures of tenderers between which there exists a relationship of control (as defined by national law) without giving them an opportunity to prove that, in the circumstances of the case, that relationship had not led to an infringement of the principles of equal treatment of tenderers and of transparency.
This would be in line with the rules applicable to the treatment of conflicts of interest (art 24 Dir 2014/24), which only justify the exclusion of candidates and tenderers ‘where a conflict of interest … cannot be effectively remedied by other less intrusive measures’ (art 57(4)(e) Dir 2014/24). 

Exclusion of competition law infringers, Self-cleaning & impact on the attractiveness of leniency programmes

Interestingly, Blažo explains that, under the version of Slovak procurement law prior to the transposition of Dir 2014/24, contracting authorities were bound to exclude tenderers that had been convicted of infringements of competition law [on this, see Generali-Providencia Biztosító, C-470/13, EU:C:2014:2469, and discussion here], but 'undertaking[s] who successfully qualified for the leniency program (immunity as well as fine
reduction)
' were not excluded from participation in public procurement procedures. Or, in more detail, 'The scheme excluding entrepreneurs who have been convicted of a cartel in public procurement applies automatically, therefore there is no need to issue any other disqualification decision. It is also a compulsory system, thus the contracting authority authority shall be obliged to exclude such an undertaking ex officio, and the law does not allow any way to alleviate such sanctions. Only the undertaking who takes part in an agreement restricting competition in public procurement can avoid exclusion from public procurement, its cooperation with the Antimonopoly Office in leniency program' (Blažo, p. 1494).

Blažo then goes on to assess the changes that the transposition of Dir 2014/24 will require [in particular, art 57(4)(d) on the exclusion of competition law infringers and art 57(6) on self-cleaning, for discussion, see here and A Sanchez-Graells, 'Exclusion, Qualitative Selection and Short-listing', in F Lichère, R Caranta & S Treumer (eds), Modernising Public Procurement. The New Directive, vol. 6 European Procurement Law Series (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2014) 97-129], noting that 'the directive does not expressly mention leniency program as an exemption from exclusion'; and, in particular, criticises the fact that Art 57(7) requires that Member States 'shall, in particular, determine the maximum period of exclusion if no [self-cleaning] measures ... are taken by the economic operator to demonstrate its reliability. Where the period of exclusion has not been set by final judgment, that period shall not exceed ... three years from the date of the relevant event in the cases referred to in paragraph 4'. In view of this, Blažo concludes that

If the contracting entity wishes to establish an infringement using a final decision of competition authority (or judgment dismissing the action against such a decision), it is almost unrealistic to have these documents available within three years from the infringement, or the time for which the undertaking can be excluded from public procurement will be very short. It is obvious that word-by-word transposition of the PPD into Slovak legal order eliminates current patterns punishment of undertakings for bid rigging and replaces it with a system that does not constitute a sufficient threat of sanctions, which would have preventive effects against cartels in public procurement. Furthermore even in case of effective application of this system, it may discourage leniency applicants and thus undermine effective public enforcement of competition law (p. 1495).

I share some of his concerns about the difficulty of establishing appropriate timeframes for exclusion based on competition law infringements. As I pointed out in Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn (2015) 291:

This raises the issue of how to compute the maximum duration, particularly in the case of article 57(4) violations, as the reference to the ‘relevant event’ admits different interpretations (ie, either from the moment of the relevant violation, or the moment in which the contracting authority is aware of it or can prove it). Given that some of the violations may take time to identify (eg, emergence of a previous bid rigging conspiracy that can be tackled under art 57(4)(c) Dir 2014/24), a possibilistic interpretation will be necessary to avoid reducing the effectiveness of these exclusion grounds. In any case, compliance with domestic administrative rules will be fundamental.

However, I am not sure that I share the concerns about the effectiveness of leniency programmes and their attractiveness for undertakings that may risk exclusion from procurement procedures. First, I am generally sceptical of the claim that leniency programmes need to be protected at all costs (see here, here and here). Second, and looking specifically at the worry that not having a mention to leniency programmes in Dir 2014/24 may exclude or reduce the possibility for contracting authorities (or Member States) to treat leniency applicants favourably in the procurement context, I am not sure that this is the case, mainly, because it would still seem possible for competition rules to foresee that any final decisions declaring the infringement of competition law should not include sanctions concerning debarment from public procurement procedures for leniency applicants (I am not convinced that this is desirable, but it is certainly possible). In that case, there would be no final judgment from which the exclusion could derive and, consequently, contracting authorities intending to exclude the leniency applicant in view of its previous infringement of competition law would be using their discretion to exclude without the constraints derived from the previous decision. This has a significant impact in terms of self-cleaning.

While Art 57(6) in fine foresees that 'An economic operator which has been excluded by final judgment from participating in procurement ... shall not be entitled to make use of the [self-cleaning] possibility ... during the period of exclusion resulting from that judgment in the Member States where the judgment is effective' [something I criticised in 'Exclusion, Qualitative Selection and Short-listing' (2014) 113], this restriction does not apply in the absence of a final judgment imposing the exclusion. Thus, the successful leniency applicant would still be able to rely on its leniency application and collaboration with the competition authority in order to claim it has complied with the requirements of the self-cleaning provisions in Art 57(6) Dir 2014/24. The sticky point would be the need to 'prove that it has paid or undertaken to pay compensation in respect of any damage caused by the ... misconduct'. Of course, this takes us back to the claim that leniency programmes will not be attractive if, in addition to exempting the applicant from the competition fine that would otherwise be applicable (let's remember it can be up to 10% of its turnover), they do not also shield competition law infringers from claims for damages--and now public procurement debarment. As mentioned, I am highly sceptical of these claims and, from a normative perspective, I am not persuaded that leniency should come at such high cost.

In any case, these are interesting issues and it would be very relevant to engage in empirical research to see if the entry into force of Dir 2014/24 last month actually has an impact on the effectiveness of leniency programmes in the EU.

 

Some thoughts on circular economy and public procurement - a propos Witjes & Lozano (2016)

The emphasis on sustainability and more effective resource management in all dimensions of public policy or, in other words, the move towards a circular economy [as first formalised by RA Frosch & N Gallopoulos, 'Strategies for manufacturing' (1989) 261(3) Scientific American 144-152] has clear public procurement implications. This has been stressed in the recent Action Plan for the Circular Economy developed by the European Commission.

The Action Plan stresses several ways in which public procurement policy can be developed or adjusted. In particular, it indicates that
 

Public procurement accounts for a large proportion of European consumption (nearly 20% of EU GDP). It can therefore play a key role in the circular economy, and the Commission will encourage this role through its actions on Green Public Procurement (GPP), where criteria are developed at EU level and then used by public authorities on a voluntary basis. First, the Commission will make sure that in future, special emphasis is placed on aspects relevant to the circular economy, such as durability and reparability, when setting out or revising criteria. Secondly, it will support a greater uptake of these criteria by public authorities, and reflect on how GPP could be used more widely across the EU, in particular for products or markets that have high relevance for the circular economy. Finally, the Commission will lead by example, by making sure that Green Public Procurement is used as widely as possible in its own procurement, and by reinforcing the use of GPP in EU funding.
- The Commission will specifically consider proportionate requirements on durability and the availability of repair information and spare parts in its work on Ecodesign, as well as durability information in future Energy Labelling measures.
- In the revised waste proposals, the Commission proposes new rules which will encourage reuse activities.
- The Commission will work towards better enforcement of the guarantees on tangible products, examine possible options for improvement, and tackle false green claims
- The Commission will prepare an independent testing programme under Horizon 2020 to help the identification of issues related to possible planned obsolescence. This work would involve relevant stakeholders as appropriate.
- The Commission will take action on Green Public Procurement (GPP), by emphasising circular economy aspects in new or revised criteria, supporting higher uptake of GPP, and leading by example in its own procurement and in EU funding.

The Action Plan also specifies that 'Public authorities can also contribute to the demand for recycled materials through their procurement policies.'

All of this is very closely linked to a 'classical' understanding of green public procurement (GPP), on which the European Commission has recently published the third edition of its Buying green! Handbook, and points towards two main issues under the rules of Directive 2014/24: technical specifications (including preliminary market consultations aimed at their definition) and life-cycle costing methods as part of contract award criteria [for discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 327-336, 373-377 and 379-388]. Within this framework, it seems natural that contracting authorities can enjoy discretion to determine what to buy and, subject to requirements of technical neutrality (see here) and the avoidance of technical steering by undertakings involved in the market consultations (see here), and to the development of appropriate and transparent methodologies for life-cycle costing (which can be very challenging, if at all possible, see here), this should not require any changes in the applicable EU public procurement legal framework.

However, there is a different interpretation of the Action Plan for the Circular Economy that conflates resource-based issues linked to GPP with other socio-economic dimensions of a broader understanding of the circular economy. I find this very problematic because it is increasingly clear to me that environmental and social considerations cannot be assessed (or promoted) together--or, strictly, under the same rules and with the same leeway for contracting authorities--due to their different impacts on market competition and local protection, and to the fact that the EU has a significant volume of environment-related competences, whereas its ability to regulate in social matters is extremely limited, if not practically non-existent. Thus, a trend that bundles together the pursuit of environmental and social considerations as part of a broader understanding of smart or sustainable procurement can be analytically problematic and result in proposals that do not pass legal muster.

This is particularly clear in positions such as the one advanced by S Witjes & R Lozano, 'Towards a more Circular Economy: Proposing a framework linking sustainable public procurement and sustainable business models' (2016) 112 Resources, Conservation and Recycling 37–44, where the authors claim that 'a Circular Economy has been proposed as one of the latest concepts for addressing both the environmental and socio-economic issues. A Circular Economy aims at transforming waste into resources and on bridging production and consumption activities' (emphasis added). Their paper 'proposes a framework to include technical and non-technical specifications of product/service combinations that improve resource usage efficiency through recovery. The framework also considers socio-cultural specifications and physical and social proximity between the stakeholders in the procurement process. The framework is based on collaboration, which is a vital link between the public procurement process and the development of more sustainable business models'.

Their main claim is that a shift from product based procurement towards service-based sustainable public procurement (SPP) is desirable and likely to achieve superior results in terms of sustainability, which they represent as a change of paradigm in terms of engagement with suppliers from the (current) tender stage to a much earlier preparation stage (see graphs below).

In their own words: 'Long term collaboration during the SPP process requires a shift from the technical specifications set up by the procurer to a more collaborative discussion on, and definition of, the proposed technical and non-technical specifications between the supplier and procurer. In addition, socio-cultural specifications, such as beliefs and attitudes of the people contributing to the procurement process ... must be included in the SPP process. While the technical and non-technical specifications drive the supplier and procurer to develop products or services aiming for more resource efficiency, the socio-cultural specifications will help the parties to hire and train personnel specifically for the co-development process, addressing the Social innovation and Multi-stakeholder involvement components of the resource efficiency transformations proposed by the European Commission' in Directive 2014/24 [sic] (emphasis added).

I find this very problematic for several reasons. First, because the dialogue on (technical) environmental issues can be achieved through market consultations and the effective use of variant bids and technical equivalents, without creating market foreclosure at early stages of the procurement procedure. Second, because the suggestion that contracting authorities can select tenderers on the basis of 'socio-cultural specifications' (sic, criteria) simply runs against the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union that bans the use of general corporate policies for the purposes of qualitative selection--as clearly stressed in the fair trade coffee case (Commission v Netherlands, C-368/10, EU:C:2012:284; for discussion, see Sanchez-Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn (2015) 388). And, finally, because this sort of arguments do not discriminate between types of procurement and goods to be sourced by the contracting authority. There certainly has to be a (very significant) threshold for contracting authorities to team up at such an early stage and get involved in the development of the technical solution to its needs, which has traditionally been linked to the possibility to use a technical dialogue and, more recently, an innovation partnership procedure--both of which surely must remain exceptional in terms of the volume of (non off the shelf, highly complex, highly value added) procurement they channel.

Overall, then, I think that the discussion on the interaction between circular economy and public procurement should remain restricted to the maximisation of green public procurement in both an innovation-promoting and competition-neutral way. And I also think that the discussion on the use of public procurement to achieve social outcomes need to be kept separately and subjected to very strict proportionality requirements due to its high risk for abuse of discretion, protectionism and, more generally, poor procurement practices leading to reduced value for money (for extended discussion in view of RegioPost, see here). In particular, I find the idea that public procurement should be used to support the emergence and consolidation of alternative forms of (corporate) governance deeply troubling, and I do not think that the issue of collaboration between private and public sector should aim at pre-selecting the modes of business structure 'for the future', however sustainable they may present themselves. The use of (public) consumption as a form of undercover economic regulation is certainly undesirable. However, this seems to be an issue that may be favoured by current policy directions...

Again, on the 'tricky' concept of State resources under EU State aid law: GC rules on German financial support for renewable energy (T-47/15)

In its Judgment of 10 May 2016 in Germany v Commission, T-47/15, EU:T:2016:281, the General Court (GC) has revisited once more the tricky issue whether publicly-mandated payments between private economic operators can constitute State aid. The GC has followed the functional approach of the Court of Justice (ECJ) in Vent De Colère and Others (C-262/12, EU:C:2013:851, see here), continuing a line of case law that distinguishes PreussenElektra (C-379/98, EU:C:2001:160, see here), and further minimising the 'outlier' decision in Doux Élevages and Coopérative agricole UKL-AREE (C-677/11, EU:C:2013:348, see here).

In the case at hand, the relevant German scheme of financial support for the production of renewable energy created both mandatory purchase obligations of energy from renewable sources ('EEG energy') at above-market prices (the 'support scheme'), and reductions in such surcharges for certain types of electric-intensive undertakings in the manufacturing sector (or 'EUIs') (the 'compensation scheme'). Thus, the EEG energy financial scheme included both measures in support of producers and of 'heavy-users' of electricity. Importantly, all these financial measures were managed by intermediaries in the energy markets. The Commission had found this scheme in breach of EU State aid rules, unless stringent conditions applied.

One of Germany's main submissions against the application of State aid rules by the Commission (mainly, Art 107 TFEU) to prohibit was that the EEG energy support and compensation schemes was that 'according to the case-law, payments between individuals which are ordered by the State without being imputable to the budget of the State or of another public body and in respect of which the State does not relinquish any resources, in whatever form (such as taxes, duties, charges and so on), retain their private-law nature' (para 73).

This submission triggers an analysis of whether such payments qualify as State resources, which mainly hinges on whether the State has control over those funds. Seeking to rely on PreussenElektra and Doux Élevages, the arguments submitted by Germany focused on the fact that the aid was administered 'at arms length' by the energy intermediaries. On the contrary, seeking to rely on a functional approach to the assessment of 'public control' of the private funds that derived from the EEG energy financial scheme, the Commission's arguments were closer to the position of the ECJ in Vent De Colère.

In order to assess these issues, the GC reiterated consolidated case law of the ECJ and stressed that 'Article 107(1) TFEU covers all the financial means by which the public authorities may actually support undertakings, irrespective of whether or not those means are permanent assets of the public sector. Therefore, even if the sums corresponding to the measure in question are not permanently held by the Treasury, the fact that they constantly remain under public control, and therefore available to the competent national authorities, is sufficient for them to be categorised as State resources' (para 83).

In the assessment of the EEG energy support and compensation schemes, the GC engaged in a reasoning that, fundamentally, relied on two main issues: 1) the fact that German law imposed on specific energy intermediaries (in the case, on transmission system operators, or TSOs) obligations oriented towards the administration of the EEG energy financial schemes that 'can be assimilated, from the point of view of their effects, to a State concession' (para 93); and 2) the fact that the funds raised through the EEG energy financial schemes are ring-fenced by law or, in other words, 'the funds are not paid into the TSOs’ general budget or freely available to them, but are subject to separate accounting and allocated exclusively to the financing of the support and compensation schemes, to the exclusion of any other purpose' (ibid).

As a result of these two circumstances, the GC concludes that 'the funds generated by the EEG surcharge and administered collectively by the TSOs remain under the dominant influence of the public authorities in that the legislative and regulatory provisions governing them enable the TSOs, taken together, to be assimilated to an entity executing a State concession' (para 94, emphasis added). Or, even more clearly, that 'the fact that the State does not have actual access to the resources generated by the EEG surcharge, in the sense that they indeed do not pass through the State budget, does not affect ... the State’s dominant influence over the use of those resources and its ability to decide in advance, through the adoption of the EEG 2012, which objectives are to be pursued and how those resources in their entirety are to be used' (para 118).

The second key element in the analysis, in my view, is that the GC gives significant relevance to the fact that the payments ultimately required from consumers derived necessarily from the existence of the German law enacting the . In other words, the GC relied heavily on the fact that the surcharges amounted to '20% to 25% of the total amount of an average final consumer’s bill. Having regard to the extent of that burden, its passing on to final consumers must therefore be regarded as a consequence foreseen and organised by the German legislature. It is thus indeed on account of the EEG 2012 that final electricity consumers are, de facto, required to pay that price supplement or additional charge. It is a charge that is unilaterally imposed by the State in the context of its policy to support producers of EEG electricity and can be assimilated, from the point of view of its effects, to a levy on electricity consumption in Germany. Indeed, that charge is imposed by a public authority, for purposes in the general interest, namely protection of the climate and the environment by ensuring the sustainable development of energy supply and developing technologies for producing EEG electricity, and in accordance with the objective criterion of the quantity of electricity delivered by suppliers to their final customers' (para 95, emphasis added).

In my view, the GC is right on both points, and both the functional analysis of the control the State exercises over ring-fenced mandatory charges and the stress given to the (para)fiscal nature of the charge are good justifications for the enforcement of State aid rules against this type of State intervention--thus closing the gap created by cases such as Doux Élevages

However, the case also leaves a strange aftertaste due to the references to a 'State concession'. Given the increasing body of EU economic law applicable to concessions (notably, Dir 2014/23, which does not seem to have much to do with what the GC assessed in Commission v Germany), it would probably have been preferable for the GC to keep a stricter use of language.

In that regard, if the GC actually wanted to stress that the intermediaries administering the EEG energy financial scheme were exercising (quasi) delegated public powers or (quasi) delegated State prerogatives (which was the language used in Doux Élevages, para 32), then it better ought to say so in those terms. Otherwise, there is a risk of generating additional confusion in an area of EU economic law that, honestly, is getting ever more complex.

RegioPost and its implications: personal notes of the full extended discussion at Bristol conference

Pictures by @PetraOden & @asanchezgraells

Pictures by @PetraOden & @asanchezgraells

Spending a whole day with friends and distinguished academics discussing the RegioPost judgment and its implications for the enforcement of labour law standards in public procurement settings under EU law proved to be both intellectually challenging and very rewarding. I am sincerely grateful to all speakers and participants for the excellent exchange of ideas (the event was definitely not short on controversy ...).

It will take us some time to get the formal publication of the proceedings of the conference in place, so I thought it would useful to advance here some of the most salient issues discussed at the event. These are my (lengthy) personal notes and, even if I tried to capture the essence of the speakers' presentations, they may not represent their views and they do not bind them in any way; all mistakes in these notes are my own.

Joanne Conaghan gave us a very warm welcome (literally, for it was a really hot day in Bristol after the gorgeous weekend weather) and stressed the relevance of putting the discussions to be held in the broader context of the constant struggle of harmonising economic and social considerations in any regulatory and policy framework.

With this in mind, the discussions for the day were organised around four panels, covering in turn different perspectives of the RegioPost judgment and, more generally, the difficulties and challenges in enforcing labour standards through public procurement. 

Panel 1: Constitutional and Internal Market Aspects of the Enforcement of Labour Standards in the EU

Constitutional view on RegioPost

Phil Syrpis' paper addressed the constitutional framework considering the dynamic relationship between secondary and primary EU law, and in particular how the posting of workers directive (PWD) impacts on provision of services in the EU. Two constitutional visions: a) all secondary legislation is under the Treaties and, consequently, secondary law cannot have any influence on the way the CJEU interprets primary law; b) more organic or heterarchical model, the CJEU’s monopoly on the interpretation of primary law is necessarily complemented by legislative action whereby the legislative institutions provide input on the context of the rights and, consequently, the CJEU should take this into account when interpreting rights under the Treaties.

Not clear how secondary law in conflict with previous case law of the CJEU should be dealt with, as both models are in tension. The case law of the CJEU is inconsistent and the Court has not clarified what is the right approach in cases of conflict between secondary law and previous case law interpreting primary law. As an aside – these issues raise important points for Brexit, particularly when some directives create individual rights, as well as the possibility for MS to shape social and citizenship rights and influence the case law of the CJEU.

Initial reaction to RegioPost is that it clarifies some issues, but it confuses others too. Essentially, the question was about compatibility with Art 56 TFEU for the regional government to insist on compliance with regional minimum wage. Usefully, the CJEU distinguished between exhaustive and non-exhaustive harmonisation. Where there is exhaustive harmonisation, the framework provided by the secondary legislation displaces that of the Treaty. From a constitutional perspective, that is the easy case. However, Art 26 Dir 2004/18 does not lay down exhaustive rules on contract performance and, consequently, the analysis of legality needs to be carried out under primary law—ie Art 56 TFEU. Moreover, Art 26 explicitly required for contract compliance clauses to be in compliance with Union Law.

However, in para 60 of RegioPost, despite saying they would assess under primary law, the Court actually assessed compliance with the PWD, which is a measure of non-exhaustive secondary legislation as well. In the light of the relationship between primary and secondary law, this approach is strange and complicates the issue of what the hierarchies are. The provision of regional law was determined to be compatible with EU law due to compliance with Art 3 PWD, rather that Art 56 TFEU, which is unusual and confusing.

Distinction between exhaustive and non-exhaustive harmonisation presupposes that most initiatives by the EU legislator will be of exhaustive harmonisation. However, exhaustive harmonisation is never the case, particularly in areas such as social or environmental law. This requires a more sophisticated approach to what to do in these areas in terms of compatibility with EU law.

PWD and Dir 2004/18 seem to be in a strange relationship because the legality under Dir 2004/18 ends up depending on the interpretation of the PWD—does this trigger a privileged position of the PWD over the procurement rules? RegioPost suggests that the CJEU’s controversial interpretation of the PWD is more important to the CJEU than the interpretation of the procurement rules. That is odd. What should the relationship between particular directive and the CJEU’s interpretation of the Treaty? ‘Provided they are compatible with the Treaties’ should imply some independent analysis of compatibility with Art 56 TFEU itself, almost regardless of compatibility with other rules of secondary EU law.

For the future: what is the likely impact for changes in the public procurement rules? Art 26 Dir 2004/18 vis-à-vis Arts 18(2) and 70 Dir 2014/24. Does the subtle wording in Dir 2014/24 alter the position of the procurement rules? Also, in view of the proposals for the revision of the PWD, there are queries as to the permeability of procurement rules to that reform. Finally, it is also unclear to what extent these changes in secondary law are likely to affect the CJEU’s case law and interpretation of primary law (will it reflect the organic model?).

Art 56 TFEU and the principle of proportionality

Piotr Bogdanowicz stressed that RegioPost has been described as the gold standard for the social protection of workers performing public contracts. However, there was no reference to proportionality in the judgment. Generally, there is a three step methodology in this area: restriction, justification and proportionality assessment. It is surprising that RegioPost does not engage in this three-step analysis because it had been used in Ruffert and Bundesdruckerei. The lack of this analysis is a shortcoming of this Judgment and, unfortunately, another case challenging the coherence of the case law of the CJEU.

Why should proportionality apply to RegioPost? Because Art 56 TFEU should apply, mainly due to the fact that procurement rules are a fundamental expression of free provision of services, as well as the fact that the fundamental freedoms are the legal basis for the adoption of the Directives. Furthermore, due to the lack of exhaustive harmonisation.

The analysis is odd because, should Art 26 Dir 2004/18 not have required compatibility with EU law, would this have been an issue? This is particularly relevant because Art 70 Dir 2014/24 does not require it. In Piotr's opinion, there is no need for this requirement to be written in secondary law because it derives simply from supremacy of EU law. And, in order to assess such compatibility, the three-step approach needs to be followed. Restrictions are easy to prove and the CJEU rarely rejects the public interest reasons raised by the Member States, so proportionality ends up being the key issue of analysis in almost all cases.

In procurement, proportionality is particularly relevant because it has been included from the early generations of public procurement directives. Proportionality has always been applied in the procurement setting as a general principle of EU law. It was applied in the case law anticipating RegioPost (Ruffert and Bundesdruckerei) and in both cases the CJEU found that national measures did not pass the proportionality test. The importance of proportionality is also reflected in Art 18(1) Dir 2014/24, where it is explicitly consolidated.

Why did the CJEU not apply proportionality? It is difficult to identify the reasons why, mainly because it derives from the construction of the judgment itself. In para 67, the CJEU stresses that interpretation of Art 26 Dir 2004/18 is supported by Art 56 TFEU, which is a strange argument. That is why the abrogation of the proportionality analysis is an odd analytical strategy. In Ruffert, the CJEU had gone the same way but did apply proportionality to assess compatibility with EU law (after the restriction was demonstrated under the PWD). Even if the CJEU wanted to distinguish RegioPost from Ruffert, it ought to have carried the proportionality analysis. As it is now, it seems that the PWD offers a safe haven for national law, which could have been done 8 years ago (in Ruffert), but not now because Art 26 Dir 2004/18 applied to the case and this should have triggered a different analysis.

This adds complication under Dir 2014/24 because of Art 70 + 18(1), which change wording and potentially the test. The case law of the CJEU shows that the more politically sensitive the case, the less intrusive the scrutiny seems to be. ‘Indulgent’ scrutiny was advocated for by AG Mengozzi because the measure is applicable to workers assigned to public contracts rather than workers in the private sector—this raises an issue of conflict between economic and non-economic goals (competition v social protection). This, however, should trigger a strict proportionality test.

The implications of lack of proportionality in RegioPost are severe. A recent report by Bruegel showed that there is 1.2 million posted workers in the EU, 40% come from Eastern countries (20% come from Poland). The CJEU seems to have adopted a more careful approach to the PWD and this may improve the situation for posted workers. This is something that requires further case law from the CJEU.

DEBATE

focused on complex issues around the way the preliminary reference ‘framed’ the CJEU’s assessment and why the CJEU ‘abrogated’ alternative analyses such as non-discrimination or split of competences. The discussion also covered the difficulty of applying proportionality in fields where we are dealing with incommensurate values. Moreover, this is complicated by the lack of clarity and consistency of the recitals in specifying what specific secondary law interventions aim to achieve—which is particularly muddy regarding Dir 2014/24.

Panel 2: Public Procurement and Labour Standards (I):
EU Procurement Law Perspective

Sustainable procurement and corporate experimentation

Nina Boeger shared some thoughts beyond RegioPost and an enquiry into two developments arising from the financial crisis: a) rise of polarisation of corporate governance models with, on the one hand, market responses to financial crisis that persevere on traditional approach to maximisation of return on investment and, on the other hand and as a counterbalance, new or revived corporate models, such as social enterprise, cooperative enterprise and commons-oriented enterprise; b) rise of sustainable or smart procurement driven by austerity politics and cuts on public budgets, which is also becoming polarised with, on the one extreme, traditional or economically-driven procurement, with focus on immediate value for money obtainable from service outputs and very much focussed on price and concrete delivery and, on the other extreme of the spectrum, smart / sustainable procurement that aims to change perspective of procurement and commissioning practices and moving towards longer-term perspectives on triple bottom line for the communities that are relevant for the procurement or commissioning body, as well as process sensitivity and long term relationships with providers of services.

Smart procurement involves a recognition of the risk that contracting with shareholder-driven corporations entails (large corporations are “too big to fail” and the risk of failure that the public sector faces requires a more diffuse provider base), as well as the passing on of costs to the tax payer. There is also a concern on the risks of insufficient specification (under-specification) and uncertainty, which is an integral part of procurement and commissioning. Corporate governance and the way they are structured will affect the way they deal with these issues of risk and how they will respond. Alignment of corporate governance and risk issues is necessary and contracting authorities are searching for trust and reliability in addition to capacity. New corporate models (such as social enterprises) that are struggling to make their business sustainable are dying to access public demand, both to raise funds for their sustainability and to raise social awareness.

In view of these trends, it looks like there are promising possibilities in procurement in aligning two very important structural developments: emergence of new corporate forms and the development of smart procurement. The question now is whether there is enough flexibility in the legal regime to allow public authorities to procure in this way? [this looks like a watershed moment for EU public procurement law, which is still fulfilling a traditional role of non-discrimination, transparency and workable market openness; but is also fulfilling the role of a change agent by supporting the development of those new models—the tension is not anymore on what the EU / the MS can do, but rather about thinking about new structures of capitalism].

The issue of flexibility then hinges on certain aspects of Dir 2014/24, such as market engagement (Art 40), the possibility of reserving non-profit contracts (Spezzino), grounds for exclusion also help some experimentation (Art 57), reservation of contracts for employee-led organisations (Art 77—which is incredibly narrow) … but the main problem for the development of ‘corporate governance’ clauses in procurement is the requirement of link to the subject matter (LtSM), which has been extended massively compared to Dir 2004/18. This poses the question how do we make sure that we can distinguish corporate governance requirements linked to the provision of the service from the limits on mandating general corporate policies. It is necessary to have these conversations so that the developments can move forward.

Minimum and living wage in public contracts:
Enforceability after RegioPost

Abby Semple started off stressing that the discussion on the enforcement of labour (pay) standards needs to be more specific and we need a taxonomy that distinguishes minimum wage, sectoral minimum wage [in particular, wages specific to public contracts], collectively agreed wage and living wage (which is a voluntary undertaking to pay a wage above the legally-mandated minimum wage). There is also an interesting argument on whether requirements for fair trade that link to wages paid to producers can be included as part of the same analysis. She also stressed that minimum wages show great disparity in the 28 Member States, even when adjusted by parity of purchasing power. This raises significant practical difficulties.

What does RegioPost say? The CJEU distinguished the Ruffert case very strongly because it was then a non-universal collective agreement that set the minimum wage in dispute, whereas in RegioPost the minimum wage is a result of (regional) law, in which case it does not matter that it only applies to the public sector. The CJEU also acknowledged the social protection argument as potential justification (like in Bundesdruckerei), but did not engage in full proportionality assessment (maybe because it did not need to do so, but leaves RegioPost vulnerable to future case law where the CJEU may engage in proportionality review).

Proportionality review should be a mechanism of last resort because Dir 2014/24 sets precise rules and, if they were not shielded from proportionality review, then contracting authorities would have no liberty to rely on the secondary rules.

Interestingly, the CJEU did not distinguish from Bundesdruckerei. The CJEU did not make any assessment / statement on the issue of lack of a cross-border situation in RegioPost. This is important in itself. It is also relevant that the CJEU engaged with an analysis with the PWD, primarily because the referring court had raised it. Also because Art 26 Dir 2004/18 is an empty / reenvoi clause that required engaging with PWD (this is cross-referenced in Recital 34 of Dir 2004/18C and Recital 98 of Dir 2014/24).

It is also relevant to stress that RegioPost makes some conceptualisations of contract compliance / performance clauses problematic. Nord pas de Calais, which reinterpreted Beentjes, also created a circular self-justifying doctrine that indicated that contract performance clauses did not allow for exclusion of those that did not meet the requirements. The RegioPost judgment now allows for exclusion of tenderers that are not committing to comply with contract performance requirements, which conflicts with the Commission’s understanding under the previous case law.

Looking specifically at minimum wage clauses, it is relevant to look at the Fair trade coffee case (C-368/10), where the CJEU stressed that you could have fair trade as an award criterion. Fair trade includes, amongst other things, the payment of wage premia to producers—this creates a problem if a contracting authority can do it in a third jurisdiction, but not in its own jurisdiction. There is evidence that the Commission does not accept that payment of a living wage could be a pass/fail criterion (Scottish government sent repeated letters to the Commission, to which it replied in the negative). How to address living wage as an award criterion? Could you use the wages the tenderer is willing to pay as an award criterion? Semple does not see any reason why it is not possible.

Scenarios for further thought. 1. Could you have a maximum wage clause in the contract for cost-control purposes? 2. Where a contract is affected by TUPE, the obligation to apply same terms and conditions, as the contracting authority, you need to effectively require pre-existing terms and conditions including wages (and you NEED to do that, including where the incumbent is the contracting authority itself in case of outsourcing).

RegioPost allows for legally-embedded sectorial [public sector] minimum wages. It does not deal specifically with living wages but the argument can be made in light of fair trade coffee.

Competition and State aid implications of
minimum wage clauses in EU public procurement

Albert Sanchez-Graells' presentation focused on the trade / social dumping rationale for minimum wage requirements, and I submitted that the PWD is the anti-dumping standard under EU economic law, so that no more demanding standard can be allowed without subjecting them to a very strict proportionality test. I also submitted that the approach of the CJEU to the interpretation of the PWD in the public procurement scenario does not make economic sense because it creates double standards for cross-border and inter-regional situations, which results in an impossible situation for contracting authorities that, at the time of tendering, cannot foresee whether they will manage a purely domestic or cross-border procurement project (as that depends on actual interest from cross-border tenderers).

On that basis, I discussed the problems of reverse discrimination and unforeseen consequences (anti-SME, pro-delocalisation, etc) that can derive from strict enforcement of the contradictory rules created by the Bundesdrukerei-RegioPost tandem. I moved on to stress the competition law implications that can result from this situation and the difficulties in capturing such anticompetitive effects with the competition law prohibitions in Arts 101 and 102 TFEU, included the supporting State action theory.

I finally tackled issues of application of State aid and submitted that the payment of above-market wages by the contracting authorities is an economic advantage that triggers the prohibition of Art 107 TFEU and, in turn, this cannot be justified either under the 2014 general block exemption regulation (it does not fit the regulated categories of disadvantaged/disabled employment, or creation of jobs), or the de minimis regulation (the aid is not transparent). Thus, I submitted that State aid enforcement in this area can raise difficult issues in the near future.

DEBATE

focused mainly on the issues of the social economy model and the extent to which competition law / State aid can apply to these issues at all, as well as the undesirability of a strict proportionality assessment that would kill innovation. It is also discussed to what extent a proportionality analysis is at all possible and whether social requirements are necessarily protectionist or not, and whether this should be dealt with as an issue of direct or indirect discrimination and how EU law would regulate them, which comes back to issues of proportionality of restrictions vis-à-vis their intended goals. The debate then also moved upwards and looked at the different treatment under WTO GPA and the EU rules, as well as the possibility to coordinate them. The issue of the heterogeneity of what is considered a ‘social consideration’ was also explored in some detail.

Panel 3: Public Procurement and Labour Standards (II):
EU Labour Law Perspective

Government as a socially-responsible market actor after RegioPost

ACL Davies took a step back and looked at the discussion from first principles. Use of contracts to pursue contract-unrelated policy is controversial. It is useful to distinguish two dimensions: a) reinforcing existing legal requirements, and b) creating requirements that go beyond existing legal duties. a) may see superfluous but the leverage of contracting can make up for deficiencies in enforcement elsewhere (in the UK case, given the lack of labour inspectorate). b) has attracted significant opposition + international drive to reduce the use of contracting authorities’ discretion is a way of reducing the chance for them to adopt protectionist strategies, willingly or otherwise.

The justification for the use of procurement to enforce social goals is as follows: 1) consistency and trust in government (legislative process not only aspect of democratic mandate given to government), so if the government is committed to a public policy, it should enforce it through contracting (to show consistency and avoid silo mentality, all of these foster trust in government). This is linked to the doctrine of legitimate expectations to get government to follow promises made in the past. This use has a long tradition (government as a model employer, and procurement as an aspect of that). 2) stronger argument in modern times is to prevent the harm that competitive tendering can create. This is linked to ILO standards for government contracting. This is particularly relevant in labour-intensive services, where government can create a level playing field in terms of employment conditions, so that alternative providers compete on other dimensions and labour standards are taken out of competition.

Two issues with RegioPost: lack of understanding of procurement and lack of understanding of wage clauses in procurement. Before the negatives, RegioPost is generally welcome if nothing else because it reverses Ruffert on the basis of Art 26 Dir 2004/18.

BUT.

Art 56 TFEU and its key test for determining whether something is restrictive requires to assess whether it ‘constitutes an additional economic burden that may prohibit, impede or render less attractive the provision of their services in the host Member State’. This is applied in RegioPost and the minimum wage is characterised as an additional economic burden that makes the activities less attractive. The cost linked to the minimum wage can be a burden, but the cost can be passed on to the government and, from that perspective, there is no impediment or restriction to the provision in another Member State because the additional cost is covered by government. However, the services can be less advantageous by limiting the profit that the provider could achieve. This disadvantage is very artificial because it does not carry a loss for the service provider, but merely a missed opportunity for a larger benefit. This should not be covered by Art 56 TFEU or, at least, given that the disadvantage is very marginal. Maybe it is State aid (the government pays for it and State aid can be discussed), but it cannot also be exclusionary. It is either one or the other.

From the perspective of minimum wages, we need to remind ourselves that EU law does not say a great deal about wages. The difficulty of regulating pay at an EU-wide level is significant. This does not stop the CJEU from scrutinising different issues regarding pay in the internal market perspective, but the CJEU lacks a point of reference in this setting. This is what leads it to rely on the PWD and the importance on the wage being a minimum wage. The interpretation of the PWD in Laval is a clear attempt to elevate the PWD to the standard applicable in terms of social dumping in the EU. What’s wrong with the emphasis on minimum wage? The issue is with the justification on worker protection as the justification for the measure discussed in RegioPost. Minimum wage is of course a protection. The elephant in the room is that the minimum wage is only for public contracts, which diminishes the relevance of the argument as compared with contexts of general economic regulation.

In the public procurement setting, minimum wage is not a concern as in the labour market as a whole, but a protection against the competitive nature of government contracts and the ensuing downward pressure on worker protection. So the analysis should be procurement context-specific.

So, upshot, it is better that Ruffert, but RegioPost misses the difference between procurement and regulation, procurement being the space where the government is ready to put its money where its mouth is. This ought to do with preventing the harm that procurement might otherwise cause.

Labour law in the state of exception

Lisa Rodgers looked at labour law as an exception to economic rules and tried to see how far that helps us when thinking about labour standards in public procurement. It is worth stressing the link between economic and social law, and the theory of the ‘state of exception’ derived from neoliberal thought following the crisis. Labour law is an exception or concession against the basic economic foundation that we have. Following the crisis and austerity measures, this exceptionality has become more clear. The focus on procurement is an expression of this exceptionalism.

The state of exception is a theoretical perspective that uses the importance of the exception itself. The argument is that the ‘exception’ is the most important element in any system of regulation because it is at the edge of the legal system and it shows how politics get involved in the adjudication of legal issues. Used this way, it crowds out political considerations because the law starts covering it all.

Positive claims about inclusion of labour law in economic standards: 1) labour law’s concerns are included within the law; 2) labour law’s concerns become part of the economic paradigm; 3) law is subject to interpretation by favourable CJEU; 4) other Treaty provisions can help; 5) incorporation of international legal standards is facilitated.

Responses to the claims: 1) labour law is an exception or a concession, so it is included (by exclusion) as a discretion rather than a mandatory condition [eg Arts 56(1) and 57(4) Dir 2014/24] and some innovations do not include social/economic concerns [eg Art 68 Dir 2014/24]; 2) as an ‘exception’, labour law is only part of the economic paradigm, which weakens the political power of labour law institutions; 3) the CJEU has given broad discretion to consider employment and social considerations as part of the public procurement process (Beentjes), BUT the link to the subject-matter of the contract (LtSM) is an increasingly constraining economic test, which means that the contracting authority cannot influence the policy it applies; 4) relationship between labour standards, public procurement and other EU law provisions and policies (including soft law) show a shift in those instruments and a prevalence of macroeconomic policies that downgrades labour law standards’ relevance; 5) finally, there is a very limiting approach to the inclusion of international standards [narrow list included in Dir 2014/24 and NO reference to ILO convention 94 on public contracts) + Art 18(2)].

In conclusion, labour law is increasingly seen as important in the context of the public procurement directives, but there are some important risks if labour law is seen as an exception or a concession to economic law and economic goals. Labour standards are restricted because they need to comply with economic paradigms, there is a tendency to promote individual over collective rights, the institutions of labour law can find their power to challenge the law reduced.

Scope for collective bargaining in posting and procurement

Tonia Novitz looked at Laval and Ruffert and their impact on collective bargaining in public procurement, and positioned them in historical context (decided in 2007 and 2008), which has changed very significantly as a result of the economic crisis. Elektrobudwa and RegioPost indicate new horizons for trade union protection of posted workers and space for regional protection, but not for collective negotiation. This indicates stark shortcomings in proposals for the revision of the PWD.

Laval was a case of a trade union trying to improve conditions for a group of workers. This was generally seen as problematic. Collective negotiation and action could only be permitted in the context of social dumping. This is a very controversial judgment and has been heavily criticised. Laval had a negative impact on the ability of trade unions to call for action with cross-border effects. There is a strong clash between the EU approach and international standards, which cannot be easily reconciled.

Ruffert adopted the Laval approach whole-heartedly on the basis of another rigorous reading of the PWD and, in particular, about Art 3(8) setting out the ways in which collective agreements can be declared generally applicable. Ruffert failed to meet those. MS could exclude the construction industry from these requirements under Art 3(10) PWD, but that did not save the situation either. The imposition of such large limitations on the collective setting of rights for posted workers’ rights led to an understanding of the PWD as a ceiling rather than a floor of employment rights. This could not be overcome as a result of the Monti II Regulation, which was abandoned for different reasons.

It may be worth revisiting these issues by going back to the basics of the need for the PWD, particularly in view of the vulnerability of posted workers, which supports the case for their access to collective representation. It is also worth stressing that the capacity of labour inspectorates across the EU has been severely eroded as a result of the financial crisis. Additionally, memoranda and other crisis-related recommendations have been in line of flexibility and minimising collective negotiation to enterprise level-agreements. Overall, this makes the requirement of universal application stressed in Laval and Ruffert seems very outdated in the context of 2016.

Currently, the number of posted workers is at about 1.9 million and has increased by 49% compared to prior to the crisis. The treatment of posted workers is also reported to suffer from 51% lower wages, higher instances of work-related accidents and displacement issues. This can be triggering a mild shift of the case law regarding collective bargaining.

In Elektrobudwa, there was support for regional collective action on behalf of posted workers. This is linked to the issue of individual claims because in this specific case, there is direct representation by the trade union. There is nothing to indicate sympathy for collective bargaining for posted workers, but it could be seen as a first step in that direction. In RegioPost you can also identify a first step away from Ruffert, but they stress that there was no collective agreement and, therefore, the distinct treatment between public and private workers did not matter. However, none of these cases make significant inroads into collective bargaining in public procurement. RegioPost was very cautious in the way it treated collective agreements.

Commission’s proposals from February 2016 can potentially make a difference around collective agreements that could have a spillover effect on procurement. Of these proposals, the rules concerning subcontract chains, including those that foresee the posting of workers, can have significant effects. But, for this to be relevant, there has to be a move beyond ‘minimum rates of pay’ (absolute minimum) towards ‘remuneration’ (so as to cover a variety of different elements), which should then be equally applicable to all employees regardless of subcontracting chains. This has a connection with Art 71(6) Dir 2014/24 in terms of control of subcontracting chains. It is also a nod to international standards, but a timid one.

Overall, however, this seems very unlikely to be adopted in the near future, and it may well be only after a monitoring of the implementation of the PWD enforcement measures. However, a case could reach the CJEU on the basis of a case based on strike action including both posted and non-posted workers, which will trigger issues of evidence-based social dumping and may not allow the CJEU to set aside this type of collective action as easily as in the past.

DEBATE

focused on issues of localism and devolution, and the way that this can impact the use of procurement to enforce labour standards, particularly in the UK. It also explored the implications of the post-Lisbon social market economy on the issue of the ‘exceptionalism’ of labour law. The audience also questioned whether Laval is really not still the relevant standard and whether the restrictive approach to collective bargaining is not still the rule. There was also discussion on whether wage-based advantages deserve a different treatment where there are and where there are not posted workers, as well as what actually amounts as a restriction on the freedom of provisions of services in terms of two-tier employment scales and issues of discrimination / disadvantage of workers within one same undertaking.

Panel 4: Procurement and Labour Standards (III):
Domestic UK Perspective

Labour standards, domestic law and public procurement

Michael Ford focused on how non-pay labour standards (such as blacklisting [note: of workers involved in trade union activities, not of undertakings from public procurement procedures] or discrimination rules) can be applied in the public procurement setting. UK history shows that the underlying issues have been discussed repeatedly in the past. However, there have been significant developments, such as the use of procurement to promote non-discrimination law. Section 149 Equality Act 2010 (EA 2010) imposes an explicit duty on public authorities to prevent discrimination and give effect to advancing equality law. It is also important to stress the importance of sectoral collective bargaining and quasi-collective bargaining in the UK, which lead to legally binding pay rates and holiday terms. Currently, though, this has been discontinued and there is no legal mechanism for the determination of sectoral pay. Query is whether this will not change again in the future.

From a practical perspective, looking at procurement litigation, it is worth reminding that this is an area institutionally dominated by large commercial organisations with large budgets to litigate, which skews the litigation field. It is also affected by other pragmatic tensions, which raises issues of the different access to statutory review vs judicial review of procurement decisions. Pragmatically, it is also very difficult to apply standard legal tools (proportionality) to non-pay labour standards and, in particular, in issues of non-discrimination—not least due to the absolute protection of non-discrimination concerns over economic issues. Thus, even if it is fundamentally difficult, pay is relatively straightforward compared to non-pay labour standards.

The counterfactual question is, though, what would have happened in EU procurement law if there had been no PWD? Would the CJEU engaged in an untrammelled proportionality test based on ultimate considerations of discrimination? That would have been highly political and this is why the CJEU has sheltered behind the PWD, which has effectively provided the CJEU with a relatively easy answer compared to the alternative of having to legitimise its decisions. This is exemplified in Bundesdruckerei in that there was not AG Opinion to support the CJEU, which considered the use of the PWD straightforward.

However, let’s assume that the PWD is a useful point of departure. Can the government use 'administrative provisions' [which are not defined, under Art 3(1) PWD] to enforce pay policies, particularly reinvigorating sectoral rate setting mechanism? This raises a set of issues: would it still qualify as minimum wage of pay despite the existence of a lower universally applicable minimum wage? Yes, it would. Would it be possible to give legal effect to the result of the collective bargaining? Yes, it would because the rate, despite the collective bargaining origin, derives from law. Could you use a RegioPost type system where you already have a national minimum wage (ie creating a higher minimum wage only for public contracts)? It looks as if the CJEU considered it central that in RegioPost there was no minimum wage, but it is not clear why it would not be possible to go above that ceiling with a RegioPost-like mechanism.

An alternative to the legal enforcement of rates of pay, which is not in line with UK tradition, would be to rely on Art 70 Dir 2014/24 rather than on Art 3(1) PWD (ie base it on discretion of the contracting authority). However, this is still a confusing environment.

A connected issue is blacklisting, in relation with the ILO conventions, which is now illegal under UK law. However, this could be possible under Art 18(2), Art 57(3) and Art 70 Dir 2014/24 by focusing on the tender rather than the tenderer [as in the enactment of reg.56(2) PCR2015]. This should not be subjected to a proportionality analysis under Art 18(2) Dir 2014/24, which only requires proof of breach of any of the international standards.

Another issue is whether there is a tension between the public sector equality duty under the EA 2010 and public procurement. One difficulty is whether you can use procurement as a preference for undertakings that have equal opportunity policies, equal pay audits, etc. This would fit within Art 70 Dir 2014/24, complemented with the relevant ILO conventions. There is again a tension with the issue of minimum standards in the PWD or not.

The answer is that PWD, even when it applies, it does not give the answer—particularly outside the area of pay, it is very difficult to figure out how to effectively carry out a proportionality assessment when there are procurement measures that go beyond agreed (EU) standards.

Discretion and labour objectives

Richard Craven presented preliminary findings of on-going research funded by the British Academy and Leverhulme, where he assesses practitioners’ reactions to existing rules on the possibility to enforce labour standards within the limits of discretion given to public procurement officers.

DEBATE

focused on the difficulties of extrapolating qualitative insights and the insufficiency of public procurement data, which could allow for complementary quantitative research.

An extended discussion of RegioPost--teaser

On Monday 9 May 2016, and in celebration of Europe Day 2016, at the University of Bristol Law School, we are hosting the event "Public Procurement & Labour Standards–Reopening the Debate after RegioPost", where we will discuss in depth the implications of the Judgment of the Court of Justice of 17 November 2015 in RegioPost, C-115/14, EU:C:2015:760 (for my own views, see here and here).

We will be live tweeting from the event (follow #regiopostandbeyond), and I will post a summary of the discussions next week. For now, as a teaser, these are the slides that I will be using in my own presentation regarding the competition and State aid law implications of RegioPost.

Additional Austrian postal services to be exempted from compliance with EU (utilities) procurement rules (T-463/14) -- a warning of procedural rebalancing under dir 2014/25?

In its Judgment of 27 April 2016 in Österreichische Post v Commission, T-463/14, EU:T:2016:243 (not available in English), the General Court (GC) of the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled on judicial review of the Commission Implementing Decision exempting certain services in the postal sector in Austria from the application of Directive 2004/17 on utilities procurement, in particular as carried out by Österreichische Post AG (the Austrian national universal service provider, under public ownership of 52.8% of its capital).

The GC quashed the Commission's Decision regarding the denial of exemption for cross-border postal services for addressed (‘outbound’) business to business and business to consumer letters ('B2X letters'), as well as for addressed (‘outbound’) letters between private customers and between private customers and business customers ('C2X letters')--ie, in relation with the activities covered in paras [43]-[50].

The Commission's Decision was based on Art 30 Dir 2004/17, which allowed for utilities procurement linked to activities directly exposed to competition to be exempted from compliance with the otherwise applicable EU public procurement rules. The same regime is now foreseen in Art 34 of Directive 2014/25 on utilities procurement. Thus, the GC's Judgment in Österreichische Post v Commission is interesting in order to gain a better understanding of the procedure (and evidentiary requirements) for the exemption of activities directly exposed to competition from compliance with the revised EU utilities public procurement rules.

the contested decision

In its Implementing Decision, the Commission had considered that

(46) Competition for cross-border letter post is very different for private persons and for companies. Private persons generally have no real choice but to send international mail with their national universal service provider. The volumes sent by private persons are generally too low to offer incentives for new entrants into the market.

(47) It is noted that the competitive situation depends also on the size/population of each city due to the fact that cross-border service providers do not maintain a nationwide access network but generally collect the mail directly at the customer's premises. 

(48) Previous Commission practice... made a distinction between the cross-border postal services for addressed B2X letters market and the cross-border postal services for addressed C2X letters market. 

(49) There is no evidence that the situation is different in Austria,  therefore, for the purposes of this Decision and without prejudice to competition law, two separate product markets will be considered, namely the cross-border postal services for outbound B2X addressed letters and the cross-border postal services for outbound C2X addressed letters. 

(50) Austrian Post could not provide detailed information ... on its relevant shares in each market, nor the market shares of its main competitors. In the absence of information on the degree of competition in each of those markets, it is not possible to conclude that the conditions for granting an exemption under Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/17/EC to cross-border postal services for outbound B2X addressed letters and to cross-border postal services for outbound C2X addressed letters in Austria are met. Consequently, Article 30(1) of Directive 2004/17/EC does not apply to contracts intended to enable the pursuit of those activities in Austria (Implementing Decision 2014/184/EU, paras 46-50, references omitted).

In reviewing this argumentation, which seems to fundamentally rely on the ultimate ratio that Österreichische Post had not discharged the burden of proof imposed by Art 30 Dir 2004/17 (now Art 34 Dir 2014/25), the GC raises some important issues about the level of detail with which the Commission needs to assess estimated figures provided by applicants for exemption from compliance with EU public procurement rules:

(161) ... the applicant states that, following its own argument, the Commission should have exempted at least the B2X international market from the application of Directive 2004/17. It adds that, given that, according to paragraph 46 of the contested decision, its services were not substitutable in the C2X international market, its market share in the B2X international market should be significantly below [confidential]%, which it also corresponded with the Commission's assessment contained in paragraph 47 of the contested decision that the applicant's competitors were mainly in urban areas.

(162) This argument must be accepted. Indeed, on the one hand, the Commission did not dispute that the market share of the applicant in the market for postal services for addressed ['outbound'] B2X and C2X letters at international level was below [confidential]%, as stated in ... the application of the applicant. Moreover, as stated by the applicant, recital 46 of the contested decision shows that the services in question were not substitutable in the C2X international market, since, according to the Commission, private persons generally have no real choice but to send international mail with their national universal service provider. It follows that the market share of the applicant in the market for postal services for addressed B2X letters at international level should be well below [confidential]%, which the Commission did not take into account when considering that those postal services were not directly exposed to competition. In view of these considerations, it must be concluded that the Commission incurred in a manifest error of assessment in not exempting postal address for addressed B2X letters at international level from the application of Directive 2004/17.

(163) Accordingly, the fourth plea must be upheld in so far as it relates to the postal services for addressed B2X letters at international level and dismissed as regards postal services for addressed C2X letters at international level (T-463/14, paras 161-163, own translation from Spanish).

Cracking the specifics of the reasoning is complicated due to the confidential nature of the initial application for exemption under Art 30 Dir 2004/17, as well as the confidentiality of the market share data used by the GC. However, it seems clear that the Commission is subjected to a very demanding standard of data assessment and that it is obliged to use any information provided by the applicants in order to make educated guesses where market intelligence is insufficient to support a direct analysis. Looking to the future, this stringent approach highlights one of the differences between the 'old' regime of Art 30 Dir 2004/17 and the 'new' rules of art 34 Dir 2014/25, which may well make the Commission's life easier.

what Dir 2014/25 has changed

Under the procedural provisions of Art 30(6) Dir 2004/17, 'For the adoption of a Decision [exempting activities directly exposed to competition from compliance with Dir 2004/17] the Commission shall be allowed a period of three months commencing on the first working day following the date on which it receives the notification or the request. However, this period may be extended once by a maximum of three months in duly justified cases, in particular if the information contained in the notification or the request or in the documents annexed thereto is incomplete or inexact or if the facts as reported undergo any substantive changes'.

Conversely, Dir 2014/25 now has a new Art 35 on the procedure applicable for exemption decisions for activities exposed to competition under Art 34. And this is complemented by the additional rules in Annex IV, according to which second paragraph, 'The Commission may require the Member State or the contracting entity concerned or the independent national authority referred to under paragraph 1 or any other competent national authority to provide all necessary information or to supplement or clarify information given within an appropriate time limit. In the event of late or incomplete answers, the periods set out in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 shall be suspended for the period between the expiry of the time limit set in the request for information, and the receipt of the complete and correct information'.

The change of the extension of the maximum period for a decision to exempt activities exposed to competition for a suspension of the period to adopt such decision is important because, both under the old [Art 30(4)(II) Dir 2004/17] and the new rules [Art 35(3)(II)(b) Dir 2014/25], in the absence of a decision within the specified time period (3 months in the old rules, and 90 working days under the new ones), the Directive ceases to apply to contracts intended to enable the activity exposed to competition. Consequently, a combination of a ticking time limit and the impossibility to reject claims based on what the Commission may have considered unreliable or insufficient evidence, would have resulted in significant pressure on the Commission under the old rules. Thus, it seems clear that, under the new rules and with the ability to 'stop the clock', the Commission will be able to relocate the burden of proof squarely onto the applicant's shoulders, which may well minimise or neutralise the tough approach indicated by the GC in its Österreichische Post v Commission Judgment.

AG Sharpston rightly opposes use of financial guarantees as pre-requisite for procurement challenges (C-439/14 and C-488/14)

In Opinion of 28 April 2016 in joined cases Star Storage and Max Boegl România and Construcții Napoca, C-439/14 and C-488/14, EU:C:2016:307, AG Sharpston considered 'whether EU law precludes a Member State from requiring an applicant to lodge a ‘good conduct guarantee’ in order to access review procedures for public procurement decisions by contracting authorities' or,  'how far can the Member States set up financial requirements for challenging contracting authorities’ decisions in order to reduce the risk of frivolous challenges, that is to say, challenges that are inherently likely to be unsuccessful and whose purpose is merely to impede the public contract award procedure?'.

The case comes on the back of a challenge against Romanian procedural rules whereby undertakings seeking the review of procurement decisions need to lodge such a 'good conduct guarantee' of 1% of the estimated value of the contract (with progressive caps at €10k, €25k and €100k), and contracting authorities retain the good conduct guarantee where the body competent to review their decisions rejects the challenge or where the applicant abandons it. For the sake of completes, the Opinion also assesses whether a guarantee that was returned to the applicant regardless of the outcome of the case would be compatible with EU law.

AG Sharpston's Opinion is interesting because it covers arguments linked both to the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal recognised by Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (which is clearly of prominence in this area; see Fastweb, C-19/13, EU:C:2014:2194), and to the more precise rights to access to rapid and effective review procedures and remedies in the field of public procurement under the Remedies Directive (and the identical provisions of the Utilities Remedies Directive).

After a very detailed assessment (see below), AG Sharpston unsurprisingly concludes that the Remedies Directive and the Utilities Remedies Directive, 'read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, preclude national legislation ... which requires an applicant to lodge a ‘good conduct guarantee’ in order to obtain access to review of a contracting authority’s decisions relating to public procurement and under which the contracting authority must retain that guarantee if the challenge is rejected or withdrawn, regardless of whether or not the challenge is frivolous'. Equally, that 'the same provisions of EU law also preclude national legislation which requires an applicant to lodge a ‘good conduct guarantee’ in order to obtain access to review of a contracting authority’s decisions and under which that applicant automatically gets back the guarantee at the end of the challenge, whatever its outcome'.

These issues generally concern the delineation of the locus standi to challenge procurement decisions, which I have submitted needs to be interpreted in broad terms because 'the adoption of open or broad rules on active standing is a crucial element—particularly because, in this area, one of the major problems is the reluctance of public contractors and offerors to initiate litigation' [see A Sanchez-Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 439-441]. AG Sharpston's Opinion is clearly in line with such general expansive interpretation of rules recognising active standing in procurement review procedures. Therefore, her Opinion must be welcome and it is submitted that the Court of Justice should follow it. However, I also submit that she could have been bolder in assessing these issues in the broader context of the use of financial guarantees in public procurement. From this perspective, I think that some of the specific elements of Sharpston's analysis are interesting in their detail.

AG Sharpston's analysis on the basis of art 47 charter

When setting the legal background to the dispute, AG Sharpston emphases that the right under Art 47 of the Charter is not absolute, but that it can only be limited subject to the principle of proportionality and only if the limitation is necessary and genuinely meets objectives of general interest recognised by the EU, or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others [as per Art 52(1) Charter]. She also stresses that under Art 1(1) of the Remedies Directive, Member States must 'ensure that ... decisions taken by the contracting authorities may be reviewed effectively and, in particular, as rapidly as possible ... on the grounds that such decisions have infringed [EU] law in the field of public procurement or national rules transposing that law', and that under Art 1(3) of the Remedies Directive, 'the review procedures [shall be] available, under detailed rules which the Member States may establish, at least to any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement'.

AG Sharpston also clearly stresses that the Remedies Directive only sets 'minimum conditions which the review procedures under domestic law must satisfy in order to comply with EU public procurement law [so that if] no specific provision governs the matter, it is for each Member State to lay down the detailed rules of administrative and judicial procedures governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU public procurement law' (para 30, references omitted). Thus, given that the Remedies Directive 'contains [no] rules on financial requirements which economic operators may have to fulfil in order to obtain access to review procedures against decisions of contracting authorities. National provisions ... fall within the procedural autonomy of the Member States, subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness' (para 31).

However, AG Sharpston raises two relevant issues: 'First, can [the principle of effectiveness] be limited to verifying that a national procedural requirement ... renders practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of the right to review procedures set out in [the Remedies Directive]? Or is it broader in that it requires any national rule which undermines those provisions to be set aside?' (para 33, emphasis in the original). To which she answers that 'what matters ultimately is to ensure that the rights which EU law confers on individuals receive more, rather than less, protection. [The Remedies Directive gives] specific expression to the right to an effective remedy. It is therefore not possible to limit the analysis of the principle of effectiveness to whether a procedural requirement such as that in issue in the main proceedings is liable to render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of that right. Rather, in that specific context, the effectiveness test must surely involve examining whether such a requirement is liable to undermine the right to effective review procedures which those provisions guarantee' (para 35, emphasis in the original).

'Second, what impact does the fundamental right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter have on the principle of effectiveness as a limit to the procedural autonomy of the Member States?' (para 36). And, in that regard, she clearly explains that 'Article 47 of the Charter applies in the main proceedings. Providing the good conduct guarantee is a pre-condition for getting any challenge examined. That requirement therefore constitutes a limitation on the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal within the meaning of Article 47. Such a limitation can therefore be justified only if it is provided for by law, if it respects the essence of that right and, subject to the principle of proportionality, if it is necessary and genuinely meets objectives of general interest recognised by the EU or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. That test is similar to the test that the Strasbourg Court applies when it examines whether financial restrictions on access to courts are compatible with Article 6(1) of the ECHR' (para 37, references omitted).

This is an interesting analytical approach, which leads to the further consideration that the rules are underpinned by a legitimate purpose. In Sharpston's words, 'the national provisions establishing the good conduct guarantee are intended in essence to protect ... from frivolous challenges which economic operators (including those who are not tenderers) might initiate for purposes other than those for which the review procedures were established. Such an objective is undeniably legitimate. In particular, discouraging frivolous challenges enables the bodies in charge of reviewing decisions of contracting authorities to concentrate on ‘genuine’ challenges. That is likely to contribute to satisfying the requirement that Member States must ensure that decisions of contracting authorities may be reviewed effectively and, in particular, as rapidly as possible where it is claimed that such decisions infringe EU public procurement law or national rules transposing that law' (para 44, references omitted).

AG Sharpston also considers that the possibility of loosing significant amounts (up to €25k or €100k depending on the type of contract) meets the requirement that the rules are capable of achieving that objective because 'costs of that magnitude are such as to deter the lodging of frivolous challenges because the latter are, by their very nature, likely to be rejected and, therefore, to result automatically in loss of the entire good conduct guarantee and the associated costs' (para 47).

However, she submits that the rules on 'good conduct guarantees' do not meet the requirements of the principle of proportionality as derived from Art 52(1) of the Charter because there is no indication that they do no go further than is necessary to attain their objective. She assesses the situation in two scenarios. First, where the guarantee is automatically forfeited in case the challenge is rejected or withdrawn. In this case, there is no question that the rule is not proportionate because '[w]here a challenge was rejected or withdrawn, the ... competent court might for example have been given latitude to ascertain whether that challenge was frivolous or not, taking into account all relevant circumstances, and to decide in consequence whether retaining (all or part of) the good conduct guarantee was justified' (para 50, references omitted). Second, where the the applicant gets back the good conduct guarantee irrespective of the challenge’s outcome (which was a transitional regime proposed by Romania), AG Sharpston considers 'that such a procedural requirement does not protect contracting authorities adequately from frivolous challenges. Under the transitional regime, the contracting authority has to return the good conduct guarantee to the applicant within five days following the date on which the decision ... or the judgment has become final, even where the applicant manifestly abused his right to access review procedures. The costs which the transitional regime involves may therefore not be such as to discourage an economic operator from lodging a challenge that pursues an objective other than those for which the review procedures are established — for example, harming a competitor. They may nevertheless prove an obstacle to an economic operator with an arguable claim but limited means' (para 56). Therefore, she also considers it contrary to EU law.

scope for a bolder approach?

In my view, AG Sharpston is right on all issues she discusses, particularly given the framework of analysis she creates. However, the Opinion leaves space for Member States to still develop mechanisms whereby they require the submission of 'bid protest guarantees' that will only be forfeited in case of spurious litigation and on a case by case assessment. Broadly, this is not in line with the normative position that the use of financial guarantees in public procurement (primarily, at bidding stage, but also at review stage) needs to be minimised and only used where there is an actual risk against which the contracting authority cannot (self)protect by other means--which will very rarely be the case [see my Public procurement and the EU competition rules (2015) 326-327 & 425-426]. In my view, the risks derived from litigation are a given for the public sector and, consequently, unless there is a special circumstance that raises the possibility of damage to the public sector above abnormal levels, the need for the financial guarantee can be doubted.

A less restrictive alternative would be to devise a system of penalties which public procurement review bodies and courts could apply in case of spurious litigation. That would avoid front-loading the financial burden and would dissipate negative effects on access to review procedures. Conversely, it would leave the public sector exposed to bankruptcy risk in case the frivolous challengers did not have the ability to pay the fine. But this is not different from the general risk the public sector (and society at large) faces in terms of the effects of bankruptcy on the effectiveness of administrative sanctions. Thus, once more, the risk does not seem to be specific enough as to justify the requirement of specific 'bid protest guarantees' and, from that perspective, I submit that AG Sharpston could have been bolder in her Opinion in Star Storage and Max Boegl România and Construcții Napoca. However, on balance, her Opinion is certainly a positive step.

 

Can you ask for what you already have? GC tightens access to documents of EU institutions (T-221/08)

©European Commission.

©European Commission.

In its Judgment of 26 April 2016 in case Strack v Commission, T-221/08, EU:T:2016:242 (not available in English, not even the official extracts) the General Court (GC) of the Court of Justice of the European Union decided some interesting practical issues related to the rules on access access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents under Regulation 1049/2001. The point I consider most interesting is whether documents to which the claimant has had previous access by means other than the rights provided by Reg 1049/2001 can be excluded from an access request. Or, in other words, whether Reg 1049/2001 allows you to ask for what you already have.

This point is important because different "access routes" to the documents imply different uses for those documents, particularly if the applicant intends to reveal them to third parties or to the general public. As the applicant in the case submitted to the court,

Only a transmission on the basis of [Reg 1049/2001] would make the document automatically available to third parties and would enable the applicant to achieve his goal, that is, to provide the public, in a fully legally-compliant form, with information on how his complaint was handled by OLAF (T-221/08, para 124, own translation from French).

In the case at hand, the applicant required access to voluminous documentation held by OLAF. Among those documents were correspondence between OLAF and the applicant and OLAF and a mediator, which had previously been disclosed to the applicant (in the course of that correspondence or in relation to mediation efforts). OLAF excluded those documents from the request for access on the basis that they were previously disclosed (PD documents). The applicant challenged this exclusion from his request.

Interestingly, the GC deals with this issue in a rather comprehensive manner and determines that

128 The purpose of Regulation 1049/2001 is to ensure that documents of the institutions are accessible to the general public ... and ... a document disclosed under that regulation document enters the public domain.

129 This result is also reflected in Article 9, paragraph 2, point e) of the annex to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the provisions relating to the application of Regulation 1049/2001 ... under which documents already disclosed in response to a previous [Reg 1049/2001] request will be "automatically" provided on [further] request.

130 It is true that ... in the case Miettinen v Council (T-303/13, EU:T:2014:48, paragraphs 17 to 19) the Court stated that, since the applicant was granted access to the requested document, it had obtained the only result that its action could provide. However, contrary to what happens in this case, in the Miettinen v Council case ... the requested document had been released to the public, so it can not be inferred from that decision that the mere fact that the person concerned had had access to the document requested for any reason would prevent her, in every case, to request access to the same document on the basis of Regulation no 1049/2001, when such document has not been disclosed to the public.

131 It is therefore apparent that the first decision of OLAF, insofar as it refused the applicant access to [PD documents] on the basis of Regulation no 1049/2001, prevents those documents being considered public, which is precisely what the applicant claims and which corresponds to the objective pursued by Regulation 1049/2001, which is to grant the widest possible access to documents with a view to greater openness, to ensure greater participation of citizens in the process of decision making, and greater legitimacy, effectiveness and accountability of government to citizens in a democratic system ...

132 Consequently, the fact that the applicant already had the documents concerned by his request for access and that the objective of the latter was not, therefore, to give him access to their content but rather to disclose them to third parties is indifferent, especially because the reasons for applicant's decision to submit such a request are irrelevant, since Regulation 1049/2001 does not require that the person concerned motivates her request for access to documents, and the reasons for such a request cannot have any impact on its admission or refusal ... (T-221/08, paras 128 to 132, references omitted, own translation from Spanish and emphasis added).

This is quite an important clarification because, in my view, it will force European Institutions to tighten their procedures under Reg 1049/2001 and always assess access to documents requests on their merits. Importantly as well, the Judgment comes to clarify in very strong terms that documents disclosed under Reg 1049/2001 enter the public domain and, consequently, there can be no restrictions on their further use by the applicant or any third parties.

In the area of public procurement, this means that the European Institutions, when they act as contracting authorities, need to be particularly careful in the way they assess requests that concern documents which can impact on the commercial interests of economic operators, including intellectual property, which once made available will become part of the public domain--and may need to start (re)considering ways in which to ensure appropriate protection of business secrets along the lines of the standards created by the new Directive on trade secrets, even if it will not be directly applicable. Once again, this is linked to the issue of the level of transparency in public procurement and the need to seek a difficult balance between transparency and competition in procurement processes, and a more market-oriented approach such as that emerging in the UK may be a good example to take into consideration.