Can you ask for what you already have? GC tightens access to documents of EU institutions (T-221/08)

©European Commission.

©European Commission.

In its Judgment of 26 April 2016 in case Strack v Commission, T-221/08, EU:T:2016:242 (not available in English, not even the official extracts) the General Court (GC) of the Court of Justice of the European Union decided some interesting practical issues related to the rules on access access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents under Regulation 1049/2001. The point I consider most interesting is whether documents to which the claimant has had previous access by means other than the rights provided by Reg 1049/2001 can be excluded from an access request. Or, in other words, whether Reg 1049/2001 allows you to ask for what you already have.

This point is important because different "access routes" to the documents imply different uses for those documents, particularly if the applicant intends to reveal them to third parties or to the general public. As the applicant in the case submitted to the court,

Only a transmission on the basis of [Reg 1049/2001] would make the document automatically available to third parties and would enable the applicant to achieve his goal, that is, to provide the public, in a fully legally-compliant form, with information on how his complaint was handled by OLAF (T-221/08, para 124, own translation from French).

In the case at hand, the applicant required access to voluminous documentation held by OLAF. Among those documents were correspondence between OLAF and the applicant and OLAF and a mediator, which had previously been disclosed to the applicant (in the course of that correspondence or in relation to mediation efforts). OLAF excluded those documents from the request for access on the basis that they were previously disclosed (PD documents). The applicant challenged this exclusion from his request.

Interestingly, the GC deals with this issue in a rather comprehensive manner and determines that

128 The purpose of Regulation 1049/2001 is to ensure that documents of the institutions are accessible to the general public ... and ... a document disclosed under that regulation document enters the public domain.

129 This result is also reflected in Article 9, paragraph 2, point e) of the annex to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the provisions relating to the application of Regulation 1049/2001 ... under which documents already disclosed in response to a previous [Reg 1049/2001] request will be "automatically" provided on [further] request.

130 It is true that ... in the case Miettinen v Council (T-303/13, EU:T:2014:48, paragraphs 17 to 19) the Court stated that, since the applicant was granted access to the requested document, it had obtained the only result that its action could provide. However, contrary to what happens in this case, in the Miettinen v Council case ... the requested document had been released to the public, so it can not be inferred from that decision that the mere fact that the person concerned had had access to the document requested for any reason would prevent her, in every case, to request access to the same document on the basis of Regulation no 1049/2001, when such document has not been disclosed to the public.

131 It is therefore apparent that the first decision of OLAF, insofar as it refused the applicant access to [PD documents] on the basis of Regulation no 1049/2001, prevents those documents being considered public, which is precisely what the applicant claims and which corresponds to the objective pursued by Regulation 1049/2001, which is to grant the widest possible access to documents with a view to greater openness, to ensure greater participation of citizens in the process of decision making, and greater legitimacy, effectiveness and accountability of government to citizens in a democratic system ...

132 Consequently, the fact that the applicant already had the documents concerned by his request for access and that the objective of the latter was not, therefore, to give him access to their content but rather to disclose them to third parties is indifferent, especially because the reasons for applicant's decision to submit such a request are irrelevant, since Regulation 1049/2001 does not require that the person concerned motivates her request for access to documents, and the reasons for such a request cannot have any impact on its admission or refusal ... (T-221/08, paras 128 to 132, references omitted, own translation from Spanish and emphasis added).

This is quite an important clarification because, in my view, it will force European Institutions to tighten their procedures under Reg 1049/2001 and always assess access to documents requests on their merits. Importantly as well, the Judgment comes to clarify in very strong terms that documents disclosed under Reg 1049/2001 enter the public domain and, consequently, there can be no restrictions on their further use by the applicant or any third parties.

In the area of public procurement, this means that the European Institutions, when they act as contracting authorities, need to be particularly careful in the way they assess requests that concern documents which can impact on the commercial interests of economic operators, including intellectual property, which once made available will become part of the public domain--and may need to start (re)considering ways in which to ensure appropriate protection of business secrets along the lines of the standards created by the new Directive on trade secrets, even if it will not be directly applicable. Once again, this is linked to the issue of the level of transparency in public procurement and the need to seek a difficult balance between transparency and competition in procurement processes, and a more market-oriented approach such as that emerging in the UK may be a good example to take into consideration.

 

GC supports exercise of discretion in the assessment of technical compliance in public procurement (T-30/12)

In its Judgment in IDT Biologika v Commission, T-30/12, EU:T:2015:159 (only available in DE and FR and involving public procurement by the EU Institutions), the General Court (GC) has decided on an issue involving the contracting authority's discretion to assess the sufficiency of technical reports and certificates submitted by the tenderer in order to proof conformity of its offer with requirements set out in the technical specifications. This is an important case because it supports the exercise of technical discretion in the assessment of compliance with specifications in public procurement processes and, in my view, consolidates a welcome anti-formalistic development of this area of EU public procurement law.

In the case at hand, there was a tender for the supply of anti-rabies vaccines to a region in Serbia. The technical specifications determined that the vaccines had to meet certain conditions, amongst which it was necessary to demonstrate that the vaccine had been registered by the European Medicines Agency or equivalent agency of an EU Member State, and that its use was also authorised by the Serbian medicines agency prior to its distribution.

Bioveta made an offer to supply anti-rabies vaccines based on a type of virus ("SAD-Bern MSV Bio 10") that differed from the one included in the registration and the authorisation documents it submitted as part of the technical documentation (referring to "SAD-Bern"), which had been obtained for commercialisation in both Serbia and the Czech Republic. 

In view of that discrepancy, the contracting authority required Bioveta to clarify and confirm that, despite the use of a different virus, the vaccine it offered did not require a new registration with a medicines agency, and that the commercialisation under a different name did not breach the initial authorisation to distribute the product in the Serbian market. 

In simple terms, Bioveta explained that the virus had been changed in 1992 and that the "SAD-Bern MSV Bio 10" was the virus used when the product had been authorised for distribution in Serbia. It also submitted a written explanation of the mere commercial orientation of the change of name (implemented to distinguish Bioveta's vaccines from those of competitors that also sold solutions based on the "SAD-Bern" virus), and submitted that it did not require new registration. It also furnished a report by the Czech medicines agency that confirmed that the products were equivalent and the name "SAD-Bern MSV Bio 10" had been used in all registrations and renewals that had taken place since 1992. 

The contracting authority considered that the clarification was sufficient and the contract was eventually awarded to Bioveta. The decision was subsequently challenged by the competing bidder IDT Biologika on several grounds (some of them very technical in veterinary terms). In my view, the interesting ground for challenge rests on the discretion of the contracting authority when it comes to the assessment of technical aspects of a tender for a contract to be awarded on the basis of the lowest price (or in post-2014 terms, to the most cost-effective offer).  

IDT Biologika fundamentally submitted that the explanations and certificates provided by Bioveta had been improperly assessed and taken into consideration by the contracting authority, and that the award decision was flawed due to the exercise of excessive discretion in accepting them--as, in IDT Biologika's view, the contracting authority should have taken a formalistic approach and rejected Bioveta's tender.

In order to resolve this issue, the GC builds on CMB and Christof v Commission, where it was established that "in the context of a public procurement procedure where ... the contract is awarded to the tenderer who has submitted the lowest priced administratively and technically compliant tender, the contracting authority limits its margin of discretion with regard to the award of the contract to the lowest priced tender among the compliant tenders. However, its margin of discretion must remain broad with regard to the evaluation of the conformity of the tenders presented, and in particular the documentation provided in that regard" (T-407/07, EU:T:2011:477, para 116, emphasis added). It then goes on to determine that, in view of the information supplied by Bioveta, it was not unreasonable or manifestly wrong for the contracting authority not to reject the tender.

In my view, this is a significant consolidation of the case law and, under the CMB and Christof v Commission and IDT Biologika v Commission line of case law, contracting authorities and their evaluation teams should be confident in sticking to a possibilistic approach towards the assessment of the tenders--so as to move past strict formalities and accept sufficient technical evidence as to ensure compliance with the technical specifications.

This is certainly the correct approach from the perspective of maximization of competition and the assessment of technical requirements from a functional perspective--and, consequently, the one that best fits the framework set by Art 44 of Directive 2014/24 on test reports, certification and other means of proof of conformity with requirements or criteria set out in the technical specifications, the award criteria or the contract performance conditions (in particular, art 44(2) dir 2014/24 on alternative means of proof).