A hot potato? CJEU faces questions on rules applicable to cross-border procurement litigation (C-480/22)

The Court of Justice has received a very interesting preliminary reference from the Austrian Supreme Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) concerning international conflict of laws issues relating to cross-border public procurement involving contracting entities from different Member States (Case C-480/22, EVN Business Service and Others, hereafter the ‘EVN II’ case). The preliminary reference covers issues of judicial competence and applicable procedural law to cross-border challenges of procurement decisions.

Interestingly, the case concerns a negative conflict of jurisdiction, where neither the Bulgarian nor the (first instance) Austrian courts consider themselves competent. The case thus seems to be a bit of a hot potato—although the referring (higher) Austrian court seems interested in nipping the issue in the bud, presumably to avoid a situation of deprivation of procurement remedies that would ultimately violate EU procurement rules and general requirements of access to justice under the Charter of Fundamental Rights (though this is not explicit in the preliminary reference).

The root of the problem is that the conflict of laws dimension of the administrative review of procurement decisions involving contracting authorities from different Member States is not explicitly addressed in the 2014 Procurement Directives. Although the case concerns the interpretation of Article 57 of Directive 2014/25/EU, it is of direct relevance to the interpretation of Article 39 of Directive 2014/24/EU, as the wording of provisions is near identical (with the exception of references to contracting entities rather than contracting authorities in Art 57 Dir 2014/25/UE, and the suppression of specific public sector rules on awards under framework contracts that are not relevant to this case).

I have been interested in the regulatory gaps left by Art 39 Dir 2014/24/EU for a while. In this post, I address the first two questions posed to the CJEU, as the proposed answers would make it unnecessary to answer the third question. My analysis is based on my earlier writings on the topic: A Sanchez-Graells, ‘The Emergence of Trans-EU Collaborative Procurement: A “Living Lab” for European Public Law’ (2020) 29(1) PPLR 16-41 (hereafter Sanchez-Graells, ‘Living Lab’)); and idem, ‘Article 39 - Procurement involving contracting authorities from different Member States’ in R Caranta and A Sanchez-Graells (eds), European Public Procurement. Commentary on Directive 2014/24/EU (Edward Elgar 2021) 436-447 (hereafter Sanchez-Graells, ‘Art 39’).

The ‘EVN II’ case

Based on the facts of the preliminary reference, the legal dispute originates in a ‘public house’ environment within the Austrian EVN group. The Land of Lower Austria owns 51% of EVN AG, which in turn indirectly wholly owns both (i) EVN Business Service GmbH (‘EBS GmbH’), an Austrian central purchasing body (CPB), and (ii) Elektrorazpredelenie YUG EAD (‘EY EAD’), a Bulgarian utilities company. EBS GmbH had the task of procuring services on behalf of and for the account of EY EAD through a framework agreement on the performance of electrical installation works and related construction and dismantling works divided into 36 lots, the place of performance being located in Bulgaria.

Notably, in the invitation to tender, the Landesverwaltungsgericht Niederösterreich (Regional Administrative Court, Lower Austria) was named as the competent body for appeal proceedings/review procedures. Austrian law is stated as the law applicable to the ‘procurement procedure and all claims arising therefrom’, and Bulgarian law as the law applicable to ‘the performance of the contract’.

Two Bulgarian companies unsuccessfully submitted tenders for several lots and subsequently sought to challenge the relevant award decisions. However, those claims were dismissed by the Austrian Regional Administrative Court on grounds of lack of competence. The Court argued that a decision on whether a Bulgarian undertaking may conclude a contract with a contracting entity located in Bulgaria, which is to be performed in Bulgaria and executed in accordance with Bulgarian law, would interfere massively with Bulgaria’s sovereignty, thereby giving rise to tension with the territoriality principle under international law. Moreover, the Court argued that it is not apparent from the Austrian Federal Law on public procurement which procedural law is to be applied to the review procedure.

The case thus raises both an issue of the competence for judicial review and the applicable procedural law. The conflict of jurisdiction is negative because the Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court confirmed the lack of competence of the Bulgarian procurement supervisory authority.

An avoidable gap in the 2014 Directives

The issue of cross-border use of CPB services is regulated by Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU, which in identical terms to Art 39(3) Dir 2014/24/EU, establishes that ‘The provision of centralised purchasing activities by a central purchasing body located in another Member State shall be conducted in accordance with the national provisions of the Member State where the central purchasing body is located.’

The main contention in the case is whether Article 57(3) of Directive 2014/25 must be interpreted as covering not only the procurement procedure itself, but also the rules governing the review procedure. The argument put forward by the Bulgarian challengers is that if the CPB is required to apply Austrian law from a substantive point of view, the appeal proceedings before the Austrian review bodies must also be conducted in accordance with Austrian procedural law.

As mentioned above, conflict of laws issues are not regulated in the 2014 Procurement Directives, despite explicit rules having been included by the European Commission in the 2011 proposal for a new utilities procurement directive (COM(2011) 895 final, Art 52) and the 2011 proposal for a new public sector procurement directive (COM(2011) 896 final, Art 38). With identical wording, the proposed rule was that

Several contracting [authorities/entities] may purchase works, supplies and/or services from or through a central purchasing body located in another Member State. In that case, the procurement procedure shall be conducted in accordance with the national provisions of the Member State where the central purchasing body is located [Art 52(2)/Art 38(2) of the respective proposals].

Decisions on the award of public contracts in cross-border public procurement shall be subject to the ordinary review mechanisms available under the national law applicable [Art 52(8)/Art 38(8) of the respective proposals].

The 2011 proposals would thus have resolved the conflict of laws in favour of the jurisdiction where the CPB is based. Reference to subjection ‘to the ordinary review mechanisms available under the national law applicable’ would also have encompassed the issue of applicable procedural law. The 2011 proposals also included explicit rules on the mutual recognition and collaboration in the cross-border execution of procurement review decisions (for discussion, see Sanchez-Graells, ‘Living Lab’, 25-26).

However, the 2014 Directives omit such rules. While there are indications in the recitals that the ‘new rules on cross-border joint procurementshould determine the conditions for cross-border utilisation of central purchasing bodies and designate the applicable public procurement legislation, including the applicable legislation on remedies’ (rec (82) Dir 2014/25/EU and, identically, rec (73) Dir 2014/24/EU), this is not reflected in the provisions of the Directives. While the position in the recitals could be seen as interpretive guide to the effect that the system of conflict of laws rules implicit in the Directives is unitary and the location of the CPB is determinative of the jurisdiction and applicable law for the review of its procurement decisions, this is not necessarily a definitive argument as the CJEU has made clear that recitals may be insufficient to create rules [see C-215/88, Casa Fleischhandel v BALM, EU:C:1989:331, para 31; Sanchez-Graells, ‘Art 39’, para 39.26. For discussion, see S Treumer and E Werlauff, ‘The leverage principle: Secondary Community law as a lever for the development of primary Community law’ (2003) 28(1) European Law Review 124-133].

Questions before the CJEU — and proposed answers

Given the lack of explicit solution in the 2014 Procurement Directives, the CJEU now faces two relevant questions in the EVN II case. The first question concerns the scope of the rules on the provision of cross-border CPB services, which is slightly complicated by the ‘public house’ background of the case. The second question concerns whether the rules subjecting such procurement to the law of the CPB extend to both the legislation applicable to review procedures and the competence of the review body.

Question 1 - contracting authorities/entities from different Member States

In the EVN II case, the CJEU is first asked to establish whether Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU (and, implicitly Art 39(3) Dir 2014/24/EU) should be interpreted as meaning that the provision of centralised purchasing activities by a CPB located in another Member State exists where the contracting entity – irrespective of the question as to the attribution of the control exercised over that contracting entity – is located in a Member State other than that of the CPB. The issue of attribution of control arises from the fact that, in the case at hand, the ‘client’ Bulgarian contracting entity is financially controlled by an Austrian regional authority—which, incidentally, also controls the CPB providing the centralised purchasing services. This raises the question whether the client entity is ‘truly’ foreign, or whether it needs to be reclassified as Austrian on the basis of the financial control.

While I see the logic of the question in terms of the formal applicability of the Directive, from a functional perspective, the question does not make much sense and an answer other than yes would create significant complications.

The question does not make much sense because the aim of the rule in Art 57(3) does not gravitate on the first part of the article: ‘The provision of centralised purchasing activities by a central purchasing body located in another Member State shall be conducted in accordance with the national provisions of the Member State where the central purchasing body is located.’ Rather, the relevance of the rule is in the extension of the law of the CPB to ‘(a) the award of a contract under a dynamic purchasing system; [and] (b) the conduct of a reopening of competition under a framework agreement’ by the ‘client’ (foreign) contracting authority or entity. The purpose of Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU is thus the avoidance of potentially conflicting rules in the creation of cross-border CPB procurement vehicles and in the call-offs from within those vehicles (Sanchez-Graells, ‘Art 39’, paras 39.13-39.15).

Functionally, then, the logic of the entirety of Art 57(3) (and Art 39(3)) rests on the avoidance of a risk of conflicting procurement rules applicable to the cross-border use of CPB services, presumably for the benefit of participating economic operators, as well as in search of broader consistency of the substantive legal framework. Either such a risk exists, because the ‘client’ contracting entity or authority would otherwise be subjected to a different procurement legislation than that applicable to the CPB, or it doesn’t. That is in my view the crucial functional aspect.

If this approach is correct, the issue of (potential) Austrian control over the Bulgarian contracting entity is irrelevant, as the crucial issue is whether it is generally subjected to Bulgarian utilities procurement law or not when conducting covered procurement. There is no information in the preliminary reference, but I would assume it is. Primarily because of the formal criteria determining subjection to the domestic implementation of the EU Directives, which tends to be (implicitly) based on the place of location of the relevant entity or authority.

More fundamentally, if this approach is correct, the impingement on Bulgarian sovereignty feared by the Austrian first instance court is a result of EU procurement law. There is no question that the 2014 Directives generate the legal effect that contracting authorities of a given Member State (A) are bound to comply with the procurement legislation of a different Member State (B) when they resort to the services of that State (B) CPB and then implement their own call-off procedures, potentially leading to the award of a contract to an undertaking in their own Member State (A). This potentially puts the legislation of State B in the position of determining whether an undertaking of State A may conclude a contract with a contracting entity located in State A, which is to be performed in State A and executed in accordance with the law of State A. It is thus not easily tenable under EU law that this represents a massive interference with State A’s sovereignty—unless one is willing to challenge the EU’s legal competence for the adoption of the 2014 Directives (see Sanchez-Graells, ‘Living Lab’, 31-33).

A further functional consideration is that the cross-border provision of CPB services does not need to be limited to a two-country setting. If the CPB of country B is eg creating a framework agreement that can be used by contracting authorities and entities from countries A, C, D, and E, the applicability of Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU (and Art 39(3) Dir 2014/24/EU) could not vary for entities from those different countries, or from within a country, depending on a case-by-case analysis of the location of the entities controlling the ‘client’ authorities and entities. In other words, Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU (and Art 39(3) Dir 2014/24/EU) cannot reasonably be of variable application within a single procurement.

Taking the facts of the EVN II case, imagine that in addition to EY EAD, other Bulgarian utilities were also able to draw from the (same lots of the) framework agreement put in place by EBS GmbH. How could it be that Art 57(3) controlled the procurement for the ‘clearly’ Bulgarian utilities, whereas it may not be applicable for the Bulgarian utility controlled by an Austrian authority?

In my view, all of this provides convincing argumentation for the CJEU to answer the first question by clarifying that, from a functional perspective, the need to create a unitary legal regime applicable to procurement tenders led by CPBs where there is a risk of conflicting substantive procurement rules requires interpreting Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU (and Art 39(3) Dir 2014/24/EU) as applicable where the location of ‘client’ contracting authorities or entities is in one or more Member States other than that where the CPB is itself located.

Question 2 - presumption of jurisdiction and applicable law

The second question put to the CJEU builds on the applicability of Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU and asks whether its ‘conflict-of-law rule … according to which the “provision of centralised purchasing activities” by a [CPB] located in another Member State is to be conducted in accordance with the national provisions of the Member State where the [CPB] is located, also cover[s] both the legislation applicable to review procedures and the competence of the review body’. Other than on the basis of the interpretive guide included in the recitals of Dir 2014/25/EU (and Dir 2014/24/EU) as above, I think there are good reasons to answer this question in the affirmative.

The first line of arguments is systematic and considers the treatment of conflict of laws situations within Art 57 Dir 2014/25/EU (and 39 Dir 2014/24/EU; see Sanchez-Graells, ‘Living Lab’, 21-24). In that regard, while there is a hard conflict of laws rule in Art 57(3) (and 39(3)) that selects the law of the CPB to the entirety of the procurement procedure, including ‘foreign’ call-offs, the situation is very different in the remainder of the provision. Indeed, when it comes to occasional cross-border joint procurement, in the absence of a binding international agreement, the choice of the applicable substantive procurement legislation is left to the agreement of the participating contracting authorities or entities (Art 57(4) Dir 2014/25/EU, and Art 39(4) Dir 2014/24/EU). Similarly, where the cross-border procurement is carried out through a joint entity, including European Groupings of territorial cooperation, the participating contracting authorities have a choice between the law of the Member State where the joint entity has its registered office, or that of the Member State where the joint entity is carrying out its activities (Art 57(5) Dir 2014/25/EU, and Art 39(5) Dir 2014/24/EU). This indicates that the choice of law rule applicable to the cross-border provision of CPB services leaves much less space (indeed, no space) to the application of a substantive procurement law other than that of the CPB. An extension of this argument supports answering the question in the affirmative and extending the choice of law rule to both the legislation applicable to review procedures and the competence of the review body.

A second line of argument concerns the effectiveness of the available procurement remedies. Such effectiveness would, on the one hand, be increased by a reduced judicial burden of considering foreign procurement law where the location of the CPB determines jurisdiction and procedural applicable law, which can also be expected to be coordinated with substantive procurement law. On the other hand, answering the question in the affirmative would require economic operators to challenge decisions concerning potential contracts with a domestic contracting authority or entity in a foreign court. However, given that the substantive rules are those of the foreign jurisdiction and that they were expected to tender (or tendered) in that jurisdiction, the effect may be relatively limited where the CPB decisions are being challenged—as compared to a challenge of the call-off decision carried out by their domestic contracting authority or entity, but subject to foreign procurement law. In my view, the last set of circumstances is very unlikely, as the applicability of the ‘foreign’ law of the CPB generates a very strong incentive for the CPBs to also carry out the call-off phase on behalf of the client authority or entity (Sanchez-Graells, ‘Art 39’, 39.14).

Overall, in my view, the CJEU should answer the second question by clarifying that the reference to the national provisions of the Member State where the CPB is located in Art Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU (and 39(3) Dir 2014/24/EU, also covers both the legislation applicable to review procedures and the competence of the review body.

Some further thoughts

Beyond the specific issues before the CJEU, the EVN II case raises broader concerns around the flexible contractualised approach (not to say the absence of an approach) to conflict of laws issues in the 2014 Procurement Directives—which leave significant leeway to participating contracting authorities and entities to craft the applicable legal regime.

While the situation can be relatively easy to sort out with an expansive interpretation of Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU and Art 39(3) Dir 2014/24/EU in the relatively simple case of the cross-border provision of CPB services (as above), these issues will be much more complex in other types of procurement involving contracting authorities from (multiple) different Member States. The approach followed by the first instance Austrian court in EVN II seems to me reflective of more generalised judicial approaches and attitudes towards unregulated conflict of laws situations where they can be reluctant to simply abide by whatever is published in the relevant procurement notices—as was the case in EVN II, where the invitation to tender was explicit about allocation of jurisdiction and selection of applicable procedural law and, that notwithstanding, the first instance court found issues on both grounds.

This can potentially be a major blow to the ‘contractualised’ approach underpinning the 2014 Procurement Directives, especially where situations arise that require domestic courts of a Member State to make decisions imposing liability on contracting authorities of another Member State, and the subsequent need to enforce that decision. The issue of the conflict of laws dimension of the administrative review of procurement decisions involving contracting authorities from different Member States will thus not be entirely addressed by the Judgement of the CJEU in EVN II, although the CJEU could hint at potential solutions, depending on how much it decided to rely on the 2011 proposals as a steppingstone towards an expansive interpretation of the current provisions—which is by no means guaranteed, as the suppression of explicit rules could as easily be interpreted as a presumption or as a rejection of those rules by the CJEU.

It seems clearer than ever that the procurement remedies Directives need to be reformed to create a workable and transparent system of conflict of laws dimension of the administrative review of procurement decisions involving contracting authorities from different Member States, as well as explicit rules on cross-border enforcement of those decisions (Sanchez-Graells, ‘Living Lab’, 39-40).

New paper on competition and procurement regulation -- in memory of Professor Steen Treumer

Image credits: Steve Johnson.

Last year brought the saddest news with the passing of Professor Steen Treumer after a long illness. Steen was a procurement colossus and a fantastic academic. I was extremely lucky to count him amongst my mentors and champions, especially at the very early stages of my research and academic career, before he had to take a step back to focus on his health. I am particularly grateful to him for having opened the door of the European Procurement Law Group to me. And for his generosity in providing feedback, job and promotion references, and thoughtful and clever advice without ever asking for or expecting anything in return.

It is nigh impossible to do justice to the intellectual contribution Steen made to the procurement field and the influence his approach had on the research of others such as myself. It is now a humbling honour to have been invited to contribute to an edited collection in his memory (a Mindeskrift). If he could read my contribution, I am not sure Steen would agree with what I say in the paper, but we would certainly have an interesting and stimulating discussion on the basis of the sharp comments (even some devil’s advocate ones) he would surely come up with. I hope you will find the contribution worth discussing too.

Probably unsurprisingly, the paper is entitled ‘Competition and procurement regulation: a goal, a principle, a requirement, or all of the above?’ and its abstract is below. In the paper, I use the background of recent developments in UK and EU case law, as well as the UK’s procurement rulebook reform process, to reframe the issue of the role of competition in procurement regulation. While I do not provide any insights I had not already developed in earlier writing, I bring some scattered parts of my scholarship together and hopefully clarify a few things along the way. The paper may be particularly interesting to those looking for an entry point to the discussion on the role of competition in public procurement, but hopefully there is also something for those already well versed on the topic. As always, comments most welcome: a.sanchez-graells@bristol.ac.uk.

In this contribution, I reflect on the role of competition in public procurement regulation and, more specifically, on whether competition should be treated as a regulatory goal, as a general principle of public procurement law, as a specific (implicit or explicit) requirement in discrete legal provisions, or all of the above. This is an issue I had the pleasure and honour of discussing with Professor Steen Treumer back in 2009, when I was a PhD student visiting the Copenhagen Business School. While Steen never revealed to me what he really thought, his probing questions continue to help me think of this issue, which remains at the core of my research efforts. This contribution shows that the role of competition keeps cropping up in procurement regulation and litigation, as evidenced in recent UK developments. This is thus an evergreen research topic, which were Steen’s favourites.

The full citation is: Sanchez-Graells, Albert, ‘Competition and procurement regulation: a goal, a principle, a requirement, or all of the above?’, to be published in Steen Treumer’s Mindeskrift edited by Carina Risvig Hamer, Erik Bertelsen, Marta Andhov, and Roberto Caranta (Ex Tuto Publishing, forthcoming 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4012022.

ECJ opens door to remedial possibilities when contracting authorities aim to exclude on the basis of shady participation requirements (C-27/15)

In its Judgment of 2 June 2016 in Pizzo, C-27/15, EU:C:2016:404, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has provided interpretative guidance on some aspects of the qualitative selection process that contracting authorities need to carry out prior to the award of public contracts covered by the relevant EU rules. It is worth noting that, even if the Pizzo Judgment is based on the rules of Directive 2004/18 (Arts 47 and 48), but the functional criteria it sets will be equally relevant under the new rules of Directive 2014/24 (Arts 56 to 58).

In particular, the Pizzo Judgment clarifies the scope of the discretion given to contracting authorities to interpret tender documents in a way that would unfavourably result in the exclusion of economic operators (following Manova, C‑336/12, EU:C:2013:647, see here; and Cartiera dell'Adda, C‑42/13, EU:C:2014:2345, see here), as well as the limits of the possibility given to economic operators to remedy formal shortcomings in the documentation presented in the course of their participation in the tender for a public contract in order to avoid such exclusion.

Pizzo also follows the flexible approach previously established by the ECJ regarding reliance on third party capacities (as per Swm Costruzioni 2 and Mannocchi Luigino, C-94/12, EU:C:2013:646, see here; and in a related fashion to Ostas celtnieks, C-234/14, EU:C:2016:6, see here). 

The case concerned the tender of a public service contract for the management of waste and cargo residues produced on board ships calling at ports within the contracting authority’s territorial jurisdiction (ie the Messina area, in Italy). The contracting authority received four tenders but decided to exclude three tenderers due to the lack of payment of an administrative fee that it considered a mandatory participation requirement, which led the authority to award the contract to the only remaining tenderer (Pizzo).

One of the excluded tenderers (CGRT) appealed the exclusion decision on the basis that the payment of the fee was only mandatory for works contracts, not for services contracts, and that the authority required such payment on the basis of a broad interpretation of the relevant rules and its general powers under Italian administrative law. In CGRT's submission, before proceeding to its exclusion from the tender, the authority should at least have given it the possibility to remedy the situation and pay the fee. CGRT's action was faced with a counterclaim by Pizzo whereby it challenged CGRT's compliance with the economic standing requirements for the participation in the tender due to the fact that it had relied on third party capacities (in the case, those of RIAL). 

Therefore, the case raised two issues: 1) to what extent can a contracting authority engage in a (discretionary) broad interpretation of the tender documents in a way that incorporates the requirement to pay a fee and proceed to the exclusion of those tenderers that had not paid the fee without giving them the opportunity to remedy the situation; and 2) to what extent must contracting authorities follow a flexible approach to the assessment of economic and technical standing requirements when tenderers rely on third party capacities. The first issue is more interesting and controversial than the second one. Thus, let's focus on the second issue first.

Again, on the flexible approach to reliance on third party capacities and how it carries over to new rules of directive 2014/24

In Pizzo, the ECJ revisits its consolidated case law in this area, without adding much to the already clear position that the applicable EU rules create significant flexibility for tenderers to rely on third party capacity, unless the tender documents establish reasonable and proportionate restrictions justified by the subject matter of the contract. In its own terms:

23      The Court has held that EU law does not require that, in order to be classified as an economic operator qualifying for tendering, a person wishing to enter into a contract with a contracting authority must be capable of direct performance using his own resources (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 December 2009 in CoNISMa, C‑305/08, EU:C:2009:807, paragraph 41).
24      ... Article 47(2) and Article 48(3) of Directive 2004/18 does not lay down any general prohibition regarding a candidate or tenderer’s reliance on the capacities of one or more third-party entities in addition to its own capacities in order to fulfil the criteria set by a contracting authority (see Swm Costruzioni 2, paragraph 30).
25      ... those provisions recognise the right of every economic operator to rely, for a particular contract, upon the capacities of other entities, ‘regardless of the nature of the links which it has with them’, provided that it proves to the contracting authority that it will have at its disposal the resources necessary for the performance of the contract (see Ostas celtnieks, paragraph 23).
26      It must therefore be held that Directive 2004/18 permits the combining of the capacities of more than one economic operator for the purpose of satisfying the minimum capacity requirements set by the contracting authority, provided that the candidate or tenderer relying on the capacities of one or more other entities proves to that authority that it will actually have at its disposal the resources of those entities necessary for the execution of the contract (see Swm Costruzioni 2, paragraph 33).
27      Such an interpretation is consistent with the objective pursued by the directives in this area of attaining the widest possible opening-up of public contracts to competition to the benefit not only of economic operators but also contracting authorities (see, to that effect, CoNISMa, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). In addition, that interpretation also facilitates the involvement of small- and medium-sized undertakings in the contracts procurement market, an aim also pursued by Directive 2004/18, as stated in recital 32 thereof (see Swm Costruzioni 2, paragraph 34).
28      ... however ... there may be works the special requirements of which necessitate a certain capacity which cannot be obtained by combining the capacities of more than one operator, which, individually, would be inadequate. It has thus acknowledged that, in such circumstances, the contracting authority would be justified in requiring that the minimum capacity level concerned be achieved by a single economic operator or by relying on a limited number of economic operators as long as that requirement is related and proportionate to the subject matter of the contract at issue. The Court has, however, stated that since those circumstances represent an exception, the requirements in question cannot be made general rules under national law (see, to that effect, Swm Costruzioni 2, paragraphs 35 and 36) (C-27/15, paras 23-28, references shortened).

The only novelty to be found in Pizzo is that the ECJ anticipates the interpretation of Art 63 Dir 2014/24 by stressing that

the specific provisions ... provide that it is possible for the contracting authority to require that the entity which is relied on to satisfy the conditions laid down with regard to economic and financial standing is to be jointly liable (Article 63(1), third subparagraph, of Directive 2014/24) or to require that, with regard to certain types of contracts, certain critical tasks are to be performed directly by the tenderer (Article 63(2) of that directive). Those provisions do not therefore impose specific limits on the possibility of divided reliance on the capacities of third-party undertakings and, in any event, such limits should have been expressly set out for in the call for tenders in respect of the contract at issue, which is not the case in the main proceedings (C-27/15, para 33, emphasis added).

This is in line with the interpretation of Art 63 Dir 2014/24 I hold in Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 315-318, but it is worth stressing that the ECJ has not yet tackled some of the restrictions allowed for under Art 63(2) Dir 2014/24 (ie the requirement that certain critical tasks are to be performed directly by the tenderer) which in my view run contrary to its previous case law. Thus, in this instance, the fact that the ECJ makes obiter comments on the likely future interpretation of the rules of Dir 2014/24 is worrying because there are two possible readings of paragraph 33 in Pizzo: (a) that the ECJ is giving carte blanche to the potential restrictions created by Art 63(1) and (2), or (b), that the ECJ is simply stressing that (regardless of their substantive merit and from a prior formal perspective), for such requirements to apply, they need to be created in the applicable tender documents (which, having not happened in this case, makes them irrelevant). I strongly vouch for (b), but I am certain that there will be claims based on (a) when the issue properly arises in litigation. Thus, in this case, the probably well-intended effort by the ECJ to anticipate the interpretation of the new rules may have created more shadows than lights.

On the tricky issue of the interpretation of tender documents, the duty to seek clarification or, at least, allow for remediation of short-comings leading to exclusion of economic operators

When tackling the challenge of the contracting authority's broad interpretation of the obligation to pay an administrative fee and its decision to exclude, without possibility to remedy such short-coming, the economic operators that had failed to pay it, the rephrased the question to mean 'whether the principle of equal treatment and the obligation of transparency are to be interpreted as precluding an economic operator from being excluded from a procedure for the award of a public contract as a result of that economic operator’s non-compliance with an obligation which does not expressly arise from the documents relating to that procedure or out of the national law in force, but from an interpretation of that law and from the incorporation of provisions into those documents by the national authorities or administrative courts' (C-27/15, para 35).

In that regard, the ECJ makes the following arguments and establishes the following reasoning:

36 ... all the conditions and detailed rules of the award procedure must be drawn up in a clear, precise and unequivocal manner in the contract notice or specifications so that, first, all reasonably informed tenderers exercising ordinary care can understand their exact significance and interpret them in the same way and, second, the contracting authority is able to ascertain whether the tenders submitted satisfy the criteria applying to the contract in question (see, to that effect, Cartiera dell’Adda, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
37      The Court has also held that the principles of transparency and equal treatment which govern all procedures for the award of public contracts require the substantive and procedural conditions concerning participation in a contract to be clearly defined in advance and made public, in particular the obligations of tenderers, in order that those tenderers may know exactly the procedural requirements and be sure that the same requirements apply to all candidates ...
45 ... in the case in the main proceedings, the alleged obligation to pay a fee to the AVCP [the Supervisory Authority on Public Procurement] can be identified only by the interaction between the 2006 Finance Law, the AVCP’s decision-making practice and the judicial practice of the Italian administrative courts in applying and interpreting Law No 266/2005.
46      As the Advocate General points out ... a condition governing the right to participate in a public procurement procedure which arises out of the interpretation of national law and the practice of an authority ... would be particularly disadvantageous for tenderers established in other Member States, inasmuch as their level of knowledge of national law and the interpretation thereof and of the practice of the national authorities cannot be compared to that of national tenderers.
48 ... it is apparent from the order for reference that there is no possibility of rectifying non-compliance with that condition that a fee must be paid.
49      According to paragraph 46 of the judgment in Cartiera dell’Adda ..., the contracting authority may not accept any rectification of omissions which, as expressly provided for in the contract documentation, must result in the exclusion of the bid. The Court stated, in paragraph 48 of that judgment, that the obligation concerned was clearly laid down in the contract documentation, on pain of exclusion.
50      However, in a situation where ... a condition for participating in a procedure for the award of a contract, on pain of exclusion from that procedure, is not expressly laid down in the contract documentation and that condition can be identified only by a judicial interpretation of national law, the contracting authority may grant the excluded tenderer a sufficient period of time in order to rectify its omission (C-27/15, paras 36-50, some references omitted and emphasis added).

I agree with the main reasoning of the ECJ on this issue as it coincides with a possibilistic and functional approach to the management of the exclusion and qualitative selection procedure aimed at minimising exclusion for causes that can be remedied without infringing the principle of equal treatment [for discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells, 'Exclusion, Qualitative Selection and Short-listing', in F Lichère, R Caranta & S Treumer (eds), Modernising Public Procurement. The New Directive, vol. 6 European Procurement Law Series (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2014) 97-129; and ibid, 'Rejection of Abnormally Low and Non-Compliant Tenders in EU Public Procurement: A Comparative View on Selected Jurisdictions', M Comba & S Treumer (eds) Award of Contracts in EU Procurements, vol. 5 European Procurement Law Series (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2013) 267-302].

However, I am not convinced by the way the ECJ has limited the opportunity to remedy the (interpreted) shortcomings in the tender documentation (or material requirements) to a mere possibility. As phrased in the operational part of the Pizzo Judgment, the ECJ has interpreted that

the principle of equal treatment and the obligation of transparency must be interpreted as precluding an economic operator from being excluded from a procedure for the award of a public contract as a result of that economic operator’s non-compliance with an obligation which does not expressly arise from the documents relating to that procedure or out of the national law in force, but from an interpretation of that law and those documents and from the incorporation of provisions into those documents by the national authorities or administrative courts. Accordingly, the principles of equal treatment and of proportionality must be interpreted as not precluding an economic operator from being allowed to regularise its position and comply with that obligation within a period of time set by the contracting authority (C-27/45, para 51, emphasis added).

I find this approach too lenient and I would have expected the ECJ to create a mandatory vis-a-vis procedure similar to the one applicable in case the contracting authority suspects an offer to be abnormally low under Art 69 Dir 2014/24. Generally, I think that rather than focusing solely on the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination, it is worth stressing the relevance of the principle of good administration as well. From that perspective, if the contracting authority identifies a participation requirement that was not obvious from the tender documentation, it should be subjected to a mandatory phase whereby it allows tenderers to remedy the situation. The same would go for the interpretation of Art 56(3) Dir 2014/24 in terms of the possibility (in my view, non-discretionary) to seek clarifications from tenderers and to 'take all appropriate steps to avoid the rejection of candidates on the basis of shortcomings in the available documentation that could be overcome if the contracting authority were to exercise the appropriate level of diligence' [Public procurement and the EU competition rules (2015) 321-323].

Overall, I think that this is an area where the ECJ is avoiding a much needed delineation of the limits (or at least checks and balances) to be imposed on the discretion of the contracting authorities to proceed to exclusion without exhausting the possibilities for clarification or remedy of formal shortcomings in the submission of tenders. This is likely to be an area of continued litigation, particularly as the Pizzo case opens the door to different treatment of participation requirements that directly derive from the tender documentation (where the contracting authority is likely to have its hands tied and not be able to provide any scope for remedial action beyond the very limited possibilities foreseen in Manova and Cartiera dell’Adda) or that indirectly arise from its contextual interpretation (where the Pizzo approach seems to open a rather big door to the enablement of remedial actions). Thus, the last word is certainly not yet written...