In this guest post, Dr Aris Christidis follows up on the issue of termination of contracts where the contracting authority has exceeded the limits of permissible contract modifications under Article 72 of Directive 2014/24/EU, focusing in particular on the shortcomings of Art 73 thereof and its transposition in the UK through reg.73 Public Contracts Regulations 2015.
A note on Regulation 73 of the Public Contracts Regulations (and by extension Article 73 of the EU Public Procurement Directive)
In this earlier post about the alleged unlawfulness of the NHSX contract modification, Albert argued that ‘the cause for termination could not be waived because reg.73 is meant as a safeguard against abuses of reg.72 and, thus, is unavoidably triggered the moment the boundaries of reg.72 are exceeded’.
I want to pick up on this point and provide some thoughts on the scope of Regulation 73 and by extension on Article 73 of the EU Public Procurement Directives.
Let me start by examining the position under the EU Directives. The 2014 directives have included a provision (Art 73 of Dir 2014/24/EU and the equivalent of Art 90 of Dir 2014/25/EU and Art 44 of Dir 2014/23/EU) which requires the Member States to empower their contracting authorities, under their national laws with the option of unilaterally terminating a contract during its term at least under the following three situations:
(a) the contract has been subject to a substantial modification, which would have required a new procurement procedure pursuant to Article 72;
(b) the contractor has, at the time of contract award, been in one of the situations referred to in Article 57(1) and should therefore have been excluded from the procurement procedure;
(c) the contract should not have been awarded to the contractor in view of a serious infringement of the obligations under the Treaties and this Directive that has been declared by the Court of Justice of the European Union in a procedure pursuant to Article 258 TFEU.
While such a remedial measure is in the right direction because it allows contracting authorities to correct their violations after a contract comes into effect, it does not address various issues on how this remedy is supposed to operate. These issues are to be determined solely by national laws.
Also, it is not clear why the only option for contracting authorities is to terminate a contract, instead of providing other remedial alternatives such as the shortening of the duration of the contract—similarly with the ineffectiveness remedy.
Surely, even if contracting authorities are under an obligation to terminate a contract, this should not be automatic. Public interest considerations such as the urgency of executing the contract should be carefully considered before any decision to prematurely discharge such a contract is made.
Finally, the EU legislator does not explain convincingly the rationale behind the reason why in the aforementioned violations the contracting authorities should have the right (rather than the obligation – see next section) to terminate an existing contract and why other violations should not necessarily constitute reasons to terminate an existing contract (e.g. finding of conflict of interest or direct awards).
Does Article 73 impose a positive obligation?
Undoubtedly, Article 73 (c) - unlike the other two– has a mandatory effect. This is because it concerns a violation that has been declared under Article 258 TFEU, which Member States must comply with under Article 260 TFEU.
The purpose of this provision seems to be to ensure that a duty of a Member State to terminate a contract is fulfilled as quickly as possible and avoid any possible cumbersome procedural issues that may be imposed under national law.
An issue that requires some consideration is what amounts to a ‘serious infringement’ that may lead to an obligation to terminate a contract (interestingly, the proposal for the 2014 directive (COM (2011) 896) did not refer to the wording ‘serious infringement’ rather it stated: ‘…a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligation under the Treaties…’).
Following the ruling of the CJEU in Waste (C-503/04), which concerned a decision under Article 258 TFEU, a ‘serious infringement’ will constitute any violation that restricts the fundamental freedoms of the internal market, in that case, the fact that an unlawful direct award had the effect of restricting other economic operators from providing the particular service.
It is submitted that serious breach may constitute any violation that influences the outcome of competition and that termination of an existing contract seems relevant, inter alia, in the following situations: when a tender should have been excluded because of prior involvement of candidates in the submission of bids, when a conflict of interest is found or when a tender should have been rejected because it did not comply with tender conditions.
What seems to be certain is that a ‘serious infringement’ would most probably be regarded by the CJEU as any violation of the other two explicit reasons for termination as provided in the Article at hand - namely, violations with regards to the modification of contracts (see case C-601/10 Commission v Hellenic Republic available in French and Greek) and the entering to a contract with a provider who should have been disqualified from the awarding process.
This argument, in turn, raises the concern on whether the provisions of Article 73 are facultative or in effect contracting authorities are under an obligation to terminate a contract when the prescribed violations take place. In other words, whether EU law raises a positive obligation for contracting authorities.
On the one hand, the wording of this Article is clear: ‘Member States shall ensure that contracting authorities have the possibility… under the conditions determined by the applicable national law, to terminate a public contract during its term…’ (emphasis added).
On the other hand, this wording does not align with the rationale behind the adoption of this measure. According to Recital 112, ‘contracting authorities are sometimes faced with circumstances that require the early termination of public contracts in order to comply with obligations under EU law in the field of public procurement’ (emphasis added).
I lean towards the more formalistic interpretation, that is, there is no positive obligation. In my view, the Directive is not sufficiently clear on this and, as discussed below, the UK has not made termination a requirement but rather an option for the contracting authorities.
The implementation in the UK
Regulation 73 of the Public Contract Regulations 2015 (PCR) has transposed the EU law requirement of empowering contracting authorities to terminate an existing contract. Regulation 73 did not opt to include other violations that could give the right to a contracting authority to terminate an existing contract.
Two things should be noted about this unilateral power. The first is that Regulation 73(1) makes it clear that it is up to the discretion of a contracting authority to terminate a contract or not. It specifically states that ‘…contracting authorities shall ensure that every public contract which they award contains provisions enabling the contracting authority to terminate the contract where…’ (emphasis added; see for example the Model Contract for Services by the Government Legal Department at clause 33). Therefore, contracting authorities can simply refrain from exercising such power even if the relevant violations have taken place.
The second is that Regulation 73(3) clarifies that when provisions for termination are not provided within the terms of the contract, such power shall be an implied term of the contract. In other words, Regulation 73 overrides the absence of express contractual terms by providing a statutory basis for such unilateral power to be exercised.
In my view, Regulation 73 has little practical effect. In principle, it is a very good idea to empower contracting authorities to unilaterally terminate a contract. They are, indeed, in the best position to correct any unlawful acts especially when these are unintentional. Also, the disposal of such power minimises the possibility of litigation by third parties and ensures that any violations are remedied with minimum costs and in the public interest.
However, the way Article 73 was implemented in the UK shows the problematic design of this measure. There is nothing to compel contracting authorities to terminate an existing contract even if, on the face of it, they have violated the relevant rules. To require compliance, you need some form of external enforcement or recommendation. Otherwise, who is to determine whether the prescribed rules have been violated or not and who may induce a contracting authority to terminate a contract?
The only way for the government to be compelled to terminate a contract which is the result of unlawful modification or other serious infringement is if the Commission brought a case before the CJEU under Article 258 TFEU. In the current, COVID-19, and Brexit environment, I very much doubt that this will happen.
What if the government decides to terminate a contract under Regulation 73?
A final issue that perhaps requires some attention, is how are consequential matters between parties treated where the government decides to terminate the contract based on Regulation 73.
The first point to note is that Article 73 Directive 2014/24/EU does not give any indication as to how such consequential matters are to be regulated by the Member States and this is another problematic aspect of the design of this provision at the EU level.
Indeed, if the purpose of this remedial measure is to correct violations by returning a contract to the status quo ante then surely any compensation to the contractor due to early termination should be reasonable and proportionate.
Therefore, any form of redress must in principle be based on restitution, that is, a contractor must not be able to recover anything further that the value of what has been performed and has benefited the contracting authority.
The Commission had indicated that this is a requirement for the ineffectiveness remedy. In particular, Recital 21 of the Remedies Directive states that the objective to be achieved where the Member States lay down the rules which ensure ‘that the rights and obligations of the parties under the contract should cease to be enforced and performed’.
It goes on to say that ‘the consequences concerning the possible recovery of any sums which may have been paid, as well as all other forms of possible restitution, including restitution in value where restitution in kind is not possible, are to be determined by national law’. Similar careful thinking and considerations were not given for Article 73.
In the content of the PCR, Regulation 73(2) provides that consequential matters in case of termination should be regulated by express contractual provisions. Hence, the provisions of a contract itself will stipulate how these matters are to be regulated between parties and not some contract or administrative law principle.
The Model Contract for Services by the Government Legal Department provides some signs as to how the government will treat consequential matters in case of termination pursuant to Regulation 73. For instance, clause 34.5 (b) provides that in case of termination due to a substantial modification any costs from this termination should lie where they fall. This seems to be an appropriate form of compensation.
Some final thoughts
The current crisis has triggered a conversation about the design of the procurement rules all over the world. Perhaps this is also a good time both for the EU and the UK to think harder as to the scope of the exercise of unilateral termination powers by contracting authorities.
This is an excellent remedial tool. It is less costly and more time-efficient than any other form of enforcement when a contract has been concluded unlawfully. However, various issues need to be considered carefully. The following are some suggestions:
Careful consideration of the type of violations that should give rise to termination. Legislators could consider the gravity of the violation and perhaps make a distinction between violations that require termination and violations for which a contracting authority can exercise discretion as to whether to terminate or not.
An independent body with powers to compel contracting authorities to terminate or at least make suggestions to consider termination. In the UK, for instance, such power may be exercised by the Public Procurement Review Service which current remit does not allow the exercise such powers.
Clear indication as to how consequential matters are treated. As argued above, any compensation in case of unilateral termination due to violation of procurement rules should be based on restitution to align with the purpose of this remedy, which is to restore the public contract market in the status quo ante.
Dr Aris Christidis
Dr Aris Christidis is a Lecturer in Law at Newcastle Law School, which he joined in January 2018. He previously taught at the University of Nottingham, where he completed his PhD in December of 2018 (without corrections). He currently teaches Introduction to Business Law and Contract Law. Aris’ current research lies in public procurement law and the interaction of public with private law in the context of public contracts. His research interests are in comparative law, the law of obligations, public procurement law and in the economic analysis of law.
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