Public procurement (entry for an Encyclopaedia)

I was invited to provide an entry on ‘public procurement’ for the forthcoming Elgar Encyclopedia of European Law co-edited by Andrea Biondi and Oana Stefan. I must say I struggled to decide what to write about, as the entry was limited to 4,000 words and there are so many (!!) things going on in procurement. Below is my draft entry with perhaps an eclectic choice of content. Comments most welcome!

The draft entry is also available on SSRN if you prefer a pdf version: A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Public procurement’ in A Biondi and O Stefan, Elgar Encyclopedia of European Law (forthcoming) available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=4621399.

Public Procurement

I. Introduction

From up close, public procurement law can be seen as the set of mostly procedural rules controlling the way in which the public sector buys goods, services, and works from the market. Procurement would thus be a set of administrative law requirements concerned with the design and advertisement of tenders for public contracts, the decision-making process leading to the award of those contracts, and the advertisement and potential challenge of such decisions. To a more limited extent, some requirements would extend to the contract execution phase, and control in particular the modification and eventual termination of public contracts. From this narrow perspective, procurement would be primarily concerned with ensuring the integrity and probity of decision-making processes involving the management of public funds, as well as fostering the generation of value for money through effective reliance on competition for public contracts.

The importance and positive contribution of public procurement law to the adequate management of public funds may seem difficult to appreciate in ordinary times, and there are recurrent calls for a reduction of the administrative burden and bureaucracy related to procurement procedures, checks and balances. However, as the pervasive abuses of direct awards under the emergency conditions generated by the covid pandemic evidenced in virtually all jurisdictions, dispensing with those requirements, checks and balances comes with a very high price tag for taxpayers in terms of corruption, favouritism, and wastage of public funds.

Even from this relatively narrow perspective of procurement as a process-based mechanism of public governance, procurement attracts a significant amount of attention from EU legislators and from the EU Courts and is an area of crucial importance in the development of the European administrative space. As procurement regulation has been developed through successive generations of directives, and as many Member States had long traditions on the regulation of public procurement prior to the emergence of EU law on the topic, procurement offers a fertile ground for comparative public law scholarship. More recently, as EU procurement policy increasingly seeks to promote cross-border collaboration, procurement is also becoming a driver (or an irritant) for the transnational regulation of administrative processes and a living lab for experimentation and legal innovation.

From a slightly broader perspective, public procurement can be seen as a tool for the self-organisation of the State and as a primary conduit for the privatisation and outsourcing of State functions. A decision preceding procurement concerns the size and shape of the State, especially in relation to which functions and activities the State carries out in-house (including through public-public collaboration mechanisms), and which other are contracted out to the market (‘make or buy’ decisions). Procurement then controls the design and award of contracts involving the exercise of public powers, or the direct provision of public services to citizens where market agents are called upon to do so (including in the context of quasi-markets). Procurement thus heavily influences the interaction between the State’s contractual agents and citizens, and becomes a tool for the regulation of public service delivery. The more the State relies on markets for the provision of public services, the larger the potential influence (both positive and negative) of procurement mechanisms on citizens’ experience of their (indirect) interaction with the State. On this view, procurement is a tool of public governance and a conduit for public-private cooperation, as well as a regulatory mechanism for delegated public-public and public-private interactions. From this perspective, procurement is often seen as a neoliberal tool closely linked to new public management (NPM), although it should be stressed that procurement rules only activate once the decision to resort to contracting out or outsourcing has been made, as EU law does not mandate ‘going to market’.

From an even broader perspective, public procurement represents a more complex and multi-layered regulatory instrument. Given the enormous amounts of public funds channelled through public procurement, and the market-shaping effects that can follow from the exercise of such buying power, procurement regulation is often used as a lever for the promotion of policies and goals well beyond the narrower confines of procurement as a regulated administrative process. In the EU, procurement has always been an instrument of internal market regulation and sought to dismantle barriers to cross-border competition for the award of public contracts. More recently, and in line with developments in other jurisdictions, procurement has been increasingly singled out as a tool to promote environmental and sustainability goals, as well as social goals, or as a tool to foster innovation. Procurement is also increasingly identified as a tool to foster compliance with human rights along increasingly complex supply chains, or to address social inequality, such as through gender responsive procurement. In the face of the challenges posed by the mainstreaming of digital technologies, and artificial intelligence in particular, procurement is also increasingly identified as a tool of digital regulation. And, against the background of rule of law challenges within the EU, procurement conditionality has added to the fiscal control effect traditionally linked to the use of EU funds to subsidise procurement projects at Member State level. From this perspective, procurement is either an enforcement (or reinforcement) mechanism, or a self-standing regulatory tool for the pursuit of an increasingly diverse array of horizontal policies seeking to steer market activities.

Relatedly, given the importance of procurement as an economic activity, its regulation is of crucial importance in the context of industrial and trade policies. The interaction between procurement and industrial policy is not entirely straightforward, and neither is the position of procurement in the context of trade liberalisation. While there have been waves of policy efforts seeking to minimise the use of procurement for industrial policy purposes (ie the award of public contracts to national champions), in particular given the State aid implications of such uses of public contracts under EU law, and while there is a general push for the liberalisation of international trade through procurement—there are also periodic waves of protectionism where procurement is used as a tool of international economic regulation or, more broadly, geopolitics. Most recently, the EU has aggressively (re)regulated access to its procurement markets on grounds of such considerations.

It would be impossible to address all the issues that arise from the regulation of public procurement in all these (and other potential) dimensions within a single entry. Here, I will touch upon some the issues highlighted by recent developments in EU law and policy, and in relation to contemporary debates around the salient grand challenges encapsulated in the need for procurement to support the ‘twin transition’ to green and digital. I will not focus on the detail of procurement rules, which is better left to in-depth analysis (eg Arrowsmith [2014] and [2018], Steinicke and Vesterdorf [2018], or Caranta and Sanchez-Graells [2021]). There are a few common threats in the developments discussed below, especially in relation to the increasing complexity of procurement policymaking and administration, or the crucial role of expertise and capability, as well as some challenges in coordinating them in a way that generates meaningful outcomes. I will briefly return to these issues in the conclusion.

II. Procurement, Trade, and Geopolitics

A constant tension in the regulation of procurement concerns the openness of procurement markets. On the one hand, procurement can be a catalyst for trade liberalisation and there are many economic advantages stemming from increased (international) competition for public contracts—as evidenced in the context of the World Trade Organisation Government Procurement Agreement (WTO GPA) (Georgopoulos et al [2017]). In the narrower context of the EU’s internal market, public procurement openness is taken to its logical extremes and barriers to cross-border tendering are systematically dismantled through legislation, such as the most recent 2014 Public Procurement Package, and its interpretation by the Court of Justice. While there is disparity in national practice, the (complete) openness of procurement markets in the EU tends to not only benefit EU tenderers, but also those of third countries, who tend to be treated equally with EU ‘domestic’ tenderers.

On the other hand, the same (international) competition that can bring economic advantages can also put pressure on (less competitive) domestic industries or create risks of uneven playing field—especially where (foreign national champion) tenderers are propped up by their States. In some industries and in relation to some critical infrastructure, the award of oftentimes large and sensitive public contracts to foreign undertakings also generates concerns around safety and sovereignty.

A mechanism to mediate this tension is to make procurement-related trade liberalisation conditional on reciprocity, which in turn leverages multilateral instruments such as the WTO GPA. This is an area where EU law has recently generated significant developments. After protracted negotiations, EU procurement law now comprises a set of three instruments seeking to rebalance the (complete) openness of EU procurement markets.

As a starting point, under EU law, only foreign economic operators covered by an existing international agreement (such as the WTO GPA, or bilateral or multilateral trade agreements concluded with the EU that include commitments on access to public procurement) are entitled to equal treatment. However, differential treatment or outright exclusion of economic operators not covered by such equal treatment obligation tends (or has historically tended to) be rare. This can be seen to weaken the hand of the European Commission in international negotiations, as EU procurement markets are de facto almost entirely open, regardless of the much more limited legal openness resulting from those international agreements.

To nudge contracting authorities to enforce differential treatment, in 2020, the European Commission issued guidance on the participation of third country bidders and goods in EU procurement markets, stressing the several ways in which public buyers could address concerns regarding unfair competitive advantages of foreign tenderers. This should be seen as a first step towards ramping up the ‘rebalancing’ of access to EU procurement markets, though it is a soft (law) step and one that would still hinge on coordinated decision-making by a very large number of public buyers making tender-by-tender decisions.

A second and crucial step was taken in 2022 with the adoption of the EU’s International Procurement Instrument (IPI), which empowers the European Commission to carry out investigations where there are concerns about measures or practices negatively affecting the access of EU businesses, goods and services to non-EU procurement markets and, eventually, to impose (centralised) IPI measures to restrict access to EU public procurement procedures for businesses, goods and services from the non-EU countries concerned. The main effect of the IPI can be expected to be twofold. Outwardly, the IPI will lead to the European Commission having ‘a stick’ to push for reciprocity in procurement liberalisation as a complement to ‘the carrot’ used to persuade more and more countries to enter into bilateral trade deals, or for them to join the WTO GPA. Internally, the IPI will allow the Commission to mandate Member States to implement the relevant restrictions or exclusions from the EU procurement markets in relation to the jurisdictions concerned. This is expected to address the issue of de facto openness beyond existing (international) legal requirements, and therefore galvanise the ability of the Commission to control access to ‘the EU procurement market’ and thus bolster its ability to use procurement reciprocity as a tool for trade liberalisation more effectively.

A third and final crucial step came with the adoption in 2023 of the Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, which creates a mechanism for the control of potential foreign subsidies in tenders for contracts with an estimated value above EUR 250 million, and can also result in the imposition of (centralised) measures curving access to the relevant contracts by the beneficiaries of those foreign subsidies. This comes to somehow create an international functional equivalent to the State aid control in place for domestic tenders, as well as a mechanism for the EU to enforce international anti-dumping standards within its own jurisdiction.

This trend of evolution in EU public procurement regulation evidences that public buyers are increasingly constrained by geopolitical and international economic considerations administered by the European Commission in a centralised manner (Andhov and Kania [2023]). Whether this will create friction between the Commission and Member States, perhaps in relation to particularly critical or sensitive procurement projects, remains to be seen. In any case, this line of policy and legal developments generates increased complexity in the administration of procurement processes on a day-to-day basis, and will require public buyers to develop expertise in the assessment of the relevant trade-related instruments and associated documentation, which will be a theme in common with other developments discussed below.

III. Procurement and Sustainability

It is relatively uncontroversial that public expenditure has a crucial role to play in supporting (or driving) the transition towards a more sustainable economy, and most jurisdictions explicitly consider how to harness public expenditure to decarbonise their economy and achieve net zero targets—sometimes in the broader context of efforts to achieve interlinked sustainable development goals. However, the details on the specific sustainability goals to be pursued through procurement (as compared to other means of public finances, such as subsidies or tax incentives), and on how to design and implement sustainable procurement are more contested.

Green procurement has been a primary focus of EU public procurement policy for a long time now, and it has received even further increased attention in recent years, culminating in the attribution of a prominent role for the implementation of the EU’s Green Deal. EU procurement law has been increasingly permissive and facilitative of the inclusion of environmental considerations in procurement decision-making and the European Commission has developed sets of guidance and technical documentation that are kept under permanent review and update. Overall, EU procurement law offers a diverse toolkit for public buyers to embed sustainability requirements.

However, the uptake of green procurement is much lower than would be desirable and progress is very uneven across jurisdictions and in different sectors of the economy. There is a growing realisation that facilitative or permissive approaches will not result in the quick generalisation of sustainability concerns across procurement practice required to contribute to mitigating the devastating effects of climate change in a timely fashion, or with sufficient scale. Informational and skills barriers, difficult economic assessments and competing (political) priorities necessarily slow down the uptake of sustainable procurement. In this context, it seems clear that technical complexity in the administration of procurement on a day-to-day basis, and limited technical skills in relation to sustainability assessments, are the primary obstacle in the road to mainstreaming sustainable public procurement. It is hard for public buyers to identify the relevant sustainability requirements and to embed them in their decision-making, especially where the inclusion of such requirements is bound to be checked against its suitability, proportionality, and its effect on potential competition for the relevant public contract.

To overcome this obstacle, it seems clear that a more proactive or prescriptive approach is required and that sustainability requirements must be embedded in legislation that binds public buyers—so that their role becomes one of (reinforced) compliance assessment or indirect enforcement. The question that arises, and which reopens age old discussions, is whether such legislation should solely target public procurement (Janssen and Caranta [2023]) or rather be of general application across the economy (Halonen [2021]).

This controversy evidences different understandings of the role of procurement-specific legislation and different levels of concern with the partitioning of markets. While the passing of procurement-specific legislation could be easier and politically more palatable—as it would be perceived to ultimately impose the relevant burden on economic operators seeking to gain public business (and so embed a certain element of opt-in or balanced regulatory burden against the prospect of accessing public funds), and the cost would ultimately fall on public buyers as ‘responsible (sustainable) buyers’—it would partition markets and eg potentially prevent the generation of economies of scale where public demand is not majoritarian. Moreover, such market partitioning would raise entry barriers for entities new to bidding for public contracts, as well as facilitate the emergence of anticompetitive and collusive practices in the more concentrated and partly isolated from potential competition ‘public markets’ (Sanchez-Graells [2015]) in ways that general legislation would not. More generally, advances in mandating sustainable procurement could deactivate the pressure for developments in more general sustainability mandates, as policymakers could claim to already be doing significant efforts (in the narrow setting of procurement).

A narrow sectoral approach to legislating for public procurement only would probably also over-rely on the hopes that procurement practices can become best practices and thus disseminate themselves across the economy through some understanding of mimicking, or race to the top. This relates to discussions in other areas and to the broader expectation that procurement can be a trend setter and influence industry practice and standards. However, as the discussion on digitalisation will show, the direction of influence tends to be on reverse and there are very limited mechanisms to promote or force industry adaptation to procurement standards other than in relation to direct access to procurement.

IV. Procurement and the ‘Digital Transformation’ of the State

Another area of growing consensus is that public procurement has a key role to play in the ‘digital transformation’ of the State, as the process of digitalisation is bound to rely on the acquisition of technology from market providers to a large or sole extent (depending on each jurisdiction’s make or buy decisions). This can in turn facilitate the role of procurement as a tool of digital industrial policy, especially because procurement expenditure can be a way of ensuring demand for innovation, and because public sector technology adoption can be used as a domain for experimentation with new technologies and new forms of technology-enabled governance.

The European Union has set very high expectations in its Digital Agenda 2030, and the Commission has recently stressed that achieving them would require roughly doubling the predicted level of public procurement expenditure in digital technologies, and artificial intelligence (AI) in particular. It can thus be expected that the procurement of digital technologies will quickly gain practical importance even in jurisdictions that have been lagging so far.

However, echoing some of the issues concerning sustainable procurement, in this second stream of the ‘twin transition’, the uptake of procurement of digital technologies is slowed down by the complexity of procuring unregulated immature technologies, and the (digital) skills gaps in the public sector—which are exacerbated by the absence of a toolkit of regulatory and practical resources equivalent to that of green procurement. In such a context of technological fluidity and hype, given the skills and power imbalances between technology providers and public buyers, the shortcomings of the use of public procurement as a regulatory mechanism become stark and the flaws in the logic or expectation that procurement can be an effective tool of market steering are laid bare (Sanchez-Graells [2024]).

Public buyers are expected to act as responsible AI buyers and to ensure the ‘responsible use of AI’ in the public sector. The EU AI Act will soon establish specific requirements in that regard, although solely in relation to high-risk AI uses as defined therein. Implementing the requirements of the EU AI Act—and their extension to other types of uses of digital technology or algorithms as a matter of ‘best practice’—will leverage procurement processes and, in particular, the ensuing public contracts to impose the relevant obligations on technology providers. In that connection, the European Commission has promoted the development of model contractual AI clauses that seek to regulate the technology to be procured and their future use by the relevant public sector deployer.

However, an analysis of the model clauses and broader guidance on the procurement of AI shows that public buyers will still face a very steep knowledge gap as it will be difficult to set the detail of the relevant contracts, which will tend to be highly context dependent. In other words, the model clauses are not ‘plug and play’ and implementing meaningful safeguards in the procurement and use of AI and other digital technologies will require advanced digital skills and sufficient commercial leverage—which are not to be taken as a given. Crucially, all obligations under the model clauses (and the EU AI Act itself) hinge on (self-assessment) processes controlled by the technology provider and/or refer back to technical standards or the state-of-the-art, which are driven and heavily influenced (or entirely controlled) by the technology industry. Public buyers are at a significant disadvantage not only to set, but also to monitor compliance with relevant requirements.

This shows that, in the absence of mandatory requirements and binding (general) legislation, the use of procurement for regulatory purposes has a high risk of commercial determination and regulatory tunnelling as public buyers with limited skills and capabilities struggle to impose requirements on technology providers, and where references to standards also displace regulatory decision-making. This means that public procurement can no longer be expected to ‘monitor itself’, and that new forms of institutional oversight are required to ensure that the procurement of digital technologies works in the broader public interest.

V. Conclusion

Although the issues discussed above may seem rather disparate, they share a few common threads. First, in all areas, the regulatory use of procurement generates complexity and makes the day-to-day administration of procurement processes more complex. It can be hard for a public buyer to navigate socio-political, sustainability and digitalisation concerns—and these are only some of the ‘non-strictly procurement-related’ concerns and considerations to be taken into account. Such difficulty can be compounded by limited capabilities and by gaps in the required skills. While this is particularly clear in the digital context, the issue of limited (technical) capability is also highly relevant in relation to sustainable procurement. An imbalance in skills and commercial leverage between the public buyer and technology providers undermines the logic of using procurement as a regulatory tool. Implementation issues thus require much further thought and investment than they currently receive.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of the regulatory goals underpinning the leveraging of procurement hinges on the ability of public buyers to meaningfully implement them. This raises the further question whether all goals can be achieved at the same time, especially where there can be difficult trade-offs. And there can be many of those. For example, it can well be that the offeror of the most attractive technology comes from a ‘black-listed’ jurisdiction. It can also be that the most attractive technology is also the most polluting, or one that raises significant other risks or harms from a social perspective, etc. Navigating these risks and making the (implicit) political choices may be too taxing a task for public buyers, as well as raise issues of democratic accountability more generally. Moreover, enabling public buyers to deal with these issues and to exercise judgement and discretion reopens the door to risks of eg bias, capture or corruption, as well as maladministration and error, which are some of the core concerns in the narrow approach to the regulation of procurement as an administrative procedure to being with. Those trade-offs are also pervasive and hard to assess.

It is difficult to foresee the future, but my intuition is that the trend of piling up of regulatory goals on procurement’s shoulders will need to slow down or reverse if it is meant to remain operational, and that a return to a more paired down understanding of the role of procurement will need to be enabled by the emergence of (generally applicable) legislation and external oversight mechanisms that can discharge procurement of these regulatory roles. Or, at least, that is the way I would like to see the broader regulation and policymaking around procurement to evolve.

Bibliography

Andhov, Marta and Michal Andrzej Kania, ‘Restricting Freedom of Contract – the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation and its Consequences for Public Procurement’ (2023) Journal of Public Procurement.

Arrowsmith, Sue, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement. Regulation in the EU and the UK, vols 1 & 2 (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014 and 2018).

Caranta, Roberto and Albert Sanchez-Graells (eds), European Public Procurement. Commentary on Directive 2014/24/EU (Edward Elgar 2021).

Georgopoulos, Aris, Bernard Hoekman and Petros C Mavroidis (eds), The Internationalization of Government Procurement Regulation (OUP 2017).

Halonen, Kirsi-Maria, ‘Is public procurement fit for reaching sustainability goals? A law and economics approach to green public procurement’ (2021) 28(4) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 535-555.

Janssen, Willem and Roberto Caranta (eds), Mandatory Sustainability Requirements in EU Public Procurement Law. Reflections on a Paradigm Shift (Hart 2023).

Sanchez-Graells, Albert, Public Procurement and the EU Competition rules (2nd end, Hart, 2015).

Sanchez-Graells, Albert, Digital Technologies and Public Procurement. Gatekeeping and Experimentation in Digital Public Governance (OUP 2024).

Steinicke, Michael and Peter L Vesterdorf (eds), Brussels Commentary on EU Public Procurement Law (C H Beck, Hart & Nomos 2018).

How to do 'doughnut procurement'? -- Re Raworth (2018)

(C) K Raworth.

(C) K Raworth.

Probably quite late — and thanks only to the recommendation of Prof Steve Schooner — I have now read Kate Raworth, Doughnut Economics : Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist (Cornerstone 2018).

It is a fascinating book that makes a compelling case for a paradigm shift in the ways in which we approach Economics — and in particular consumption economics and economic growth — so that we can (quickly, urgently) move from unsustainable and unequitable economic structures and dynamics towards sustainable and fair ones. This is represented by the doughnut (and you must read the book to understand it but, once you do, it provides a very helpful mind map).

In short, in my reading, the book makes a compelling case for a quick acceleration towards sustainability and redistribution and, in developed countries, for degrowth.

I have been left wondering how to to do ‘doughnut procurement’, as it is challenging to apply the model to specific areas of economic activity (see eg this brief approach to ‘doughnut procurement’ in Amsterdam, with contributions from Raworth herself). But there are two or three ideas I would be interested in discussing:

  1. What is the role of data and metrics in establishing both the ecological ceiling and the social foundation for ‘doughnut procurement’ and how to address their trade-offs — in the end, this is the perpetual clash between the tensions derived from scarcity (public budgets are not infinite and the needs of the society procurement is meant to satisfy tend to exceed them) and quality (in terms of the social and environmental ‘externalities’ of what is procured), except the book makes it clear that there is no such clash because both are dimensions of scarcity and, as such, the trade-offs need to be understood from a different perspective. I really wonder how to operationalise this in the context of award criteria in particular, as that seems to be where it all boils down to. Is MEAT capable of capturing this?

  2. What time horizon must public buyers be mandated to report about? So far, there is limited accountability of the way public funds are spent and, in many ways, the reporting system is extremely short-termed: hardly any information is generated or published beyond award and, certainly, not much if at all beyond completion of public contracts even if a significant volume of ecological and social impacts are only ‘visible’ many years down the line (eg at disposal of acquired equipment).

  3. Linked to that, what obligations need to be imposed on public buyers concerning the ownership (whether direct or imputed) of the assets (and the Xaas they can substitute them for) they procure, so that they engage in an adequate level of reassignment, refurbishment, recycling and minimisation of the waste resulting from procurements?

I never thought much about it, but it seems to me that public buyers have been (where at all) more concerned with trying to engage with ‘doughnut providers’ than in trying to become ‘doughnut buyers’, and I wonder if they really are in a much better position than you or me to make ‘doughnut choices’ in the absence of a legislative framework that eg completely prohibits the purchase of specific products (or specific packaging; single use plastics anyone?), and in the absence of adequate economic incentives/subsidies that make it possible for everyone to exercise ‘doughnut discretion’.

Could it be that by centering (or framing) the need to quickly boost (in exponential terms) the uptake of green and social procurement in the public, academic and political discourse around the exercise of discretion, we are falling into the same trap of soft law and self-regulation that has pervaded the corporate social responsibility movement? Is there really much justification for ‘procurement only’ legal requirements (eg environmental), rather than a more aggressive regulation of the entire economy to the extent that it affects the environment? How do we get procurement (geared towards buying, buying, buying) to degrow??

Well, I seem to have digressed quite a bit. But I hope there is some kernel of a fruitful discussion in the above. As ever, comments and challenges most welcome: a.sanchez-graells@bristol.ac.uk.

New interesting paper on green public procurement -- re Halonen (2021)

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Dr Kirsi-Maria Halonen has just published in advanced open access her new paper ‘Is public procurement fit for reaching sustainability goals? A law and economics approach to green public procurement’ (2021) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law.

This is a very interesting paper that takes a law and economics approach to assess recent proposals to make some aspects of green public procurement mandatory, in particular in the context of the EU Green Deal and its expected implementing measures. The discussion relies on European examples and data, but the insights offered by the paper are relevant to all jurisdictions considering using public procurement to tackle the climate emergency.

The paper is well worth reading in full and, to my mind, makes two main original contributions that should be stressed, as they should carefully be taken into account by anyone seeking to leverage public procurement for environmental goals (or sustainability, more generally) by means of a ‘hardening’ of current soft law approaches—that is, via the imposition of procurement-specific mandatory (green) legal requirements. The following is my understanding of those two main points, which Kirsi presents slightly differently in her paper.

First, the paper warns against blanket approaches that would apply across all areas of public expenditure or, relatedly, across types of procurement specified by reference to relatively random administration-based criteria (eg tenders of a value above a certain amount). The paper evidences how the effectiveness of mandatory requirements will vary by industry and, consequently, how the design of mandatory requirements should not be based on demand-side considerations, but rather on supply-side analysis.

More than ever, the need for sophisticated market intelligence to underpin the design of green procurement requirements comes to the fore. Relatedly, the paper shows that, for some industries (or more generally), it is possible (or likely) that regulatory measures other than mandatory public procurement requirements are more effective in promoting the desired green transition. Consequently, an analysis of alternative policy interventions should be carried out ahead of the imposition of such mandatory requirements.

Second, and more originally, the paper shows that one of the key considerations in assessing the effectiveness of mandatory green public procurement requirements has to be their knock-on effect on private consumption patterns. Relying on substitution policy analysis, the paper makes it plainly clear that changes in public demand for green (or sustainable) products will create a mix of incentives that can well result in the increased consumption of dirty (or unsustainable) goods and services by private consumers (both corporate and individual) as a result of rigidities in the supply side of the relevant markets—which, at best, can be resolved as the green transition advances and, at worse, could be structurally resistant.

This shows how, despite public procurement representing anything between 10% and 20% of most economies, policy interventions that are procurement centric can generate net negative environmental (or social) effects if the remainder of the economy (or rather, part of the rest of the economy) is displaced towards goods and services that do not meet the required standards. This once again brings home the message that procurement-specific interventions may not be the preferable (or even desirable) way to try to tackle the climate emergency and that a broader, supply (or industry)- based assessment of alternative regulatory interventions is necessary.

Taken all insights together, I would read Kirsi’s paper as making a very strong argument that green (or sustainable) public procurement must not be seen as a goal in itself, or as intrinsically desirable, and that a broader embedding of procurement within larger legislative initiatives (eg economy-wide minimum requirements, or the imposition of consumption taxes regardless of the public or private nature of the buyer) is likely to be a better way forward.

I also read the paper as offering a persuasive argument against claims that ‘mandating green procurement is better than doing nothing’, or that ‘green procurement is a low-hanging fruit that should be collected before reaching for more difficult targets like individual consumer behaviour’. Without proper analysis of the substitution effects that mandatory green public procurement requirements can generate, none of that should be taken at face value. Which is interesting because it is exactly the same way broader market dynamics operate in public procurement, and precisely the reason why the desirability of the exercise of public buying power needs to be assessed with caution, regardless of the policy goal it seeks to achieve.

A tidal wave for (UK) universities IT procurement? -- Some thoughts on post COVID-19 challenges

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All around the world, university campuses have been closed and will remain closed for a while, then reopen and likely close again, then reopen (and repeat for a few iterations), as we transition to a ‘new normal’. The current lockdown and the likelihood of continued social distancing measures for the foreseeable future are putting a lot of pressure on the higher education sector to adapt to ‘online delivery’ in no time and with no proper planning.

This is a massive (almost impossible) task and will require massive investment, whatever dire financial straits higher education institutions have to navigate as a result of the imminent (or current?) economic crisis and Governments’ funding decisions. Without such investment, the sector will not be able to adapt—except in the very few countries where some of these investment were already made. And that investment will have to be channelled through proper (and largely rethought) procurement strategies and processes, which I think require some attention in the very near future.

But, ‘online teaching’ is happening with (almost no) additional investment …

Not really. The fact that the immediate transition into (some sort of) online delivery (of teaching and, in a larger magnitude, meetings) has not (yet) required such massive investment in the higher education context is just a matter of luck. In particular in the case of the UK, with which I am most familiar (and which is likely to be rather similar to most in other developed countries), universities have a completely inadequate IT infrastructure to support working from home and online teaching and research. The situation can only be worse elsewhere. However, the shortcomings of the IT infrastructure are largely hidden behind the private investment in IT infrastructure by the (UK) higher education workforce.

More generally, the entire transition to the online environment is currently unsustainably relying on individual resources and creativity. I half-joked about the challenges of working from home on twitter, but the serious fact is that large proportions of the academic and professional services communities do not have an adequate work space at home or, for that matter, adequate IT equipment. Issues of space and office furniture may well be nigh impossible to fix (except, perhaps, better chairs), but an improvement on the current IT shortcomings will certainly be necessary sooner rather than later.

Right now, I am writing this blog post on my personal computer—from which I have also been lecturing, attending endless meetings and completing some research tasks (to the limited extent my current circumstances allow). My university (desktop) computer is gathering dust in my office. My laptop was bought a few years ago and is giving worrying signs of likely malfunctioning (please, remember to back up your hard disk!). I have no certainty that I will remain able to do my job if my laptop goes. Moreover, my laptop is struggling with the increased demands of advanced videoconferencing software and the larger amounts of information to be uploaded and downloaded from the cloud. It was simply never intended for this intense use and its technical specs are likely insufficient for some software I will likely need to use if all my teaching goes online in a more serious manner for next academic year.

If my laptop goes or at some point proves unfit for purpose, what should I do? I could try to buy another one online from my own pocket and hope it gets delivered soon enough (as dealing with emails on my phone will definitely not do my eyes and hands any favours), but should I? Or is this now the obligation of my employer? I think the latter, as ‘my’ laptop is no longer something I marginally use for work (eg when travelling to conferences) or as a convenient way of time shifting (to try to minimise time in the office as much as possible in search of a better life/work balance), but is mainly dedicated to my personal use. Right now, my laptop is the bit if University IT architecture that keeps me connected and working from home.

My impression is that the same is true for a vast majority of the (UK) higher education workforce, as most members of staff have not been given laptops or other equipment. The unsustainability of the situation creates an impending tidal wave of IT procurement for (UK) universities.

Challenge and opportunity in post COVID-19 IT procurement for HE institutions

As ‘online higher education’ (in whatever form, including blended, flexible and any other labelled models) becomes the ‘new normal’, universities will have to make sure all members of staff have adequate IT equipment (and internet connections, energy supply, etc, but that is a can of worms on its own). This will require all sorts of measures, from moving existing desktop computers to private homes in the shorter term, to heavily investing in a transition to portable IT hardware (probably not the right label) for all staff—including the possibility of emergency deliveries for those situations (and there will be a few) where the existing (privately owned) laptops, routers and other kit stop functioning the day before the most important event (usually a student-facing one, of course).

The challenge will not only be in funding this, which will itself be difficult. The challenge will be in procuring all this IT equipment sustainably. And this challenge comes with a big opportunity for the development of a (more) sustainable IT landscape in the higher education sector (and elsewhere).

The point of departure, I think, should be a reassessment of the technical specs required for adequate working from home activities, depending on the specific activities to be carried out by each member of staff. Some will have extremely demanding requirements (eg if they have to run VR based activities, such as lab replacement work, or have to run heavy duty big data analysis software), whereas others (most of the law academics, eg) will just require basic functionalities for quality videoconferencing, email and cloud storage. The specs should include some leeway to future-proof investments, but should not be such that we are all given flashy top-end laptops with more computing power than we could possibly use.

To my mind, another point of departure should be that the new investment will have to have the smallest possible environmental impact. This means that the strategy should start by reallocating existing IT equipment, continue by acquiring refurbished equipment and, only where nothing else is available, acquire new equipment—all of it having a clear view of life cycle impacts and, in particular, recyclability at the end of expected use life. On the contrary, if all newly required IT equipment was bought new, this could create a significant negative environmental impact in the transition to the ‘online new normal’ of higher education (and other sectors). It must be avoided.

Finally, this also creates an opportunity to undo the shortsighted cuts in IT support that some higher education institutions have been implementing, as well as develop new capacity that could generate teaching and research synergies. Universities are complex institutions and there seems to be certainly a lot to teach and research about how they design, create, revise, adapt, maintain and dispose of their IT infrastructures and equipment. I am sure some engineering departments could make great contributions to the improvement of the system if some tasks where reconsidered and, in particular, brought back from the myriad outsourcing arrangements currently in place.

Some musings on COVID-19 academia & beyond

© Andy Maguire

© Andy Maguire

Like every other sector, higher education is suffering the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic. We are still waiting to see whether the emergency transition to online teaching will work out and whether alternative assessments will deliver fair and appropriate results. This will forever be the ‘COVID-19 academic year’, but we still do not really know what it will end up looking like.

We are also yet to understand the deep implications of the pandemic on the functioning and sustainability of universities and academic communities around the world. The UK is perhaps in a particularly strange and vulnerable position due to the marketisation of its higher education sector, the associated waves of strikes over the last two years, the economic dependence on international student fees (mostly from China) and the global mobility of its top talent.

There will be temptations to go back to ‘normal’ or as close as possible to ‘business as usual’ (perhaps with an intervening sector-wide bailout). I would argue that, in many fronts, this should be resisted. The current shock to the way things were done should make us reflect upon what does not work in academia, what scrambling through the challenges of COVID-19 is teaching us, and what we want for the post COVID-19 academia. I have a few thoughts.

First, COVID-19 and the associated collective disorientation, fear and confusion in its immediate aftermath have created massive tensions in the governance of higher education institutions, with many of them displaying levels of dysfunctionality that will only be fully visible in the medium to long term. These challenges in governance and the vacuum or excesses (and sometimes, both) of decision-making and communications (with staff and students alike) have only been partially mitigated by the commitment and the collegiality of most, starting with those on the most precarious contracts, which are at the frontline of interactions with students. Only this attitude will carry us through this, for the unavoidable truth is that the worse is yet to come and it will be with us for quite some time. The sense of community that (the lucky ones, amongst which I am blessed to be) have been experiencing shows us something about the real meaning of academia. We must build on it.

However, making this commitment sustainable will require a very significant rethinking of the system of values and rewards in academia and, importantly, a levelling up of working conditions and an end to casualisation. ‘Citizenship’ is now the gold standard and the only way of keeping Departments/Schools afloat and, with them, the heavier University structures. This is a time where it may be all too easy for some to hide under the efforts of most. More than ever, keeping tabs with everyone’s contribution, demanding that senior colleagues pull our weight, and recompensing those that go above and beyond will be crucial. Only resilient institutions can get to the other end of this (and the next, and the following) crisis and the institution can only be as resilient as the worse-treated, paid and rewarded of its members.

Second, this crisis has shown how most of our lives are unbalanced from a personal/work life perspective and the fragility of the support structures that allow us to overwork, oftentimes to the point of neglecting our closest and dearest, as well as ourselves. The unavoidable ‘reduction in academic productivity’ that has come with the pandemic — except for some, specially in the fields of knowledge of more direct relevance, of course — should make us reflect on whether we are all doing too much, and also perhaps too little. We should take stock of what is it we think is at the core of our function as academics, as members of a scholar community. We should also take stock of all the things we would ordinarily be doing but cannot do anymore due to time constraints, or other reasons. Perhaps the current prioritisation can tell us how to refocus our efforts and how to reshape our jobs — and perhaps our personal lives — so we have a better balance.

Third, the crisis has grounded (almost) everyone. Yet, academic activity has not stopped and we are all getting used to a volume of online activities we would never have dreamt of. From the perspective of the need for academia to get serious about climate change and transitioning to a truly environmentally sustainable model, this can be one of the silver linings. I know it is unrealistic to expect everyone to join me in my pledge not to fly for work, and I understand that the reasons why that would not be feasible or fair remain. However, I think that now that we have all been forced into the exercise of 'trying it out’, we should collectively adopt a position of restarting as few activities requiring travel (and in particular flights) as possible. To a certain degree, this can also apply to distance learning, as we will very soon have accumulated significant experience in online teaching, which should make us rethink the traditional structure of campus-based degrees (not to abandon them, but to consider a better mix of presential and online activities, as well as broadening our horizons to part-time and distance-learning as potentially more inclusive options).

Finally, but this is less new, the crisis has once again brought into sharp relief the inadequacy of the methods of academic research publication and dissemination. When push comes to shove, peer review procedures can be dispensed with or minimised, publication is carried out in open access and dissemination is maximised as a true attempt at discharging the social responsibility of those with the relevant knowledge, a platform and available resources. It has been heartening to see so many specialists team up and work on the modelling and analysis required to inform public health policies, as well as robust scrutiny of political (in)decisions and other valuable interventions. There is plenty that resonates with what the academic mobilisation around Brexit already showed. This really seems to me to be the day of reckoning for the current model. May the movement to make academic textbooks and then parts of the catalogue backlist freely available online by some publishers serve as evidence that knowledge can no longer be kept behind the crumbling paywalls.

There surely is more to reflect upon and many more changes that are desirable for a post COVID-19 turn of the academy for the better but I would be satisfied to see an increase of the sector’s resilience by securing all its members and aligning the systems of incentives and rewards to what makes us collectively strong and puts us in a position to discharge our social mission sustainably; a rebalance of the personal and the professional in a sector where jobs tend to also be people’s passions (at least for the lucky ones, such as myself); a transition to a net zero emissions academia by 2025 at the latest; and a move to open access, agile and quality-assured publication and active and engaging dissemination of academic research.

Some thoughts on the SMART project's reform proposals for transition to sustainability

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The Sustainable Market Actors for Responsible Trade (SMART) project, led by Prof Beate Sjåfjell (University of Oslo) and with the participation of many dear friends and colleagues from the University of Bristol and beyond, has published a first report presenting its reform proposals aimed to support the transition to sustainability and is encouraging feedback.

Following that invitation to engage with their proposals, in this post, I reflect on the SMART projects’ transition to sustainability reform proposals (the ‘SMART proposals’), in particular those concerned with public procurement. Everyone is invited to contribute further thoughts and to engage in the debate with the SMART project, which you can do through this online form or by e-mail to smart-admin@jus.uio.no. Engagement at this stage can influence the more detailed proposals that SMART will publish in the first quarter of 2020, on which they announce a further round of public consultation.

General framework

It should be stressed that the SMART proposals, as the project more generally, 'employ the broadly recognised definition of sustainability as securing the social foundation for humanity now and in the future within planetary boundaries – encapsulated in the goal of a safe and just space for humanity' (at 6). This is broader than alternative approaches to sustainability that conceptualise it as the ability of satisfying current needs without jeopardising the ability of future generations to satisfy their own, and the concept is explored in detail in another SMART document (see here).

The SMART proposals have the ‘aim to make it possible and easy for business and finance to create value in a sustainable manner, and for products to be produced and consumed in a way that contributes to securing a safe and just space for humanity within planetary boundaries. As such, [their] reform proposals concern the EU as a global actor, and the EU as a legislator and policymaker’ (at 5, emphases in the original). Moreover, it is stressed that the SMART ‘reform proposals are interconnected. The proposals concerning business are prerequisites for the proposals concerning finance and products, forming the basis also for more sustainable investments and lending, and more sustainable private and public consumption. In turn, the proposals concerning finance and products may act as enforcers and drivers for the timely and successful implementation of the changes we suggest in the way business operates’ (at 8).

The set of recommendations is thus mainly oriented at changing, but not substituting or significantly re-regulating, existing markets through a shift in incentives for economic and socio-political actors. The proposals are indeed conceived as a set of interlinked alternative incentives to what is seen as the main cause of unsustainable business practices: shareholder primacy, and the fact that ‘this norm results in pressure on decision-makers in those companies to maximise returns for investors, especially shareholders’ (at 7).

This evidences the strong influence of corporate governance scholarship and approaches on the project as a whole, with the relative exception of the international trade-related aspects, which follow a different logic of inter-governmental and multilateral negotiations. It also clearly signals that the SMART proposals cannot be seen as radical or disruptive, but rather incremental and sometimes rather modestly incremental. While this has a clear rationale in trying to facilitate adoption by policy-makers, and in particular the European Commission, the general approach could also limit the potential upside of the much needed transition to sustainability by not including more radical proposals—eg such as enacting new legislation prohibiting specific types of products or activities, or introducing heavy environmental corporate and consumer taxes, as well as sanctions for specific unsustanaible behaviour—which perhaps fall outwith the remit of the project, with the exception of the chapter on finance, which discusses ‘brown’ penalising charges against specific non-sustainable investments (at 17).

Somehow, despite framing the proposals in terms of incentives, it seems like most of the proposals concentrate on non-economic incentives, with the relative exception of trying to boost market demand for sustainable products, in particular in the context of procurement (see below). To my mind, this is a significant limitation of the ensemble of proposals, as they still largely hinge on soft incentives and do not seem to put the necessary focus on much more intense public intervention in a manner that can create effective short-term changes in consumption and production patterns. For a project that is normatively premised on market failure—in particular, in the context of the market for corporate control—such an approach is perhaps surprising. Given the repeated indications that some of the existing problems derive from limited or non-enforcement of current rules, there is surprisingly little in the SMART proposals by way of institutional development and capacity building for national enforcement agencies.

The other main shortcoming of the project is perhaps the absence of proposals in terms of public education. Most of the proposals are addressed to regulating the behaviour of corporate entities. However, and this does not make things any easier, the behaviour of those entities (particularly large ones) will only really change if their stakeholders, either in their role as (sustainable) consumers or civil society, have a strong transition to sustainability drive. More thought seems necessary around how to inform, educate and mobilise stakeholders. The SMART project seems to presume that such knowledge and activism not only exist, but are the majoritarian position. Daily events show that, quite the contrary, this is not the case and that there continue to be many a disconnect between expressed opinions and actual (private) unsustainable behaviour. This is a major challenge. Until we are not sustainability-minded consumers and citizens, we will not be able to act as sustainability-minded stakeholders able to maximise the effect of the type of soft incentives on which the proposals rely.

Public procurement related SMART proposals

The proposals concerning public procurement are mainly focused on the ‘products’ element of their triad of priorities. They are premised on the starting point that ‘products sold in the EU must be produced in manner that supports sustainable circular production and consumption. Products are the objects of the linear business models based on overconsumption, and sold to private consumers and public procurers. [Their] proposals aim firstly to broaden and strengthen the EU’s Circular Economy initiative, secondly to make it easier to be a sustainability- oriented consumer, and thirdly to reinforce sustainable public procurement’ (at 5). Therefore, there seems to be a dual lever for the transition to sustainability in procurement. First, a more general promotion of circular economy. Second, a more specific boost of sustainable procurement (on which the SMART project is working more generally).

Accelerated transition to circular economy

This first subset of proposals has the ‘aim to increase efficiencies in production systems, extends the lifetime of products, and promote sustainable consumption. To this end, regulation should enable access to repair, promote the right to repair, and ensure the internalization of the social and environmental risks prevalent in global value chains’ (at 19). The specific instruments that would be deployed to this effect are listed, although in not much detail. One that bears some attention is the proposal to extend ‘eco-design and labelling requirements to include durability, reparability, reusability and recoverability, and also to cover more product types (e.g. textiles)’ (ibid).

Along the same lines already discussed above, this proposal seems to also go down the voluntary/soft incentive road. Labelling and eco-design will only generate a significant impact if there is a significant shift in demand. And although the proposals seek to bolster that demand, both from private consumers (at 20) and public buyers (see below), the question is left unaddressed as to why would those requirements not be made mandatory? Having the opportunity of formulating ambitious proposals to significantly shift the policy-making approach would surely support a bolder take and a recommendation to ban products that do not meet specific requirements of durability, reparability, reusability and recoverability. I would have very much preferred for the SMART proposals to take that more ambitious stance.

Sustainable public procurement

The thrust of the procurement aspects of the SMART proposals has a strong environmental component, in particular in relation to (non)circular consumption, and thus closely corresponds to the formulation of the UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) more closely related to public procurement, which establishes as part of the goal to ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns (SDG 12), the aim to ‘promote public procurement practices that are sustainable, in accordance with national policies and priorities’ (SDG 12.7).

The SMART proposals related to public procurement concern three main areas: (1) professionalisation and facilitation of knowledge exchange; (2) supply chain monitoring; and (3) making the legislative environment more 'SPP friendly'. Both (2) and (3) would, in the SMART project’s view, ‘require amendments to Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU. Ad hoc regulations need to be adopted to enact further sectoral mandatory legislation’ (at 22). It is worth looking at each of the three proposals in turn.

(1) Professionalisation and facilitation of knowledge exchange

The SMART proposal is for ‘the EU [to] invest significantly in the capacity of contracting officials, procurement strategists and financial auditors by (a) encouraging the institution of Sustainable Public Procurement (SPP) knowledge centres at EU, national and regional levels following the model already provided by virtuous Central Purchasing Bodies; (b) creating a network of knowledge centres working closely together in developing and disseminating best practices on SPP, including through training materials, and in collecting information and data on the uptake of SPP and the difficulties encountered in applying the relevant EU rules, and (c) providing financial and technical assistance targeted to specific SPP formation for ground-level contracting officials' (at 21).

The thrust of this recommendation can but be shared. There is a clear need for environmental sustainability in particular to become a core focus of public sector consumption, and that requires an investment in skills and the development of a more effective knowledge-management system. However, whether this is something that the European Commission is primarily in a good place to do remains dubious. The clear fiasco (whether temporary or permanent) of the Commission’s initiative on large infrastructure procurement evidences that such a centralised but devolved approach to the collection and dissemination of best practices can hardly work. The important barrier of language needs to be addressed in a different manner. Moreover, the initiative on procurement professionalisation also makes it clear that the Commission can only develop a relatively marginal facilitative role, but that the main changes need to be developed and implemented at national level. From that perspective, it would perhaps be preferable to address the recommendations to Member States.

There is, for example, a clear need to promote the domestic adoption and use of the already developed European Green Procurement criteria, as well as a need to educate the domestic procurement workforce and review bodies on the very significant flexibility of the current EU rules (see (3) below). Once more, then, the focus should in my view be on more specific and differently targeted education and continuous professional development proposals, rather than on proposals addressed to the Commission, which may not have the budget or be in the best position to implement them.

(2) Supply chain monitoring

The SMART proposal is that ‘the EU make it mandatory for contracting authorities to map and monitor their supply chains for risks of breaches of environmental and social rules, including those protecting human rights. That the EU takes those breaches seriously, mandating the exclusion from award procedures of those found in violation and the taking of appropriate remedial actions in case of violations during contract performance. That the EU makes it easier for contracting authorities to know about the economic operators having breached environmental and social rules, including those protecting human rights' (at 21-22).

This proposal seems to reflect frustration with the way in which compliance with environmental, social and labour (and human rights) standards is regulated in the current EU rules and, perhaps, in particular in Arts 18(2), 56(1) in fine, 57(4)(a), 69(2)(d) and 69(3), and 71(1) and 71(6) of Directive 2014/24/EU. However, the proposal is, in my view, targeting the wrong governance level.

Reading such rules and taking them into account as a whole—in particular Art 69(3)—makes it plain that the EU rules create an enabling framework for contracting authorities to engage in oversight of their supply chains for risks of breaches of environmental and social rules, including those protecting human rights. Therefore, shortcomings in this area are not a result of regulatory constraints at EU level, but rather of either a lack of political will at domestic level or, more probably, the complexity of such endeavour and the limited resources contracting authorities can dedicate to it. This seems implicit in the final part of the recommendation, which calls for the EU to make ‘it easier for contracting authorities to know about the economic operators having breached environmental and social rules, including those protecting human rights’.

I will be very interested to see how the proposal is further developed at the next stage. I think that this is setting the EU up to fail because the issue of ensuring global compliance within supply chains poses fiendish challenges and, as I have argued elsewhere, both assumes too much capability in the public procurement function and is bound to diminish its effectiveness [see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Regulatory Substitution Between Labour and Public Procurement Law: The EU’s Shifting Approach to Enforcing Labour Standards in Public Contracts’ (2018) 24(2) European Public Law 229–254].

Related to earlier comments, I think that the extent to which procurement can be used to monitor supply chains will in part hinge on expanded skills and capabilities (as already addressed at (1) above) and, in a much larger part, depend on the development or reinforcement of other mechanisms of public intervention of horizontal application. Just like private consumption, public consumption needs to rely on a broader regulatory framework fostering sustainability and preventing illegal behaviour, rather than be tasked with those goals itself.

(3) Making the legislative environment more 'SPP friendly'

The SMART proposal is that ‘the EU makes the legislative environment more 'SPP friendly'. Contracting authorities must be allowed to require suppliers to have effective sustainability policies in place. A shift is needed from enabling the Member States to pursue SPP to requiring them to buy sustainably by increasing the number of mandatory sectoral legislation and by requiring contracting authorit[ies] to take into account the life-cycle costs associated with their purchases.’

Again, this reflects a double frustration with the regulation of sustainability-enabling mechanisms in the current EU rules and, in my view, in particular with the requirement of the ‘link to the subject matter’ in Arts 42(1) and 67(3), and in relation to the limited uptake of the possibility to rely on life-cycle costing under Art 68 of Directive 2014/24/EU; as well as in the voluntary nature of most sustainability-oriented rules, eg on technical specifications (Art 42), eco-labels (Art 43), or environmental management standards (Art 62).

Once again, this seems to me unfocused. First, because it reflects an obsession with getting rid of the link to the subject matter of the contract that risks throwing the baby out with the bath water. It seems to me indisputable that the 2014 EU public procurement rules have significantly expanded the discretionary scope for the inclusion of sustainability-oriented requirements, in particular concerning environmental sustainability through green procurement. This may not unlock maximum or unlimited room for sustainability considerations (which is debatable), but this does not constitute a main regulatory barrier to a large uptake of more sustainable procurement practices. It could be argued that it is perceived as a major barrier but, in that case, what is necessary is an effort in debunking that myth and in fostering a better understanding of the current rules, which once again goes back to (1) above.

Second, and by the same token, making those provisions mandatory at EU level would not necessarily generate practical changes. Where current structures have not moved despite increased flexibility and discretion, imposing the behaviour as mandatory without addressing the root causes of the immobility would simply result in extended non-compliance or, worse, window-dressing. Thus, in order to generate a practical effect, focusing on enabling further exercises of discretion seems to me preferable to imposing compliance.

Relatedly, advocating for more sectoral legislation imposing sustainability requirements for public purchases only (which is what I understand by the reference to ‘increasing the number of mandatory sectoral legislation’) is undesirable. First, because it generates a ‘feel good’ factor for the public sector without addressing the broader social distortions of allowing for private consumption of the unsustainable goods or services. However large procurement expenditure, sectoral legislation will only cover the smaller part of the economy. If procurement represented 20% of GDP, imposing sectoral product or service-related sustainability requirements would still leave 80% of the economy free from such constraint. Second, and also very important, the creation of such sectoral requirements will fracture (or perpetuate the fracture) between ‘public and private’ markets for equivalent goods and services. This would only result in a reduction of competition for public contracts, a shrinking of the supplier base and worse conditions (in terms of value for money) for the public buyer. Therefore, where sustainability considerations need to reduce or exclude the availability of specific types of goods or services, this needs to be addressed at an economy-wide level, as suggested above re acceleration of the transition to the circular economy.

All in all, any limitations in the uptake of more sustainable procurement seem to me mainly related to issues of procurement workforce skills, public sector dimensioning and knowledge-management. There is significant space for a much larger uptake of sustainable considerations in procurement if recommendations along the lines of (1) above are seriously implemented. In my view, this should be the focus of action in the short to medium term. Advocating for legislative change in a context where there are significant difficulties in consolidating the changes of the 2014 revision and where digitalisation is already driving regulatory and practice changes over the next three years seems to me self-defeating. As does advocating for ‘procurement-only’ interventions.

(4) Excursus: the need to include digital technologies in the scope of the recommendations

One of the aspects I have found missing in the chapter on procurement in the SMART recommendations concerns digital technologies and their potential contribution to more sustainable procurement. As things stand, improving the generation and collection of procurement data, including of the outcomes of earlier procurement exercises, in order to create an evidence base that can then enable the deployment of machine learning and other artificial intelligence techniques to promote more sustainable procurement should be a priority. These are issues I discuss in detail in a recent working paper: A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Digital Technologies, Public Procurement and Sustainability: Some Exploratory Thoughts’ (November 7, 2019). I would be happy to engage with the SMART team if the inclusion of this dimension in their final report was of interest.

Digital technologies, public procurement and sustainability: some exploratory thoughts

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** This post is based on the seminar given at the Law Department of Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona, on 7 November 2019. The slides for the seminar are available here. Please note that some of the issues have been rearranged. I am thankful to participants for the interesting discussion, and to Dr Lela Mélon and Prof Carlos Gómez Ligüerre for the kind invitation to participate in this activitity of their research group on patrimonial law. I am also grateful to Karolis Granickas for comments on an earlier draft. The standard disclaimer applies.**

Digital technologies, public procurement and sustainability: some exploratory thoughts

1. Introductory detour

The use of public procurement as a tool to further sustainability goals is not a new topic, but rather the object of a long-running discussion embedded in the broader setting of the use of procurement for the pursuit of horizontal or secondary goals—currently labelled smart or strategic procurement. The instrumentalisation of procurement for (quasi)regulatory purposes gives rise to a number of issues, such as: regulatory transfer; the distortion of the very market mechanisms on which procurement rules rely as a result of added regulatory layers and constraints; legitimacy and accountability issues; complex regulatory impact assessments; professionalisation issues; etc.

Discussions in this field are heavily influenced by normative and policy positions, which are not always clearly spelled out but still drive most of the existing disagreement. My own view is that the use of procurement for horizontal policies is not per se desirable. The simple fact that public expenditure can act as a lever/incentive to affect private (market) behaviour does not mean that it should be used for that purpose at every opportunity and/or in an unconstrained manner. Procurement should not be used in lieu of legislation or administrative regulation where it is a second-best regulatory tool. Embedding regulatory elements that can also achieve horizontal goals in the procurement process should only take place where it has clear synergies with the main goal of procurement: the efficient satisfaction of public sector needs and/or needs in the public interest. This generates a spectrum of potential uses of procurement of a different degree of desirability.

At one end, and at its least desirable, procurement can and is used as a trade barrier for economic protectionism. In my view, this should not happen. At the other end of the spectrum, at its most desirable, procurement can and is (sometimes) used in a manner that supports environmental sustainability and technical innovation. In my view, this should happen, and more than it currently does. In between these two ends, there are uses of procurement for the promotion of labour and social standards, as well as for the promotion of human rights. Controversial as this position is, in my view, the use of procurement for the pursuit of those goals should be subjected to strict proportionality analysis in order to make sure that the secondary goal does not prevent the main purpose of the efficient satisfaction of public sector needs and/or needs in the public interest.

From a normative perspective, thus, I think that there is a wide space of synergy between procurement and environmental sustainability—which goes beyond green procurement and extends to the use of procurement to support a more circular economy—and that this can be used more effectively than is currently the case, due to emerging innovative uses of digital technologies for procurement governance.

This is the topic in which I would like to concentrate, to formulate some exploratory thoughts. The following reflections are focused on the EU context, but hopefully they are of a broader relevance. I first zoom in on the strategic priorities of fostering sustainability through procurement (2) and the digitalisation of procurement (3), as well as critically assess the current state of development of digital technologies for procurement governance (4). I then look at the interaction between both strategic goals, in terms of the potential for sustainable digital procurement (5), which leads to specific discussion of the need for an enabling data architecture (6), the potential for AI and sustainable procurement (7), the potential for the implementation of blockchains for sustainable procurement (8) and the need to refocus the emerging guidelines on the procurement of digital technologies to stress their sustainability dimension (9). Some final thoughts conclude (10).

2. Public procurement and sustainability

As mentioned above, the use of public procurement to promote sustainability is not a new topic. However, it has been receiving increasing attention in recent policy-making and legislative efforts (see eg this recent update)—though they are yet to translate in the level of practical change required to make a relevant contribution to pressing challenges, such as the climate emergency (for a good critique, see this recent post by Lela Mélon).

Facilitating the inclusion of sustainability-related criteria in procurement was one of the drivers for the new rules in the 2014 EU Public Procurement Package, which create a fairly flexible regulatory framework. Most remaining problems are linked to the implementation of such a framework, not its regulatory design. Cost, complexity and institutional inertia are the main obstacles to a broader uptake of sustainable procurement.

The European Commission is alive to these challenges. In its procurement strategy ‘Making Procurement work in and for Europe’ [COM(2017) 572 final; for a critical assessment, see here], the Commission stressed the need to facilitate and to promote the further uptake of strategic procurement, including sustainable procurement.

However, most of its proposals are geared towards the publication of guidance (such as the Buying Green! Handbook), standardised solutions (such as the library of EU green public procurement criteria) and the sharing of good practices (such as in this library of use cases) and training materials (eg this training toolkit). While these are potentially useful interventions, the main difficulty remains in their adoption and implementation at Member State level.

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While it is difficult to have a good view of the current situation (see eg the older studies available here, and the terrible methodology used for this 2015 PWC study for the Commission), it seems indisputable that there are massive differences across EU Member States in terms of sustainability-oriented innovation in procurement.

Taking as a proxy the differences that emerge from the Eco-Innovation Scoreboard, it seems clear that this very different level of adoption of sustainability-related eco-innovation is likely reflective of the different approaches followed by the contracting authorities of the different Member States.

Such disparities create difficulties for policy design and coordination, as is acknowledged by the Commission and the limitations of its procurement strategy. The main interventions are thus dependent on Member States (and their sub-units).

3. Public procurement digitalisation beyond e-Procurement

Similarly to the discussion above, the bidirectional relationship between the use of procurement as a tool to foster innovation, and the adaptation of procurement processes in light of technological innovations is not a new issue. In fact, the transition to electronic procurement (eProcurement) was also one of the main drivers for the revision of the EU rules that resulted in the 2014 Public Procurement Package, as well as the flanking regulation of eInvoicing and the new rules on eForms. eProcurement (broadly understood) is thus an area where further changes will come to fruition within the next 5 years (see timeline below).

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However, even a maximum implementation of the EU-level eProcurement rules would still fall short of creating a fully digitalised procurement system. There are, indeed, several aspects where current technological solutions can enable a more advanced and comprehensive eProcurement system. For example, it is possible to automate larger parts of the procurement process and to embed compliance checks (eg in solutions such as the Prozorro system developed in Ukraine). It is also possible to use the data automatically generated by the eProcurement system (or otherwise consolidated in a procurement register) to develop advanced data analytics to support procurement decision-making, monitoring, audit and the deployment of additional screens, such as on conflicts of interest or competition checks.

Progressing the national eProcurement systems to those higher levels of functionality would already represent progress beyond the mandatory eProcurement baseline in the 2014 EU Public Procurement Package and the flanking initiatives listed above; and, crucially, enabling more advanced data analytics is one of the effects sought with the new rules on eForms, which aim to significantly increase the availability of (better) procurement data for transparency purposes.

Although it is an avenue mainly explored in other jurisdictions, and currently in the US context, it is also possible to create public marketplaces akin to Amazon/eBay/etc to generate a more user-friendly interface for different types of catalogue-based eProcurement systems (see eg this recent piece by Chris Yukins).

Beyond that, the (further) digitalisation of procurement is another strategic priority for the European Commission; not only for procurement’s sake, but also in the context of the wider strategy to create an AI-friendly regulatory environment and to use procurement as a catalyst for innovations of broader application – along lines of the entrepreneurial State (Mazzucato, 2013; see here for an adapted shorter version).

Indeed, the Commission has formulated a bold(er) vision for future procurement systems based on emerging digital technologies, in which it sees a transformative potential: “New technologies provide the possibility to rethink fundamentally the way public procurement, and relevant parts of public administrations, are organised. There is a unique chance to reshape the relevant systems and achieve a digital transformation” (COM(2017) 572 fin at 11).

Even though the Commission has not been explicit, it may be worth trying to map which of the currently emerging digital technologies could be of (more direct) application to procurement governance and practice. Based on the taxonomy included in a recent OECD report (2019a, Annex C), it is possible to identify the following types and specific technologies with potential procurement application:

AI solutions

  • Virtual Assistants (Chat bots or Voice bots): conversational, computer-generated characters that simulate a conversation to deliver voice- or text-based information to a user via a Web, kiosk or mobile interface. A VA incorporates natural-language processing, dialogue control, domain knowledge and a visual appearance (such as photos or animation) that changes according to the content and context of the dialogue. The primary interaction methods are text-to-text, text-to-speech, speech-to-text and speech-to-speech;

  • Natural language processing: technology involves the ability to turn text or audio speech into encoded, structured information, based on an appropriate ontology. The structured data may be used simply to classify a document, as in “this report describes a laparoscopic cholecystectomy,” or it may be used to identify findings, procedures, medications, allergies and participants;

  • Machine Learning: the goal is to devise learning algorithms that do the learning automatically without human intervention or assistance;

  • Deep Learning: allows computational models that are composed of multiple processing layers to learn representations of data with multiple levels of abstraction;

  • Robotics: deals with the design, construction, operation, and use of robots, as well as computer systems for their control, sensory feedback, and information processing;

  • Recommender systems: subclass of information filtering system that seeks to predict the "rating" or "preference" that a user would give to an item;

  • Expert systems: is a computer system that emulates the decision-making ability of a human expert;

Digital platforms

  • Distributed ledger technology (DLT): is a consensus of replicated, shared, and synchronized digital data geographically spread across multiple sites, countries, or institutions. There is no central administrator or centralised data storage. A peer-to-peer network is required as well as consensus algorithms to ensure replication across nodes is undertaken; Blockchain is one of the most common implementation of DLT;

  • Smart contracts: is a computer protocol intended to digitally facilitate, verify, or enforce the negotiation or performance of a contract;

  • IoT Platform: platform on which to create and manage applications, to run analytics, and to store and secure your data in order to get value from the Internet of Things (IoT);

Not all technologies are equally relevant to procurement—and some of them are interrelated in a manner that requires concurrent development—but these seem to me to be those with a higher potential to support the procurement function in the future. Their development needs not take place solely, or primarily, in the context of procurement. Therefore, their assessment should be carried out in the broader setting of the adoption of digital technologies in the public sector.

4. Digital technologies & the public sector, including procurement

The emergence of the above mentioned digital technologies is now seen as a potential solution to complex public policy problems, such as the promotion of more sustainable public procurement. Keeping track of all the potential use cases in the public sector is difficult and the hype around buzzwords such as AI, blockchain or the internet of things (IoT) generates inflated claims of potential solutions to even some of the most wicked public policy problems (eg corruption).

This is reflective of the same hype in private markets, and in particular in financial and consumer markets, where AI is supposed to revolutionise the way we live, almost beyond recognition. There also seems to be an emerging race to the top (or rather, a copy-cat effect) in policy-making circles, as more and more countries adopt AI strategies in the hope of harnessing the potential of these technologies to boost economic growth.

In my view, digital technologies are receiving excessive attention. These are immature technologies and their likely development and usefulness is difficult to grasp beyond a relatively abstract level of potentiality. As such, I think these technologies may be receiving excessive attention from policy-makers and possibly also disproportionate levels of investment (diversion).

The implementation of digital technologies in the public sector faces a number of specific difficulties—not least, around data availability and data skills, as stressed in a recent OECD report (2019b). While it is probably beyond doubt that they will have an impact on public governance and the delivery of public services, it is more likely to be incremental rather than disruptive or revolutionary. Along these lines, another recent OECD report (2019c) stresses the need to take a critical look at the potential of artificial intelligence, in particular in relation to public sector use cases.

The OECD report (2019a) mentioned above shows how, despite these general strategies and the high levels of support at the top levels of policy-making, there is limited evidence of significant developments on the ground. This is the case, in particular, regarding the implementation of digital technologies in public procurement, where the OECD documents very limited developments (see table below).

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Of course, this does not mean that we will not see more and more widespread developments in the coming years, but a note of caution is necessary if we are to embrace realistic expectations about the potential for significant changes resulting from procurement digitalisation. The following sections concentrate on the speculative analysis of such potential use of digital technologies to support sustainable procurement.

5. Sustainable digital procurement

Bringing together the scope for more sustainable public procurement (2), the progressive digitalisation of procurement (3), and the emergence of digital technologies susceptible of implementation in the public sector (4); the combined strategic goal (or ideal) would be to harness the potential of digital technologies to promote (more) sustainable procurement. This is a difficult exercise, surrounded by uncertainty, so the rest of this post is all speculation.

In my view, there are different ways in which digital technologies can be used for sustainability purposes. The contribution that each digital technology (DT) can make depends on its core functionality. In simple functional terms, my understanding is that:

  • AI is particularly apt for the massive processing of (big) data, as well as for the implementation of data-based machine learning (ML) solutions and the automation of some tasks (through so-called robotic process automation, RPA);

  • Blockchain is apt for the implementation of tamper-resistant/evident decentralised data management;

  • The internet of things (IoT) is apt to automate the generation of some data and (could be?) apt to breach the virtual/real frontier through oracle-enabled robotics

The timeline that we could expect for the development of these solutions is also highly uncertain, although there are expectations for some technologies to mature within the next four years, whereas others may still take closer to ten years.

© Gartner, Aug 2018.

© Gartner, Aug 2018.

Each of the core functionalities or basic strengths of these digital technologies, as well as their rate of development, will determine a higher or lower likelihood of successful implementation in the area of procurement, which is a highly information/data-sensitive area of public policy and administration. Therefore, it seems unavoidable to first look at the need to create an enabling data architecture as a priority (and pre-condition) to the deployment of any digital technologies.

6. An enabling data architecture as a priority

The importance of the availability of good quality data in the context of digital technologies cannot be over-emphasised (see eg OECD, 2019b). This is also clear to the European Commission, as it has also included the need to improve the availability of good quality data as a strategic priority. Indeed, the Commission stressed that “Better and more accessible data on procurement should be made available as it opens a wide range of opportunities to assess better the performance of procurement policies, optimise the interaction between public procurement systems and shape future strategic decisions” (COM(2017) 572 fin at 10-11).

However, despite the launch of a set of initiatives that seek to improve the existing procurement data architecture, there are still significant difficulties in the generation of data [for discussion and further references, see A Sanchez-Graells, “Data-driven procurement governance: two well-known elephant tales” (2019) 24(4) Communications Law 157-170; idem, “Some public procurement challenges in supporting and delivering smart urban mobility: procurement data, discretion and expertise”, in M Finck, M Lamping, V Moscon & H Richter (eds), Smart Urban Mobility – Law, Regulation, and Policy, MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law (Springer 2020) forthcoming; and idem, “EU Public Procurement Policy and the Fourth Industrial Revolution: Pushing and Pulling as One?”, Working Paper for the YEL Annual Conference 2019 ‘EU Law in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution’].

To be sure, there are impending advances in the availability of quality procurement data as a result of the increased uptake of the Open Contracting Data Standards (OCDS) developed by the Open Contracting Partnership (OCP); the new rules on eForms; the development of eGovernment Application Programming Interfaces (APIs); the 2019 Open Data Directive; the principles of business to government data sharing (B2G data sharing); etc. However, it seems to me that the European Commission needs to exercise clearer leadership in the development of an EU-wide procurement data architecture. There is, in particular, one measure that could be easily adopted and would make a big difference.

The 2019 Open Data Directive (Directive 2019/1024/EU, ODD) establishes a special regime for high-value datasets, which need to be available free of charge (subject to some exceptions); machine readable; provided via APIs; and provided as a bulk download, where relevant (Art 14(1) ODD). Those high-value datasets are yet to be identified by the European Commission through implementing acts aimed at specifying datasets within a list of thematic categories included in Annex I, which includes the following datasets: geospatial; Earth observation and environment; meteorological; statistics; companies and company ownership; and mobility. In my view, most relevant procurement data can clearly fit within the category of statistical information.

More importantly, the directive specifies that the ‘identification of specific high-value datasets … shall be based on the assessment of their potential to: (a) generate significant socioeconomic or environmental benefits and innovative services; (b) benefit a high number of users, in particular SMEs; (c) assist in generating revenues; and (d) be combined with other datasets’ (Art 14(2) ODD). Given the high-potential of procurement data to unlock (a), (b) and (d), as well as, potentially, generate savings analogous to (c), the inclusion of datasets of procurement information in the future list of high-value datasets for the purposes of the Open Data Directive seems like an obvious choice.

Of course, there will be issues to iron out, as not all procurement information is equally susceptible of generating those advantages and there is the unavoidable need to ensure an appropriate balance between the publication of the data and the protection of legitimate (commercial) interests, as recognised by the Directive itself (Art 2(d)(iii) ODD) [for extended discussion, see here]. However, this would be a good step in the direction of ensuring the creation of a forward-looking data architecture.

At any rate, this is not really a radical idea. At least half of the EU is already publishing some public procurement open data, and many Eastern Partnership countries publish procurement data in OCDS (eg Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia). The suggestion here would bring more order into this bottom-up development and would help Member States understand what is expected, where to get help from, etc, as well as ensure the desirable level of uniformity, interoperability and coordination in the publication of the relevant procurement data.

Beyond that, in my view, more needs to be done to also generate backward-looking databases that enable the public sector to design and implement adequate sustainability policies, eg in relation to the repair and re-use of existing assets.

Only when the adequate data architecture is in place, will it be possible to deploy advanced digital technologies. Therefore, this should be given the highest priority by policy-makers.

7. Potential AI uses for sustainable public procurement

If/when sufficient data is available, there will be scope for the deployment of several specific implementations of artificial intelligence. It is possible to imagine the following potential uses:

  • Sustainability-oriented (big) data analytics: this should be relatively easy to achieve and it would simply be the deployment of big data analytics to monitor the extent to which procurement expenditure is pursuing or achieving specified sustainability goals. This could support the design and implementation of sustainability-oriented procurement policies and, where appropriate, it could generate public disclosure of that information in order to foster civic engagement and to feedback into political processes.

  • Development of sustainability screens/indexes: this would be a slight variation of the former and could facilitate the generation of synthetic data visualisations that reduced the burden of understanding the data analytics.

  • Machine Learning-supported data analysis with sustainability goals: this could aim to train algorithms to establish eg the effectiveness of sustainability-oriented procurement policies and interventions, with the aim of streamlining existing policies and to update them at a pace and level of precision that would be difficult to achieve by other means.

  • Sustainability-oriented procurement planning: this would entail the deployment of algorithms aimed at predictive analytics that could improve procurement planning, in particular to maximise the sustainability impact of future procurements.

Moreover, where clear rules/policies are specified, there will be scope for:

  • Compliance automation: it is possible to structure procurement processes and authorisations in such a way that compliance with pre-specified requirements is ensured (within the eProcurement system). This facilitates ex ante interventions that could minimise the risk of and the need for ex post contractual modifications or tender cancellations.

  • Recommender/expert systems: it would be possible to use machine learning to assist in the design and implementation of procurement processes in a way that supported the public buyer, in an instance of cognitive computing that could accelerate the gains that would otherwise require more significant investments in professionalisation and specialisation of the workforce.

  • Chatbot-enabled guidance: similarly to the two applications above, the use of procurement intelligence could underpin chatbot-enabled systems that supported the public buyers.

A further open question is whether AI could ever autonomously generate new sustainability policies. I dare not engage in such exercise in futurology…

8. Limited use of blockchain/DLTs for sustainable public procurement

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By contrast with the potential for big data and the AI it can enable, the potential for blockchain applications in the context of procurement seems to me much more limited (for further details, see here, here and here). To put it simply, the core advantages of distributed ledger technologies/blockchain derive from their decentralised structure.

Whereas there are several different potential configurations of DLTs (see eg Rauchs et al, 2019 and Alessie et al, 2019, from where the graph is taken), the configuration of the blockchain affects its functionalities—with the highest levels of functionality being created by open and permissionless blockchains.

However, such a structure is fundamentally uninteresting to the public sector, which is unlikely to give up control over the system. This has been repeatedly stressed and confirmed in an overview of recent implementations (OECD, 2019a:16; see also OECD, 2018).

Moreover, even beyond the issue of public sector control, it should be stressed that existing open and permissionless blockchains operate on the basis of a proof-of-work (PoW) consensus mechanism, which has a very high carbon footprint (in particular in the case of Bitcoin). This also makes such systems inapt for sustainable digital procurement implementations.

Therefore, sustainable blockchain solutions (ie private & permissioned, based on proof-of-stake (PoS) or a similar consensus mechanisms), are likely to present very limited advantages for procurement implementation over advanced systems of database management—and, possibly, even more generally (see eg this interesting critical paper by Low & Mik, 2019).

Moreover, even if there was a way to work around those constraints and design a viable technical solution, that by itself would still not fix underlying procurement policy complexity, which will necessarily impose constraints on technologies that require deterministic coding, eg

  • Tenders on a blockchain - the proposals to use blockchain for the implementation of the tender procedure itself are very limited, in my opinion, by the difficulty in structuring all requirements on the basis of IF/THEN statements (see here).

  • Smart (public) contracts - the same constraints apply to smart contracts (see here and here).

  • Blockchain as an information exchange platform (Mélon, 2019, on file) - the proposals to use blockchain mechanisms to exchange information on best practices and tender documentation of successful projects could serve to address some of the confidentiality issues that could arise with ‘standard’ databases. However, regardless of the technical support to the exchange of information, the complexity in identifying best practices and in ensuring their replicability remains. This is evidenced by the European Commission’s Initiative for the exchange of information on the procurement of Large Infrastructure Projects (discussed here when it was announced), which has not been used at all in its first two years (as of 6 November 2019, there were no publicly-available files in the database).

9. Sustainable procurement of digital technologies

A final issue to take into consideration is that the procurement of digital technologies needs to itself incorporate sustainability considerations. However, this does not seem to be the case in the context of the hype and over-excitement with the experimentation/deployment of those technologies.

Indeed, there are emerging guidelines on procurement of some digital technologies, such as AI (UK, 2019) (WEF, 2019) (see here for discussion). However, as could be expected, these guidelines are extremely technology-centric and their interaction with broader procurement policies is not necessarily straightforward.

I would argue that, in order for these technologies to enable a more sustainable procurement, sustainability considerations need to be embedded not only in their application, but may well require eg an earlier analysis of whether the life-cycle of existing solutions warrants replacement, or the long-term impacts of the implementation of digital technologies (eg in terms of life-cycle carbon footprint).

Pursuing technological development for its own sake can have significant environmental impacts that must be assessed.

10. Concluding thoughts

This (very long…) blog post has structured some of my thoughts on the interaction of sustainability and digitalisation in the context of public procurement. By way of conclusion, I would just try to translate this into priorities for policy-making (and research). Overall, I believe that the main area of effort for policy-makers should now be in creating an enabling data architecture. Its regulation can thus focus research in the short term. In the medium-term, and as use cases become clearer in the policy-making sphere, research should be moving towards the design of digital technology-enabled solutions (for sustainable public procurement, but not only) and their regulation, governance and social impacts. The long-term is too difficult for me to foresee, as there is too much uncertainty. I can only guess that we will cross that bridge when/if we get there…

Is Circular Economy a move towards or away from sustainability? A short piece on the (ab)use of the concept of circularity [guest post by Dr Lela Mélon]

With business sustainability in mind and in search of sustainable governmental behaviour, especially in terms of public purchasing practices, circularity seems like a fitting concept for fulfilling public needs in a sustainable manner (see eg Geissdoerfer et al: 2016). Given the hurdles with the implementation of green public procurement practices across the EU, and the struggles in furthering sustainable public procurement (going beyond environmental to also add social concerns), I expected that circular public procurement would be an exception and applicable only to a handful of cases. And indeed, it did not take much research to verify that the application of circularity across European public procurement is scarce at its best: while listed under green public procurement, circular public procurement exhibits few best practices across the EU that mostly arose at the local level (see eg this 2018 best practice report).

While it might be argued that circularity by definition requires local action, that does not prevent the development of practices at a regional, national or even supra-national level in specific sectors with potential to become circular, e.g. energy sector, construction sector and waste management. Yet, whether we speak about circularity in the framework of private markets or public procurement, it is absolutely indispensable to embed circular practices in the framework of sustainability and not simply formulate it under the framework of waste management.

Much has been said on recycling, less on the cycle. Seeing circularity as an exercise of recycling and bringing materials back into the loop has been widespread, leading to even higher production and consumption and straying away from true sustainability. That being said, the underpinning reasons for such developments do not lie solely in private market practices, but also stem from the lack of knowledge on circularity and policy incoherence on the national and EU level in general.

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What is (true) circularity?

Applying to both private and public markets, the notion of circularity should be clear. Recycling comes last. The whole purchasing procedure needs to be rethought and redesigned to accommodate more sustainable decisions and close the loop of linear practices as in ‘buy, use, dispose.’ Already at the stage of making the purchase decision, circularity demands us to rethink: do we need the product, service or works in question? Could we upcycle a product that we already own to fulfil that need? Could the need be filled by buying a service instead of the product or conversely leasing or renting the product? If the answer to those questions is no, then we need to purchase the product, service or work in question demanding a long life-time evaluation model.

Here the companies engaging in circular production need to provide a life-long guarantee, user manual, strategic design that facilitates reparability, minimal use of raw materials and energy (and its responsible sourcing, accounting for the social aspect of sustainability), use of renewable energy and efficient service and maintenance in case of a product fault. Spare part guarantee, service agreements, small repairs, standard components and easy disassembly are the must-haves under a truly sustainable circular economy.

Reuse and sometimes upcycling are the key. Recycling under a circular model is truly the last resort and its success in extracting useful materials for further production actually depends on the way the product was designed: the absence of hazardous materials, the possibility to disassemble the product into different materials with ease, the possibility of downcycling and upcycling of the materials. These notions all run counter to the current linear economy: and the implications of such systemic change on business models and private markets as we know them will be significant, causing significant policy spill over effects and demanding the elimination of existing policy incoherences inhibiting such a transition. This piece aims to provide further food for thought on the system as it is regarding private and public markets; discussing the current state of affairs, the impediments to a higher uptake of circular practices and the policy spill over effects of a successful implementation of circularity as a general exercise.

Where are we at? – the European Commission’s Action Plan

In terms of EU policy on circular economy in general, the European Commission has issued an ambitious circular economy package—which surprisingly focuses on waste management and bringing resources back in the loop—coupled with two subsequent implementation reports in 2017 and 2019. While the package recognises that the value of circular economy lies also in job creation, savings for businesses and the reduction of EU carbon emissions; the action plan on the matter focuses heavily on reforming the waste management legislation, albeit briefly reflecting also on the broader aspects of circular economy such as job creation, innovative design, business models, research, re-manufacturing, product development and food waste. The wrong signal is therefore sent to the private and public market: the focus on getting scarce materials back into the loop instead of a systemic change of production processes themselves. This influences private and public markets and reinforces the idea that the only issue with traditional linear production and consumption processes is the scarcity of (raw) materials.

Further reinforcing this idea, the EU study on Accelerating the transition to the circular economy focuses on public funds employed to that effect, omitting the fact that this represents only a fraction of the funds needed for a true systemic change. The study has been seen as an accelerator for the deployment of the circular economy, discussed in the framework of new circular business models and in the framework of waste management (id at 10). While the need for extensive financing has been repeatedly highlighted (eg in this 2017 report’s estimate of EUR 320 billion by 2025) for a systemic transition to circular economy (with estimated combined benefits of such shift of EUR 500 billion), the focus of the report has been on providing such finance in the current ‘business as usual’ framework, advocating for higher investment in such transition by the EU, without a comparative assessment of the current private financial market frameworks and its indispensable role in such transition (cfr this call for integrating externalities in the existing risk assessment frameworks).

Arguing for a systemic approach and a stronger focus on private finance offerings, especially with regards to small and medium-size enterprises (see here and here), points to the insufficiency of public funds for the transition to a more circular economy. To boost the private finance offerings, there is a need for a systemic change of financial systems to account for the inherent risks of the current linear business models, thereby eliminating persistent unfair competitive advantage for linear business models in the access-to-finance scenario. Not incorporating the change of linear risk assessment practices in greater detail into the EU action plan is a pitfall that needs to be remedied, qualifying change that needs to occur regarding the traditional access-to-funding setting in order to accommodate circular business and the changes it entails for ‘business-as-usual’ also in terms of the access-to-finance.

The structural flaw of underestimating the risks of linear projects and overestimating the risks of circular economy projects will not be remedied simply by taxonomy and EU funds: the financial systems on their own need to ‘circularise’ their finance offerings: the world as we know it, business as usual, is about to change and it could cost them more than just their reputation. Asset backed loans will need to change into ‘relationship’ backed loans, which presupposes also changes and ameliorations to contract laws to ensure monetised value to relationships as steering wheels of the new circular economy.

The lack of circularity in finance influences the offerings of the private market and the innovation necessary for circular solutions, which will in turn influence also the success of circular public procurement: the public funds and practices in innovation procurement cannot produce a sufficient amount of circular procurement to create a strong movement on the private market.

What are the impediments to a higher uptake of circular practices and what are their implications?

Aside from these two broader policy concerns, there are some specific impediments to circularity in public procurement: the first is the low uptake of green public procurement (GPP) across the EU,[1] impeding the insertion of circularity as the next step of GPP and the second the lack of regional, national and supranational best practices to that effect.

The integration between public procurement and circular economy itself is at its early stages at the EU level, where the incorporation of social, environmental and economic specifications into public procurement is not at a sufficiently high level to produce an indirect effect on products and consumers themselves and thereby stimulating circular economy. Furthermore, as majority of circular innovation stems from small and medium sized enterprises, it is crucial to further facilitate their access to public procurement systems, aside from general efforts to support the implementation of sustainable public procurement.

While the Eco-design Directive 2009/125/EC incentivises Member States to implement waste-preventing public procurement strategies according to information about the products’ technical durability, simultaneously suggesting the recycling requirements to be designed accounting for corresponding requirements for waste treatment in the waste legislation related to product, significantly supporting the circular flow of substances and materials, it is still strongly focused on waste management. Once again, here the notion of circularity supports more the linear production models than it does true circularity: while waste management and preservation of materials is important, determining the initial need for production and the potential for lease, reuse and upcycle is more important in terms of circularity.

The second supporting tool for circular public procurement, the Environmental Footprint Initiative of the European Commission, aims at providing a harmonisation process for the development of a scientific and consensus-based method, trying to inform and direct consumer choices with clear and comparable environmental information. Again, while reliable information is an indispensable steppingstone for determining sustainability hotspots, it is a truly preliminary and indirect step towards circular procurement. It does not provide for a true move from linearity to circularity.

Aside from the general concerns introduced above, the private sector further encounters impediments to circularity in current legislation on plastics recycling, competition law and the general corporate law favouring and prioritising linear business practices, lacking clear guidance on circularity. These are all examples of policy incoherence, some representing a direct example of incoherence (the silence of corporate legal frameworks on the social norm of shareholder primacy,[2] the plastic packaging requirements preventing the use of recycled plastics), others an indirect example (competition law).

Coupled with the abovementioned issues of financial law, these impediments are sufficient to significantly reduce the development of new circular solutions beyond pure recycling efforts. Additionally, the indirect policy incoherence in terms of competition policy as it stands, needs to be revised simultaneously to other sustainable changes to EU legal frameworks, and we have not accounted yet for those changes to a significant extent. If circularity is to be a tool towards achieving true sustainability, the traditional notions of ‘separating’ competitors and keeping them from cooperating will need to be revised. Circular systems have a need to be interconnected, cooperating and sharing, especially as reuse, repair and upcycling are the building blocks of circular economy. This calls for a systemic change of competition laws in themselves.

Furthermore, to aid the financing of this transition, traditional property and contract law will need to develop additional institutions to account for a different economy, one not based on assets as in material assets but rather relationships as assets. The road towards true circularity is still long, but these policy spill over considerations need to be resolved simultaneously with other sustainable changes to areas directly connected with sustainability in order to achieve a timely change towards truly sustainable circularity.

Where to now?

To conclude, a systemic change requires efforts of policymakers, private and public market actors as well as consumers. The above presented reflections represent just a fraction of what we will have to deal with in terms of transition towards sustainability and I would love to hear about any additional concerns and/or solutions to the policy issue that you have encountered in your professional field. I would gratefully any feedback or suggestions at lela.melon@upf.edu.

Profile Lela Professional.jpg

Dr Lela Mélon

Lela Mélon is a lawyer and an economist, specialised in sustainable corporate law. Lela started her sustainability career in 2014 with her research on shareholder primacy in corporate law. She is currently charge of the Marie Curie Sklodowska funded project ‘Sustainable Company’ at the Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona. She has co-authored and authored monographs, published several scientific articles in the field of sustainable corporate lawand sustainable public procurement and presented her work at conferences across Europe, as well as introduced sustainable corporate law curricula in several universities in Europe.

[1] Mélon, L. ‘More than a nudge? Arguments and tools for mandating green public procurement in the EU.’ Working Paper, Conference Corporate Sustainability Reforms Oslo 2019.

[2] Mélon, L. Shareholder Primacy and Global Business (Routledge 2018); Sjafjell, B. (2015) Shareholder Primacy: The Main Barrier to Sustainable Companies, University of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2015-37.

AI & sustainable procurement: the public sector should first learn what it already owns

ⓒ Christophe Benoit (Flickr).

ⓒ Christophe Benoit (Flickr).

[This post was first published at the University of Bristol Law School Blog on 14 October 2019].

While carrying out research on the impact of digital technologies for public procurement governance, I have realised that the deployment of artificial intelligence to promote sustainability through public procurement holds some promise. There are many ways in which machine learning can contribute to enhance procurement sustainability.

For example, new analytics applied to open transport data can significantly improve procurement planning to support more sustainable urban mobility strategies, as well as the emergence of new models for the procurement of mobility as a service (MaaS). Machine learning can also be used to improve the logistics of public sector supply chains, as well as unlock new models of public ownership of eg cars. It can also support public buyers in identifying the green or sustainable public procurement criteria that will deliver the biggest improvements measured against any chosen key performance indicator, such as CO2 footprint, as well as support the development of robust methodologies for life-cycle costing.

However, it is also evident that artificial intelligence can only be effectively deployed where the public sector has an adequate data architecture. While advances in electronic procurement and digital contract registers are capable of generating that data architecture for the future, there is a significant problem concerning the digitalisation of information on the outcomes of past procurement exercises and the current stock of assets owned and used by the public sector. In this blog, I want to raise awareness about this gap in public sector information and to advocate for the public sector to invest in learning what it already owns as a potential major contribution to sustainability in procurement, in particular given the catalyst effect this could have for a more circular procurement economy.

Backward-looking data as a necessary evidence base

It is notorious that the public sector’s management of procurement-related information is lacking. It is difficult enough to have access to information on ‘live’ tender procedures. Accessing information on contract execution and any contractual modifications has been nigh impossible until the very recent implementation of the increased transparency requirements imposed by the EU’s 2014 Public Procurement Package. Moreover, even where that information can be identified, there are significant constraints on the disclosure of competition-sensitive information or business secrets, which can also restrict access. This can be compounded in the case of procurement of assets subject to outsourced maintenance contracts, or in assets procured under mechanisms that do not transfer property to the public sector.

Accessing information on the outcomes of past procurement exercises is thus a major challenge. Where the information is recorded, it is siloed and compartmentalised. And, in any case, this is not public information and it is oftentimes only held by the private firms that supplied the goods or provided the services—with information on public works more likely to be, at least partially, under public sector control. This raises complex issues of business to government (B2G) data sharing, which is only a nascent area of practice and where the guidance provided by the European Commission in 2018 leaves many questions unanswered.

I will not argue here that all that information should be automatically and unrestrictedly publicly disclosed, as that would require some careful considerations of the implications of such disclosures. However, I submit that the public sector should invest in tracing back information on procurement outcomes for all its existing stock of assets (either owned, or used under other contractual forms)—or, at least, in the main categories of buildings and real estate, transport systems and IT and communications hardware. Such database should then be made available to data scientists tasked with seeking all possible ways of optimising the value of that information for the design of sustainable procurement strategies.

In other words, in my opinion, if the public sector is to take procurement sustainability seriously, it should invest in creating a single, centralised database of the durable assets it owns as the necessary evidence base on which to seek to build more sustainable procurement policies. And it should then put that evidence base to good use.

More circular procurement economy based on existing stocks

In my view, some of the main advantages of creating such a database in the short-, medium- and long-term would be as follows.

In the short term, having comprehensive data on existing public sector assets would allow for the deployment of different machine learning solutions to seek, for example, to identify redundant or obsolete assets that could be reassigned or disposed of, or to reassess the efficiency of the existing investments eg in terms of levels of use and potential for increased sharing of assets, or in terms of the energy (in)efficiency derived from their use. It would also allow for a better understanding of potential additional improvements in eg maintenance strategies, as services could be designed having the entirety of the relevant stock into consideration.

In the medium term, this would also provide better insights on the whole life cycle of the assets used by the public sector, including the possibility of deploying machine learning to plan for timely maintenance and replacement, as well as to improve life cycle costing methodologies based on public-sector specific conditions. It would also facilitate the creation of a ‘public sector second-hand market’, where entities with lower levels of performance requirements could acquire assets no longer fit for their original purpose, eg computers previously used in more advanced tasks that still have sufficient capacity could be repurposed for routine administrative tasks. It would also allow for the planning and design of recycling facilities in ways that minimised the carbon footprint of the disposal.

In the long run, in particular post-disposal, the existence of the database of assets could unlock a more circular procurement economy, as the materials of disposed assets could be reused for the building of other assets. In that regard, there seem to be some quick wins to be had in the construction sector, but having access to more and better information would probably also serve as a catalyst for similar approaches in other sectors.

Conclusion

Building a database on existing public sector-used assets as the outcome of earlier procurement exercises is not an easy or cheap task. However, in my view, it would have transformative potential and could generate sustainability gains not only aimed at reducing the carbon footprint of future public expenditure but, more importantly, at correcting or somehow compensating for the current environmental impacts of the way the public sector operates. This could make a major difference in accelerating emissions reductions and should consequently be a matter of sufficient priority for the public sector to engage in this exercise. In my view, it should be a matter of high priority.

A quick, non-comprehensive update on circular economy and public procurement

Circular-Economy.jpg

A friend and I have been discussing sustainability and property regulation for a while. In particular, he has been quizzing me on the potential for public procurement to promote a (more) circular economy for a few years now. We last touched upon this in mid-2015. In a recent email exchange, he asked me to look at what had happened since at EU level. This is what I came up with. I thought I would share it in case someone is interested in a quick, non-comprehensive update on circular economy and public procurement. Here it is. Please feel free to add to this in the comments section!

In June 2017, the European Parliament published a report it had commissioned on 'Green Public Procurement and the EU Action Plan for the Circular Economy'. In October 2017, the Directorate General for the Environment of the European Commission published this brochure of best practices (of which I was rather critical in my blog). There have been additional best practice guides put together by entities receiving EU funding, eg ICLEI or CircularPP.

This is still a weak policy intervention in the form of best practice dissemination (ie even weaker than soft law guidelines), which is supported with some additional initiatives, such as the Circular Europe Network. However, in their own words 'the integration between PP and circular economy is still at its early stage at the EU level.' (Factsheet on Public Procurement and Circular Economy, tab 2.3).

Some countries are taking the use of procurement to push for a more circular economy to reduce the environmental impact of public sector activities more seriously than others, and the construction sector seems to be ahead of others (see eg this recent report). Denmark is perhaps at the forefront of trying to use procurement for a circular economy (see eg this case study), together with the other Nordic countries and The Netherlands (see eg this 2017 report, or the 10 case studies included in the construction sector report above). There is not much going on in the UK at all (I could only find a 2016 4-pager on general aspects of circular economy that mentions procurement in passing).

There are a couple of interesting-looking academic papers: Witjes & Lozano (2016) and Alhola et al (2018), the latter being the same authors of the report on the Nordic countries above.

** Postscript (11/10/2019 11.20am) - Thanks to Dr Lela Mélon for highlighting the March 2019 Report on ‘Accelerating the transition to a circular economy‘ and for pointing out that this is ‘an overarching policy example that omits the amount of private capital needed for a transition to occur at a noteworthy scale (e.g. mentioning the EU public funds to be employed to that effect but omitting the size of the whole funding needed for the transition)‘.

New Book: G Racca & C Yukins (eds) "Integrity and Efficiency in Sustainable Public Contracts" (Brussels, Bruylant, 2014).


The new book on "Integrity and Efficiency in Sustainable Public Contracts. Balancing Corruption Concerns in Public Procurement Internationally" edited by Profs. Racca and Yukins is now available.

As the editors indicate

Ensuring efficiency and integrity throughout the public procurement cycle is essential to a sound allocation of taxpayers’ money. Yet public contracts are plagued by corruption, collusion, favoritism and conflicts of interest. This book addresses these problems from sophisticated, academic, institutional and practical perspectives.
The book’s ambition is to shape the public debate in the procurement community by highlighting how corruption implies violations of fundamental rights and undermines the fiduciary relationship between citizens and public institutions. The analysis underlines how corruption may stem from - and yet be resolved - through the exercise of discretion in the public procurement system. Focusing on the effects of public corruption and private collusion on procurement integrity, the book marks the features of misconduct and suggests needed counter-measures. The work also emphasizes that the pursuit of efficiency and integrity in public contracts must be rooted in professional skills, and in ethical regulations and training for public officers.
The research reflected in these pieces comes from sources around the world, and offers an excellent foundation for further development of these topics. Expanding on prior research, this volume builds on a more active transnational academic cooperation and exchanges of ideas on integrity in public contracts for the benefit of citizens.
This book is intended as both a textbook and an edited collection and it is available as an e-book too. The authors of the chapters are all specialists in their respective fields, and their different geographical and professional perspectives represent a valuable contribution to the scientific literature.
I have contributed a chapter on “Prevention and Deterrence of Bid Rigging: A Look from the New EU Directive on Public Procurement”, which SSRN version is available here.