ECJ new recommendations on the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings sends clear signal to UK Supreme Court that the Miller case must be referred

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has published today a new set of Recommendations to national courts and tribunals, in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings [2016] OJ C 439/1. This is a very timely document, which clarifies the circumstances under which a reference for a preliminary ruling can or must take place, as well as the basic parameters that those requests must meet in order to effectively enable the CJEU to issue preliminary rulings, including in cases requiring particularly expeditious handling.

In the context of the Brexit related litigation before the UK Supreme Court in the appeal of the High Court's Miller decision, these Recommendations are particularly timely and relevant. There has been a very intense discussion by distinguished legal scholars about the existence or not of an obligation to refer the case to the ECJ for interpretation of Article 50 TEU--and, in particular, in relation with the (ir)revocability of an Art 50(1) notice in view of Art 50(2) TEU. The positions are too wide to discuss here (see this very useful compilation of materials), and I hold the relatively minoritarian view that the UK Supreme Court is under an absolute and inexcusable obligation to request a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article 50 TEU.

I find additional support for my view and the underlying interpretation of the CILFIT test in para [6] of the CJEU's Recommendations, which very clearly indicates that:

Where a question is raised in the context of a case that is pending before a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal is nonetheless required to bring a request for a preliminary ruling before the Court (see third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU), unless there is already well-established case-law on the point or unless the correct interpretation of the rule of law in question admits of no reasonable doubt (emphasis added).

Para [3] is also relevant in its stress that:

The jurisdiction of the Court to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation or validity of EU law is exercised exclusively on the initiative of the national courts and tribunals, whether or not the parties to the main proceedings have expressed the wish that a question be referred to the Court (emphasis added).

In my opinion, the CJEU has sent the clearest possible message to the UK Supreme Court: they expect a request for an interpretation of Article 50 TEU. And the UK Supreme Court will be well advised to do so as soon as possible, once all intervening parties have presented their arguments. Tertium non datur.

Why an appeal of the High Court Parliamentary approval Brexit judgment will bring the litigation to the cjeu?

The High Court has today issued its Judgment in the dispute about the UK Parliament's necessary approval of a Brexit notification--see R (Miller) -V- Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin). It has ruled that such Parliamentary approval is indeed required as a matter of UK constitutional and public law. The Government has already announced that it will appeal this decision to the UK Supreme Court (UKSC). The implications of such an appeal are important and need to be carefully considered. One such possible consequence is that the appeal (indirectly) brings the case to the docket of the  Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).

In my view, an appeal of the High Court's Judgment before the UKSC will indeed trigger a legal requirement under EU law for the UKSC to send a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU. I have rehearsed most of my arguments on twitter earlier (see here and here) and this posts brings them together.

Basic EU Law Background

Article 267(1)(a) TFEU establishes the monopoly of interpretation of the CJEU and it indicates the Court shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the Treaties. Article 267(2) then goes on to enable the domestic courts of the Member States to issue request preliminary rulings from the ECJ where questions of interpretation of EU law are raised before them and they consider that a decision on the question is necessary to enable them to give judgment. However, that discretion of domestic courts to request preliminary rulings from the CJEU does not apply to the courts or tribunals of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law. In that case, Article 267(3) indicates that where a question on the interpretation of EU law is raised, the highest court  shall bring the matter before the CJEU.

The uncertainties surrounding the interpretation of Art 50 TEU before the High Court

One of the extremely complex issues concerning the UK's potential withdrawal from the EU following the Brexit vote of 23 June 2016 concerns the interpretation of Article 50 TEU (on this, see here). One of the difficult sub-questions concerns the (ir)reversibility of an Art 50 TEU trigger notification. This is an essential element for an assessment of the UK's constitutional requirements for the delivery of such notification, as the High Court's Judgment makes clear.

Indeed, as a preliminary issue, in today's Judgment, the High Court has addressed the problematic interpretation of Art 50 TEU. Unanimously, the High Court has indicated that "Important matters in respect of Article 50 were common ground between the parties: (1) a notice under Article 50(2) cannot be withdrawn once it is given ..." para [10]; and that "Once a notice is given, it will inevitably result in the complete withdrawal of the United Kingdom from membership of the European Union and from the relevant Treaties at the end of the two year period, subject only to agreement on an extension of time ..." para [11].

There are two ways of interpreting the High Court's dealing with the argument on irreversibility of an Art 50 notification. First, that the High Court takes this approach in para [11] because it is common ground between the parties ex para [10]--what I would call the UK procedural approach. Second, that the High Court has of its own interpreted an Art 50 notification to be irreversible ex para [11], which happens to align with the common position of the parties in para [10]--what I would call the EU substantive interpretation approach.

The UK procedural approach is saved by the High Court's discretion under Art 267(2) TFEU to consider that the interpretation of Art 50 TEU is actually not necessary for it to adjudicate the matter at hand because this is not part of the controversy between the parties. However, the EU substantive interpretation does trigger some issues because, having recognised the interpretation of Art 50 TEU as an important aspect for the adjudication of the case, the High Court should not have taken it upon itself to interpret it and should rather have requested a preliminary ruling from the CJEU. However, unless under a very expansive interpretation of the principle of sincere or loyal cooperation in Art 4(3) TEU, this does not amount to a breach of EU law.

The uncertainties surrounding the interpretation of Art 50 TEU before the UK Supreme Court

Now, in case of an appeal of the High Court's decision before the UKSC, in my opinion, the referral to the CJEU is legally unavoidable (I will not deal for now with arguments of judicial politics or pragmatic views on the UKSC's likely course of action). Even if the parties do not challenge or even raise to the UKSC's consideration the matter of the (ir)reversibility of and Article 50 notification, it is a logical given that the UKSC needs to take a stance (even if implicit) on this point in order to be able to rule on the case. If it quashes the High Court's decision, it needs to clarify the points of law which the High Court would have gotten wrong--one of which concerns the irrevocability of an Art 50 notification. if it upholds the High Court's decision, it is (implicitly) accepting the assumption that an Art 50 notification is irrevocable. Either way, the UKSC cannot escape a substantial (implicit) consideration of the interpretation of Article 50.

In my view, this engages the UKSC's obligation to request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU under Article 267(3) TFEU and not doing so triggers a risk of infringement of EU law by the UK due to the acts (or omission, in this case) of its highest court.

Semi-Advanced EU Law Background

The UKSC's obligation to request a preliminary reference from the CJEU is controlled by the so-called CILFIT test, which establishes that "a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is required, where a question of [EU] law is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the Court of Justice, unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the [EU] provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of [EU] law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. The existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of [EU] law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the [EU]" (283/81, EU:C:1982:335, para 21).

What does this mean for the UKSC in the Brexit litigation in case of appeal?

In short, my understanding of the CILFIT test is that a highest court of a Member State (the UKSC) must request a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the Treaties to the CJEU and has no discretion not to do so unless: (a) the question is (objectively) irrelevant for the adjudication of the case, or (b) the provision has already been interpreted by the CJEU, or (c) there is no scope for reasonable doubt in the interpretation of the provision. None of these apply in the specific case of the Article 50 litigation.

First, it is inconceivable to me to argue that the interpretation of Art 50 and the (ir)revocability of a notice under it is irrelevant for the adjudication of this case. A different issue would be whether the UKSC could pragmatically sidestep the need to engage in that interpretation, either by presuming its content (the EU substantive interpretation approach mentioned above), or by insisting on the fact that it is common ground to the parties to the litigation and, therefore, the issue of the (ir)revocability of the notification is not (formally, explicitly) raised before it (the UK procedural approach.

However, in my opinion, neither of these avoidance strategies would meet the basic requirements of good faith in the interpretation of the CILFIT test, coupled with Article 4(3) TEU, which requires the domestic court to assess the need to request a preliminary ruling "in the light of the specific characteristics of [EU] law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the [EU]". The interpretation of Article 50 TEU is, to put it simply, the most relevant EU constitutional law issue since the OMT litigation and one of the top, if not the top, EU constitutional law issue since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Engaging in semantics in the analysis of the first prong of the CILFIT test against this background (ie, stretching the narrow interpretation "irrelevant") seems to me logically and legally unacceptable.

Second, it is plain that Art 50 has not been interpret by the CJEU yet. And, thirdly, it is also plain that there is scope (massive scope, a gaping hole) for reasonable doubt in the interpretation of Article 50 TEU. Thus, the so-called acte claire doctrine (ie the counterbalance of the CILFIT test) simply does not apply here.

Overall, in my opinion, the UKSC has an absolute and inexcusable obligation to request a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article 50 TEU from the CJEU the moment the appeal against the High Court's Judgment (eventually) reaches its docket. Otherwise, the UKSC risks triggering an infringement of EU law and eventually creating liability in damages under the Kobler / Traghetti del Mediterraneo strand of case law on State liability. Again, I am not dealing with the arguments on the likelihood of an actual infringement case brought forward by the European Commission, or the CJEU's eventual decision. I am, for now, simply stressing the state of EU law, which the UKSC would be well advised to bear in mind and uphold, unless it aims to contribute to the deterioration of the rule of law in the UK and the EU (which is something that keeps me awake at night).

CJEU confirms incompatibility between automatic judicial inhibition rules and references for a preliminary ruling: need for reform? (C-614/14)

In its Judgment of 5 July 2016 in Ognyanov, C-614/14, EU:C:2016:514, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has taken a final decision on whether domestic (criminal) procedural rules concerned with safeguards against judicial bias need to be set aside if their application is such as to jeopardise the functioning of the system of referrals for a preliminary ruling in the interpretation of EU law established by Article 267 TFEU.

It is worth stressing that the case at hand concerned criminal law enforcement in Bulgaria, where a domestic rule concerning breaches of judicial impartiality could be interpreted so as to require a referring national court that had laid out the factual background and the law applicable to the case for the purposes of the reference to the CJEU, to inhibit itself from any further decisions in a criminal case (and face disciplinary action).

In short, the CJEU has followed the Opinion of AG Bot (see here) and has decided that such a rule is incompatible with EU law and that the domestic courts not only cannot be obliged to refrain from taking any further decisions in a given criminal case on the basis that they referred a preliminary question to the CJEU where they laid out the facts of the case and the law applicable to them, but they are also prevented from voluntarily stepping down of the case on the basis that they consider themselves biased after having referred the question to the CJEU.

I do not have much of an issue with the first part of the Judgment, where the CJEU considers contrary to EU law a rule implying that any referral of a case for a preliminary ruling is a ground for automatic judicial recusal or inhibition; but I find the second part of the CJEU's decision worrying because the opposite position, whereby a judge cannot recuse herself on the basis of a bias created or identified at the point of sending the request for a preliminary ruling, or whereby she would be breaching EU law if she decided to inhibit herself from any further decision in the case, cannot be right.

In my view, the main issue with the Ognyanov Judgment derives from the (logical) formality of the CJEU's reasoning. After having determined that 'a national rule which is interpreted in such a way as to oblige a referring court to disqualify itself from a pending case, on the ground that it set out, in its request for a preliminary ruling, the factual and legal context of that case' is contrary to EU law, the CJEU engaged in the analysis of whether that rule could be applied voluntarily by the court concerned on the basis that 'that rule ensures a higher degree of protection of the parties’ fundamental rights'. The CJEU analysis was as follows:

32 ...  the fact that a national court sets out, in the request for a preliminary ruling ... the factual and legal context of the main proceedings is not, in itself, a breach of [the right to a fair trial]. Consequently, the obligation to disqualify itself, imposed by that rule on a referring court which has, in a reference for a preliminary ruling, acted in that way cannot be considered as serving to enhance the protection of that right.
36 ... in this case, the referring court is obliged to ensure that Article 267 TFEU is given full effect, and if necessary to disapply, of its own motion [the domestic rule requiring its inhibition] where that interpretation is not compatible with EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 April 2016, DI, C‑441/14, EU:C:2016:278, paragraph 34).
37      In the light of the foregoing, ... EU law must be interpreted as precluding a referring court from applying a national rule, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which is deemed to be contrary to EU law (C-614/14, paras 32 and 36-37, emphasis added).

In my view, the biggest issue with the Ognyanov Judgment is that the CJEU seems to only take into account one of two possibilities. It is certainly true that, as the CJEU emphasises, setting out the factual and legal context of the main proceedings to which the request for a preliminary refers 'is not, in itself [always or necessarily], a breach of that fundamental right', but it is not less true that the way in which a court lays out such factual and legal context can be sufficient to establish the existence of judicial bias because the referring court may demonstrate that it has pre-judged the issues at stake and thus expressed a legal position that prevents it from remaining involved in the criminal investigation without jeopardising the fundamental rights of the accused. Therefore, a more nuanced approach is needed.

I would suggest that a careful holistic interpretation of the Ognyanov Judgment could result in such nuanced approach, particularly if it was understood that the CJEU only considers contrary to EU law for a domestic court to inhibit itself from any further decisions in an on-going (criminal) case exclusively on the basis that it had laid down the factual and legal context of that case for the purposes of the request for a preliminary ruling--that is, exclusively in view of its having met the requirements of Art 267 TFEU and Art 94 of the rules on procedure--but it does not consider the same incompatibility with EU law if the domestic court identifies any (additional) substantive (and substantial?) indication of (its own) bias in the way that factual and legal background is laid out.

It certainly seems wrong to me to adopt a broader reading of the Ognyanov Judgment whereby any judicial inhibition (or recusal) on the basis of bias shown within the context of a request for a preliminary ruling is barred as a matter of (non)compliance with EU law.

Ultimately, and beyond these considerations, in my view, the difficulties derived from the reconciliation of domestic rules on judicial impartiality (in criminal law matters) and the EU preliminary reference mechanism seem to be more than a good reason to revisit the assumption that the same rules can apply without causing significant problems for civil/administrative and criminal references for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU.

A PLEA FOR A MORE NUANCED APPROACH THAN AG BOT'S to the INTERACTION BETWEEN ART 267 TFEU AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO FAIR TRIAL AND PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE (C-614/14)

In his Opinion of 23 February 2016 in case Ognyanov (C-614/14, EU:C:2016:111, not available in English), Advocate General Bot addressed the question whether, regarding the content of a reference for a preliminary ruling, compliance with Articles 267 TFEU and 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) by a domestic criminal court may impair the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Articles 47 (right to a fair trial) and 48 (presumption of innocence) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR). AG Bot answers in the negative. He considers that a national rule that presumes that referring a case to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling is a breach of judicial impartiality, and therefore requires the referring criminal court to inhibit itself (and face disciplinary sanctions) upon having referred the case to the CJEU is contrary to EU law. In my view, AG Bot raises important points on the need to keep an effective level of judicial cooperation between the domestic courts and the CJEU, also when criminal matters are concerned. However, some parts of the reasoning in the Opinion are too formal and too heavy-handed in favour of the CJEU's monopoly of interpretation of EU law and the effectiveness of the preliminary reference mechanism, at the expense of a substantive assessment of the proper respect to the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Art 48 CFR. In my view, a more nuanced position would be preferable, even if it requires a revision of the rules of procedure of the CJEU in relation to preliminary references in criminal law matters.

The case at hand concerns criminal law enforcement in Bulgaria, where a domestic rule concerning breaches of judicial impartiality could be interpreted so as to require a referring national court that has laid out the factual background and the law applicable to the case for the purposes of the reference to the CJEU, to inhibit itself from any further decisions in a criminal case (and face disciplinary action).

In particular, the dispute is about the 'EU law-compliant' interpretation of Art 29(2) of the Bulgarian Code of Criminal Procedure (BCCP), which  establishes that 'A judge ... may not be part of the court composition due to some other circumstances on account of which he/she may be considered biased or interested, directly or indirectly, in the outcome of the case'. In stylised terms, the argument is that, by laying out the relevant facts and the rules applicable thereto, the national court expresses a 'preliminary view' on the substance of the case. By doing so before the case is at deliberation phase, and then refraining from inhibiting itself from further decisions in the case, the criminal court would be breaching its duty of impartiality (which is a fundamental guarantee of the right to a fair trial) and the accused's right to the presumption of innocence.

In case this interpretation was accepted, this would create a significant issue of coordination of EU law and domestic criminal law in the Member States--which may well be an unresolved issue in the deepening of judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU, since there are no special rules for the purposes of a reference for a preliminary ruling in criminal law matters under Art 94 of the rules of procedure of the CJEU (as acknowledge by AG Bot in para 19). Thus, the case is important beyond the technical point concerning the current rules applicable to the content of references for a preliminary ruling and their effects in criminal law cases, and could easily be pointing out to the need to create such special rules.

In addressing the question referred by the Bulgarian court, AG Bot indeed acknowledges that the referral mechanism 'can create difficulties in situations requiring delicate handling by domestic courts of all jurisdiction and rank' (para 6, own translation from Spanish). However, he rejects that the referral of a case for a preliminary ruling can be interpreted as requiring the inhibition of the referring criminal court (much less the imposition of disciplinary sanctions). His arguments are based both on the need to facilitate judicial cooperation, and on the specific rules applicable to the preliminary reference procedure (para 7). More specifically, AG Bot submits to the CJEU that such a requirement for the inhibition of the referring criminal court would neutralise the effectiveness of Art 267 TFEU and would prevent (Bulgarian) criminal courts from referring cases for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU, which would encroach upon the prerogatives of the Court under Art 267 TFEU--most notably, its monopoly on the interpretation of EU law, which is an issue that comes up again and again in the area of enforcement of fundamental rights under EU law, as became clear in relation to Opinion 2/2013 on the accession of the EU to the ECHR (EU:C:2014:2454; see comments here, here and here).

AG Bot's point of departure is encapsulated in his consideration that 'case law and doctrine have sufficiently stressed that preliminary references are the cornerstone of the Union's judicial system, which exercise concerns the national courts' (para 36, own translation from Spanish). He further relies on Opinion 2/2013, where the CJEU stressed that 'by setting up a dialogue between one court and another, ... between the Court of Justice and the courts and tribunals of the Member States, [the preliminary ruling procedure] has the object of securing uniform interpretation of EU law ... thereby serving to ensure its consistency, its full effect and its autonomy as well as, ultimately, the particular nature of the law established by the Treaties' (para 176). Moreover, he stresses that the proper exercise of the possibility to refer cases to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling is an integral part of the right to a fair trial, as recognised by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Dhabbi v Italy (No. 17120/09) (para 38 of AG Bot's Opinion).

All the ensuing analysis concerning the content of the factual and legal requirements of Art 267 TFEU and Art 94 of the rules of procedure (paras 41-72) rests fundamentally on the importance of the exposition of facts and the explanation of the applicable domestic law that the domestic court needs to provide the CJEU for the purposes of enabling the Court to provide a ruling on the proper interpretation of EU law as it relates to the relevant domestic rules. AG Bot stresses that there is no reason to apply different requirements in criminal matters as compared with civil or administrative law cases (para 66, although he offers no further elaboration or support for this position); and that, if anything, the imposition of higher thresholds of precision and motivation in criminal cases would be justified by the impact that the CJEU's ruling can have on the accused's freedom (para 68).

AG Bot proceeds to consider the arguments regarding the lack of impartiality derived from the 'preliminary view' expressed by the criminal court in the referral (paras 73-87). Remarkably, he stresses that '[i]t is clear from settled case law of the European Court of Human Rights that the mere fact that a judge adopts resolutions before the process can not justify by itself any reproaches regarding his impartiality. What should be assessed is the extent of the measures which have been adopted ... Consequently, although a preliminary question before the Court is a court decision, it is not least true that stating, in that context, the circumstances of fact and legal issues inherent to the case constitutes only a mere statement by the national court, which, furthermore, does not to carry out any legal characterisation' (para 83, references omitted, own translation from Spanish, emphasis added). AG Bot supports this argument with his view that, in the specific case, there is no reason to believe that the referring court is biased or partial. This reasoning is, however, problematic because it tries to address a substantive requirement (ie assessment of the extent of the measures) with a formal justification (that, formally, the description of the legal rules applicable to the case by the domestic court does not necessarily imply a definite legal characterisation of the facts of the case).

Moreover, when it comes to the arguments on a potential breach of the presumption of innocence (paras 88-104), the Opinion seems to get into a muddy road. It starts off by acknowledging that the adoption of any preliminary view on the guiltiness of the accused would infringe the right to the presumption of innocence (para 89) and that, consequently, the key element in an analysis of compliance with Art 48 CFR would be to determine whether, in the referral for a preliminary ruling, the domestic criminal court has indicated that it considers the accused guilty, without guilt being duly proven. In my view, this is indeed the proper framework for the analysis. However, AG Bot proceeds to stress that, in the specific circumstances of the case, the accused cannot benefit from the presumption of innocence because he had already been convicted (para 91).

He also indicates that '[i]n any case, we must not forget that the request for a preliminary ruling by a national court is only intended to obtain a correct interpretation of EU law--whereas determining, on the basis of this interpretation, if the accused is to be found innocent or guilty of the facts, is a task that can only result from the unique and personal appreciation of that [national] court' (para 92, own translation from Spanish). Then, he proceeds once more to arguments on the neutralisation or deactivation of the preliminary reference mechanism should domestic courts be forced to inhibit themselves (and face disciplinary sanctions) in case they referred cases to the CJEU (which is circular and returns to the initial points). AG concludes on this point that 'there is no doubt whatsoever that European Union law, and in particular Articles 267 TFEU and 94 of the Rules of Procedure, precludes national legislation ... which, if maintained, could very seriously affect the preliminary ruling mechanism and, with it, the cooperation established between the Court and national courts, and threaten the primacy of EU law' (para 103, own translation from Spanish).

I find this line of reasoning exceedingly formal because it creates an absolute separation between a view on the need of asking for the interpretation of specific legal provisions and the domestic court's position on the need or likelihood to apply that law to the case. Granted, not every instance in which a request is made necessarily indicates that the referring court has reached a decision on whether the rules will be applicable (as this may, in fact, be affected by the outcome of the CJEU's interpretative exercise). However, in my view, it cannot automatically be ruled out that by its nature the content of a reference for a preliminary ruling is inapt to contain an indication of bias by the referring court, or a breach of the presumption of innocence of the accused. Where that was apparent, and in order to properly protect the rights of the individuals affected by the procedure under the CFR, the CJEU shall engage in a substantive assessment to determine whether Art 48 CFR was at risk and, where warranted, include adequate safeguards when deciding on the preliminary ruling--such as, in specific instances, requiring the referring court to inhibit itself in favour of a different court.

Granted, the main difficulty is that there is no procedural avenue for this as Art 94 of the rules of procedure stands--which in my view seems to be more than a good reason to revisit the assumption that the same rules apply for civil/administrative and criminal references for a preliminary ruling (see para 66 of AG Bot's Opinion).

Beyond these issues, I find it troubling that AG Bot submits to the CJEU that it also needs to rule that a discretionary inhibition by the referring court should also be declared contrary to EU law. Specifically, when considering 'whether EU law prevents [the referring national court] from opting, in application of the national rule under dispute, to inhibit itself because that rule ensures a higher level of protection of fundamental rights of the individuals concerned' (para 113, own translation from Spanish), AG Bot argues considers that the question is actually whether 'European Union law precludes the national court's application of a national rule that has been declared contrary to EU law [by the CJEU]?' (para 114, own translation from Spanish). Of course, AG Bot considers that the answer is that EU law indeed prevents the referring court from relying on that rule to opt for discretionary inhibition. 

However, in my view, given that the domestic rule at stake is the fundamental rule for the disqualification of judges in criminal proceedings, this seems way too far fetched. In particular, because Art 29(2) BCCP establishes a general, open-ended standard to ensure judicial impartiality (see above), there seems to be no reasonable way to conclude that, even if the mere fact of having referred the case to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling does not necessarily trigger the application of Art 29(2) BCCP, its application should be completely excluded for the reasons discussed by AG Bot in his Opinion. More leeway is necessary for the referring court to exercise her own discretion and decide whether, all things considered, she is no longer in a position to make further decisions in the criminal process in an impartial way. Any other interpretation would be, in my submission, a breach not only of Article 48 CFR, but also of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, as it ensure the right to a 'fair and public hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law'.

Therefore, overall, I would like to see the CJEU decide this case in a more nuanced way than AG Bot proposes. I do not hold very high hopes, though.

"Ask responsibly": a warning on the hypertrophy of referrals for preliminary rulings

The tendency towards saturation and the risk of a bottleneck in the activities of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) are one the main concerns that prompted the recent changes in the rules of procedure of this institution (adopted on 25 September, published in the OJ and due to enter into force on the 1st of November). 

As the CJEU expressly remarked: 
"Faced with a constant rise in the number of cases brought before it, dominated by references for a preliminary ruling, the Court is adapting its rules of procedure to ensure that the particular features of those cases can more readily be taken into consideration, while at the same time strengthening its ability to dispose within a reasonable period of time of all the cases that are brought before it" (see press release here, emphasis added). 
Indeed, references for a preliminary ruling account for more than 60% of the CJEU’s caseload and the hypertrophy of this mechanism for the consistent and harmonized interpretation and enforcement of EU Law risks leaving us with a CJEU without time and resources to effectively deal with any of its other duties under the Treaties.

In that regard, the proactive approach adopted by the CJEU in changing its rules of procedure must be welcome, but at the same time it should be stressed that preventing the hypertrophy of the preliminary ruling mechanism is a two way avenue and that referring courts should also make an effort to "ask responsibly" and avoid referring unnecessary questions to the CJEU. However, the open question is whether the current drafting of Article 267 TFEU allows them to do so. 

As is well known, according to Article 267 TFEU, the CJEU shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the Treaties; and (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the  institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union. And domestic courts are under an asymmetrical duty/possibility to raise such questions before the CJEU. Indeed, where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon. However, where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court.

In my view, the imposition on the highest courts of the Member States of an absolute duty to refer cases for a preliminary ruling prevents them from exercising the basic degree of judicial discretion required to "ask responsibly" and generates a potentially non-negligible number of unnecessary referrals without the national courts or the CJEU being able to avoid them. Even if those unnecessary referrals can be replied by way of a reasoned order under the new Article 99 of the rules of procedure of the CJEU, that still takes significant time and costs. Therefore, in my view, some flexibility needs to be introduced to prevent such cases from the very beginning.

The recent Judgment of the CJEU of 18 October 2012 in case C-385/10 Elenca Srl Ministero dell’Interno is an example of an unnecessary referral. The case involved the interpretation of Council Directive 89/106/EEC of 21 December 1988 on the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to construction products as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003, and also the interpretation of the free movement of goods in the TFEU. More specifically, the case involved a mandatory requirement for construction materials used in chimney pipes sold in Italy to bear the CE mark.

Under the applicable Italian rules, all products used to insulate chimneys and make them fire proof had to bear a CE mark that ensured compliance with a given European technical standard. However, the complainant in the case was using innovative materials for which there exists no equivalent European standard and, consequently, cannot bear the CE mark. As put by the complainant, the contested Italian rule infringed Articles 34 TFEU to 37 TFEU because it made the marketing of a product originating from another Member State of the European Union (in this case, Hungary) subject to a technical condition, namely the affixing of the CE marking, a requirement that is impossible to fulfill because there is no corresponding harmonized standard in Hungary, which makes it impossible in practice to import and distribute the product in question.

The Italian Council of State shared the complainant's doubts as to the validity of the national legislation under European Union law but had to refer the case regardless of such doubts. It should come as no surprise that the CJEU indeed ruled that, in the absence of a harmonized standard for those specific construction products,
18 [... Directive 89/106] provides that the Member States are to allow such a product to be placed on the market in their territory if it satisfies national provisions consistent with the Treaty until the European technical specifications provide otherwise [...]
19 It follows that a Member State may not require the affixing of CE marking on a construction product not covered by [a harmonized European standard], originating from another Member State, in order for that product to be marketed on its territory. That Member State may subject the placing on the market of that construction product only to national provisions which comply with its obligations under the Treaty, in particular with the principle of the free movement of goods set out in Articles 34 TFEU and 36 TFEU.
20 [...] Directive 89/106 must be interpreted as precluding national provisions which automatically make the marketing of construction products, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, originating from another Member State, subject to the affixing of CE marking.
Moreover, the CJEU also dismisses very clearly any possibility to consider such a disproportioned restriction of free movement of goods justified on public interest grounds:
28 Although [...] it is established that, in the absence of harmonising rules, the Member States are free to decide on their intended level of protection of human life and health and on the need to monitor the goods concerned when being used (see, to that effect, Case C-293/94 Brandsma [1996] ECR I-3159, paragraph 11, and C-432/03 Commission v Portugal [2005] ECR I-9665, paragraph 44), it must be observed that legislation which prohibits, absolutely and automatically, the marketing on national territory of products lawfully marketed in other Member States because those products do not have CE marking is not compatible with the requirement of proportionality imposed by European Union law.
29 [...] such a strict requirement of CE marking, which prevents at the outset the very application of the principle of mutual recognition of products for which the European legislature has not effected full harmonisation or drawn up European technical approvals, by prohibiting compliance by the products in dispute with the required safety standards on the basis of approval and certification procedures conducted in the Member State of origin, goes beyond what is necessary to attain the safety objective pursued.
30 [...] Articles 34 TFEU to 37 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding national provisions which automatically make the marketing of construction products, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, originating from another Member State, subject to the affixing of CE marking.
The outcome of the case seems rather straightforward to anyone acquainted with the case law on free movement of goods and, consequently, it seems that the Italian Council of State (which already indicated its position by sharing the doubts of the complainant) did not need this answer from the CJEU in order to be able to give a judgment consistent with EU Law. Therefore, this is a good example of an unnecessary preliminary ruling that has taken up time and resources of the CJEU (and the Italian Council of State) without facing an actual difficulty of interpretation of EU Law. Therefore, in terms of prioritization in the development of EU Law, such a case ranks very low, and should have been avoided.

In my opinion, this shows that we need to allow all domestic courts, including the highest courts of the Member States against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law to "ask responsibly". Otherwise, the risk of hypertrophy of the preliminary ruling instrument and the suffocation of the European Courts will still be a storm over our heads.