"National brands" and State aid: AG Whatelet on investing in "State branding" (C-533 & 536/12)

In his Opinion of 15 January 2014 in joined cases C-533/12 P and C-536/12 P SNCM v Corsica Ferries France, Advocate General Whatelet has addressed an interesting (and creative) argument concerning the protection of a "national brand" as a justification for the granting of public support that would otherwise constitute illegal State aid under Article 107 TFEU.

In the case at hand, and as part of a privatisation process, the French Republic had allegedly agreed to assume the costs of payment of excessive compensations for termination of employment and retirement of certain employees of a public undertaking. Regardless of the fact that the existence of such excessive compensations was also challenged, the French Republic claimed the protection of the national brand (ie, the reputation of French business conglomerates) as a justification for such public support to the privatised undertaking (or, rectius, its new owners). France considered that any social unrest derived from severance and pension payments within the context of the privatisation process would trigger significant strikes that would, in turn, create the image that the French State and its industrial conglomerates are not a reliable trading partner. As the argument goes, the protection of future business by French companies (or companies more closely linked to the French State) would justify such a (reputational) investment under the private investor test and, consequently, would exclude the existence of illegal State aid under Article 107 TFEU. More specifically, the French arguments were as follows:
72 . Furthermore, the French Republic considers that the payment of additional compensations is necessary to protect the brand image of the state. In support of his thesis, it refers to the risk that sympathy strikes would spread throughout the public sector and would have the effect of paralyzing the economic activity of enterprises in this sector.
73 . In this context, the French Republic claims that an epidemic of strikes would generate serious economic losses to the state. It refers to the abrupt disruption of contractual relationships between the companies at strike and their suppliers and customers, as well as to payment and supply difficulties that would force non-professional clients of public companies to switch to competing private companies.
74 . The French Republic therefore claims to have considered the avoidance of these dire economic consequences as the indirect material benefit that the state wished to obtain from the payment of additional compensations (Opinion in C-533 & 536/12 P, own translation from Spanish).
AG Whatelet disagrees with this argument very clearly and presents a set of very interesting remarks in paragraphs 76 to 96 of his Opinion. In short summary, I think that the most remarkable points of AG Whatelet's wrap-up of the (limited) existing case law concerned with the existence and protection (through investment) of a "national brand" are the following: 
  1. In the absence of specific circumstances and a specially compelling motivation, protecting the brand image of the state as a global investor in the economy cannot be a sufficient justification to demonstrate the long-term economic rationality of the assumption of additional costs such as additional employment and retirement-related compensation (para 78).
  2. As AG Jacobs and CJEU made clear in joined cases C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92 Spain v Commission, it is difficult to accept that a state holding would worry so much about the damage that its global image would suffer as a result of the failure of one of its companies (or as a result of social unrest related to its winding up or bankruptcy) so as to offer, just for that reason, huge sums as an incentive for a private company to take charge of it (paras 83-86).
  3. The same position was held by the GC in joined cases T-129/95 Neue Maxhütte Stahlwerke and Lech-Stahlwerke v Commission, where it also considered that "It is not credible that Bavaria have been obligated to pay a sum of money to a private company [...] to entice it to restructure [the company in question] in order to prevent that the bankruptcy of the latter could harm severely the reputation of the Land" (paras 87-90).
Hence, AG Whatelet concludes that, in the case at hand,
the General Court did not commit any error of law in concluding that "in the absence of special circumstances and without a particularly compelling motivation, the protection of the brand image of a Member State as a global investor in a market economy cannot constitute sufficient justification to demonstrate the long-term economic rationality of the assumption of additional costs such as additional severance pay" (Opinion in C-533 & 536/12 P, at para 91, own translation from Spanish).
And, as a matter of general principle, clearly indicates that 
I find it highly unlikely that the considerations made so far by the States on their brand image as global investors in a market economy can eventually circumvent the qualification of their decisions as State aid in light of the private investor test [...] the concerns raised by the Member States in relation to their brand image as global investors in a market economy, however noble they may be for other reasons, are far from those of a private investor, whether they relate to 'political costs' (in addition to the economic and social costs) of closing a business, "trade union or political pressure", the location of the failing firm in "in an area in social crisis" or, as in this case, the risk of sympathy strikes that would spread throughout the public sector. These considerations are absent of any prospect of profitability, even in the long term (Opinion in C-533 & 536/12 P, at paras 92 and 94, footnotes omitted and own translation from Spanish).
Ultimately, the rationale for this line of thought is that State aid rules' effectiveness would be significantly impaired if Member States can justify their public support decisions on the basis of the construction of their own "national brand". In my view, this is a very interesting Opinion and it is to be hoped that the CJEU will follow it and consolidate a very restrictive approach towards this type of justifications in the field of EU State aid law.

CJEU toys with the one stop shop approach and muddies the waters of State Aid analysis (C-284/12)


In its Judgment of 21 November 2013 in case C-284/12 Deutsche Lufthansa, the Court of Justice of the EU has further defined the role of domestic courts hearing State aid cases and has clarified the legal effects that result from an Article 108(2) TFEU Decision whereby the European Commission decides to open a formal investigation and expresses a preliminary opinion on the incompatibility of certain State aid measures with Article 107(1) TFEU.
 
In the case at hand, Lufthansa intended to avail itself of a Commission's Article 108(2) TFEU Decision that opened an in-depth investigation on certain types of aid received by Ryanair for its activities at Frankfurt Hahn Civil Airport (operated by FFH). Prior to the Commission's investigation, Lufthansa initiated private litigation and sought an order for the recovery of certain payments made to Ryanair and an additional order that there be no future aid for the benefit of Ryanair. The initial dismissal of Lufthansa's action was under appeal when the Commission formally decided to investigate the case.
 
After learning that the Commission had opened an in-depth investigation, Lufthansa contended that the domestic courts were barred from conducting their separate assessment under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU and were bound to follow the preliminary assessment of the Commission--which indicated that 'each of the measures in question was selective and constituted State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, unless it satisfied the private investor principle. As regards that principle, the Commission noted that, on the basis of the information available to it at the time of the adoption of the [Decision], the airport fees paid by Ryanair were not enough to cover the costs incurred by FFH'.
 
The German courts were not satisfied and asked the Commission for its opinion under the relevant provisions in the Notice on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts. Unsurprisingly,  the Commission supported Lufthansa and replied that the domestic court itself was not required to assess whether the measures in question could or could not be classified as State aid as it could take the Commission's Decision as a basis for drawing all the necessary inferences from the infringement of Article 108(3) TFEU. The German court was still not persuaded and made a preliminary reference.
 
In its Lufthansa Judgment, the CJEU has ruled that:
37 While the assessments carried out in the decision to initiate the formal examination procedure are indeed preliminary in nature, that does not mean that the decision lacks legal effects.

38 It must be pointed out in that regard that, if national courts were able to hold that a measure does not constitute aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU and, therefore, not to suspend its implementation, even though the Commission had just stated in its decision to initiate the formal examination procedure that that measure was capable of presenting aid elements, the effectiveness of Article 108(3) TFEU would be frustrated.

39 On the one hand, if the preliminary assessment in the decision to initiate the formal examination procedure is that the measure at issue constitutes aid and that assessment is subsequently confirmed in the final decision of the Commission, the national courts would have failed to observe their obligation under Article 108(3) TFEU 
[...]
to suspend the implementation of any aid proposal until the adoption of the Commission’s decision on the compatibility of that proposal with the internal market.

40 On the other hand, even if in its final decision the Commission were to conclude that there were no aid elements, the preventive aim of the State aid control system established by the TFEU 
[...]
requires that, following the doubt raised in the decision to initiate the formal examination procedure as to the aid character of that measure and its compatibility with the internal market, its implementation should be deferred until that doubt is resolved by the Commission’s final decision.

41 It is also important to note that the application of the European Union rules on State aid is based on an obligation of sincere cooperation between the national courts, on the one hand, and the Commission and the Courts of the European Union, on the other, in the context of which each acts on the basis of the role assigned to it by the Treaty. In the context of that cooperation, national courts must take all the necessary measures, whether general or specific, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations under European Union law and refrain from those which may jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, as follows from Article 4(3) TEU. Therefore, national courts must, in particular, refrain from taking decisions which conflict with a decision of the Commission, even if it is provisional.

42 Consequently, where the Commission has initiated the formal examination procedure with regard to a measure which is being implemented, national courts are required to adopt all the necessary measures with a view to drawing the appropriate conclusions from an infringement of the obligation to suspend the implementation of that measure
(C-284/12, paras 37-42, emphasis added).
So far, the solution is clear cut and seems to impose a very clear preference for Commission (preliminary) assessment over any other assessment independently carried out by domestic courts. This would strengthen the one stop shop approach derived from the Commission's monopoly over the enforcement of Article 107 and 108 [except for the direct effect of 108(3) TFEU] and would strengthen the current centralised enforcement system.
 
However, in the two followning paragraphs, the CJEU muddies the waters by further ellaborating and indicating that:
43 To that end [ie to draw the appropriate conclusions from an infringement of the obligation to suspend the implementation of that measure] national courts may decide to suspend the implementation of the measure in question and order the recovery of payments already made. They may also decide to order provisional measures in order to safeguard both the interests of the parties concerned and the effectiveness of the Commission’s decision to initiate the formal examination procedure.

44 Where they entertain doubts as to whether the measure at issue constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU or as to the validity or interpretation of the decision to initiate the formal examination procedure, national courts may seek clarification from the Commission and, in accordance with the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU, as interpreted by the Court, they may or must refer a question to the Court for a preliminary ruling (see, to that effect, as regards requests for preliminary rulings on the validity of State aid, Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others [2006] ECR I-289, paragraphs 72 to 74)
(C-284/12, paras 43-44, emphasis added).
In my view, this reopens the question and destroys the one stop shop approach (or, in more clear terms, the approach in para 44 basically deactivates all the reasoning in paras 39-40 and introduces a level of uncertainty and procedural complication that seems unnecessary). And I wonder where are the concerns about the effectiveness of Article 108(3) TFEU that had previously been alluded to in para 38, particularly if the preliminary reference is made before any interim measures are adopted (and what would be the use for it otherwise?). 
 
As I already indicated when I criticised the Advocate General's Opinion in this case (here), this can create significant complications by way of parallel procedures (before the Commission, the national courts and the CJEU) in one and the same case. Such duplication of procedures can only result in a waste of resources and, most likely, in legal uncertainty and potentially contradictory outcomes.
 
Leaving the door open for a reference for a preliminary ruling (of validity) against a provisional assessment of the European Commission is excessively deferential towards domestic courts and can have significant undesirable effects. This is not satisfactory and it starts to be evident that there is a need for the adoption of a more streamlined procedural system where (in the absence of a decentralised enforcement system for State aid, which may well be superior), national courts would have to suspend their powers of interpretation of the concept of aid and limit their role to the adoption of effective interim measures when the Commission is still completing its investigation on a given measure.

In my view, this could be easily achieved by simply applying Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, since the need for sincere cooperation in this type of matters seems out of the question (an argument the CJEU has used differently in Lufthansa). Nonetheless, it is now clear that the CJEU is not willing to go very far in striking a more sustainable balance between the sphere of jurisdiction/competence of domestic courts and ensuring a manageable procedural system in State aid law. In my view, domestic courts should resort to the possibilities outlined in para 44 of the Lufthansa Judgment only in very extreme cases (if ever).